The Irrawaddy Magazine |
- Four Artists Depict Glimpses of Myanmar
- Poverty Decreases, But Rural Areas Slower to Develop: Report
- Faced With Aid Cuts, Shan IDPs Call for Continued Support
- Tough Choices Ahead to Prevent ‘Black Friday,’ Achieve Stability in Rakhine
- US Ambassador Rejects Govt Implication of Aid Agencies in Rakhine Attacks
- Losing Sight of Solutions in Rakhine
- Myanmar’s Post-Panglong Problems (Part 3)
| Four Artists Depict Glimpses of Myanmar Posted: 31 Aug 2017 08:36 AM PDT YANGON — Four artists whose depictions range from the stunning islands of the Mergui Archipelago in Myanmar's far south to Yangon's bustling cityscapes will showcase their work in early September. The exhibition titled "The First Artist in Residence Exhibition of the Art Garden," will be held at Bo Aung Kyaw Street Gallery in Yangon from September 1-7 and feature the paintings of Nyi Aung Maw, Saw Satay Pha, Min Zaw Aung and Zaw Zaw Ko.  Min Zaw Aung is showcasing eight surrealistic paintings portraying love, vanity and mystery. One of the paintings show two people covered in red robes. At first glance, they seem to be monks, but on closer inspection their faces are covered and one appears to be a woman. "Wearing a cloak, the hollowness [in the painting] has become a tangible thing. I just don't want to create and tell people what they are. I prefer to leave my paintings to the imagination of the audience," said Min Zaw Aung.  The works of Nyi Aung Maw, a cartoonist-turned-painter, are full of fun. His paintings are all about children in rural villages swimming and playing in mud while herding buffalos, and novices playing football—just more than enough to evoke one's carefree childhood memories. Zaw Ko Ko said his paintings are inspired by the life of people on Yangon's streets, and in its markets and pagodas. Another artist, Saw Sate Pha, traveled deep into the Mergui Archipelago to take pictures of the landscape and people there. One of his paintings features the floating homes of Moken people—structures similar to houses in Shan State's Inle Lake.  The exhibition will display 40 acrylic paintings priced between US$250-$700. The four artists lived together at the Art Garden/Bamboo School in Yangon's Kyauktan Township for three months to create their paintings. "Previously, other people arranged my exhibitions for me. This is the first time I've organized an exhibition as well as accommodation for the artists. So, I am delighted," said Khin Zaw Latt, the founder of the Art Garden/Bamboo School and curator of the exhibition. The post Four Artists Depict Glimpses of Myanmar appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Poverty Decreases, But Rural Areas Slower to Develop: Report Posted: 31 Aug 2017 08:16 AM PDT YANGON — The number of people in Myanmar living in poverty has decreased from 32 percent of the population in 2004 to 19 percent in 2015, according to a recent report. The World Bank and the Ministry of Planning and Finance analyzed data on living conditions from surveys conducted in Myanmar in 2004-5, 2009-10, and 2015. Household spending has increased by 1.4 percent annually and living standards have improved according to a number of indicators—including the sales of mobile phones, televisions, and motorcycles. More than 42 percent of households owned a motorcycle in 2015, compared with just 25 percent in 2009. "We are encouraged by the decline in poverty, moving ahead it will be critical to ensure that economic reforms continue to reach everyone in Myanmar," said U Kyaw Win, Union Minister for Ministry of Planning and Finance. The report shows that rural poverty declined slower than in urban areas in the same time frame—from 36 percent to 23 percent in rural areas compared to 22 percent to 9 percent in urban areas. This reflects growth in the respective areas—1.1 percent per year in rural areas compared to 1.9 percent in urban areas—fueled by greater development in manufacturing and services than in agriculture. After 2010, the garment sector improved significantly and created many jobs, according to Dr. Khin Maung Aye, a central executive committee member of the Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association (MGMA). "In the garment sector, there was a major increase in order rates and product quality after 2012. No doubt that could have helped reduce poverty through employment," he told The Irrawaddy. Most garment factories are based in Yangon and Mandalay regions, according to MGMA, although recently factories have opened in Irrawaddy and Bago regions. "There are some problems with transportation costs in opening garment factories in other states and regions though opening them could create job opportunities for locals and help develop the areas," said Dr. Khin Maung Aye. Upper House lawmaker Sai One Hlaing Kham of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) said people's living conditions had improved in non-conflict areas of Shan State. "A lot of young people from Shan State went to China or Thailand as migrant workers, they sent their income back to their families, and then new buildings appeared," he told The Irrawaddy. "Consumption rates also increased in the last decade." Sai One Hlaing Kham said: "We can see improvement in non-conflict areas. My question is, is this real improvement? We have lost manpower in the country because we can't create job opportunities in our own area and country. On the other hand, migrants face exploitation and lose their citizens' rights because most of them migrate illegally." The government's technical and financial support is still needed to boost production and create jobs, which would reduce poverty in the area, he said. Karen and Mon states are among the highest producers of migrants in Myanmar, which some observers say has brought money and development to the states, with almost everyone able to access phones and transport. "We can see the improvement of buildings in our area. Many people own motorbikes here," said Ko Tun Myint, chairperson of Mon Youth Network in Mudon Township. But, he added, "nowadays there is too much crime such as robbery and theft in the area, showing that people are still suffering from poverty." Ko Tun Myint said young people believe "the government can create better job opportunities by supporting the technology and finance industries" in order to boost the quality and production of the many rubber plantations in the region. The report is the first of a two-part series on poverty assessment that recommends a revision of poverty measurements for Myanmar. Part two of the assessment will be released in late 2017. The post Poverty Decreases, But Rural Areas Slower to Develop: Report appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Faced With Aid Cuts, Shan IDPs Call for Continued Support Posted: 31 Aug 2017 06:05 AM PDT YANGON — Thousands of displaced Shan have called for continued humanitarian support for refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps along the Shan-Thai border. After more than a decade of providing aid, international non-governmental organizations have announced that they will cut off food support for all six camps in the region in October, said Sai Korn Lieo, spokesperson for the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF). The Shan-Thai border camps—established 18 years ago—host around 6,200 displaced people, 70 percent of whom are women and children, according to SHRF. Many of the camps' residents fled central Shan State between 1996 and 1998 due to clashes between the Myanmar Army and Shan armed groups.
Those in the camps represent a range of ethnicities, including Shan, Lahu, Akha, Wa, Ta'ang, Pa-Oh, Lisu, Karen and Chinese. News of the upcoming cuts to aid was reported to camp leadership in April and May, after more than a decade of support; international non-governmental organizations cited progress in Myanmar's peace process as a reason for the policy shift. Lung Sai, chairperson of the Shan State Refugee Committee (Thailand), outlined some of the challenges faced by these communities. "We don't have land to cultivate. Thailand does not allow us to work. We have a water shortage in the camps. And now, the aid is going to stop," he said. IDPs cannot engage in traditional agriculture on either side of the border, where they live on slivers of territory controlled by the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S), situated between the Myanmar Army or militias on one side, and the Thai authorities on the other. Those in the camps rely on aid—13 kilograms of rice, as well as yellow beans and one liter of cooking oil per person, per month. Sai Korn Lieo told the Irrawaddy on Thursday that they are urging donors to continue this support "for their survival." Although the RCSS/SSA-S signed the nationwide ceasefire agreement with the military and government in 2015—a key step in the current peace process—fighting continues to take place near several IDP camps over disputed territory with the Myanmar Army. There are also frequent clashes between the military and non-signatory ethnic armed groups in Shan State. "Despite the peace process, it is still impossible for the displaced villagers in camps along the Thai-Shan border to return home, unless there is a genuine nationwide ceasefire, withdrawal of Burma Army troops, and a political settlement with the ethnic armed stakeholders," read a statement from SHRF. Sai Korn Lieo added that despite the existence of a peace process, "there's still not any peace" in Shan State. "We don't have or have lost our national identity cards, so I don't think we can enter Myanmar. I haven't heard of any plans from the Myanmar government regarding long-term IDPs," said Lung Sai. Lower House MP Sai Thiha Kyaw of Shan State's Mong Yai Township told The Irrawaddy that he would propose a discussion regarding a government plan for Shan State's displaced during the upcoming parliamentary session. According to SHRF's report on the crisis, the future of many in Shan State is further complicated by plans to construct large hydropower dams in the region—like the Mong Ton project on the Salween River—as well as mining projects, which they say will cause further displacement. The post Faced With Aid Cuts, Shan IDPs Call for Continued Support appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Tough Choices Ahead to Prevent ‘Black Friday,’ Achieve Stability in Rakhine Posted: 31 Aug 2017 04:05 AM PDT It was "Myanmar's Black Friday" declared National Security Advisor U Thaung Tun at a press briefing, describing the August 25 attacks on 30 police stations and an army base in Northern Rakhine State. Now, the question is how to prevent Myanmar's second "Black Friday." The volatile situation in Rakhine State will require time, patience, and calm responses to counter extremists and assure citizens. First, the government needs to restore normalcy, and deliver aid and assistance to the needy. A military presence is required to maintain security, but in the long run, a political solution must be sought. Whatever obstacles and strains they may have, the government and military should coordinate (they have been doing so according to their press briefings) to establish a clear strategy on Rakhine State. The importance of a report issued by the Kofi Annan-led Rakhine Advisory Commission has been acknowledged in part. Upon receiving the commission's report, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi hastily said that her government would implement the recommendations, but army leaders voiced their reservations. If that is the case, the two will have to find common ground and reconcile pragmatically in order to move forward. We can't have a repeat of the violent attacks or allow Muslim extremists to gain control. Army leaders must have a reason behind their hesitance to implement the commission's recommendations. And make no mistake, we all know who calls the shots in Myanmar. The army is the country's most powerful institution and it is deeply entrenched in politics. It is important to listen to these army leaders as well as the elected civilian leaders.  Combat Terrorism? But How? First, the government and military should not fall into terrorists' trap. The Brussels-based International Crisis Group warned that terrorists wanted a strong military reaction and corresponding political backlash to the attacks. We saw that the army, which deployed additional troops to Northern Rakhine ahead of the attacks, was not able to secure the large territory. Perhaps the army planned to divide its troops to tackle insurgents belonging to the Arakan Army that are active along the China border and recently in Paletwa Township, Chin State, next to Arakan State. So when the attacks occurred and soldiers scattered, they were unable to maintain a hold, as they were instructed to exercise restraint and were outnumbered by mobs that included women and children. Army leaders were well aware of the international comdemnation that could arise, as an increase in troop operations has often been tied to accusations of human rights abuses and excessive force. After attacks on Oct. 9, 2016, the army was accused of serious rights abuses against the Rohingya. Since then, there have been repeated requests for the Myanmar government to allow access to a United Nations fact-finding mission to the area, which has thus far been denied. At the press briefing, National Security Advisor Dr. Thaung Tun said that the government would exercise "maximum restraint" in order to avoid collateral damage and casualties among innocent civilians.  At the same time, opposition parties including Arakanese politicians and former ruling party leaders have pressed to declare an emergency situation in Rakhine State. This will only heighten tensions and is not a permanent solution. Whether armed forces leaders including Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing want to take on this burden is the question. Domestic and international media are covering the issue, and the attention of the UN and the international community is there. And in fact, this is a good opportunity to explore the real cause of the attacks and explain the situation on the ground, as it was recently raised at the UN Security Council. Embassies and organizations are ready to assist Myanmar to combat terrorism if necessary. The government and army need to respond to some media's one-sided coverage of the issue without emotion, and as well counter some allegations and pressure. But they need to be extremely careful when rushing to accuse INGOs and NGOs of aiding terrorists. This could backfire against the government and undo much-praised reforms. To eventually repair the wounds in Rakhine State, Myanmar will need international goodwill and assistance. Thus, it should allow media access to troubled northern Rakhine State with protection provided for reporters, and begin to allow aid and outside support in the near future. International media at the moment is too far removed from the situation on the ground to provide nuanced coverage. To hunt down those that the government has deemed terrorists, Myanmar will also need sophisticated training, regional and international support and coordination. Over the years, authorities have studied the immediate and root causes and effects of the conflict, but much more remains to be done. Sending infantry troops to engage extremists who allegedly have international ties will not work in the long run. Myanmar will need counterterrorism training and to strengthen the National Security Agency and intelligence gathering forces A Rakhine task force and counterterrorism strategy are needed – starting with a debate in Parliament. But the government, military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies will all need to coordinate to combat and prevent terrorism. This includes the business and finance sector, in regards to rooting out terrorist financing. In this context, maintaining law and order and respecting human rights are both key compenents. Thus, Myanmar will need to seek assistance and draw lessons from its neighbors particularly India, China, Indonesia and Thailand. Indonesia, for instance, has come a long way. In order to conduct counterterrorism campaigns, police there have been given priority jobs and trainings. The military has also played its part in gathering intelligence, and providing civic assistance in conflict areas and propaganda campaigns. Myanmar has a lot to learn from its neighbors in countering any future threats of terrorism. More importantly, Myanmar will have to work with moderate voices in Rakhine State and beyond. There is some encouraging news in that local Muslim and Buddhist leaders have stated that they don't agree with or condone the use of violence in the region. Violence is not the solution to the issues to Rakhine State. The danger that Myanmar faces is real and will have serious long-term consequences within the country and beyond its borders. The government and security agencies must be aware that there are extremist elements such as IS and the Taliban that could exploit the plight of Muslims in Rakhine State. Some regional security analysts predict that it's only matter of time before jihadists flock in. The real danger is in homegrown terrorists linking with foreign backing, which will only inflame the violence in Northern Rakhine. At a press briefing, Home Affairs Minister Lt-Gen Kyaw Swe said that the latest attacks show that the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) is trying to establish an "Islamic State" in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. But this is not new. Myanmar saw the rise of local mujahideen starting in the late 1940s when the country regained its independence. Muslim leaders sought the concession of land to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), but this was rejected by Myanmar and the insurrection was quelled by the army. During World War II, colonial forces, both British and Japanese, exploited the Arakanaese and Muslim populations along this loose border.  Convene an NDSC Meeting? Brig-Gen Win Tun claimed at the press briefing that the recent systematic attacks were a plan to force locals to flee the area. Military leaders claimed that militants had taken four steps toward claiming territory: scaring locals from the area, killing government informants, the October 9 attacks last year, and the latest attacks. Army leaders have wanted to call a meeting of the 11-member National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) as mandated in the military-drafted 2008 Constitution, but the ultimate decision rests in the hands of President Htin Kyaw, a close confidante of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Such a meeting would be used to present and analyze the country's security situation and discuss preparations. The meeting could also serves to warm relations between the two sides, as interactions between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the commander-in-chief have been uneasy at times. If the meeting is held, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will sit as foreign minister along with the president, vice presidents, commander-in-chief, vice commander-in-chief, and border and home affairs ministers. The president, and not Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, will chair the meeting and one thing is certain – he will need to make some major assessments and decisions. The government and the army had a duty to secure the northern territory and prevent further attacks. But this is also a sovereignty issue for Myanmar and its citizens. The country should pay attention to international concerns but it must listen to its own inner voice, because it is this country and its citizens that will need to find a solution. The post Tough Choices Ahead to Prevent 'Black Friday,' Achieve Stability in Rakhine appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| US Ambassador Rejects Govt Implication of Aid Agencies in Rakhine Attacks Posted: 31 Aug 2017 01:55 AM PDT YANGON — The US Ambassador to Myanmar Scot Marciel on Thursday rejected suggestions by the Myanmar government that international aid agencies—including the US Agency for International Development (USAID)—are supporting the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in northern Rakhine State. "Any suggestion that USAID, or any other US government agency is providing support to ARSA, an organization we have condemned, is absurd," Marciel told The Irrawaddy on Thursday. "Everything that we have been doing, and that we continue to do, is in support of the Myanmar people and their effort to build democracy, peace, and prosperity," he said, adding that embassy staff had spoken to the government regarding the allegations. The Myanmar government reported the discovery of aid items in suspected militant camps in a number of official statements, as it has launched large security operations in northern Rakhine State after ARSA attacked police and military posts last Friday. The attacks and continuing violence have left more than 100 confirmed dead—including 12 security personnel—and displaced thousands, with the International Organization for Migration estimating on Wednesday that some 18,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh. On Wednesday, the government's Information Committee reported that packets of high-energy biscuits provided by the UN's World Food Program (WFP) and packets of USAID-branded rice were found at suspected terrorist camps near Kyeekyun in Maungdaw Township on Monday. At a press conference held by National Security Advisor U Thaung Tun on Tuesday, police Brig-Gen Win Tun said militants had made land mines from aid groups' construction materials such as ammonia nitrate fertilizer and metal pipes, though he did not specify which aid groups and how militants accessed the materials. WFP said it was aware of photographs circulating of WFP-branded food and had asked Myanmar authorities for more details in order to track the supply batch and investigate the matter further in a statement released Thursday. "WFP takes any allegations of food diversions very seriously and considers any manipulation of food assistance destined for needy families as theft," the statement said. A US Embassy spokesperson said because the situation is fluid, and access to reliable information is limited, it cannot verify the discovery of the bags of rice or investigate how they might have been diverted. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein also expressed concern about claims by the government that international aid workers were complicit in or supporting the attacks. "Such statements are irresponsible and only serve to increase fears and the potential for further violence," he said in a statement on Tuesday. "I am extremely concerned that the unsupported allegations against international aid organizations place their staff in danger and may make it impossible for them to deliver essential aid." There were 77 aid agencies active in Rakhine State in March 2017, including 28 international NGOs, according to the Myanmar Information Management Unit. Reuters reported this week that the UN and other aid groups had evacuated non-critical staff from northern Rakhine in response to the violence. Anti-NGO sentiment has developed in Rakhine State since conflict in 2012, with ethnic Arakanese protesting what they feel is unfair favorable treatment of the Rohingya. Marciel echoed sentiments of the UN and other embassies in condemning Friday's vicious attacks and said he welcomed government comments that security forces would restore law and order with restraint. He also urged unfettered access for monitors, aid groups, and journalists. The post US Ambassador Rejects Govt Implication of Aid Agencies in Rakhine Attacks appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Losing Sight of Solutions in Rakhine Posted: 30 Aug 2017 09:27 PM PDT Rakhine State took a distinct turn away from a possible peaceful future the day after the Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission on Rakhine State released its final report. Friday saw the second wave of attacks claimed by a Rohingya militant group who refer to themselves as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). This week, they aired pre-recorded video messages on social media in the style of many international terror groups—including infamous Islamic State. ARSA, in their videos, claimed "Arakan [Rakhine] belongs to the Rohingya," and warned the Myanmar Army to withdraw its troops immediately. The same group claimed previous violent attacks on border guard police in northern Rakhine State in October 2016—just one month after the Annan commission was established. Although it is not a comfortable truth for the country, Myanmar is likely facing "cross-border terrorism," that the commission labeled a "potential threat." The question is: Is the Myanmar government prepared to face this reality? The answer is, probably not. Violence invites more violence—the Myanmar government promptly declared ARSA a terrorist group on Friday and immediately responded with anti-terrorism security operations. Conflict in northern Rakhine has so far claimed dozens of civilians' lives and displaced thousands. As violence sweeps through northern Rakhine, former UN general secretary Kofi Annan's recommendations to alleviate the state's suffering have been forgotten. Rakhine's Complex History Since its beginning, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State was widely rejected by both ethnic Arakanese and Muslim Rohingya. Although the mandate of the commission was to find "lasting solutions to the complex and delicate issues in Rakhine state," many, including Arakanese politicians and Rohingya militant groups, immediately turned a blind eye to the commission appointed to find solutions. The first thing the Commission tackled in its report was nomenclature—opting to use neither the term "Bengali" nor "Rohingya" to refer to the Rohingya population but instead use "Muslims" or "the Muslim community in Rakhine" on the advice of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Rohingya—the ethnic group living along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border—are referred to as "Bengali" by many in Myanmar, including the government, to infer they originated from Bangladesh and don't belong in Myanmar. Neither Bangladesh nor Myanmar recognizes them as citizens though the Myanmar government in the past registered some 700,000 Rohingya with temporary identify cards popularly known as "white cards." Myanmar has been practicing different categories of citizenship for a long time and does not guarantee equal rights to all its citizens. The Commission finds "the linkage between citizenship and ethnicity," has caused problems in Rakhine, it recommends to "re-examine" it. Different categories of citizenship create social injustices between majority ethnic Bamar and minority ethnic groups. Thus, the Commission recommends "the abolition of distinctions between different types of citizens" in Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law to align with "international standards and treaties." The final report says: "The law should be reviewed to ensure the equitable treatment of all citizens." With that recommendation, the commission kills two birds with one stone: Issues of citizenship and issues of ethnic identity. If everyone in Myanmar came under one category of citizenship, there should be fewer arguments over ethnic identity. It requires, however, the government to review the 1982 Citizenship Law. This recommendation might not sit well with both sides. Ethnic Arakanese have expressed concern over providing equal citizenship status to Rohingya in Rakhine State. Various protests against the government's citizenship verification process for the Rohingya community have been organized in Rakhine State. The protesters' fear was that if the Muslim community living along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border was gaining in population, they might occupy Rakhine territory in the future. The ARSA's claim that "Rakhine belongs to Rohingya," taps into this great fear of ethnic Arakanese people. On the other hand, the Rohingya Muslim community is reluctant to go through the citizenship verification process in Rakhine State as they lack trust in the government and can't envisage any tangible benefits—as mentioned in the final report. Practicing Basic Human Rights International media have long highlighted the plight of the oppressed Rohingya population in Rakhine State, who are denied basic human rights such as freedom of movement and access to health services and education. Violence in Rakhine State in 2012 which resulted in 120,000 internally displaced people (IDPs)—the vast majority Rohingya and many still living in camps—made headlines around the world. Rohingya IDPs are "almost entirely deprived of freedom of movement," the report highlights. Travel of non-IDP Rohingya is restricted by a lack of citizenship status. "Both communities face self-imposed restrictions emanating from the fear of neighboring communities, limiting access to farmland, fishing areas and markets," the report adds. The Commission highly recommends the government to ensure "freedom of movement and equal access to health and education" for all people in Rakhine State, irrespective of religion, ethnicity, or citizenship status. Myanmar was among the first 48 nations to sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by United Nations which recognizes human rights and fundamental freedoms—human rights should not be limited to one particular group, race, or religion. Rakhine's Delicate Reality The Commission finds "a sense of lawlessness along the border with Bangladesh." The Bangladesh-Myanmar border area has seen illegal trafficking in humans and drugs for many years. Uneducated and jobless young men, unprotected children and young girls living in refugee camps along the border become prey of human traffickers. In a graphic by the BBC, Bangladeshi and Rohingya trafficking routes are shown to originate in Cox's Bazar—home to Rohingya refugee camps on the Bangladesh side of the border. A report released by UN High Commission for Refugees in 2015 showed about 25,000 people, including women and children, were trafficked in the three months from January to March 2015—double the number in the same period in 2014. A US Department of State's 2017 report said transnational drug trafficking organizations operate within Bangladesh with underground operations stretching from Myanmar to India. Recently, there have been numerous reports in local media of vast hauls of illegal narcotics in Rakhine State. The Commission's final report highlights "drug smuggling is reportedly funding the activities of non-state armed groups, such as the Arakan Army (AA) and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)." The illegal drug trade is the delicate reality of Rakhine and has remained unsolved for decades. The Annan commission recommends Myanmar government to establish a joint commission with Bangladesh to discuss bilateral relations including "combating human trafficking and drug smuggling, and security cooperation to combat violent extremism." ARSA is using terror to claim Rakhine territory and using the lives of several hundred civilians as shields or weapons. "ARSA's violent actions inevitably will harm, not help it, despite its claims to be fighting the Myanmar state—and not Rakhine civilians—for the Rohingya cause," International Crisis Group pointed out in its recent report. If the real intention of ARSA is to save its own people—the Rohingya—and fight for their rights, it should not be using terrorist tactics. Rather than taking note of the commission's recommendations, ARSA is rushing to claim territory in Rakhine State and encroach on Myanmar's sovereignty. The question is whether ARSA really represents the Rohingya in Rakhine State. If it does, thousands of civilian lives are in danger. Speaking about the Aug. 25 attacks, Kofi Annan showed grave concern over the perilous situation in Rakhine State: "After years of insecurity and instability, it should be clear that violence is not the solution to the challenges facing Rakhine State," he said in a statement released on his website. If all parties involved turn a blind eye to the commission's recommendations, there will only be more violence. Mon Mon Myat is an independent journalist and graduate student at the Department of Peace Studies in Payap University in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The post Losing Sight of Solutions in Rakhine appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Myanmar’s Post-Panglong Problems (Part 3) Posted: 30 Aug 2017 07:27 PM PDT This is the third and final in a series of articles on Myanmar's peace process. Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) processes are only one aspect of the state building process that will need to occur in ethnic armed organization (EAO) areas; durable peace will only arrive when communities in EAO areas discern value in citizenship, and so a distrusted state must deliver health, education, and other services, and offer impartial protections, including the provision of land tenure. Education is particularly important: successful reintegration and enhanced livelihood security in EAO areas are fundamentally a question of human resources, the foundation of which is public schools. Across Myanmar, the educational system is in need of repair, and this is doubly so in many EAO areas. Education is supposed to create citizens as well as workers literate in a common language. A lack of vocational and technical training centers, not only in areas accessible to EAO populations, but in Myanmar as a whole, is also an urgent issue. These matters warrant much greater exploration— exploration that is beyond the scope of this analysis, however. Afghanistan amply demonstrates how both DDR and alternative livelihood programs fail when they are standalone programs occurring in areas lacking the administrative, service-oriented, and coercive presence of the state. The process of state building in insurgent areas will occur through an inflow of Bamar civil servants into these areas to deliver services, and this will also lead to resentment. As a rule of thumb, many EAO host populations will not possess the requisite human resource capacity to completely staff education, health, and general administrative posts. Business and capital, some of it exploitative, will follow. Migrants historically dominate local markets in newly colonized areas; Chinese already play this role in Kachin, while Naga markets in Northeast India are dominated by Marwaris and Biharis, and Han Chinese in Tibet. This can also cynically play into conflict resolution efforts, if it gives struggling ex-EAOs entities to levy extra legal taxes on. Myanmar's ethnic minorities—and for that matter, China's Tibetans, Indonesia's highland Papuans, Thailand's hill tribes, and others—know that uncontrolled in-migration will reduce them to minorities, with their cultures and lands subsumed by newcomers. James C Scott's engulfment— defined as the settlement of loyal (read: docile) populations with an existing "national" identity in areas where such identity was lacking among indigenous peoples— may occur as a part of an unstated but overarching government strategy to dilute the concentration of peoples with separatist tendencies in sensitive areas. Rich historical precedents exist, such as Manchu/ Qing settlement of Han Chinese colonists and soldiers in Southwest China: Han settlement into areas where they are not a majority has been a Chinese government policy that transcends types of rule, and its continuity from empire to republic to communist dictatorship to the present appears unbroken. Significantly, however, the greater the disruption of the previous demographic status quo, the greater the volatility, as is demonstrated by contemporary anti-state violence in Xinjiang and unrest in Tibet. Controls on migration will likely be sticking points in future negotiations, between the Union and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Karen National Union (KNU), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and United Wa State Party (UWSA) in particular. Lessons from Thailand: The future settlement of conflicts in Myanmar's EAO borderlands, either through Panglong or another forum, cannot be predicted, but the contours of a long path can be inferred from the recent experience of Northwestern Thailand, which only became integrated into the modern Thai state beginning in the 1960s. While Afghanistan's experience demonstrates how reintegration and alternative livelihoods standalone programs not synchronized within a larger state-building and service delivery exercise can often prove futile, Northwestern Thailand's integration into the Thai state confirms this. The region's hill tribe regions were developmentally and administratively ignored until the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) based itself there: hill tribe members served as CPT foot soldiers, and the exponential increase in poppy cultivation in hill tribe areas made many Thais perceive them as threats to the state. The government's defeat of the CPT involved coaxing CPT members to surrender, but unlike Myanmar, the Thai state's relatively strong position made the process a simpler one than the current context of EAO areas. In Thailand's opium-growing strongholds, much of them in then-CPT areas, poppy cultivation dropped from 12,112 hectares in 1961 to 281 hectares in 2015, and the opium trade shifted almost entirely to Laos and Myanmar. The historical success of Northwestern Thailand's incorporation into the state through both counterinsurgency and alternative development in formerly insurgent areas is not attributed to any one factor, but to a combination of many. Opium poppy cultivation there was not halted because substitute crops earned the same income as opium. In the Thai case, nothing equaled the price of opium to smallholder farmers, especially those without land tenure and the consequent inability to invest in longer-term crops: in 1984, 15 years after alternative crops and extension services were introduced, cultivation was again peaking, and the Thai authorities introduced forcible eradication and arrests in response. But alternate crops did provide income, especially through Arabica coffee. Despite the interference of middlemen and exploitative contract farming— problems for farmers across Thailand and Myanmar, not simply in opium cultivation areas— farmers did earn a living. But the end of illegality was aided by much more than new crops and price guarantees, and the presence of state security actors. The means by which this once remote area of Thailand was truly integrated into the state was through the provision of health and education services, the extension of roads, the provision of land tenure, and the assignment of civil servants to administer areas they were previously absent from— both the presence of the state, and people's perceptions that its presence was worthwhile. This success took generations. Myanmar's will as well: If Panglong 21 is a success, then it will only be because it serves as the foundation upon which services and protections for EAO communities are built. If Panglong 21 is the end of a process, rather than a beginning, then it will fail. Conclusion: The negotiated assertion of the power of the lowland state into state-resistant areas continues with the Panglong 21 peace process. Myanmar's borderland insurgents have replicated lowland state coercive power in order to fight the state. The egalitarianism discussed by Scott and others mainly exists in those armed communities which continue to resist the state, as they form and fracture over time. Many of these insurgents historically protected their communities from Tatmadaw incursions distinguished by violence, flight and impunity. Like states, they also tax and control the communities they protect. Many have resorted to criminal activities to survive, and also, profit. EAO communities have been caught between a rock and a hard place. Panglong 21 offers them a chance to be relieved of the pervasive insecurity and occasional violence they have been subject to for generations. It offers many of those who represent them less: what we witness in the insurgent offensives that began in Shan in November 2016 may be the last gasp of certain smaller groups and the beginning of serious negotiations between larger entities and the government. That process will see EAOs surrender some powers while retaining others: outlaws will legitimize, and a certain amount of post-conflict criminality from former militia and EAO structures will be tolerated as the price of peace. The peace process, if it works, will not be the end of an era of instability, but rather, the beginning of a different type of insecurity, and expectations must be managed. Transitional justice and other demands will prove to be illusory. No one should underestimate the long task ahead of both the government and the insurgents; it will take a generation, at least, before insurgent populations will find a place in licit economies, and before adequate services are provided. No particular program or step serves as a "magic bullet". The same infrastructure that will allow troops to travel quickly to quell unrest will also serve to reduce costs for farmers to get their produce to market and reduce times for people to access emergency care. That access, to name one example of many, gives people a vested interest in the state. And in many an EAO territory, that interest is lacking. It is exactly this type of social capital that the state needs to invest in EAO areas that will guarantee peace after Panglong. The state's presence will be measured not in terms of soldiers but by health, education, markets and opportunities. Bobby Anderson (rubashov@yahoo.com) is a Myanmar-based Research Associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own. This article originally appeared in Tea Circle, a forum hosted at Oxford University for emerging research and perspectives on Burma/Myanmar. The post Myanmar's Post-Panglong Problems (Part 3) appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
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