The Irrawaddy Magazine |
- Activists, Govt Push Forward Bill to Prevent Gender Violence
- Wanted: A Happy Ending
- Proportional Representation in Burma: More Divisive Than Inclusive
- The Irrawaddy Business Roundup (June 28, 2014)
| Activists, Govt Push Forward Bill to Prevent Gender Violence Posted: 27 Jun 2014 06:12 PM PDT  Burmese activists pose in front of a banner that reads "#Time to Act at the summit in London. They cross their arms to mirror the ethnic Kachin flag, in a call to end violence in Kachin State. (Photo: Burma Campaign UK / Facebook) RANGOON — Burmese women's rights activists and government officials aim to finish drafting a bill by the end of the year to prevent violence against women, activists say. "Once enacted, it would be the first law to ensure the protection of women from all forms of violence, including physical, mental, sexual and verbal violence," May Sabe Phyu, a peace activist and coordinator of the Gender Equality Network (GEN), a large network of civil society organizations, told The Irrawaddy on Friday. Activists began drafting the bill with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement in 2012. "We are still in the drafting process on the anti-violence against women [bill]," Myat Myat Ohn Khin, the minister of social welfare, relief and resettlement, told The Irrawaddy. "We have been drafting bills for disabled people, childhood development and other socio-economic issues, so we are trying our best." Thirteen Burmese activists recently joined a Burmese government delegation in traveling to London to attend a summit that raised awareness about sexual violence in conflicts around the world. At a press briefing about the trip in Rangoon on Friday, the activists, including May Sabe Phyu, said Burmese victims of rape and sexual violence desperately required greater assistance. They called on Burma to bring perpetrators of sexual violence to justice, particularly in ethnic areas, where soldiers from the government's army have been accused of using rape as a weapon of war against ethnic armed groups. Burma is one of 150 countries that has endorsed the Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, a UN declaration launched last year. "We welcome that the international community and the Burmese government have endorsed the commitment to end sexual violence in conflict, but we need to be careful that it is not just for show," May Sabe Phyu said, urging concrete action. "The voices of civil society groups need to be heard for greater effectiveness." The activists said victims of sexual violence in Burma often face threats and other obstacles to reporting their cases, while perpetrators are rarely brought to court. They said Chin women have been threatened with arrest after protesting against military rapes recently in Chin State. Susanna Hla Hla Soe, an activist from the Karen Women's Empowerment Group who also attended the summit in London, noted that Burmese soldiers accused of rape are not prosecuted in civilian courts. "Gender discrimination persists in Burma, which harms development, liberty and peace," she said, adding that it was positive that Burma was one of six countries that pledged at the summit in London to start implementing within the next six months a framework to end sexual violence. The post Activists, Govt Push Forward Bill to Prevent Gender Violence appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. | |||
| Posted: 27 Jun 2014 06:00 PM PDT  As well as being a famous Myanmar film heartthrob, movie star Win Oo was a director, writer, singer and publisher. (Poster image from the Myanmar Motion Picture Museum) YANGON — More than 80 years after the funeral of a leading politician of the pre-independence era became the subject of Myanmar's first foray into the world of the cinema, the country's once illustrious film industry is dying a slow death of its own, say industry insiders. Captured with a second-hand camera, the footage of the funeral of U Tun Shein, an early campaigner for Myanmar's independence from British colonial rule, set the stage for a proud cinematic tradition that survived both the political upheavals of the twenties and thirties and the devastation of World War II, but never quite recovered from the policies of the socialist era. The golden age of Myanmar cinema lasted from the 1950s to the 1970s, when local filmmakers produced more than 80 movies a year. But as poverty and political repression deepened in the decades that followed, the number of films that were made declined steadily. Today, despite some improvement in the political and economic climate, the country produces barely a dozen films each year. Disappearing Theaters Meanwhile, movie theaters are disappearing fast. Many once-famous cinemas in Yangon are now construction sites, while elsewhere in the country, would-be moviegoers have long since lost the venues that in the past offered them an escape from their everyday lives. "According to our data, there are only around 20 cinemas left in the country," said U Lu Min, the chairman of the Myanmar Motion Picture Organization (MMPO). "In my hometown of Aungban, in southern Shan State, there is no cinema now." Until the 1980s, there were hundreds of movie theaters in Myanmar. But the nationalization in the mid-1960s of all forms of media, including movie production, eventually began to take its toll on the country's filmmakers, who were increasingly pressed into service as propagandists. Like the movie houses that screened them, movies had become state property. Although Myanmar officially abandoned socialism in 1988, the military regime that seized power that year continued to exercise strict control over the media and retained ownership of state properties such as movie theaters. Before it handed over power to the current quasi-civilian government in 2011, it sold off some of this property to cronies, but even now, most of the remaining movie theaters are publicly owned. A New Lease on Life As the owner of most of the country's cinemas, the government has until recently shown little interest in making them more attractive to investors. "For the past 10 years, the government limited leases on cinemas to one year," said U Lu Min. "But that wasn't long enough for businessmen to recover their initial investment, so now it has been extended to five years." But while this move has helped the established theater operators—notably the Mingalar Group, which runs three of the most famous cinemas in Yangon, the Thamada, Mingalar and Thwin—it has so far not brought in any new investment. Meanwhile, as technology changes, the cost of transforming one of Yangon's old-school cinemas into a modern movie theater has become prohibitively expensive. According to U Lu Min, who says the MMPO and the government have both urged cinema operators to switch from analogue to digital projection systems, bringing in new equipment would cost at least 300 million kyats (US$300,000). "When cinema operators do a cost-benefit analysis, they just decide it's not worth it. That's why most are shutting down," said U Lu Min. "In Southeast Asia, Myanmar now has fewer movie theaters than any other country. Thailand alone has more than 800." This dearth of theaters means that new films now have to wait at least a year before being screened, dampening filmmakers' enthusiasm for taking on new projects. "On average, it costs about 100 million kyats [US$100,000] to make a movie here, or double that if we shoot on location overseas. But with audiences shrinking the way they are, we can barely break even, much less make a profit," said film producer Daw Aye Aye Win, whose Lucky Seven Film and Video Production Company accounts for nearly half of Myanmar's current cinematic output. "As a rule, movies are screened for just three weeks here. How can we recover our investment in such a short time? This is why so few movies are being made these days," she added. "If the film doesn't attract big audiences, it may not even get three weeks—it could be dropped and replaced with a foreign film." Just Not Funny Ironically, the production companies' efforts to hold onto audiences may only be making matters worse. Critics say that by relying too heavily on tried-and-true formulas and popular genres such as comedies—which account for two-thirds of the movies now made in Myanmar—the local industry has lost much of its appeal. "It's no mystery why this industry is declining. People are just not that interested in comedies these days. The stories are almost all the same, the acting is bad and production values are really poor," said Daw Ei Phyu Aung, the chief editor of the entertainment journal Sunday. Foreign films offer much better value for money, she added. "If you want to go see a movie these days, it will cost you about 10,000 kyats per person by the time you pay for a ticket, transportation and snacks. For that kind of money, most people would rather watch a Korean film." Even U Lu Min conceded that quality is an issue that needs to be addressed if the Myanmar film industry is to turn itself around. "I agree that the quality of Myanmar films is falling," he said. "There are many reasons for this, including the lack of cinemas, producers cutting costs, people having other options for entertainment. Poor film quality isn't the only reason the industry is in decline." Despite the steady pressure on the film industry, however, U Lu Min said he expects this year and next to buck the trend toward fewer movies (only 15 were produced in 2013, down from 17 the year before). Although he was not specific about what he based his confidence on, he did offer one source of hope: "I want our president to promote our industry as Obama has supported Hollywood."
This article first appeared in the June 2014 print issue of The Irrawaddy magazine. The post Wanted: A Happy Ending appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. | |||
| Proportional Representation in Burma: More Divisive Than Inclusive Posted: 27 Jun 2014 05:30 PM PDT Electoral systems are important conduits through which the voice of citizens is heard, and careful consideration of a nation's circumstances must be given when selecting an electoral system best suited to reflect the variety of opinions expressed by its citizens. The study of elections in weak democracies or hybrid regimes, including those that reserve executive or legislative positions for unelected representatives, continues to garner attention in political study, though systematic research on this topic is lacking when compared to studies of elections in functioning democracies. Those looking into the impact of elections in such hybrid regimes are therefore asking themselves the following question: To what extent do electoral systems matter in regimes that practice a diluted form of democracy, in which, for example, the legislature and constitution favor the interests of the security forces? Such is the case for Burma as it approaches elections scheduled for some time in 2015. The current debate of electoral system design for Burma is one between proportional and majoritarian systems. Burma currently utilizes a first-past-the-post voting arrangement, a majoritarian system inherited from British colonial rule. Recently, it has been suggested that a proportional representation (PR) electoral system would bring improved inclusion of minority parties into the country's parliament. Indeed, PR is generally believed to be more representative of a diverse electorate, and it has better mechanisms for avoiding the problem of "wasted votes." Various observers also favor a change to PR in Burma, mainly in a concerned response to the possibility of the military reacting strongly to another landslide of the NLD, as it did after the results of the 1990 election. However, the situation of the 1990 elections, which followed soon after horrific repression by the country's military, and today's consolidation of power by the military in the legislative and executive of Burma reflect very different circumstances for elections and thus very different ways for elections to be felt. As stated above, the inclusion of minority representation is important in a country as diverse as Burma, and there is no theoretical argument presented here against PR in its ability to offer such diversity. However, the discussion of an appropriate electoral system in Burma for the 2015 election should not be limited to the argument of representation of minority parties in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Burma's legislature. Or the likelihood of the military to annul results, which would effectively jeopardize the legitimacy of institutions that it has created and supported for the last three years. The discussion should instead center on how and when negotiations and alliance building can or will take place between different opposition political parties of this country. There is strong reason to believe that the eventual representation of legitimate and consolidated ethnic minority political parties in Parliament and strong pre-election party alliance building among the opposition are intrinsically linked. A change to a PR system will likely increase challenges for opposition unification, a task that is already proving difficult. 2015 With First-Past-the-Post System If the electoral system of Burma remains first-past-the-post (FPTP) for the 2015 election, then there is a higher likelihood of alliance building between political parties before the elections (and probably afterwards too). Such pre-election alliance building has been more common in countries using majoritarian systems. For Burma, this means a higher likelihood of alliance building between the NLD and non-coopted or fake opposition parties, particularly ethnic minority parties. This is based on two ideas: First, parties that have mutual ideologies (similar policy or, in the case of Burma, a common political enemy) and strongholds of voters, (strongholds based on areas of traditional support or on areas of ethnic homogeneity, especially for nationalist parties) are more likely to come to a pre-election agreement about campaigning. Second, if smaller parties in a single constituency stand alone in FPTP, they each have much less chance of winning the most votes against bigger parties that are already well established; and they face a situation in which only one out of many will be the winner. Therefore, alliance building could take place in two ways. Firstly, ethnic minority parties could combine in certain ethnic areas but we will see less likelihood of trans-ethnic state alliances. For example, if there are many parties within Shan State competing with one another over a number of constituencies, then it is more likely that some parties will merge; players will realize that they need to join forces (make one party) if they want to reduce their risk of total loss in a FPTP election. However, if there are not that many parties in constituencies of ethnic minority areas, then there will be less risk of losing out in FPTP; therefore, there is less chance of alliance building. It must be noted that even with many political parties in one ethnic area, a major deciding factor regarding whether parties merge lies in the divergent or analogous nature of each party's ideology as well as the condition of relations between party leaders, not to mention the relationship of such parties with the incumbent USDP. But such cleavages would exist to begin with, despite the chosen electoral system. The point is that in a FPTP election with single member constituencies, there will be a stronger "pull-factor" for mergers between similar parties than there would be under a PR system. Secondly, ethnic parties and the NLD can support one another by deciding what constituencies to run in, thus making use of campaign resources more efficiently while also solidifying pre-election relations. This assumption has limits, as the NLD has weak relations with those parties that took part in the 2010 elections and some questionable relations with those that it forged alliances with in 1990. But, if this type of alliance building occurs, with the NLD respecting some limits to its campaigning in certain ethnic minority constituencies, then the NLD can enter Parliament alongside a larger contingent of allied ethnic parties. Accordingly, despite its shortcomings as a truly democratic legislative body, the Parliament of Burma could become an arena where the NLD and ethnic minority parties further establish rapport, something that has been hard for them to do in the face of the military and government’s divide and rule policies. A Change to Proportional Representation If the system is changed to proportional representation (PR) before the 2015 elections, then alliance building among various opposition forces will be significantly more challenging. The NLD, worried about its real representation in Parliament, which will very likely be lowered with PR, will feel pressured to run in all constituencies that it can, thereby causing friction between itself and other opposition parties, especially ethnic minority parties. The NLD will run in ethnic minority areas not because it wants to challenge the right of ethnic minority parties to represent their own people or because it thinks it necessarily has more chance to represent more people in that constituency, but because it will need to scrape up as much representation in the national legislature as possible to balance out that which it will lose in its own strong constituencies, all of which it would normally carry in an election using FPTP. Consequently, it will be harder for the NLD to make genuine agreements with ethnic parties that truly make up opposition to the USDP / military. It will not genuinely be able to say, "We won't run in this constituency because we want to honor an alliance and find ourselves together in the parliament in opposition to the USDP and military." Changing to PR has at least two key consequences. Though it contrasts with the pragmatism of creating opposition unity, the first is that the NLD will have to persuade the ethnic minority opposition parties that it must run in ethnic minority constituencies. This will be hard to do, but it could be made even harder by a public relations campaign run by the USDP or a new USDP-friendly party that publicizes its friendly relations with ethnic minority parties, friendly relations created by alliances in which the USDP or another USDP-friendly party will "respect" the sovereignty of minority parties to run in their areas and represent "their people." The NLD will have no choice but to confront this publicly. It will be forced into a corner where it will be made to look like the selfish, self-fulfilling party that will not let ethnic minorities represent their own demands through their own parties. This will be easier to do in some areas of Burma than others, particularly in places where the NLD has lost ground. Arakan State is a prime example, but it is not the only area where the NLD will face open criticism. For example, in areas where the National Brotherhood Federation is able to influence voters, there will be stronger resistance to the NLD's participation. The NBF does not have strong relations with the NLD; however, it is highly likely that the NLD currently holds a bigger place in the hearts and minds of the public within NBF constituencies than the relatively new NBF parties. Secondly, a PR system would allow for the existence of smaller parties that could further atomize the opposition. In the case of Burma, any PR system that is introduced would most likely include a low threshold to allow a wide range of political parties. This means more small parties in Parliament, and, as a result, more chance of division in the opposition. Furthermore, the combination of high levels of corruption and numerous political parties, many of which would in all probability represent the interests of party leaders instead of constituents, could create more incidents of cooption by powerful elites or the dominant party. Those parties, including the NDF, who have expressed desire for such an arrangement have clearly revealed their insecurities as small parties and their concern of losing the chance for any representation in parliament. However, it is also important to note that the USDP had in the not too distant past 1) rejected PR 2) been unsure ; and 3) supported PR. In any reelection, it is in the incumbent's favor for the opposition to be as separated as possible, and a move to PR would undoubtedly have this effect. Understandably, an FPTP election that is freer and fairer would make it more difficult for USDP incumbents from single member constituencies to win against candidates from the more popular NLD, particularly in urban areas, as well as ethnic minority parties for that matter. The USDP's past indecisiveness about changing the electoral system reflects an interesting tactic of the incumbent to see how ethnic minority parties reacted to the possibility of adoption of PR for 2015. Now with the USDP voting through a bill in the Upper House to change the nation's electoral system to some form of PR, the incumbent has signaled its readiness to use further tactics to divide and weaken the opposition. If it becomes law, this change will have the additional costs of likely gerrymandering and confusion among voters inexperienced in PR elections. Civil society will likely feel the pull to spend its time and resources in educating citizens about the functioning of the new PR system instead of focusing on the important tasks of election monitoring. Post-2015 Electoral reform should take place in a post-election period when the question is less politicized and when there is enough time for a good consultation process and the drafting of laws. As the time before 2015 dwindles, it will be of no surprise if the incumbent advocates such an argument and leaves the electoral system as it is. Burma is largely agricultural, with farmers struggling against difficult production conditions, including land insecurities, restricted markets, and poor weather conditions. Furthermore, many village systems are still authoritarian in nature, often with villagers following the instructions of the village head, individuals frequently chosen by nearby township authorities. This reality raises the issue of vulnerability to vote buying, the occurrence of which was widely reported during the 2010 elections. In a mostly agricultural country that struggles with poverty and poor infrastructure, such practice can become rampant. Recent vote buying in Afghanistan, a mostly agricultural and underdeveloped nation, offers an example of how serious this interference with voting can become. The opportunity for vote buying along with the fail-safes provided to the military and the state party by the 2008 Constitution will undoubtedly see the military and USDP through to the other side of the 2015 elections with most of their power intact. But changing to PR and further disrupting opposition unity before new institutional frameworks and civilian bodies have been tested by non-incumbent participation further weakens legitimate chances of reform, particularly in the realm of civil-military relations. It is not that some form of PR could not be a good electoral system for Burma. It is that the benefits of PR in the current system are highly defunct (25 percent military seats in Union Parliament, 25 percent military seats in state and regional assemblies, and a non-civilian commander-in-chief, whose powers actually exceed that of the president). The fact that any political force needs a unified majority within Parliament to make significant headway in law-making and constitutional changes against a sizeable unified voting block of the military and USDP makes the idea of a more inclusive, and thus more diverse, system of representation a paradox. It is true that when looking at a wide range of legislatures filled by systems of proportional representation we consistently find more party representation than legislatures filled by means of a majoritarian electoral system. However, if the electoral system of Burma changes to PR, the military and the incumbent will likely face a weaker challenger to its power in parliament as more parties stand alone, each taking votes and a small portion of seats and finding themselves trying to form a complex coalition in parliament. As a result, Burma will continue to wrestle with a pseudo-democratic system, in which the military not only pursues its own interests but also establishes itself as a cohesive voting block in the face of a more fractured opposition. Tom Lochery is a teacher at Educational Initiatives Burma. The post Proportional Representation in Burma: More Divisive Than Inclusive appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. | |||
| The Irrawaddy Business Roundup (June 28, 2014) Posted: 27 Jun 2014 05:00 PM PDT Foreign Banks Will Be Licensed to Operate in Burma 'From September' A number of foreign banks will be permitted to open limited banking services in Burma from September, a report said, quoting Central Bank Deputy Governor Set Aung. Licenses will be issued to between five and 10 foreign banks out of the dozens that have already opened representative offices in the country. A selection committee to pick the banks will be made up of the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, the Attorney General's Office, a German advisory team and representatives from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, reported Eleven Media, quoting Set Aung. Earlier this month, the IMF's chief representative in Burma, Matt Davies, said the Burmese government would need to firmly control bank licenses when it gives the final go-ahead. More than 40 foreign banks have representative offices in Burma, but presently they can only provide consultation and advisory services. Upmarket Property Development Lures More Foreign Money to Rangoon Singapore-based Marga One Investment will lead a US$300 million luxury property development in Rangoon, featuring a five-star hotel, apartments, shops and offices, reports said. Marga One has teamed up with Burmese property firm Thu Kha Yadanar to form the joint venture Marga Landmark, the Marga Group said on its website. Marga One is linked to Marga Group, an international finance business headed by Hong Kong businessman Stephen Suen. Work on the luxury development on a plot on Rangoon's Shwedagon Pagoda Road leased from the government is scheduled to begin in September and be completed by 2019, Mizzima magazine reported. Marga Landmark plans more property development in Burma but will not be involved in low-cost housing, Mizzima quoted Suen as saying. Instead, the joint venture will allocate 2 percent of annual profits to Rangoon authorities for welfare work, including the construction of schools, he said. Thai Coup Leaders Oppose Visa-Free Overland Travel From Burma The National Council for Peace and Order formed by the leaders of Thailand's military coup last month is blocking completely visa-free travel with Burma, a travel industry magazine reported. Thailand is one of four countries out of the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) with which Burma has yet to achieve open travel agreements. Next year sees the beginning of the Asean Economic Community, a European Union-style open trading market that will also supposedly allow for unfettered travel among member states. "[Burma] has requested visa exemption [with Thailand] whatever the mode of transport, but Bangkok opposed blanket permission for overland travelers fearing it would encourage migration for work purposes," said TTR Weekly. "[Thailand] counter-proposed that visa exemption be limited to air travelers," it said, quoting Thailand's deputy chief of mission at the country's embassy in Rangoon, Chainarong Keratiyutwong. "As long as Thailand insists that visa-free exemption is linked to airline travel, it will favor airlines operating between the Thai capital and cities in [Burma]. The same inconvenience applies to [Burmese] citizens planning to travel to Thailand for leisure or business," said TTR Weekly. Burma has already signed via-free agreements with Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei, but not with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia or Thailand. Bids Invited for Gas-Fueled Electricity Plant at Kyaukphyu in Arakan State The Ministry of Electric Power has invited bids to supply a temporary 50 megawatt gas-fueled power plant for Kyaukphyu district on the Arakan State coast. A power supply is urgently needed as more businesses move into the district in preparation for a special economic zone. The government has been resorting to mobile, temporary electricity generating plants as a quick-fix solution to acute power shortages in areas of development. Few details of the terms of the tender have been published, but President Thein Sein told the legislative assembly several months ago that more than US$50 million has been made available to fund a power plant at Kyaukphyu. The money will come from a loan provided by the Export-Import Bank of China, according to the website Ramree.com. It is expected that gas for the power plant will be provided by the Shwe field in the Bay of Bengal. A pipeline from the field comes ashore at Kyaukphyu. Most of the field's gas has been bought by the China National Petroleum Corporation to be piped through Burma into China. Government Ministry Budgets to 'Face Checks' After Religion Minister's Dismissal Spending by government ministries is to be subject to checks by a special parliamentary committee following the dismissal of Minister of Religious Affairs Hsan Hsint over allegations of corruption. The budgets of each Naypyidaw ministry will be scrutinized, Eleven Media reported, citing Khaing Maung Yi, a member of the Sports, Culture and Public Relations Development Committee. "The committee is duty-bound to check the budgets of government ministries, including the Information Ministry. The previous years' budgets will be rechecked at a time when the relevant budget is under scrutiny," Eleven Media quoted Khaing Maung Yi saying. Hsan Hsint was accused of spending 10 million kyat (US$10,000) of ministry funds on "family interests," various media reports have said. Ministry budget scrutiny comes as an international NGO, Global Witness, published a report this week alleging that only a few of the foreign and domestic Burmese firms that have won offshore oil and gas exploration licenses have voluntarily disclosed details of their ownership. "The international watchdog group said that out of 47 companies that have gained license interests who were contacted with a request for information on ownership, only 13 provided feedback, and many of these gave only partial responses," the Western industry magazine Upstream reported. "Global Witness stated that only two of the 16 local companies required to partner international players on onshore and shallow-water tracts disclosed their ownership information." The post The Irrawaddy Business Roundup (June 28, 2014) appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
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