| A Suu Kyi Presidency Would Bring ‘Chaos,’ Says Firebrand Monk Posted: 28 Nov 2013 05:08 AM PST  Aung San Suu Kyi at a World Economic Forum BBC debate in Naypyidaw in June 2013. (Photo: Simon Roughneen / The Irrawaddy) RANGOON — U Wirathu, the Mandalay-based monk who heads the "969" anti-Muslim movement, believes that democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi would not be a good president for Burma. "I wish [President] Thein Sein to be re-elected. If he refuses to go for the post, my vote will go to Shwe Mann," said the controversial monk—whose speeches and sermons are said to have fueled anti-Muslim violence across Burma since June 2012. Both Suu Kyi, the former dissident and now opposition parliamentarian, and Shwe Mann, a former No. 3 in the old military junta, have stated their interest in becoming president after the 2015 parliamentary elections. Incumbent Thein Sein, Shwe Mann's Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) colleague, has not said whether or not he will put his name forward after the 2015 elections. While describing Suu Kyi as "a good revolutionary" and praising her for having "sacrificed her life for the people," U Wirathu described the long-time political prisoner as "weak at governance." The monk went on to dismiss the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader's presidential credentials. "She doesn't know about Burma and its nature. All she knows is to stage revolution and attack the government. So, if she became the president, the governance would be in chaos. Racial and religious conflict would deteriorate. There would be public unrest because people are not pleased with what she does," he said. However, the controversial monk claimed that if Suu Kyi were to speak out in favor of a controversial proposed inter-marriage law—which would force non-Buddhist men to convert to Buddhism in order to marry Buddhist women—the opposition leader would win the electorate's support. "If Daw Suu could realize the law, she could easily become the president and we could even dare to worship her," said U Wirathu, using a Burmese honorific for the opposition leader. Suu Kyi has been criticized in recent months for her apparent reluctance to speak up on behalf of Burma's ethnic minorities, such as the Kachin, a mostly Christian group whose homeland of Kachin State is the site of an ongoing war between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Burmese Army. Suu Kyi has also taken lumps internationally for not supporting the rights of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority group who mostly live in western Arakan State but who are regarded by the government and many Burmese as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Speaking in Australia, where she is currently visiting, Suu Kyi reiterated her self-image as that of a politician rather than a human rights icon or activist. "Let me assure you, I'm no saint," she said on Wednesday. "I look upon myself as a politician and not as an icon." Suu Kyi again rejected the term "ethnic cleansing" to describe the anti-Rohingya violence in western Burma. "When you use terms like ethnic cleansing—which I think is a little extreme—it just plays into the hands of extremists. There are extremists on both sides … we only have a few extremists but they can exercise great power," she said, speaking at the Sydney Opera House. Burma watchers speculate that Suu Kyi's reticence on human rights issues is prompted by a political calculus: a fear of losing the majority Burman and Buddhist vote in the 2015 elections. Her efforts in recent months to drum up support for a Suu Kyi presidency come as ethnic and religious tensions are being stirred up nationwide by U Wirathu, who told The Irrawaddy that "if you favor too much human rights, your race and religion will be vanished as there are people who want to invade our country, destroy our race and religion on human rights basis." The logic is that if Suu Kyi speaks out against violence against the Rohingya, she will lose votes to the incumbent USDP. Suu Kyi's long-time spokesman Nyan Win told The Irrawaddy that "there are no Rohingya in Burma's history. There are Bengalis who try to come across to Burma and claim citizenship." However, the former parliamentarian and political prisoner added that the 1982 Citizenship Law, which scholars say denies the Rohingya status as an ethnic group in Burma, should be amended, saying that once the measure is revised, "they can then apply to be citizens." Asked to put a number on how many of the estimated 800,000 Rohingya in Burma would be entitled to citizenship under such a reform, Nyan Win said he did not know. And lamenting the recent violence between Buddhists and Muslims across Burma, which has mostly displaced Muslims, Nyan Win told The Irrawaddy that "all the people in the conflict are human beings and need to be treated like human beings." With additional reporting by Kyaw Phyo Tha. The post A Suu Kyi Presidency Would Bring 'Chaos,' Says Firebrand Monk appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| Govt, Armed Rebels Look Headed for Clash on Federal Army Issue Posted: 28 Nov 2013 04:56 AM PST  Leaders from 17 ethnic armed groups meet in Chiang Mai, Thailand, on Thursday. (Photo: Nyein Zaw / The Irrawaddy) CHIANG MAI, Thailand — Representatives from 17 non-Burman ethnic armed groups are demanding that Burma's future military establishment consist of a federal army, with the coalition finalizing terms of a proposed peace deal with the government on Thursday in which they call for "forming a federal union with a federal army." The so-called "Laiza Agreement" was first drafted in Kachin State's Laiza, a rebel town on the Sino-Burmese border, on Nov. 2, with this week's three-day meeting in Chiang Mai, northern Thailand, bringing together the ethnic minority coalition's technical team to make tweaks and finalize the document. The creation of a "federal army" is viewed by the ethnic rebels as the only way to solve the thorny military issues that have arisen in ongoing peace negotiations with the central government, but its formation faces strong headwinds from an ethnic Burman military establishment that appears reluctant to embrace the idea. Given that Burma is a multiethnic nation with more than 100,000 rebel groups' troops controlling territories largely in the country's border regions, the ethnic armed coalition believes the idea of a "federal system" for the armed forces is the only way to end decades of civil war. Ethnic rebels have been fighting for greater autonomy against the now 400,000-strong government army known as the Tatmadaw since Burma gained independence from Britain in 1948. Salai Lian Hmong Sakhong, an ethnic Chin representative from the Chin National Front (CNF) who was closely involved in drafting the Laiza Agreement, said the final document included provisions on the signing of a "nationwide ceasefire agreement," and on holding an inclusive political dialogue. Asked about a government proposal suggesting that the ethnic armed groups give up their armed struggle policy, Salai Lian Hmong Sakhong said, "We need to talk to end the civil wars and talk about the reason why the civil war started. We don't have plans to hold our arms forever. The armed struggle has been to protect ourselves and demand political rights." "If we get what we want, we won't hold onto our arms. The aim of armed struggle is that we want political problems to be solved through political means. Unless this is addressed, we can't give up our arms," he added. The central government is dominated by ethnic Burmans who make up 60 percent of the country's population. The country's previous military regimes have been repeatedly called on the ethnic armed groups to disarm and fall in line with the central government since 1962, under the rule of Gen Ne Win, the late Burman dictator. The ethnic minorities that make up the remaining 40 percent of the country have been marginalized by the ethnic Burman-dominated government for generations. Civilians have not been spared in the government's military campaigns to quash the various ethnic rebellions and hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced by the decades-long civil war. Since a nominally civilian government took power in 2011, restrictions on media and freedom of expression have eased, hundreds of political prisoners have been released and Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) has been allowed to enter the political arena. Despite such positive reforms, national reconciliation between the government and Burma's ethnic rebels remains a major challenge. Armed clashes between government troops and ethnic armed groups still occur semi-regularly, most glaringly in northern Kachin State, where a ceasefire between the government and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) broke down in mid-2011, with some 80,000 people displaced in sporadic fighting since then. Though nearly all of the country's major ethnic armed groups have signed bilateral ceasefire agreements with the government, a trust deficit remains, highlighted in October when a government Army offensive in Kachin State's Mansi Township forced about 2,000 civilians to flee their homes. Military matters are a key challenge to the national reconciliation process, with Burma's constitutionally enshrined "one nation, one army" policy at odds with what ethnic rebels want. Among other things, the armed groups are seeking a quota system that would see ethnic minorities in senior military leadership positions. Khun Okkar, joint secretary 2 of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), an alliance of 11 ethnic armed groups, said that because the government had already accepted the creation of a federal union for Burma in principle, acceptance of a federal army structure should follow. "It is not just the ethnic Burman majority that has a military; the ethnic minorities have them too, so the country needs to establish a 'Federal Armed Force' combining both ethnic rebels and the government Army," he told The Irrawaddy. Asked about the objection of Lt-Gen Myint Soe, commander of a unit that oversees military operations in Kachin State, on the "federal army" proposition, Khun Okkar said Myint Soe perhaps misunderstood the ethnic groups' proposal. "He maybe thought that we asked for the government's armed forces to be abolished immediately and form a federal army. But, if we triy to explain more about it, he may understand it. But it will take time," said Khun Okkar, adding that a Constitution guaranteeing a federal system of governance should be written to replace the current, military-drafted charter. The UNFC leader said that even Suu Kyi, who serves as chairwoman of the NLD, had accepted the idea of a "Federal Armed Force." Asked about the government proposal, Timothy Laklem, a spokesperson for the Karen Peace Council (KPC), said that some points offered by the government contained with military mindset, only to marginalized the ethnic armed groups. "They should not ask the ethnic minorities to give up armed struggle. They asked us to disarm, but will they also give up their arms? They can't do it to the ethnic minorities. The ethnic groups such as the Karen and Kachin have practiced armed struggle since the colonial era—even earlier than the ethnic Burmans," Timothy said. In early November in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, a draft document from the government proposed that the minorities end their armed resistance, while the ethnic groups' corresponding proposal put forward the "federal army" condition. In an interview with The Irrawaddy following the Myitkyina talks, Myint Soe expressed concern that a federal army could cause the military to "collapse or become divided." The post Govt, Armed Rebels Look Headed for Clash on Federal Army Issue appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| In Southern Shan State, the Land Provides Posted: 28 Nov 2013 04:38 AM PST  Farmers spray pesticides on crops in Aungban Township in August 2013. (Photo: Tay Za Hlaing / The Irrawaddy) AUNGBAN, Shan State — After travelling for one night by bus from Mandalay, a journey of 117 miles (188 km), I arrived at the beautiful land of Aungban Township, southern Shan State. It was a bumpy trip in some parts. The cement road was damaged in places by the rainy season, and repairs were underway. Aungban is a major supplier of food for the rest of Burma, with potato, ginger, cabbage, sunflower seeds and rice produced here sold as widely as Mandalay and Rangoon. The area hosts different ethnic groups, including Danu and Shan, but the majority of the people are Pa-O, an ethnic group that has a long-standing ceasefire agreement with the government that gives it some autonomy in the area. Most people work in agriculture, often with their children in tow. Most earn just 1,500 kyat, or about $1.50, for a hard day's work in the fields. The area is near to the Shan State capital of Taunggyi and Loikaw Township, and centers around the modern Aungban town, complete with banks and a range of shops. In the surrounding area, I walked the hills and flatlands, photographing farmers on this fertile land, many spraying insecticides to protect the crops. Cabbages here, which go for just 100 kyat each, are taken overnight to be sold at the markets of Burma's major cities. The post In Southern Shan State, the Land Provides appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| Burma Making Progress, Despite ‘Being Smothered With Love’ Posted: 28 Nov 2013 03:07 AM PST Lex Rieffel is an economist of 40 years experience, and a Burma watcher who has visited the country more than a dozen times, first in 1967. After 18 years as a staff economist in the U.S. Treasury Department and seven years as a senior advisor with the Institute of International Finance (the leading association for the global financial industry), he joined the Brookings Institution in 2002. The American currently teaches a seminar on Burma at the School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, DC. Following a visit to Burma, also known as Myanmar, in August, Rieffel answered questions from The Irrawaddy correspondent William Boot. Question: What changes for the better—or perhaps for the worse—did you notice on your last visit to Burma compared with earlier tours? Answer: In January 2010, I began visiting Myanmar every six months for at least two weeks each time. My last visit was in July-August 2013. From an economic development perspective, I have witnessed steady and remarkable and positive changes from one visit to the next. I hope the pace of positive change will continue for the next 30 years with no significant interruptions, as it did in China. I have been most impressed by the Government of Myanmar's decision to move to a market-based exchange rate system on 1 April 2012, by the debt relief operation in January 2013, and by the award of two mobile phone licenses through a competitive process in June 2013. I have been pleasantly surprised by how rapidly the private banks in Myanmar have been raising their game. My biggest worry is that the 70 percent of the population that lives in rural areas and depends on agriculture is being left behind because of inadequate agriculture sector policies. Another big worry is that Myanmar is being smothered with love: too many non-Myanmar people are coming to Myanmar to "make a difference." They all want to meet with the top policymakers and as a consequence these policymakers are not giving enough attention to the crucial tasks of policy formulation and implementation. Beyond these short-term concerns, of course, are the existential challenges of establishing peace and overcoming the country's resource curse. Q: Processing key investment often seems bogged down in bureaucracy. For example, offshore oil and gas development: Despite international interest for more than one year, it will be first quarter 2014 before any of 30 new blocks on offer are awarded. Is this due to inexperience by government departments, and if so how can it be improved? A: What's the rush? I share the view of many others that Myanmar suffers from a resource curse, part of which derives from excessive ongoing extraction of resources. I pointed out back in May 2010 that an economic case can be made for declaring a 5-year moratorium on new resource extraction projects.  Lex Reiffel Myanmar's resources are unlikely to be widely perceived as a blessing until the Government of Myanmar is able to negotiate transparent contracts with resource extracting companies that maximize revenue to the national treasury, and to create financial systems that visibly channel this revenue to projects and programs that benefit the population as a whole. I believe the Government of Myanmar does not have the ability to do this now, and it could easily take five years to develop the ability. In the meantime, the Government of Myanmar should be able to obtain all the foreign exchange it needs to foster rapid economic growth and rising living standards from existing resource extraction projects (in some cases on the basis of renegotiated contracts), from FDI in the manufacturing and service sectors, from foreign aid, and from remittances sent by Myanmar people residing in other countries. Q: Do you think that Burma's vague laws, continuing lack of transparency and fragile financial system still deter some major investors? A: Yes, there can be no doubt about these obstacles, which deter small investors as well as "major" investors. At the same time, it is important to have realistic expectations about the pace of improvement in Myanmar's business climate. Look how long it has taken China to create an attractive environment for investment. Many experts would say that China still does not have one. One lesson from China's experience is that political stability, including a negligible level of internal conflict, is more important than well-crafted laws, above-average transparency, and a sound financial system. It is not easy to assess the views of investors because there are so many factors that go into their investment decisions. There seem to be plenty of major investors gearing up to operate in Myanmar. From an economic development perspective, I see more risks from Myanmar getting too much foreign investment in the near term than getting too little. Q: Burma's economy is expanding quickly in some areas, notably in property and tourism, but foreign investment in infrastructure such as electricity supply remains sluggish. Is there a danger of lopsided economic growth? A: There is always danger in lopsided economic growth, but there is just as much danger in trying to force balanced growth in a low-income, late-starting country like Myanmar. A market economy is a complex system with many "non-linearities." This means that when an input is increased, the output does not necessarily increase; it will increase more at some moments and less at others, depending on what is happening elsewhere in the system. Growth is an "emergent" phenomenon. This means it is fundamentally unpredictable. I believe that the single most important key to satisfactory, sustainable growth in a country like Myanmar is selecting good ministers, deputy ministers, and director generals. These are the people who decide which policies to adopt and then ensure that these policies are well implemented. Putting the right women and men into these positions today is more important than building effective institutions because the policies will affect people immediately while building effective institutions can easily take more than one generation. And if the right people are chosen, they will get the process of institution building off to a good start. Q: Burma might perhaps look to Thailand as an example of economic development, but a centralized system there has focused much national wealth in Greater Bangkok while rural poverty remains elsewhere. What can Naypyidaw do to avoid that negative trend? Is a federal system the answer? A: I'm an economist, not a political scientist. The question reminds me of a quotation attributed to [the late Chinese leader] Deng Xiaoping: It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice. It seems to me it doesn't matter what kind of political system Myanmar chooses as long as it leads to internal peace and releases the energy that exists in the Myanmar population to build a prosperous society. Why would Myanmar look to Thailand for an example of economic development? I see a lot of unhappy people in Thailand. Why would Myanmar want to consider any other country to be a model for its development? The world will not benefit from having a Myanmar that looks like a clone of Thailand or Vietnam or Singapore. It will benefit from a Myanmar that finds better solutions to the problems that diminish the quality of life in these countries and many others. I hope the government and people of Myanmar aspire to developing their economy better than other countries have done and thus become a model for others. The post Burma Making Progress, Despite 'Being Smothered With Love' appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| World Bank to Survey Burma’s Business Landscape Posted: 28 Nov 2013 02:54 AM PST  Nuns walk past IKBZ Insurance company's building being built in downtown Rangoon on June 6, 2013. (Photo: Reuters / Minzayar) RANGOON — The World Bank has begun collecting detailed survey data on Burma's business enterprises for first time, and expects the results of the endeavor to be available in June of next year, the global lender announced this week. The World Bank will provide an assessment of the business environment and barriers facing firms doing business in Burma as the country's formerly hermetic economy opens up to the West. "Myanmar [Burma] is implementing a broad range of reforms to stimulate investment and growth, hearing from businesses in Myanmar on what they see as the main issues and comparing constraints they face with those in other countries can help to focus on policies with the most impact," said Kanthan Shankar, the World Bank's country manager for Burma, in the statement. "As a first survey, this will also set a benchmark and help in measuring progress as the Myanmar businesses environment improves." The World Bank, working with local partner Myanmar Marketing Research and Development, will collect survey data from some 1,400 manufacturing and services companies in Burma, domestic and foreign and of all sizes. The survey began this month and covers the cities of Rangoon, Mandalay, Monywa, Taunggyi and Bago, with preliminary results expected in June 2014. The World Bank hopes the survey results can help inform government policy to promote investment, productivity and economic growth. Maung Maung Lay, the vice chairman of Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI), said the survey could shine light on what ails Burma's business sector—and how to cure it. "It's like physicians looking for what disease a patient is suffering from. We don't know what is happening without a detailed survey. If we get this kind of survey, we can find solutions for Burma's economy to develop," he said. The World Bank has conducted similar surveys in more than 120 countries around the world including in East and South Asia, the statement said. The results have included information on access to finance, access to electricity, roads and water, and business regulations. Last month, Burma was ranked one of the world's most difficult countries in which to do business by the World Bank, which said only a handful of economies, including Chad, the Central African Republic and Eritrea, offered a worse environment for entrepreneurs. The post World Bank to Survey Burma's Business Landscape appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| Thailand’s Political Palimpsest Posted: 28 Nov 2013 02:03 AM PST  Anti-government protesters gather inside Thailand's Finance Ministry during a rally in central Bangkok on November 25, 2013. (Photo: Reuters / Chaiwat Subprasom) Despite Thailand's trappings of modernity, particularly when it comes to politics, the country's tribal roots remain all-too-visible.
"It's too difficult," said Christopher, throwing up his hands in exasperation. "Tonal languages are one of the vestiges of tribalism!" he exclaimed. An American formerly resident in Thailand, he had attempted to learn the language, to varying degrees of success, ever-stymied by the subtle tones of the Thai language. "We are still a tribal people," I rebutted, as we walked down bustling Sukhumvit Road, its skyscrapers, shopping malls, apartment complexes and trains ever-encroaching on what little sky is left to be seen from Bangkok's streets. I was not talking about linguistics. A palimpsest is a manuscript in which attempts have been made to scratch or wash out the text so that the paper can be reused. However, the original writing is often still legible. Similarly, despite Thailand's trappings of modernity, particularly when it comes to politics, our tribal roots remain all-too-visible—our political palimpsest. We have a bicameral parliament and a prime minister. We have televised parliamentary debates and local and national elections. We no longer pledge fealty to individual, local lordlings and their lords, who bear long, grandiose feudal titles. But today, thousands blindly do so for the likes of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra or Suthep Thaugsuban, a leading figure in the current anti-government rallies who called for an end to the Thaksin regime and the installment of a "people's government." For too many of us, such individuals can do no wrong. Never mind that the former has been indicted for massive corruption and, during his tenure as prime minister, launched a war on drugs that resulted in thousands of extrajudicial deaths (for which he has been accused of crimes against humanity), and who oversaw a freefall in indices of Thai press freedom. Never mind that the latter is no stranger to allegations of environmental destruction and shady land deals in his own hometown of Surat Thani, a massive scandal that unseated a Democrat government in 1995. There are many others, far too many of whom have checkered pasts and shady presents that are conveniently overlooked in pursuit of a perceived common enemy tribe. Bells or whistles, hand or feet clappers, the result is cacophony. Too many of us pledge allegiance to individuals who often promise big but deliver little, and we forgive them for that. We forgive them for nebulous, ever-shifting goals and goalposts, and overlook their opacity (particularly in deals involving vast sums of money, taxpayers' or otherwise), their corrupt practices, vote-buying and nepotism, and human rights abuses. Many would tolerate—even welcome—the closure of roads and seizure of airports and government offices, intimidation and violence against others (including the media) if such deeds were done by "our" tribe. We are still too often held prisoner in our own feudal mindsets, loyal to our individual lordlings and their current causes. This mindset pervades and perverts our politics, and democracy too often becomes but an empty byword, a distant backseat to our tribal affiliations. This reality underlies the reason why Thailand has more political dynasties than anywhere else in the world: In an analysis by King Prajadhipok's Institute, during the country's last election, July 3, 2011, 42 percent of members of parliament elected were replacing family members, more than next-closest Mexico (40 percent), the Philippines (37 percent), Argentina (10 percent), and the United States (6 percent). The ruling Pheu Thai Party topped the list, with 19 families "inheriting" the political torch, followed closely by the Democrats at 17. For the same reason, election campaign materials by opposing candidates for political office are often nearly inseparable in message and, at best, superficial in political platform. With administrative reform tasked to such "lordlings," it is difficult to envision durable, democratic reform in Thailand. Indeed, most of them have demonstrated their priorities with the match that ignited the current crisis: the expedited passage of a blanket amnesty bill at the questionable hour of 4am, a bill that would dismiss corruption charges against some of their own, including Thaksin Shinawatra. Without a change in popular mindset, the faces of our lordlings and their official titles in government may shift, but the prospects for durable change in the Thai political system remain distant. In 2004, Burma's hated and feared spy chief, Gen Khin Nyunt, was purged by Gen Than Shwe, cementing his rule over the country. When asked about prospects then of durable reform, an exiled Burmese journalist colleague replied simply: "Alien versus Predator." The post Thailand's Political Palimpsest appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| Aung San Suu Kyi Meets Australian PM Posted: 28 Nov 2013 12:26 AM PST  Aung San Suu Kyi meets with Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott in Canberra on Thursday. (Photo: Reuters) CANBERRA — Pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi met with Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott on Thursday as she travels the country seeking backing for changes to Burma’s Constitution, which currently prevents her from becoming president. The Nobel Peace Prize laureate met with Abbott and later spoke to journalists about her fight for fair elections. "We are just starting out on the road to democracy. We are not there yet, as some people seem to assume," she said. "Without amendments to the Constitution, we can never become a truly democratic society." The military regime that governed until 2011 shut Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy party out of politics, but last year she and several dozen party members won parliamentary seats. A clause in the army-dictated Constitution disqualifies her from becoming president. The 68-year-old is now seeking the constitutional changes that would allow her to run. "Certainly we think that there should be free and fair elections in Burma and they should be conducted on the proverbial level playing field," Abbott said. Suu Kyi is in Australia on a five-day trip to Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne. On Wednesday, she received two honorary doctorate degrees during a ceremony in her honor at Sydney’s Opera House. The post Aung San Suu Kyi Meets Australian PM appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| Burma’s Last Remaining Independence Fighter Dies Posted: 28 Nov 2013 12:18 AM PST ![A portrait photo of the]() A portrait photo of the "Thirty Comrades," the legendary group that spearheaded Burma’s struggle against British colonial rule. (Photo: Wikimedia Commons) RANGOON — The last member of the "Thirty Comrades," the legendary group that spearheaded Burma’s struggle against British colonial rule, has died. He was 91. Ye Htut died of old age at a hospital in the main city of Rangoon on Wednesday, family members said. The Thirty Comrades were led by Gen. Aung San, father of democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. During World War II, the men went to Japan for training to fight British colonizers. Aung San later negotiated independence from Britain, but was assassinated before that happened in 1948. Ye Htut, who had been serving in the Burma army up until independence, went underground soon after, joining the armed struggle of the banned Burma Communist Party. He laid down his weapons in 1963 to join the ruling party of then-dictator Gen Ne Win, but was purged several years later in an inner-party struggle, according to his eldest son Kyaw Kyaw. Ye Htut was involved in the 1988 pro-democracy movement. Tin Oo, a former chief-of-staff and a veteran of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, expressed his condolences, saying he had great respect those who helped the country fight for independence. "I am very sad to hear about the death of the last surviving member of the Thirty Comrades," he said. Tin Oo said he had met Ye Htut before independence and also when he served in Ne Win’s ruling party. "U Ye Htut served as a patron of the Patriotic Old Comrades league — a group formed by retired army leaders during the peak of 1988 uprising. He shared his experience and had given us advice during the initial days," Tin Oo said. Ye Htut is survived by his two sons. The post Burma’s Last Remaining Independence Fighter Dies appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| Philippines’ Typhoon Rebuilding May Cost More, Last Longer Than Aceh Posted: 28 Nov 2013 12:09 AM PST  People carry bags of relief supply as they are seen through a damaged window frame in the typhoon-battered Tacloban city Nov. 23, 2013. (Photo: Reuters) MANILA — The Philippines' post-typhoon reconstruction could take as long as 10 years, with the leadership of President Benigno Aquino put to a test amid complex problems such as property rights, missing title deeds and land zoning, experts said on Wednesday. The task will likely take longer and cost more than the rebuilding of Indonesia's Aceh province after the 2004 tsunami, they said. Super typhoon Haiyan wiped out or damaged practically everything in its path as it swept ashore on Nov. 8, with seven-meter storm surges destroying around 90 percent of the city of Tacloban in Leyte province alone. Haiyan killed at least 5,500 people, left more than 1,700 missing, displaced as many as four million and destroyed around US$563 million worth of crops and infrastructure. "The enormity of this disaster is unprecedented at least in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of the geography," said Sanny Jegillos, coordinator for crisis prevention and recovery at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). "It's much, much larger than the tsunami in Aceh. "The rehabilitation cost will be more expensive for Haiyan, because a unit of a school will be more expensive than a school built in Aceh because of the design parameters." The government's initial estimates point to a reconstruction cost of as much as 250 billion pesos ($5.7 billion). Aceh's rebuilding over eight years required nearly $7 billion, funded by the Indonesian government and international donors. Manila has said new structures in the typhoon-prone areas must be able to withstand winds of 300 kph (186 mph), close to Haiyan's maximum winds when it slammed into Eastern Samar province before crossing the central Philippines. Sonny Rosal, head of the United Architects of the Philippines which is helping the National Housing Authority (NHA) design stronger houses, said there were challenges related to government buy-outs of landowners in risky areas, reestablishing title and revising the national building code which now specifies that public structures must withstand winds of only up to 250 kph. "What is being discussed now in the NHA is that it may take us 10 years to be able to rebuild. It's not that easy. A lot is involved here," Rosal said. "It's like building a new country." On Wednesday, a government task force assigned to draw up a recovery and rehabilitation plan submitted its immediate, medium-term and long-term goals to Aquino, who demanded more specific details before giving final approval. The task force will report back to Aquino on Friday with more refinements. That plan will likely identify only immediate needs and plans of action, since a longer-term rebuilding strategy will take weeks if not months to complete, officials said. In Japan's case, it completed its long-term reconstruction plan six months after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami. "This case [Haiyan] is much more complex than the Japanese experience. The Japanese experienced only a tsunami," said Kimio Takeya, an engineer and expert for reconstruction planning at the Japan International Cooperation Agency. "In this area, there was a storm surge and strong wind combination." The post Philippines' Typhoon Rebuilding May Cost More, Last Longer Than Aceh appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| Problems Pile Up in Asia for US Policymakers Posted: 28 Nov 2013 12:00 AM PST  US Secretary of State John Kerry gestures during a news conference at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial meeting in Nusa Dua, Bali island, on Oct. 5, 2013. (Photo: Reuters / Beawiharta) WASHINGTON — While the Obama administration is making diplomatic progress on some of the Mideast's thorniest security issues, problems are piling up in Asia, a region that President Barack Obama had wanted to play a bigger part in American foreign policy. Despite efforts to forge deeper ties with China to make East Asia more stable, Beijing's declaration of a maritime air defense zone has escalated its territorial dispute with US ally Japan. The United States responded by flying B-52 bombers through the zone on a training mission Tuesday without informing Beijing. Analysts say the risk of a military clash between the Asian powers has gone up a notch—a serious concern for the United States because its treaty obligations mean it could be drawn in to help Japan. Meantime, relations between America's core allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, have deteriorated. South Korea is bitter over Japan's attitude toward its colonial past and wants more contrition from Tokyo for Japan's use of Korean sex slaves in World War II. That complicates the strategic picture for the Obama administration as it looks to advance its so-called pivot to Asia and strengthen not just its own alliances, but get its partners in the region to collaborate more. "The region is moving in a very problematic direction," said Evans Revere, a former senior US diplomat and East Asia specialist. "That's the result of territorial disputes, historical issues, long-standing rivalries and the inability of countries to put history behind them and move forward in improving relations." Adding to this witches' brew of bickering in the region, Washington is grappling with the threat posed by an unpredictable North Korea. The deal the United States orchestrated with Iran to temporarily freeze its nuclear program, despite three decades of animosity, is a stark reminder of the impasse in negotiations with Pyongyang. Unlike Iran, North Korea already has a nuclear bomb, and there's worrying evidence it is pressing ahead with weapons development. Vice President Joe Biden will broach these issues when he travels to Japan, China and South Korea next week—a trip to demonstrate that the top level of the administration remains focused on Asia. The administration said that in Beijing, Biden will meet with Chinese leaders including President Xi Jinping and will voice concern about what it calls an emerging pattern of behavior by China that is unsettling to its neighbors. The vice president will also make clear the firm US commitment to its allies and its desire for a lowering of tensions between China and Japan, the world's second- and third-largest economies. Secretary of State John Kerry hasn't neglected the region, but his primary focus is on the Mideast and is likely to remain that way as he strives for the distant goals of an end to Syria's civil war, peace between Israelis and Palestinians and a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran after the current pact expires in six months. US domestic woes have contributed to a narrative that Asia is a secondary concern to the administration. Obama was forced to cancel a four-nation trip to the region in October because of a partial US government shutdown and threat of a debt default. He'll travel to Asia in April instead. Obama made Asia a foreign policy priority when he took power in 2009 and has been particularly active in engaging China. Not known for the personal touch with foreign leaders, Obama sought to cultivate a relationship with new leader Xi when he met him in June at a California resort. That's part of a strategy to promote cooperation between the world's two largest economies and prevent their rivalry in the Asia-Pacific from spawning conflict. But China's declaration of its East China Sea air defense zone will be viewed as unhelpful. It was rejected by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and prompted quick expressions of deep US concern that it could escalate tensions in the region. "This really casts a bit of a pall over efforts to improve [US-China] relations," Revere said. The United States said it would not change how it conducts military operations in the region and flew a pair of B-52 bombers through the zone Tuesday on what officials said was a long-planned training mission. China's Defense Ministry said Wednesday it had detected and monitored the bombers. It said all aircraft flying through the zone would be monitored but made no mention of a threat to take "defensive emergency measures" against noncompliant aircraft that was included in an announcement Saturday. Bonnie Glaser, a China specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, expected Biden to raise the issue with civilian and military leaders in China. She said that while countries have a right to declare such a zone—the United States, South Korea and Japan all have them—there will be concern about how China would enforce it. "The question is how many times China will scramble their jets and against whom," she said. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Wednesday that China had announced the zone without prior consultation with other nations, although it overlaps existing air defense zones of both Japan and South Korea. Most provocatively, the Chinese zone encompasses unoccupied but Japanese-administered islands that Japan calls Senkaku and China calls Diaoyu. Since Japan nationalized some of the islands a year ago, there's been a constant cat-and-mouse between the two nations' sea vessels and aircraft. There's been no skirmish, although Japan accused China in January of locking targeting radar on a Japanese helicopter and frigate, which underscored the risks of a clash. The post Problems Pile Up in Asia for US Policymakers appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| The Man Who Leads Bangkok’s Anti-Government Protest Posted: 27 Nov 2013 10:49 PM PST  Protest leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban talks to his staff outside a government complex where anti-government protesters gather, in Bangkok Nov. 27, 2013. (Photo: Reuters) Suthep Thaugsuban, Thailand's current mob leader, has reinvented himself from villain to national hero, at least in the eyes of his supporters, because he has dared to challenge what is characterized as the evil regime of the Yingluck government, backed by the long-ousted former premier Thaksin Shinawatra. The entire planet must know who Thaksin is: Thailand's most popular prime minister since the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932. But for Suthep, he has earned the title of villain. Suthep was serving as deputy prime minister in the Abhisit Vejjajiva administration in charge of launching deadly crackdowns on Red Shirt demonstrators in 2010, leading to more than 90 people being killed, most of them protesters, and more than 2,000 injured. Today, Suthep is leading anti-government forces to bring down the elected Pheu Thai government, just as his party—the Democrats—helped the yellow-shirted People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) remove the Thaksin government from power in 2006. Starting off with a protest against the government-initiated amnesty bill which could potentially free Thaksin from his corruption charges and, more importantly and ironically, pardon those behind the May 10, 2010, killings of the Red Shirts at the Rachaprasong area of Bangkok, Suthep's determination to topple the Yingluck regime is unwavering. But the legitimacy behind Suthep's street mobs evaporated following the government's forced willingness to put the controversial bill back on the shelf. Suddenly, Suthep lacked valid reasons that could be used against the government. The reinterpretation of the 1962 International Court of Justice verdict on the Preah Vihear Temple dispute failed to ignite nationalist sentiment. Without any credible motivation, Suthep returned to the old tricks, exploiting the ghosts of Thai politics in defying the government. One is to continue to condemn the "Thaksin regime" as the sole source of today's political crisis. In painting a picture of Thaksin as the enemy of the state, it provides Suthep with justification for his street protests which can now be perceived as necessary and moral. The other is to drag the monarchy into the political mess once again. Fighting against the Yingluck government and Thaksin together is now equated with the protection of the royal institution. This kind of political game, which draws the political fault line at the monarchy, is dangerous. The massacre at Thammasat University in the 1970s, in which as many as 100 students were murdered and others were beaten and brutalized, demonstrated how the manipulation of the monarchy ended up in political violence. Now, let's analyze why Suthep has been so desperate to topple the government. Certainly the Democrat Party has been unable to compete with Thaksin in the game of electoral politics as shown in its failure to win a majority since 1992. Thus extra-parliamentary tactics are preferred. Also, Suthep's desperate action unveils his personal problem. Suthep has successfully highlighted the issue of amnesty in order to obscure his own alleged crime behind the deaths of the Red Shirts, downplaying the charges brought against him while reinjecting what is known as "Thaksinophobia" among the Thai middle and upper classes in Bangkok. The transformation from killer into a national hero has begun; and in this process, Suthep has risen to become the new face of "moral protector" in Thai politics. Again and again, Thais are witnessing the deep irony within the domain of Thai politics when immoral politicians themselves enjoy preaching about morality. With no sign that the government has been weakened by the protests, Suthep has intensified the pressure and at the same time worked closely with his Democrat Party. With Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajiva filing a no-confidence motion against Yingluck in the Parliament, Suthep has upgraded his protests, in the past few days ordering his anti-Thaksin supporters to occupy a number of key government offices including the Ministry of Finance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the National Budget Bureau in order to disrupt the functionality of the government and surely to create the situation of ungovernability so as to invite intervention by the military and possibly the Thai court. Yingluck declared a state of emergency and handed greater authority to the police to control the situation. She also vowed not to use force against demonstrators, acknowledging that such use could destroy her party's standing, given the condemnation of political violence in 2010 at the hands of the Democrat government. Also, use of force would inevitably bring in the military into the conflict—something that the government will be reluctant to do so. So far, the military has remained silent regarding the current round of political provocations. This could be explained in two contexts. First, the military must fully realize that intervention this time is not tenable. The 2006 coup produced a series of unfavorable effects on the part of the military and its position in politics. It also gave birth to the Red Shirts whose key agenda has been to reject a coup. The fact that a large number of Red Shirts are now gathering inside a Bangkok stadium seems to send out a strong signal that they are willing to protect the government from any intervention from the army. Second and crucially, the military has never worked alone in the maintenance of its interests in politics. It has worked intimately through the so-called network monarchy, in creating a particular kind of politics whereby civilian governments must be kept vulnerable or otherwise they could be toppled. But since the monarchy has been weakened by its long years of self-politicization and the ill health of the King, the military may find that making no move to be the best option for its survival. Lastly, it is all about the monarchy too. The Thai crisis has partly echoed the anxiety of the Bangkok elite as Thais are approaching the sunset of the Bhumibol reign. This shift of political landscape will cause an impact on their wealth and social status. The anxiety has served as a driving force behind the hatred campaign against Thaksin, seen as an adversary of the monarchy. Many in Thailand wonder why the King, often intervening in the crises in the past, has also remained silent. This might be because the monarchy has never been above politics or neutral, and has actively engaged in conflict. Whatever the King will say now may not be taken seriously by many in the Thaksin camp. Recently, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, heir to the throne, conveyed a message through a Thaksin proxy, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Pol Lt-Gen Kamronvit Thoopkracharng, about his concern over the escalating political situation and urged all sides to talk to each other. Vajiralongkorn's choice of messenger is interesting—someone so close to Thaksin—thus confirms the rumor of a sort of relationship between the Crown Prince and the former prime minister. It remains to be seen if his concern will be responded to positively by Suthep's side, whose members also identify themselves as another kind of royalist—loyal to the King but ambivalent about his son. Another important point is that the Crown Prince has become increasingly vocal in politics. This also signifies that the process of royal transition within the walls of the palace has already begun. His active role will answer a question of whether he will be enthroned after the King passes from the scene. Surely, the faction identified with the more popular Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn would rather not want to hear such an answer. Pavin Chachavalpongpun is an associate professor at Kyoto University's Centre for Southeast Asian Studies and regular contributor to Asia Sentinel. The post The Man Who Leads Bangkok's Anti-Government Protest appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
