| Burma Army attacks and robs villagers in Muse Township Posted: 24 Sep 2015 06:15 AM PDT The Burma Army reportedly shot and robbed local people on Tuesday evening in a village seven miles from the Burma-China border gate in Muse Township, northern Shan State, according to local witnesses.
Using artillery, the Burma Battalion No. 99 from Pang Zai opened fire on Wan Kong Weng village in Maw Tong sub-township at about 5 p.m. on Tuesday, allegedly claiming that they were searching for Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) forces.
Witnesses reported that soldiers first fired into the surrounding forest and then began targeting residences. Over 10 houses were damaged or destroyed in the attack, but only one person was reported injured, as most residents were away for work.
"It was fortunate that no one was in the houses," said a Kong Weng resident who witnessed the incident. "Now the house owners are very afraid to stay." He added that some have left the area to instead stay with relatives elsewhere in Muse Township.
The same source added that a local woman, Nang Thi Thi Kyaing, who was driving by at the time of the attack, endured a gunshot to her right leg.
After the artillery fire, witnesses reported that Burma Army soldiers entered the village and looted local houses.
One local man, age 60, was at home when the troops came into his house. A soldier allegedly hit him with a gun and then took his savings from the residence: 50,500 Chinese yuan and 1.5 million kyats, an amount equivalent to almost $10,000.
Another household reportedly lost 1 million kyats worth of property and goods in the attack, or $800.
It has been reported that there was another clash at noon on the same day between the Burma Army troops and the TNLA in nearby Ton Karng village.
The TNLA Information Department also reported that there was further fighting between the Burma Army Battalion No. 77 and the TNLA Army Battalion No. 367 yesterday evening between Yae Pong and Marn Zawm villages, in Mongmit Township, in northern Shan State.
The TNLA army is one of the six ethnic armed groups which remain excluded from the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), the first formal step in Burma's peace process. The NCA is slated to be signed during the first week of October.
By SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N)
|
| Treaty signing preparation begins with a rocky start Posted: 24 Sep 2015 03:03 AM PDT The 20 September Sunday meeting, in Rangoon, was supposed to be a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) signing preparation meeting between all the regime's preferred 15 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the regime, but with only some 8 EAOs attending the gathering, it was unable to form necessary committees to go ahead with the government plans.
It seems that the regime has been in such a haste, probably for it is in the middle of election campaign and needs to produce positive result fast, that it has given only three days notice to the EAOs to appear before the preparation meeting.Notably absent were the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and Chin National Front (CNF), the two EAOs that have made known and committed to sign the NCA, buttressing it with a four party joint-statement ahead of the 5 top-level EAOs leadership meeting, which took place in Naypyitaw, with the President on the 9 September. The joint-statement, involving Karen National Union (KNU), RCSS, Karen Peace Council (KPC) and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) , has made it clear that they are for signing the NCA, with or without all-inclusive participation of all EAOs, original demand of the Law Khi Lar and Laiza meetings' resolution. Surprisingly the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), also known as Mong La, was present, which is seen as a Chinese proxy and closest ally of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), also a Chinese proxy. The Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) that has been considered a hardliner firmly anchored in United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) camp, some 11 armed ethnic organizations' military alliance, was also present, making the guessing game even more difficult. Whatever the case, it was reported that Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), SSPP, KNU, NDAA, KPC, All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF) were there at the Union Peace-making Work Committee's (UPWC)invitation. The Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) reasoned that the low turn out of the EAOs was due to the short invitation time span, which was sent out just three days before the meeting. And so, the preparation meeting would be moved to the 3 October, aiming the signing of the ceasefire treaty to be held in the middle of October, according to the regime's functionaries. But the government headed "Plan B" or open book signing – starting the signing of NCA with those who are in agreement, to be followed by others at a later date, according to the given situation – looks more and more likely, as the 17 EAOs leadership are still bogged down by the preparation of the upcoming summit meeting, to thrash out the NCA signing issue, during the end of this September month, probably in Chaingmai. In other words, this gathering is aimed to map out a common position on how to reply to the regime's pushy agenda of signing it by the middle of October deadline. One EAO leader likened the situation to the " Phook Mue Choke " Thai expression, where a man, whose hands are tied to be beaten up. Well-meaning, well-wishers have been doling out opinions from outright siding with the regime's advocacy of signing the NCA as it is – meaning: forsaking the all-inclusiveness of all EAOs – to the suggestion of EAOs, squeezing out more political concessions to a maximum, before signing the treaty. But the hard facts that the rank and file of such well-wishers' failure is to pinpoint the core problem of " political settlement " in a clear and unmistakable formulation, which is "power and resources sharing" through establishment of a genuine federal system. As all know, although this crucial theme has been mentioned in a couple of places within the NCA draft, such as the phrase "building a union based on democracy and federal system, according to the outcome of political dialogue". This has let the bulk of the EAOs, if not all, to consider that it is a wishy-washy interpretation without a clear-cut commitment and promises to build a political system, as historically agreed and envisaged by the founding forefathers of the union through the 1947 Panglong Agreement and promises. To put it differently, the ethnic nationalities' view of the need to first and foremost addressing and correction the Burmese political class breaching of Panglong Agreement in order to reach a durable political settlement is a legitimate concern, in every sense of the words. Having said that, the successive military regimes, including the present quasi-civilian regime of Thein Sein, continue to uphold the Bamar supremacy political system unabated, with some democratic trappings, coupled with the denial of an equitable political power-sharing and resources-sharing. The reason why the EAOs are so reluctant to go along with the NCA is because the regime is implementing its time tested "carrots and sticks" tactics to disrupt the achievement of a real nationwide ceasefire agreement. In other words, the regime is only ready to go along with its "negotiated surrender" ploy, but not a fair and equitable political settlement. Thus, the regime goes about with the strategic aim of maintaining its top dog position by implementing the policy of "area conquering and administration" militarily of ethnic homelands and also making use of the Unlawful Association Act as tactical tools to achieve its desirable results. The policy of area conquering and administration The strategic aim of the Burmese words "Nare Myae Soe Moe Yaye" could be roughly translated into "area conquering and administration", which has been used constantly and continuously to justify the Burma army's occupation of the ethnic homelands. And to add legal touch to the notion, it has applied another international term, by making use of international norms of protecting the infringement of " national sovereignty "; meaning: the infringement of the ethnic resistance forces on its national sovereignty rights. Thus, lending legitimacy to the Burmese military's occupation and militarization of the ethnic homelands, under the pretext of "national unity". But the problem remains, as the ethnic nationalities refuse to accept the sovereignty monopoly of the Bamar-dominated military government, covering the whole country. The ethnic nationalities rightly argued that they have the right to "shared-sovereignty" and have been struggling to regain their birthright sovereignty and rights of self-determination, which are hijacked by the Burmese military, with the aim of achieving their aspirations within the mould of a genuine federalism, where power and resources sharing could be equitably worked out between the dominant ethnic Bamar and the rest of the ethnic nationalities. And thus, the occupation of the ethnic homelands and reinforcement of the Burma Army continues unabated, while the NCA deliberation, whether with sincere intention or not, is moving parallel on a different track. One doesn't need to be so clever or even sophisticated, to imagine that such contradicting double-track approach could never work or deliver a genuine, workable ceasefire atmosphere, much less a genuine peace. Unlawful Association Act And as if to add insult to injury, the regime has openly and actively employed Sections 17/1 and 17/2, Unlawful Association Act, as a "carrots and sticks" tool to push for the EAOs into signing the NCA. UWSA was openly threatened that if it refuse to sign the NCA, it would not be given the right to participate in the political dialogue phase, besides being branded as an illegal organization. Likewise, NSCN-K and the rest of EAOs were also threatened. A keen observer from one of the EAOs said: "It is like the government is dangling carrots in front of our faces, saying that if we take the offer, we will not be attack, besides being able to roam the government controlled areas without harassment and of course, also allowance to do business unhindered." He said the logic behind the whole NCA is just to create a step, to pave way for comprehensive political settlement and not just to have some easy life for the leaders and roam the government controlled towns and cities. If the regime's aim is to threaten of withholding such privileges and at the same time, give some rights of doing businesses and move around country without harassment and ease, they are too cheap a bargain to exchange with the genuine political settlement. After all, he added, "Armed resistance is a form of politicking and not to be mistaken with some immediate personal or group material gains." But the logic and even the legal prospect of employing this Unlawful Association Act as a trump card could backfire, as Aung San Suu Kyi's legal advisor has pointed out rightly, when the KNU team met her a few weeks ago, that any agreement signed with an illegal organization would be nullified and void, as no such treaty could be legalized, without first lifting the unlawful association clause of treaty partner. But it seems now that President Thein Sein has, somehow, awaken to such possible legal implication, for a few weeks ago, U Aung Min has told various media outlets that the President has ordered to lift particular Sections of Unlawful Organization Act, for those who are ready to sign the NCA, before signing of the treaty take place. And thus, the barrier of bilateral ceasefire first, before being allowed to sign the NCA, imposed on Ta'ang National Liberation Army / Palaung State Liberation Front (TNLA/PSLF) might become meaningless, in the ongoing talks between the government and the said armed organization. Furthermore, the question arises, whether all the state and union level of some 39 ceasefire agreements that have been reached between the regime and the various EAOs, could be commended as legal, in an official sense. The problema of bilateral ceasefire agreement in relation with the TNLA/PSLF is more evident, as could be seen with the group's position reported below. The PSLF said that the government has promised and keen to sign a bilateral ceasefire agreement with its group, but not ready and would not promise the same offer to the Arakan Army (AA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as Kokang. According to 22 September DVB report, Ta Phone Kyaw of PSLF regarding the two left out groups, AA and MNDAA, said: " I believe, the NCA signing with just 15 plus 1 – government chosen 15 EAOs and PSLF – would not solve the problem. Battles are occurring with MNDAA and AA, which our troops – as allies – are also involved. That's why we can't sign the NCA without these two groups participation. It is our basic principle." Military engagement with the EAOs In a recent interview the BBC, on 21 September, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing when asked why the armed clashes reoccurred at the time of NCA deliberation, making some EAOs not to attend the regime's initiated 20 September meeting, replied that there were two or three places, where the battles were happening. They were Nam Hsang, Zang Pawn of southern Shan State, Palaung area of Hsipaw, Kyaukme and Burma-China border of Kyukok – Panghsai. But Min Aung Hlaing insisted that the Tatmadaw was not launching the attacks on the EAOs designated areas, implying that there were such demarcated areas of agreement, and that firefights occurred only outside of such areas. RFA report of 22 September said that fighting in northeastern Myanmar pitting Shan and Palaung rebels against government troops from infantry units 510 and 516 in Shan State resulted in the deaths of troops from both sides in Nam Zang and Yatsout (Lawksawk) townships, said Col. Sai La, spokesman for the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army. The same report said that clashes also ensued between government soldiers and Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) troops in Kyaukme and Mongmit townships, said Col. Ta Phone Kyaw of the PSLF. "The government army has been attacking us with five columns, and we have been fighting for three days," he said. "Three people from our side have injuries, and we heard that about 10 government soldiers had been killed. They have been attacking us with heavy weapons and fusillades." SHAN report on 18 September that the Burma Army Battalion No. 152, with about 45 troops, clashed with the RCSS/SSA at Wan Kong village, 10 miles from southern Shan State's Kolam Town in the sub-township of the same name. According to RCSS/SSA sources, three Burma Army soldiers were killed and one was seriously wounded. "The clash broke out at about six or seven in the morning," said Col. Sai La, the RCSS representative. "The Burma Army lost a lot of soldiers and then they used helicopters to fight against us." It was reported on 17 September by the Tai Freedom Shan language website that the military used the five helicopters to locate RCSS/SSA soldiers on the ground. Col. Sai La echoed an RCSS report released on 16 September, speculating that the renewed clash comes amid the Burma Army's efforts to take control of RCSS/SSA controlled-areas. The report describes a wider military strategy in which the Burma Army searches for and then attacks Shan troops in the region. Meanwhile, fighting between the KIA and government troops, which broke out earlier this month continues unabated, with no sign of deescalation. In sum, if the regime would like to make headway in a dignified manner, it would be well advised to seriously rethink its misled employment of defending national solidarity pretext to militarily suppress and occupy ethnic homelands; and the usage of Unlawful Association Act as a trump card, for the contradicting and legal implication would only nullified the whole NCA signing process. The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) – Editor |
| November election through ethnic lens Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:58 AM PDT As 8 November nationwide election draws nearer, the speculation, on how the ethnic political parties would fare and simultaneously able to address and achieve their people's aspirations, have been pushed further to the forefront, at least for the non-Bamar ethnic population, if not the whole length and breadth of the country.
Generally speaking, the political clout of the ethnic parties have not been considered to be such an important deciding factor in national-level political configuration. Regarding contemporary political development, domestic and as well international eyes were only normally trained on the two major Bamar parties – National League for Democracy (NLD) and Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). But this might be changing, for with the rising political awareness and available political space, the ethnic parties are now aiming to be a king-maker or a coalition partner and become part of the national political player, on the same level as those unelected military parliamentary representatives, that have 25% allotment, according the military-drafted, 2008 Constitution.
This means in case the two major parties failed to gather enough votes to form a government, they might either have to turn to the ethnic parties to form a coalition or to the the military faction.
Ethnic alliance parties
There are two ethnic alliance parties, fielding sizeable candidates for the upcoming November elections – United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) and National Brotherhood Federation (NBF).
The UNA has been around since 1990 nationwide election, headed by Khun Htun Oo of Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), when the Aung San Suu Kyi led National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory, in 1990 elections, coming out first and the SNLD second most winning party, but were refused to form government by the then military regime.
The UNA is comprised of 12 political parties that were formed before the 1990 elections, including Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Kayan National Party, Zomi Congress for Democracy, Mon National Party, the Rakhine National Party, the Kachin National Democracy Congress, Karen National Party, and Shan State Kokang Democratic Party, among others.
Three more parties have asked to join UNA, officials said, naming them as the Chin League for Democracy, Danu National Democracy Party and Rakhine Patriot Party, according to Myanmar Times report of 30 July 2015.
The NBF is a newly formed ethnic alliance coalition, founded in the aftermath of 2010 elections, with 5 ethnic member parties joining the fray and has grown to 23 ever since.
The NBF is made up of Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), Chin Nationalities Democratic Party, Phalon-Sawal Democratic Party, Arakan National Party, All Mon Regions Democracy Party, Federal Union Party (FUP), Kachin Democratic Party, ࠼࠻Tai–Leng (Red Shan) Nationalities Development Party and so on.
It has also formed Federal Union Party (FUP) in 2013, in an attempt to unite the country's ethnic groups under one banner.
The NBF elected members include 158 of the 188 ethnic party lawmakers across the country, including 24 seats in Naypyidaw's Upper House and 42 in the Lower House.
Spokesman for NBF, Saw Than Myint, said that the party intended to capture a quarter of Naypyitaw's 664 seats in November 8 poll. He was said to be confident that all the ethnic parties would win in their regions and the previous election results are the best example. Adding " Every ethnic party won in their regions and none of them can be defeated now, especially in Shan, Mon and Arakan", according to The Irrawaddy report of 22 July 2015.
The latest report on 2 September by DVB said the NBF alliance would field 710 seats nationwide; 381 in States and Regions, 116 National Assembly, 184 People's Assembly and 29 Ethnic Affairs Minister post.
U Hla Saw of the Arakan National Party said: " We believe that neither USDP nor NLD could not win decisively in Pyidaungsu Parliament. We, ethnic parties, are convinced that we will be strong enough in par as the USDP and NLD."
He further stressed that since Sai Mauk Kham from USDP is now the Vice-President. The next Vice-President should also be the one from powerful ethnic parties. Apart from that, during the 2010 election the ethnic parties had won 160 seats and that this time around the NBF believed it would win more.
The two umbrella ethnic organizations have tried to work out a compromise on how to avoid the overlapping of competition in elections, but were unable to do so. The same also goes for ethnic parties under the banners of NBF and UNA in trying to resolve this kind of overlapping competition among each other, across the country. As a result, ethnic alliance members would have to work out among themselves in areas where such overlapping exist during the election campaign.
Saw Than Myint of the NBF said that the alliance had entertained the idea of avoiding potential overlap in constituencies contested by its member parties, a decision was ultimately taken to allow member parties to contest freely rather than compromising, according to The Irrawaddy 7 August report.
"If we were to negotiate, there could be difficulties from each side," he said, without elaborating.
"[Some parties] will negotiate in some areas. Not at the arrangement of the NBF, but based on closeness. For example, in Mon State, the Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party and All Mon Region Democracy Party can negotiate with their own plan," Saw Than Myint added.
UNA would be going into the game with an aim to amend the constitution, while the NBF would strive for at least one quarter of the seat in the parliament, so that it could also become a "king-maker" in par with the 25% unelected, military bloc within the parliament.
The SNLD is a prominent member of the UNA, while the SNDP is also one of the leading member in the NBF. Apart from that the two groups also don't have a common framework for political dialogue.
Another political alliance, Federal Democratic Alliance (FDA) is made up of 13 political parties, including non-ethnic party like National Democratic Force (NDF), Democratic Party (Myanmar), Union Democratic Party etc., while the five ethnic parties are Kayin People's Party, Chin National Democratic Party and so on. As NBF is seen by some parties as too confrontational and oppositional, meaning perhaps to the USDP-Military regime, according to the report titled "Myanmar's Ethnic Parties And The 2015 Elections", written by Marie Lall, Nwe Nwe San, Theint Theint Myat and Yin Nyein Aye and funded by European Union. This paved way for the formation of FDA by those parties who were uncomfortable with NBF's political stand. FDA is considered as an alliance to be keen in cooperating, rather than confronting the USDP-Military regime.
According to Thu Wai, chairman of the alliance member Democratic Party (Myanmar). Thu Wai downplayed the possibility of its members fielding competing candidates, however, according to 7 August report of The Irrawaddy.
He further said: "We might have a little overlap in Irrawaddy Division, but we can't do anything about that. We might have to compete, with understanding."
Although FDA also strive for federalism like the NBF and UNA, it is not considered an ethnic coalition party, even five of its members are ethnic, due to the participation of Bamar opposition parties.
Union Election Commission (UEC) participation list and election bird's eye view
Myanmar Times report of 2 September, reflecting on the UEC's 170 pages complete candidate list predicted that the voter turn-out is bound to be high, with 32 million people eligible to cast ballots at 46,000 polling stations. But given the sheer scale of the event – 93 parties, 1171 constituencies and 6189 candidates – tracking the most interesting match-ups will prove a challenge for even the most dedicated political junkie.
The same Myanmar Times report listed a total of 93 political parties, which is a big jump up when only 36 parties enter the elections in 2010. Among this year's total, 46 parties were established after the 2012 by-election, while 11 parties were established between the 2010 and 2012 polls.
The following facts are a condensed version of the same Myanmar Times report on 2 September.
A quarter-century old parties are the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD); the Mon National Party (MNP); the National League for Democracy (NLD); the Democratic Party (Myanmar) (DPM); and the National Unity Party (NUP). Other than the NUP, however, all were declared illegal under the military junta and were re-established and re-registered only during President U Thein Sein's term.
One other party worth highlighting is The Women Party (Mon) is the only party to comprise only women.
Aside from the voters, the election's main protagonists are the candidates themselves, who number nearly 6200 according to the Union Election Commission (UEC).
The NLD is fielding the biggest team, with 1151 candidates, with the USDP trailing behind with 1134. Another large bid comes from the National Unity Party, fielding 763 candidates.
A new party with a strong slate of candidates is the National Development Party (NDP), which will be only five months old by election time, fielding an impressive 354 candidates, ranking the fourth-most candidate participation of any party. The party is led by former adviser to the president, U Nay Zin Latt.
Across Myanmar, 1171 constituencies are up for grabs. But it's not, strictly speaking, a national election, as no votes will be cast in parts of Shan State: Four townships controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and one controlled by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) will have to wait still longer for the transition to democracy to reach them.
While the NLD, apart from the above mentioned no voting areas, would not run in Teddim township, Chin State, honouring a long-standing agreement with Pu Chin Sian Thang of Zomi Congress for Democracy, the USDP will not compete in Yangon's South Dagon for the Pyithu Hluttaw; 14 places in Shan State; and eight places in Kachin State. The USDP has also chosen not to contest against the Union Pa-O National Organization and the Lahu National Unity and Development Party (LNUDP), which suggests an alliance with these parties.
The military's representatives in parliament – 25% of seats – are not decided by the public, but its influence also spreads into the parties and their candidates. Of the four biggest parties – the NLD, the USDP, the NUP and the NDP – all have substantial ex-military representation.
The NLD is usually portrayed as being in opposition to the military, but many ex-soldiers joined the party in its early days. U Tin Oo, U Aung Gyi, U Aung Shwe (party chair before Daw Aung San Suu Kyi) and U Lun Tin – former high-ranking military figures all – took the lead roles when the party started. Now, the party's central executive committee (CEC) includes former soldier and sitting MP U Win Htein, while the chair of the central campaign committee for the 2015 election, U Tin Oo, is a former minister for defence.
The USDP, NUP and the newly formed NDP are overwhelmingly all former military people, including the election referee, the UEC, comprises retired military officials, including chair U Tin Aye.
Ethnic Alliance the real third force?
The actual fourth ranking candidate participation party might be the NBF, which is fielding 710 candidates, rather than the NDP, with 354 candidates, as the UEC suggested. But if the breakdown as individual party is applied, then NDP would be correctly placed as the fourth-most candidate fielding party.
If one would do a simple arithmetic, according to the latest available data from UEC, the three sizeable ethnic parties combined would have a total of 489 candidates with 7.4%. The actual breakdown for the parties are SNDP with 211 candidates – 3.2%, SNLD with 156 – 2.4%, and Karen Pyithu Party (KPP) 1.8% – 122, respectively.
Furthermore, the NBF alliance 710 candidates, most likely drawing from the category of " Other political parties with less than 100 candidates", of which most small ethnic parties are categorized, would be a formidable force to reckon with, even if SNDP's 211 candidate count is deducted. SNDP is the leading member of the NBF.
But whether the NBF and UNA could keep their respective alliance members intact after, perhaps, winning the elections would be crucial to project their common ethnic aspirations. A further cooperation between the NBF and UNA would also be needed, if the ultimate goal of realizing a genuine federalism is to be achieved.
Thus, all will boil down to the fact on how the ethnic alliances would fare in the elections, in their respective areas, nationwide and to what extent they could cooperate and coordinate – between the NBF and UNA – to fulfil their people's desire and aspirations.
Ethnic Armed Organization (EAOs)
In the same vein, the EAOs are also as divided as the two ethnic political alliances – the NBF and the UNA. But the good thing about it is that the EAOs have been able to iron out their differences to a certain extent and still continue to strike a bargain with the regime, where the issue of "all-inclusiveness" is concerned.
The Karen National Union (KNU) led soft-liner group has been at odds with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) led hard-liner faction within the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) 16 members, which has been negotiating with the government for the past four years.
The so-called soft-line faction is made up of KNU, Karen Peace Council (KPC), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and later joined by the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) and Chin National Front (CNF), while the hard-liners are generally speaking, the rest of the 16 NCCT members. RCSS and ABSDF are not members of the NCCT.
The soft liners want to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) as soon as possible, so that political dialogue could begin, according to their argument. But the hard-liners desire to extract more political guarantee of agreeing to a national state-based federalism, before signing the ceasefire agreement.
In the end, as the government side is not prepared to yield more political concession and stick to its argument and vague position – " a union based on the principles of democracy and federalism", which could mean everything from the minimal to maximal devolution of the present presidential unitary system of governance, continuing with the present unitary structure, to the actual ethnic nationalities' demand of fully-fledge, national state-based federal set up.
It now seems, all these will be discussed only at the Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) and later thrashed out at the actual political dialogue phase. In other words, the most crucial core issue of national state-based federalism won't be included in the NCA, to be signed.
The last hurdle to sign the NCA is the issue of "all-inclusiveness", meaning from the point of the ethnic, that the regime accept all the NCCT members, plus ABSDF. The government, however, is still refusing six of the NCCT members to include as signatories, giving various reasons from not qualifying as armed groups according to its criteria, not having any armed engagement and infringing in national sovereignty. The said EAOs are Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army/ Palaung State Liberation Front (TNLA/PSLF), Arakan Army (AA), Wa National Army (WNO), Arakan National Congress (ANC), and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU).
The high-level five ethnic leaders – KIO, Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), KNU and New Mon State Party (NMSP) -, together with the three Ethnic Armed Organizations-Senior Delegation (EAOs-SD) collective team is, at this writing, on its way to Naypyitaw to iron out the pressing issue.
If the NCA could be signed before the 8 November election, the election climate could improve considerably, also lending President Thein Sein and his USDP more positive outcome and better credential to go into the election campaign.
But for the ethnic, the no-vote areas of four townships controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and one controlled by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) will remain unchanged. And most EAOs won't interrupt the election process, even though they don't agree with the 2008 Constitution and seeking to amend or rewriting it. For most see it as practice of democratization process, if not within the mould of their genuine federalism they aspire.
In Shan State, SSPP is morally backing the SNLD, while the RCSS said that it won't take side. But the way RCSS is related to SNDP, which is sympathetic and also participates in the drawing of FPD, under the RCSS, KNU headed team and endorsed by President Thein Sein initiated Deeds of Commitment signatories on 12 February this year, the RCSS neutral claim could be doubtful, even if this could really be the case.
Other than that the EAOs won't be able to involve directly in the November election process, much less to enter the political arena as political parties. For this have to wait until the next legislature period, which is 2020, depending on how the political dialogue progress plays out and if the second last phase political road map of "Pyidaungsu Accord" could be signed. Then the final phase of security reintegration, also known as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR), will be implemented, according to the outcome of the political dialogue. And only after this, the entrance of the EAOs into political arena, either as civilian or part of the union defence apparatus, could be worked out, according to the agreed procedures. In short, for now, the ethnic political parties would have the ethnic political space for themselves, without worry until 2020.
The Aung San Suu Kyi factor
To the dismay but not a surprise to the ethnic political alliance, particularly the UNA, Aung San Suu Kyi decided to go it alone, despite the hope given earlier that the NLD won't compete in its old alliance, Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP), constituencies. NLD has declared not to compete with Pu Chin Sian Thang, leader of the Zomi Congress for Democracy, in Teddim township, Cin State, honouring its long-standing agreement. Apart from that the NLD has no strategic deals with ethnic parties elsewhere, as some expected they would.
Recently, according to DVB 5 September report, Aung San Suu Kyi while campaigning in Pa-O self-administrative area of Hsi-Hseng, in southern Shan State said: " We, the NLD, compete in this election almost in all places; in states and regions. Concerning this some ethnic people have questioned us why the NLD has to contest in ethnic areas with their representatives and don't cooperate with them. In reality, we contest for we want to cooperate. Please let me explain. To make it short, if we want to change this country to a democratic system, NLD have to become government."
The VOA 5 September also report that Aung San Suu Kyi explained, why the NLD has decided to compete in the whole country, including all ethnic areas. She said: " It is like this, for the whole country 70%, 75% could be a secure base. The NLD has to compete in ethnic areas also because of this. We need altogether at least 70%."
Khun Htun Oo, leader of the SNLD, as if responding to the situation told SHAN, on 1 September, his party will not form a political alliance with other parties contesting in Burma's upcoming general election. He said: " In the past, we used to wait for NLD [National League for Democracy], for the possibility of forming a coalition, as we had the same goal to fight for democracy in our country. But now, we have made the decision that we are not going to make a coalition with any party. We will serve as an opposition party and stand on our policy in fighting for the rights of the citizens."
But toning down his "go it alone" stance later, in an interview with Myanmar Now, on 4 September, when asked what his perspective is on cooperating with Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy Party [NLD] in this election and beyond, he replied: "We used to work together with the NLD. We even joined the Committee Representing the People's Parliament formed by the NLD in 1998 [as the army ignored the 1990 election results]. The cooperation with the NLD benefited us. Some NLD leaders even recently informed me that the party wouldn't field candidates in areas where we are contesting in light of our comradeship. I was grateful for that as it is inappropriate for the NLD to take it all, since this would generate misunderstanding on the part of the ethnic parties. The NLD might do well to take the UNA [United Nationalities Alliance, a coalition of 12 ethnic parties] into account; my advice for the NLD is to collaborate with the UNA in the future."
Khun Htun Oo further stressed the NLD contesting in all ethnic constituencies, including those in Shan State, as follows: "That's part of being a democracy. If we say 'you can't come and compete in our areas because we want no rival,' then that is not genuine democracy. We also need to care about the public's freedom to choose [a party]. We need to open up choices for the public. There are many [ethnic politicians] who tend to complain about the NLD's plan to compete in their areas. But nobody is blaming the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party [USDP] in the same way."
Ethnic Alliances perspective
Looking at the situation of the two ethnic alliances, the UNA and NBF, it almost seems that their sympathy and loyalty are anchored on two major Bamar opposing, parties of NLD and USDP. But the reality might be more complex than this kind of assumption.
First, the SNLD led UNA, although sympathetic to the NLD is not totally committed to the coalition to it, partly for the NLD thought that it could manage better to win majority vote by going it alone than depending on an ethnic coalition partner like SNLD, even though 1990 elections had shown that it came out first in Shan State and second nationwide, just after the NLD.
The reason might be the reasoning that SNLD vote will be split between itself and the SNDP, which also had a good record of winning in 2010 election, coming out third nationwide after USDP and NUP. And as such, the NLD might consider, it is safer to ride on Aung San Suu Kyi popularity, even though a bit waning, to win more votes and come out on top. But SNLD, and as an extension the UNA, has leave the door open for eventual coalition, if the NLD win the majority or come out just in par with the USDP, producing a draw situation after the elections, with no party able to form a government on its own.
Second, the SNDP headed NBF said that it won't commit itself to any coalition during the pre-election time, but doesn't also rule out that there won't be one in post-election period. This could be out of tactical consideration for if it commits itself to the coalition with USDP, as many have been speculating, it could work against the party during the election, considering the fact that the military is being hated by the people. But still, even though the SNDP is near to the USDP, it is still unclear on how the rest of its alliance partners would think about it. Statements coming out from NBF functionaries indicate a strong pro-ethnic politics, and as such, it is also hard to believe that it would dance only to the tune of the USDP without question.
According to a member of the USDP management team who wished to remain anonymous, the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) and the 23-party bloc known as Nationalities Brotherhood Federation (NBF), has formed a coalition with USDP, Burma's ruling party. A certain SNDP representative denied this, calling such an alliance impossible, reported SHAN, on 4 September.
Whatever the outcome of the elections, the ethnic alliances and their member parties would have to navigate the political water with great care and sophistication.
The two Bamar major parties have their advantage positions to be used in and the aftermath of the elections. Generally, the USDP has all the tools necessary to maintain the military supremacy in the present quasi-civilian government, but has to be within the legal bound, if necessary. Just imagine the USDP is now fully controlled by the ex-military people; 25% unelected military MPs still sitting in the parliament, national and as well states and regions; and UEC, the election referee, is made up of all ex-military men; which are advantages that would likely be used to further the military monopoly of political decision-making power, if the going proved to be rough.
The NLD, with Aung San Suu Kyi as its leader could still command popularity, which could be transformed into victory in the upcoming elections, although various opinion have suggested that her charisma and popularity might be waning, due to her rejection of 88 generation group to run election under NLD banner; non-committal stance in ethnic conflict, especially in conjunction with the KIO-Military armed conflict; and total silence on the plight of the Rohingya or Bengali as preferred by the regime.
Under this prevailing circumstances, both the ethnic alliances would need to identify themselves with the ethnic people's aspirations. And all know what the priorities are.
The short term goal would be to bring genuine peace and normalcy to the ethnic homelands, which have been enduring decades of armed conflict, meted out between the ethnic resistance forces and the Burmese military, devastating their homelands and peoples. However, this is a two way street and as it takes two to tango, one can't perform the dance alone. As such, a compromise need to be found with the adversary, one way or the other, in order to be able to deliver. This, in turn, calls for the need of sophistication and proper, pragmatic calculation and many believe the ethnic resistance leadership is doing a good job at that.
The medium one would be on how to cooperate between the two alliances and as well, with one of the two Bamar, major parties, so that the much talked about federalism based on national state configuration could materialize. The talks of each ethnic alliance each taking side separately with two opposing major Bamar parties is not healthy and won't do any good for the concerned ethnic electorate or people. And so, the best option the two ethnic alliance should take is to position themselves as non-committal, neutral stance and wait for the election outcome, while trying to iron out the differences between themselves in order to serve the same people they are said to represent and advocating for.
The long range goal is, of course, on how to really implement the strategic aims of achieving a genuine federal form of governance and instilling harmonious living across societies and ethnic lines, under the motto of "unity in diversity".
Thus, whether the general strategic aims of the ethnic people could be realized or not will depend solely on how effectively cooperation and coordination between the two ethnic alliances, the EAOs as a whole and all stripes of civilian-based civil societies could be meted out, in practical terms.
Finally, a well known and famous columnist, Dr.Yan Myo Thein has recently pointed out, in 7 Day Daily, on 3 September, that the military has a strategy to contain the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, so that it could continue to stay on top of the political arena, but said the ethnic and democratic opposition have none. Perhaps, it is not too late to work out a compromised, "winning strategy", if the opposition could agree upon common goal, common leadership and common strategy on how to handle the phase of election and beyond.
The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU)-Editor |
| NAYPYITAW MEETING: Would ethnic coalition compromised posture lead to nationwide ceasefire signing? Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:55 AM PDT The ethnic leadership meeting from 21 to 24 August, in Chiangmai, Thailand, was supposed to be a showdown between the pro and contra factions of the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), on whether or not to sign the 7 August, Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) that was ironed out between the government and Ethnic Armed Organizations-Senior Delegation (EAOs-SD). But instead of a clear-cut scenario outcome, it turned out to be a compromised, combination of "yes" and "no". In German, there is a popular word for such situation. The word "ja" is "yes" and "nein" is "no" and the fusion of the two words becomes "jein", pronounced "yein", which means the combined meaning of yes and no. The ethnic leadership meeting outcome could also be termed as such. This "jein" position could be seen in EAOs Summit Resolution, Number 5, made at the end of recent EAOs' leadership summit meeting. It writes: "In the deliberation to sign the NCA, the leadership summit meeting decided to adhere to the all-inclusive principle and agreed to search for pragmatic implementation." The message here is the connection made between the two words "inclusion" and "compromise", which boils down to "pragmatism" and should be the key operational word for the ceasefire negotiation process. This in turn could be seen as not being dogmatic to the position of "all-inclusiveness" or clinging to it literally, according to the EAOs Summit Resolution. But "pragmatic" in this sense has a "jein" interpretation. For it means compromising the very stand of "all- inclusiveness" by excluding six of the EAOs, which are the ethnic coalition members. In a way, it could be taken as a rejection of the very notion of "all-inclusiveness" that it is professed to uphold or yielding to the demand of the government to exclude some of its members. Thus, it would be in order to imagine what this could mean in practical terms for the ongoing peace process in Burma. Apart from the above mentioned core decision, the eleven point resolution of the EAOs' leadership summit meeting mainly highlights the endorsement of the NCA that the the SD has worked out together with the Union Peace-making Work Committee (UPWC) at their 9th meeting. Other than that, it has decided that the EAOs' Chiangmai summit meeting would be taken in par as those of Laiza and Law Khi Lar summit meetings; all-inclusiveness notion to be implemented in pragmatic way; to fix the meeting date with the President and Commander-in-Chief as soon as possible; has chosen and entrusted the five EAOs leaders, together with three SD executive members; the Nationwide Ceasefire Negotiation Team (NCCT) is entrusted to continue with the deliberation and formulation of Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD), military Code of Conduct (CoC) and Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), among others. Pragmatism or giving in The sophisticated formulation of NCA was made more complicated as President Thein Sein has doled out invitations to 15 EAOs that his government accepts as signatories to the NCA, on 11 August. The EAOs were at that time only concerned with the issue of how to push for all-inclusiveness and have not expected the President's pre-empting their geared intention of bargaining for their position at the highest decision-making level. The EAOs leadership summit resolution of yes and no or "jein" position is due to consideration to compromise the hard line and soft line postures of the two camps within the EAOs. The hard-liners involved are Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) , New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), while the soft line, eager to sign faction is led by Karen National Union (KNU), joined by the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), which is not part of the NCCT or SD. KNU in its 14 August statement, prior to the recent EAOs leadership meeting said that although it is for all-inclusion of the EAOs in signing the NCA in principle, it won't stick to it literally and would accept the exclusion of the other ethnic coalition members, for various reasons, but would work for them to join the process at a later date, from within. The four EAOs – KNU, RCSS, Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Karen Peace Council (KPC) – joint-statement that followed 3 days later also emphasized the same KNU stated points above. Not surprisingly, the EAOs leadership recent statement also highlights the same position, stating that it would be pragmatic in pursuing it's all-inclusiveness stance, indicating that it won't stick to the position dogmatically, but would compromise if the regime would promise and guarantee that it would not attack the six left out EAOs and let them participate in the political process phase that would follow after the signing of NCA. Meanwhile, according to various news coming out from ethnic and government sources, the meeting will take place between the five top ethnic leaders, plus three SD executives and the government, on 9 August, in Naypyitaw. However, the question of how the gaps between the two parties could be bridged will be the main concern for the main actors from both camps, which will effect the fate of the whole nation. The bone of contention is on how to work out an agreement on the heatedly debated participant list, which both contending parties interpret it quite differently. The regime side wants to exclude six of the EAOs that are members of the ethnic coalition, while the ethnic leadership prefers to include it all together. At the same time, the EAOs leadership is not counting the four groups – United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), National Socialist Council of Nagaland -Khaplang (NSCN-K), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) – out of respect for their own decision, to only participate at the level of political dialogue, for UWSA and NDAA have maintained 26 years of ceasefire and don't think that it is necessary to sign another treaty. The NSCN-K reportedly is not interested to sign for its aim is to establish an independent country carved out from Burma and India, while RCSS is not part of the NCCT, ethnic coalition from the outset. The core concern of the regime, or rather the military, is to exclude the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), aslo known as Kokang, from any political equation or settlement. It has portrayed the MNDAA as infringing on the country's sovereignty and under the influence of the big neighbouring state, which has been categorically rejected by MNDAA. The regime however has indicated that out of the six excluding groups, the Arakan Army (AA) and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) might be qualified to sign the bilateral ceasefire agreement, although both parties have fought hand-in-hand together with the MNDAA, before participation in the ratification of NCA. The three remaining groups – Arakan National Congress (ANC), Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), Wa National Organization (WNO) -, will be allowed to be part of political dialogue phase, although it is not clear in what kind of capacity they will be allowed to participate. The reason for it is that the three groups have never had any military confrontation with the government, besides that they don't qualify as armed forces, according to the government' s criteria. Of late, news have been making the rounds that the ANC, LDU and WNO would be only allowed to be observers, rather than fully-fledged participants in political dialogue phase, according to the Myanmar Times report of 26 August. Armed clashes Parallel to these happenings, Burma army attacks have been ongoing or occurred recently with the KIA, TNLA and RCSS. The Irrawaddy reported on 28 August, that Tar Bong Kyaw,TNLA general secretary, told The Irrawaddy on Friday that clashes had occurred almost every day during the week amid an increased deployment of Burma Army troops in the area. "We have five brigades. They chased every one of our brigades and attacked our troops' bases. They even vowed to destroy our TNLA," said Tar Bong Kyaw, who claimed that Burma Army officers were telling ethnic Palaung community leaders in northern Shan State that they would "destroy" the TNLA in the same way that the government has largely crushed a rebellion of ethnic Kokang insurgents in the state's north-east. The same report also said that the military-owned Myawady news outlet reported that fighting broke out between the Burma Army and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) troops as well, on 26 August, in Kachin State's SumprabumTownship. On 27 August, SHAN reported that fighting broke out between the Burma Army and RCSS/SSA in Peng Khan and Wan Lao villages, on 25 August, when the Shan troops entered Kunhing Township after travelling from Namzang Township in southern Shan State. Min Aung Hlaing also renewed his verbal assaults on EAOs, mostly buttressing the usual message that they must surrender, after NCA signing, if political settlement and reconciliation should follow, which the EAOs rejected feverishly and bitterly. He quite recently also said, according to DVB 25 August report, that the MNDAA and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 4th Brigade must surrender. But shortly after the disgruntled complaint of most EAOs, the Commander -in-Chief changed tune from the immediate surrender of the EAOs after signing the NCA to implement security reintegration, only after obtaining the "Pyidaungsu Accord", according to the outcomes of political dialogue. Aung San Suu Kyi enters the fray Aung San Suu Kyi, head of the NLD and whose party is expected to win majority seats in this coming November elections, also enter the peace process fray, when she was reported to have told KNU advisor to the Chairman, Colonel Saw Htoo Htoo Lay recently that the EAOs should not sign the NCA hastily and should wait until after the election. This statement could be interpreted in a couple of ways. One would be that she doesn't like President Thein Sein to reap the political profit out of the NCA signing, and the other, she might like to indicate that a better deal could be made by waiting a little longer, when she could form a government after the election. Still, it could also be that she really cares that the EAOs cut a more inclusive and comprehensive deal, which would bring a lasting solution to the ethnic conflict and ushers the country towards a genuine federalism. Following accusations that she has been advocating for the hindrances of NCA, she made a sort of clarification that her intention has been to advice that meaningful and comprehensive ceasefire agreement should be achieved first, before signing it. Myanmar Times reported on 28 August that opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi urged armed ethnic organisations to quickly wrap up the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, but to also ensure that a sustainable deal is reached. "If we look carefully at the world's history, there have been many ceasefire deals that broke down after signing," she told Radio Free Asia (RFA) in an exclusive weekly interview program. "We all want a strong ceasefire agreement that will guarantee peace for our nation," she said. Naypyitaw meet For now, the scheduled Naypyitaw meet on 9 September is aimed at achieving a compromise, where the issue of all-inclusiveness is concerned, from the point of EAOs. But for the government, it has on many occasions and even recently has made it clear that the 15 chosen EAOs signing the NCA is, as far as it could go. In other words, there will be no changes on participant list. While the five top ethnic delegation would be banking on the all-inclusiveness of all its 17 EAOs to sign the NCA as a first step, it might be prepared to make concession that all six excluded members – MNDAA, TNLA, AA, LDU, WNO and ANC – be given the guarantee that the government won't attack them militarily, allow them to participate in political dialogue, give humanitarian aids and lift Section 17/1 and 17/2, Unlawful Association Act, as those who signed the NCA. Of course, whether such a guarantee, even if it is granted, would be adhered and honoured is a question that only time could answer. But if the union-level ceasefire agreements between the government and the SSPP and RCSS were to be taken as indications, the chances of adhering to the ceasefires would be quite slim. For after the signing the agreements, hundreds of fire-fights were registered between the two Shan armies and the government troops, whose pretext was said to be conducting area cleansing and inserting influence within the Shan State. The same is also true with the KIO, as numerous battles continue to occur, even after the armed conflict reduction agreement was signed between the government and the KIO, a few years ago. However, whether enough trustworthiness is available or not, the EAOs' pitch for such compromise would need to go along and give the regime the benefit of the doubt, simply as there is no other choice left. Given such a situation, the successful signing and ratification of the NCA would depend on if a compromise, based on political will and genuine political settlement, could be worked out by the two contending parties, when they meet in Naypyitaw within a few weeks. |
| To Burma’s Big Power friends: We need your support not meddling Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:47 AM PDT Burma has already been a Cold War battlefield between 1948-1989, which had cost the country tremendous loss in both properties and lives.
It took us two decades plus more to realize the folly in order to launch a peace process 4 years ago which, despite all the obstacles that we have erected by ourselves between us, is still ongoing. At present, we might say that the process is undergoing a bumpy period even without interference from our "friends." But when they are "advising" about what we should do and what we should not, things get more complicated as they were during the Cold War. One friend plays a subtle game. He is a long time foe to the country's rulers, who has since 2011 become a friend. As years go by, one can't help but notice that he is becoming more than a friend to our rulers, while at the same time less of it to the non-Burman underdogs. He has been urging the armed resistance movements to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) whether or not it leaves out some of the movements. What he should have done instead is tell the government to make it inclusive. In the meanwhile, there is the other friend who is not shy about telling us what he wants: - On 5 October 2011, there was a murder in cold blood of 13 sailors who were members of the friend's family on the Mekong. Ambassadors of Burma, Laos and Thailand were then unceremoniously summoned and "asked" to speed up their probe into the killing. The friend's spokesman himself conceded afterward that his minister "was not completely diplomatic."
- Less than two years later in February 2013, there was a meeting between representatives from the government and the armed resistance movements which was hosted by the friend. Everything went right until the draft agreement was read out. Then the friend demanded that some of the draft's wordings and substance be changed because he didn't like it, which both surprised and dismayed negotiators on both sides.
- The latest, but probably not final, straw was when the friend started to insist, both directly and through intermediaries, that we see to it that the other friend is not meddling in our internal affairs.
What it amounts to is that our big friend is telling us only he, and not others, has the right and privilege to have a say in everything we do. This is simply a demand that our country's rulers and leaders of the armed resistance movements should not comply. Not because we like the other friend better. But because we want peace, not only among ourselves, but with all our neighbors, far and near. Moreover complying to this friends' demand is most likely not going to end the problem. Because more demands will follow until we are completely gobbled up by the friend. What we all should do instead is that both friends allow us to sort out our differences by ourselves and then support us in whatever agreement we have reached. Burma, being a small country and jammed between big power friends is certainly not going to decide anything that is harmful to anyone of them. Because, no matter how strong and modern our Tatmadaw is, the country and its peoples can only live in peace only if they are friends to all their neighbors, both far and near. |
| Why are some groups excluded from Burma’s “inclusive” nationwide ceasefire? Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:45 AM PDT Fifteen ethnic armed groups are expected to be invited to sign Burma's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in the first week of October.
But the other five groups who comprise the membership of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), founded in 2013 to negotiate an end to longterm active conflict with government forces, will be left out of the ceasefire agreement. Hesitation regarding the signing of the NCA largely stems from an ethnic demand that all ethnic armed forces be allowed to join the ceasefire for it to be truly "nationwide" and "inclusive," as the agreement has been widely described. However, the Burma government will only allow groups that have already signed bilateral ceasefires to sign the NCA. The six organizations excluded from the signing are the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA), Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), Arakan National Congress (ANC), Wa National Organization (WNO). The Burma Army alleges that the three excluded armed groups—the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the ethnic Kokang's Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Arakan Army (AA)—are involved in continued clashes with government forces, making them ineligible for participation in the NCA. If these groups were allowed to sign the accord, they would receive certain benefits reserved for other signatories, including the retaining of arms for self-defense, removal from the national list of unlawful organizations, joint implementation of a code of conduct, joint monitoring of the ceasefire to prevent recurrence of clashes and participation in political dialogue. The other three groups have been excluded by the government under the pretense that they have no significant armed wings. This includes the Wa National Organisation (WNO), the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) and the Arakan National Council (ANC). An August 2015 report from Euro-Burma Office (EBO) describes the government's view of these groups as "not combatants." It would allegedly remain possible for them to join a political dialogue at a later date. This is somewhat in contrast to a S.H.A.N. report earlier this month revealing government threats to exclude groups from political talks if they refuse to sign the NCA. As for the other three excluded groups, the AA, MNDAA and TNLA, the EBO report explains government claims that these organizations were formed after the peace process began four years ago. The government view is that "including them will encourage a proliferation of more groups." EBO states that the activities of armed groups like the MNDAA "are seen [by the government] as a deliberate provocation to wreck the peace process." The Burma Army has stated publicly that they will not accept ceasefire talks with the groups allied with the MNDAA. On August 5, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA) released a joint statement inviting the government to hold ceasefire talks. They received no response. It is possible that the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) will be included as a signatory in early October, if it has finalized its own separate ceasefire agreement at the state and union levels. On September 15, the Myanmar Times reported that the government would eventually allow for the participation of all armed groups, but that such inclusiveness would happen "step-by-step." The formalization of such steps for excluded groups is yet to be seen.
By SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.) |
| The November elections: What the voters ought not to forget Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:40 AM PDT Once upon a time, when this country was still ruled by elected officials and a coup det'at was far from the people's minds, the following story was told and listened (but not heeded):
Youth: Grandpa, what's more important between lu (person, what a person is ) and mu (principle)? Grandpa: That's a good question, and I'm happy to answer it. But that horse-drawn carriage that has just passed in front of our house. What a horse! And what a carriage! Who do they belong to? Youth: Well, Grandpa. Who can they belong to except Mr X, our one and only millionaire in the village. Grandpa: You mean it's Mr X himself who's riding it? Youth: Oh, no. That's his son, X Junior. Grandpa: And where is he going? Youth: To the toddy-palm field to get drunk with his friends, as usual. Grandpa: I think Mr X is also using the same carriage sometimes. If he is, where does he go to? Youth: To the monastery to listen to the sermons by the abbot or to attend meetings to discuss village affairs. But, Grandpa, why are you asking these questions? Grandpa: My dear grandson, I'm not trying to sidestep your questions. On the contrary, I'm just trying to make you understand the difference between lu (what a person is) and mu (principles, policies). Principles and policies are like that horse and carriage. They may be both beautiful and sturdy. But whether they bring forth good results is up to the person or persons who implement (s) them. If you have a good and able person to implement them you don't need to worry where these principles and policies will lead to. But, on the contrary, if you have a mischievous and incapable person to implement them, having beautiful-worded super principles and policies won't get you anywhere. It is the same with having a good and able person with bad policies. No matter how good and able the person is, his policies won't do the countless needy much good. Youth: So you mean both lu and mu are equally important, Grandpa? Grandpa: Yes, I reckon that's what I mean. Youth: Thank you, Grandpa. We hope this time it's heeded. |
| The Peace Process: The Lady enters the fray Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:37 AM PDT You don't need to be a politician to know Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, under present circumstances, is not going to be our President for the next 5 years. That wasn't apparent in March, when the 7th meeting between the government's Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) and the ethnic armed organizations' Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) was held. The proposal to amend Article 59 (f) which bars anyone with children holding citizenship of a foreign country was yet to be resolved by the parliament which it did a few months later by rejecting the bill. On the third day of the meeting, 19 March, Yup Zau Hkawng, the happy-go-lucky leader of the Kachin Peace-talks Creation Group (PCG) was asked on the sidelines, "Who are you going to support for President: U Thein Sein, U Shwe Mann, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, or Senior General Min Aung Hlaing?" He was anything but hesitant about it. "We don't know who's going to be President, do we? "he asks rhetorically. "But I urge everyone to support any candidate that promises continuation of the peace process. Because without peace, this won't be a country worth living." The incumbent who met the 9 top leaders of the EAOs on 9 September in Naypyitaw certainly echoed Yup's words when he said, "We cannot move democratic transition without having peace." Now it looks like the President, who is also the leader of the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), isn't the only one who is working for peace. Aung San Suu Kyi, his most formidable rival, after years and months of silence on the subject, is coming forth with her position on the peace process. During her election campaign visit to Taunggyi last weekend, 5-6 September, she had toured two of its townships, where she promised to "prioritize the peace process and dialogue, and immediately work on it," if her party wins, adding that she would stand by her promise to convene a Second Panglong conference. "We will never break our promise," she said. For the non-Burmans, especially the Shans, nothing else is sweeter in their ears than the word "Panglong", and her resurrection of it is sure to win her votes, not a few if not overwhelming. She did take her time and timing to say that in public. In May, her party sent representatives to participate in the informal consultations on the draft Framework for Political Dialogue. Then last month, on 22 August, she received representatives from the Karen National Union (KNU), to discuss the ongoing peace talks. According to sources close to the KNU, she had made 3 major statements, among others: - The NCA should be signed before the elections
- The Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) should be agreed before the elections
- The political dialogue (PD) should start after the elections
Taking for granted that the information is correct, it means she wants the first and second phases of the roadmap —NCA signing and FPD drafting —over and done with during the incumbent's term while he has still a lot of pull with the military. Which seems to make sense, because overcoming the first two phases might prove to be a bigger challenge to her than the third phase — political dialogue — that may take a while— 5-10 years according to the Senior General — to finish, whether or not she's the government. As for the ethnic parties, most if not all, no doubt are for the peace process and Panglong. All in all, it thus appears whoever is going to win, the peace process is going to win. If so, it is now up to the people to decide which parties — USDP, NLD or the ethnic parties—will not only be working for peace, but also able to pull them through the long hard road to peace in our land. |
| The peace process: Say ‘No’ to closed minds Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:34 AM PDT One of the Shans' most well known politician-writer was Tun Myint Taunggyi aka Tun Myint Lay. He, in 1957, wrote on the Shan State's right of secession as bestowed by the 1947 constitution. There may be those who wish to remain in the Union. At the same time, there may also be those in wish to secede in order set up their own nations. Among the pro-Unionists, there may be found two categories: - Those who wish to remain because of self-interest, and
- Those who sincerely believe that it is in the interests o the people of their states to remain in the Union.
Similarly, corresponding categories in the opposite camp may be found: - Those who wish to secede due to lack or loss of private interests in the Union, and
- Those who sincerely believe that only through secession, will progress and prosperity be worked out for the Shan people.
Accordingly, one cannot at a glance denounce everyone who supports unionism of being opportunists, office seekers, and lacking patriotism. Similarly, one can also not accuse everyone who upholds secession of being traitors and imperialists' fifth columnists. Instead, each side should be open-minded, respect the right of freedom of thought and expression of other people, give the other side the benefit of the doubt and examine their arguments carefully. People in general must be encouraged to freely and broadly discuss the issue. The decision of the majority must be taken as final. To me the rise of the secession issue is a most valuable eye-opener for the Shan people. It will also serve as a criterion for Shan democracy. ('To part or to stay', 4 April 1957) Today we are also facing the same kind of situation albeit in a new twist: To sign or not to sign (the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, more commonly known as NCA). Those who want to sign are being accused as traitors and opportunists lining their pockets with millions of dollars from a certain foreign-supported NGO. On the other hand, those who are reluctant to sign are being charged as pitheads and puppets of a certain superpower nation. As could be expected, these often repeated but unverified allegations, in time, became gospels for many. As Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda chief, used to say: "If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it." Were they true, they would only be for a handful of people on each side. The majority are just who, in accordance with their experience and information available, have decided to stand on the side that they believe is "for the people." At this critical hour, slinging stones and mud from afar at each other through mainstream and social media is certainly not going to help. It is high time both sides invite each other, sit at the same table, to sort out the pros and cons of each side's position. Then we may be able to come to a decision that is indeed beneficial to the people. |
| Success of peace negotiations doesn’t rest on who’s right and who’s wrong Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:31 AM PDT Dale Carnegie whose book How to win friends and influence people became a high school text* after Burma's Independence, had admonished: When dealing with people, remember that you are not dealing with creatures of logic, but creatures of emotion. He learned that valuable lesson one night in London, after he unsuccessfully tried to correct a person who cited a quotation from Hamlet and mentioned it was from the Bible. However, the man stuck to his guns and absolutely refused to be corrected.
Carnegie's friend who was sitting at the same table and was considered an expert on Shakespeare, when asked for his opinion, kicked him under the table and gave his verdict: Carnegie was wrong. On their way back, his friend told him he was right after all. But he added, "Why prove to a man he is wrong? Is that going to make him like you? Why not let him save his face? Why argue with him? Always avoid the acute angle." Carnegie's counsel: You can't win an argument. You can't, because if you lose it, you lose it; and if you win it, you lose it. He then related about a truck salesman who was continually scrapping with the very people he was trying to do business with. To his credit, he often emerged the winner of his arguments. But there was another result: He wasn't able to sell any of his trucks to the prospective customers. So what does that teaches our leaders on both sides who will be meeting tomorrow? It is simple, according to Carnegie: The only way to get the best of an argument is to avoid it. I remembered it when I was recently told by a friend (I disremember whose side he is on) about a negotiator: "He is so clever that after he has made his statements, the other side feels trapped on every side. And as you know, sometimes a cornered animal may submit. But more likely it may try to attack you. So the best way to approach the other side is not to lecture the other side, but to call upon the other side's high self esteem and disarm him." Of course, Carnegie has something to say about it: Appeal to the nobler motives. The reader may also agree that the following quotations from the same book are applicable for our leaders: - Begin in a friendly way.
- Get the other person saying, "yes, yes," immediately (Start with something that each and both can agree to, he explained, because human beings' psychological patterns are such, when one says "No", the entire organism—glandular, nervous, muscular—gathers itself together into a condition of rejection. On the other hand, when one says "Yes", it will pull itself together into a condition of acceptance.)
- Never say, "You're wrong."
He quoted Lincoln who quoted the age-old maxim that "a drop of honey catches more flies than a gallon of gall." There is nothing more to say. Because saying more would amount to lecturing. This editorial is only meant to be a reminder for all of us, not a lecture. The rest, especially peace which has proven so elusive to the people of Burma, is up to our leaders, each one and all. May there be peace.
*The text book was translated by the late Premier U Nu. |
| Framework meet finds 3 key issues for peacemakers Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:26 AM PDT The sixth informal meeting participated by more than 50 representatives from government, parties, armed resistance movements and CSOs last Monday, 14 September, has confirmed that the country's leading stakeholders face 3 critical issues that they must overcome in order to reach agreement on the framework for political dialogue (FPD).
Agreement on the FPD is the second step in the 7 September peace roadmap drafted by the government's Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) and the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs)' Special Delegation-Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (SD-NCCT) on 7 August. According to the draft Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) accepted by both sides, the FPD agreement must be reached within 30 days after the NCA signing. The NCA signing is being planned for the first week of October. The informal meeting which began in May so far has found few problems on other key issues, which include: aims and objectives, principles, agenda, structures, sequencing of agenda and people's participation, among others. The said crucial issues that remain unresolved are: - Composition: how many participants from each grouping i.e. government, parliament, armed forces, EAOs and political parties
- Decision-making: vote-taking or consensus
- How to get the political parties grouping on an equal footing with the government-parliament-armed forces grouping and EAOs grouping that had drafted the NCA
- The general view of the political parties' representatives, which include the National League for Democracy (NLD), Federal Democratic Alliance (FDA), Nationalities Brotherhood Federation (NBF) and United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) is that the NCA has placed them in a subordinate status.
"A dignified and equal footing by the political parties needs to be guaranteed," said a representative from the NBF. Another political party representative suggested a drafting of FPD independent from the NCA. The meeting's response was a meaningful silence. One participant told SHAN afterward, "To say 'No' would be thoughtless. But to say 'Yes' would amount to the rejection of the NCA draft that took almost 2 years to finish." "After all is said and done, the final decision rests on the FPD (formal) conference to be held by the three parties (government-parliament-armed forces, EAOs and political parties)," concluded a representative from the technical support team. Another informal meeting is expected to be held, also in Rangoon, before the NCA signing. |
| Burma Army introduces use of helicopters in clash with Shan State Army Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:24 AM PDT Locals are concerned by the Burma Army's use of helicopters to monitor movements of the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) after fighting broke out on Wednesday morning in southern Shan State's Kolam Township.
The Burma Army Battalion No. 152, with about 45 troops, clashed with the RCSS/SSA at Wan Kong village, 10 miles from southern Shan State's Kolam Town in the township of the same name. According to RCSS/SSA sources, three Burma Army soldiers were killed and one was seriously wounded. "The clash broke out at about six or seven in the morning," said Col. Sai Hla, an RCSS representative. "The Burma Army lost a lot of soldiers and then they used helicopters to fight against us." The fighting continued until 10 a.m., he added. It was reported yesterday by the Tai Freedom Shan language website that the military used the five helicopters to locate RCSS/SSA soldiers on the ground. Col. Sai Hla echoed an RCSS report released on Wednesday, speculating that the renewed clash comes amid the Burma Army's efforts to take control of RCSS/SSA controlled-areas. The report describes a wider military strategy in which the Burma Army searches for and then attacks Shan troops in the region. "Villagers are now fearful because of the Burma Army's use of helicopters in the area. They are so worried about their security," said Sai Thurein Oo, the Parliament member representing Namzang Township. Since late August, seven clashes have been reported between the Burma Army and the RCSS/SSA in the Shan State townships of Namzang, Loilem, Kunhing, Mauk Mai, Lang Khur and Kyaukme. The RCSS/SSA also requested that political parties stop their election campaigns in the areas where fighting is taking place. A nationwide legislative election is scheduled for November, and the signing of a nationwide ceasefire agreement has been tentatively proposed for early October. By SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.) |
| Without NCA signing, No Political Talks for Wa Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:22 AM PDT The United Wa State Army (UWSA) will not have a chance to demand an autonomous state if they do not sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Accord (NCA), according to a senior Burma government official on Saturday in Kengtung, eastern Shan State.
Representing the Ministry of Defense, Lt. Gen. Yar Pyae said in a meeting with delegations from two ethnic armed groups—the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—that if the UWSA does not sign the NCA alongside other ethnic armed groups during the first week of October, they will be abandoned from political talks as well as lose the chance to demand a self-administrated state. The meeting was led by the government's Union Peacemaking Working Committee (UPWC) representatives, U Aung Min and U Thein Zaw to discuss the possibility of signing the NCA, a cumulative step in Burma's current peace process, which was launched in 2013. According to a S.H.A.N. phone interview on Saturday with a senior UWSA official, the armed group feels it is not necessary to add their signature to the ceasefire agreement, but are disappointed that this position eliminates the opportunity to participate in national political dialogue. "We have made a statement that we will not sign the NCA, because throughout the past 25 years there was no fighting between us," he said of UWSA and the Burma Army, referring to a 1989 ceasefire that the group signed with Burma's previous government, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). "We have been staying in peace. There is no point in signing the NCA." At approximately 20,000 strong, UWSA is one of the largest armed groups in Shan State. The UWSA-controlled area consists of two territories: one in Shan State's north, on the Sino-Burma border, and the other in the east, on the Thai-Burma border. The demand for recognition of an autonomous Wa state in this region dates back to the 1989 deal with the government. On September 9, the commander of Triangle Region Command, the Burma Army division located in eastern Shan State, held a meeting about the NCA where they urged the UWSA to participate in signing the agreement. But the UWSA's position has been known since September 4, when they released an official statement confirming that if the NCA was perceived as negatively affecting the rights of the Wa people, they would not sign it, and would only join the peace process for political talks. There are more than 20 ethnic armed forces in Burma, however, the government is currently allowing only 15 of these groups to sign the NCA. The Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Arakan Army (AA) are currently excluded from the ceasefire agreement. By SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.) |
| Burma Army Artillery and Knife Attack Kills One Villager and Injures Six Others in Southern Shan State Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:21 AM PDT An elderly woman was killed and six villagers were seriously injured in an artillery and knife attack on a Buddhist temple by the Burma Army on Saturday morning in southern Shan State's Loilem District, according to a S.H.A.N. reporter in the area.
The Burma Army Battalion No. 12, with about 40 troops, fired long-range weapons at Nong Bar Deb's village temple, 18 miles (29 kilometers) south of Loilem's Mong Pawn Township while locals gathered at the site to make offerings to monks in keeping with the full-moon day, a Buddhist holiday. After the artillery was launched, soldiers allegedly continued the assault with knives. A senior official from the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), an armed group who is active in the area, said that Burma Army troops first fired the weapons from outside the village at about 11 a.m. He reported that a local woman, Pa Kya, whose age is unknown, was pronounced dead immediately at the scene. Five others are currently being treated for wounds at area hospitals, and four more have been detained by the Burma Army, a local source confirmed. A male resident of Nong Bar Deb village who survived the attack explained that after the Burma Army troops shot into the temple, they entered the premises and chased villagers with knives. According to his account, another local resident, Sai Dong, age 40, was shot, rendering him unable to run. When he was apprehended, a Burma Army soldier then allegedly stabbed him in both his right leg and arm. After first attempting to get treatment at the local hospital in Mong Pawn, Sai Dong was transferred to Sao Jarm Tun hospital in Taunggyi, Shan State's capital, the following day. "His wounded is getting worse," said a nurse from Sao Jarm Tun hospital when asked to comment on Sai Dong's condition, which she classified as critical. The other villagers who are believed to have non-life threatening injuries are: Sai Sarng Shwe, age 30, with stomach wounds; Nang Kham Moe, age 30, with wounds to her hands; Nang Kaw, age unknown, with leg wounds; Sai Aik Pea, age unknown, with leg wounds; and Sai Mea, age unknown, who was wounded throughout his body. They all are being treated at the hospital in Mong Pawn. Last week, Mong Pawn Township was host to a clash between the same Burma Army Battalion No. 12 and the RCSS/SSA, allegedly killing three Burmese soldiers and one Shan soldier, as was previously reported by S.H.A.N. Last Friday, the Tai Freedom news agency reported in Shan language that seven villagers in northern Shan State's Muse Township were taken from their village by Burma Army. No news on their condition, location or release was available at the time of reporting. By Sai Aw / Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.) |
| Ceasefire agreement may only “reduce” fighting Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:19 AM PDT Until a dialogue begins, government peace affiliate and Shan army representatives fear episodes of fighting will continue throughout the region.
A ceasefire agreement may not end fighting, a Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) representative told S.H.A.N. on Thursday, following a clash between the Burma Army and Shan armed forces in a village one hour outside of Taunggyi which left four soldiers dead. MPC senior advisor U Hla Maung Shwe's comments came in response to reports of three casualties from the Burma Army Battalion 12 and one from the Shan State Army-South/Restoration Council of Shan State (SSA-S/RCSS) after fighting in southern Shan State's Mong Pawn Township on Tuesday. The clash occurred near Sam Bu village and was reported to have lasted over one hour. Sam Bu is 38 miles from Shan State's capital, Taunggyi. "No one can guarantee that there will be no fighting," U Hla Maung Shwe said. "We are signing [a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement] in order to reduce the fighting." After the military confrontation on Tuesday, the SSA-S/RCSS raised concerns about the conflict being exacerbated by a combination of increased militarization in Shan State and unclear boundaries between territories held by government and non-state armed groups. "I believe it is because we cannot avoid each other," said RCSS spokesperson Sai Hla, of why the fight broke out with the Burma Army in Mong Pawn. "During the peace process, neither side has designated which areas are for which group." He also claimed that the Burma Army is reinforcing troops in ethnic areas. "If they continue doing this, the fighting cannot be stopped," he said. On Wednesday, international media widely confirmed that Burmese President Thein Sein and ethnic armed group leaders now aim to sign an official and inclusive Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in mid-October—weeks after a date the government had proposed for later this month. As November's national legislative election nears, Aung San Suu Kyi, on a campaign visit to Hopong, southern Shan State, urged ethnic armed organizations not to rush to sign the NCA until it could be considered "long-lasting." "No fighting should break out again on the next day after signing the agreement," she said in The Guardianon Monday. U Hla Maung Shwe explained that he hoped a political dialogue would serve as an end to the country's ongoing armed conflict. "During this time, while we are trying for a political dialogue, the fighting can happen," he said. According to the steps outlined in Burma's peace process, after the signing of an official nationwide ceasefire, the framework for a political dialogue should be created and the dialogue initiated. This dialogue is intended to generate a peace agreement, which would need to be approved by the Union Parliament and, finally, implemented. |
| Sai Aik Pao: “The more seats SNDP wins, the better off Shan people will be” Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:17 AM PDT In a translated Shan-language interview conducted on September 6 in Taunggyi, Chairman Sai Aik Pao describes SNDP as a "true" Shan party and reveals a campaign platform intended to appeal exclusively to Shan voters.
Sai Aik Pao is currently the Shan State Minister of Mining and Forestry, the Chairman of the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), and the owner of a salt business. Aged 69 and born in Nam Kham Township, he will contest for a seat in the Amyotha Hluttaw—the Union Parliament's Upper House—representing northern Shan State's Kyaukme Township in the upcoming November election. He once served as the former General Secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), which was the frontrunner in Shan State during Burma's 1990 elections and earned the second largest number of votes nationwide, after Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD). Sai Aik Pao resigned from the SNLD in 2000. In 2005, the SNLD party leadership was imprisoned by the Burmese government, and remained so until 2012. This prohibited the SNLD from competing in Burma's 2010 elections. In 2010, the SNDP officially registered as a political party. Known locally as the White Tiger Party, SNDP won a combined 57 seats in the 2010 election and the by-election of 2012. The 2015 election marks the first time in which the SNDP and SNLD will compete against one another in the political arena. SNDP has announced that in November the party will contest constituencies in Shan State and in townships with significant Shan populations in Kachin and Kayah States and Mandalay and Sagaing Divisions. Question: What is the aim of SNDP? Answer: Our aim is to win the 2015 election. Of the ethnic parties, SNDP has the largest number of candidates. There are 207 candidates competing in the 2015 election. We will set up a government. We want Shan people to govern Shan State. Right now Shan State is underdeveloped compared to other states. I would like [SNDP] to be the Shan State government…I have said it for the past three years. As I am now a Minister [of Mining and Forestry]—I have seen the inequality of what the current government is doing. For example, the roads in Loilem and Lang Khur districts are very bad, but there is no development. If we are not the government, we cannot change anything. We cannot do anything for the Shan people. We will not be the government who only works for people in Shan State, but also in Kachin State…There are 11 townships populated with Shan people; we [SNDP] are competing in nine of these townships. We truly believe we will win in Kachin State. The present situation is better than in the 2010 election. In 2010, we won only two seats, one minister and one Amyotha Hluttaw [House of Nationalities]. We were not allowed to compete in Kayah State in the 2010 election, even though there is a large number of Shan populated [areas]. But in this coming election, we will compete in six of the seven townships in Kayah State. Q: Why is the 2015 election important for Shan people? A: It is very important. There has never been a truly Shan party competing in an election after Burma's independence. There are 330 townships in Burma and SNDP is competing in 68 townships. This election will change the fate of the Shan people. The more seats SNDP wins, the better off Shan people will be. Please vote for SNDP because SNDP is a true Shan party; the chairman of SNDP is Shan, the vice-chairman is also Shan. We are Shan-born families. We are 100 percent Shan. Therefore, we will [work] for our Shan people including those who are in Kachin State, Sagaing Division, Kayah State and Mandalay Division. If we don't have power, we cannot do anything. Therefore, we need power. Q: What will you do for the people if you win the election? A: This is very good question. I really want to answer this. Shan people have been through difficult [times]. Because of the uncertainty in the country, over one million Shan people have migrated to Thailand. I want to do many things for them. But first, there has to be peace in our country. What we want to do for our people economically, is, for example—we need to have agriculture, roads, electricity, health and education. …The big problem in Shan State is land confiscation. [Most] Shan people are farmers and most of their lands are seized by the military. The first thing I will do if SNDP become Shan State's government is to find jobs for them. We will focus on agriculture. I have learned many things from Thailand about agriculture. We will provide education about agriculture to the people of Shan state. Q: What have you prepared for the election? A: We have organized campaigns in every township. I want to tell Shan people: please, do not be confused. If the Shan want to support a true Shan party, that party is SNDP. I urge all Shan people in Shan State, Kachin State, Sagaing, Mandalay and Kayah State to vote for SNDP. Q: Which party do you think is the biggest competition for SNDP? A: I think it is the USDP and the NLD. But I really believe SNDP is a strong party because we get support from the people. Q: There was only one Shan party in the 2010 election, but in this upcoming election, there are other Shan parties: such as SNDP and SNLD. What are your thoughts on this? A: I have said that SNDP is a true Shan party. All Shan people also know this, but they just do not say it. I believe Shan people in Shan State, Kachin State, Sagaing, Mandalay, and Kayah State will vote for us. I am 100 percent sure. Q: You will be competing with SNLD. How do you feel about this? A: We are not competing as only two parties. There are other parties such as USDP, NLD and other ethnic parties that we are competing against. SNDP members number about 500,000; in Hsipaw Township alone there are more than 40,000 members. In Nam Kham Township, we have more than 20,000 members.*
* These party statistics were provided by Sai Aik Pao, but have not been confirmed by S.H.A.N. |
| No clean sweep for ethnic parties: TNI paper Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:14 AM PDT Ethnic based parties are unlikely to sweep the 7 ethnic states, concludes Transnational Institute (TNI) briefing paper, entitled Ethnic Politics and the 2015 Elections in Myanmar, which was published yesterday.
One of the reasons, unlike the 2010 where they only had to face the government proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), is competition from the nationally popular National League for Democracy (NLD) that is fielding candidates in almost all the available seats, 1,151 out of 1,171 up for grabs. Others include: - The prospect of vote-splitting among different parties belonging to the same ethnicities ("The choice for a voter is easy if there is only one party in their constituency representing their ethnicity")
- The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) is still yet to be signed which indicates that some constituencies in conflict areas are likely to be affected by polling cancellations shortly before the election day, which happened in 2010
- Also unlike big parties, many ethnic parties are facing significant financial constraints
- Equally important, in many ethnic borderlands, especially conflict-affected areas, there is very little interest in elections that do not appear to have tangible relevance for the challenges in most people's daily life
However, the ethnic parties number of seats can be boosted, if they could either agree to merge or agree not to stand against each other in the same constituencies, it counsels. In addition, the signing of the NCA could also provide an adequate insurance that there shall be no cancellation of polling. "To date, the only successful merger has been that of the 1990 and 2010 Rakhine parties to form the Rakhine National Party, which now appears poised to take a large majority of the seats in its state," the paper reports.
Nevertheless, there is a bright side to the upcoming elections, compared to 2010 or even 2012 say the paper: - The political climate in the country is significantly more open, with a fairly vibrant and generally uncensored media and greater civil liberties, as well as public confidence in using them
- Another is the close collaboration between the election commission international electoral support organizations which has helped to promote international standards
- Not last and not least is the cost of candidacy which has been reduced from K 500,000 to K 300,000 (about US $ 250). In 2010 it was non-refundable. But now, as in 1990, it is a deposit, refunded in full to winners, as well as to any candidate who obtains at least 12.5% of valid votes.
The TNI's recommendation that the elections are "closely monitored and openly pursued and that, whatever the outcome, it is not perceived as an end itself but another step in a reform process that still has a long way to run in bringing peace, equality and democratic rights to all the country's peoples." |
| “We need genuine competition and respect the public’s choice” Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:09 AM PDT In an interview with Myanmar Now, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy chairman discusses the upcoming election, political cooperation and rivalry, and the ongoing negotiations for a nationwide ceasefire.
KhunTunOo, 72, is an ethnic Shan politician and leader of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), one of the largest parties in Shan State. He spent many years in prison for his political activities after the SNLD, known locally as the Tiger Head Party, was one of the major winners in the parliamentary elections in 1990, the results of which were ignored by the military government. KhunTunOo and his party boycotted the flawed 2010 general elections, but on Nov. 8 they will contest in Shan State, Kayah State and Mandalay Region, with the aim of securing 46 Lower House, 14 Upper House and 96 regional legislature seats. The party leader himself decided not to run in the polls. In a recent interview with Myanmar Now reporter HtetKhaung Linn, KhunTunOo talked about the elections, the federalist aspirations of Myanmar's ethnic groups and the ongoing ceasefire negotiations between ethnic armed groups and the government. Question: Why did you decide not to run in the elections though your party is contesting many constituencies in Shan State? Answer: Many of our party representatives will be in parliament. For me, I would like to work in tandem with other political forces that are working outside of parliamentary politics. Constitutional reform is something that all political forces – those working inside and outside the parliament – have to work on by collaborating with each other. Efforts within parliament to strive towards that have recently failed. So, I believe that we have to find a way to work outside the parliamentary framework in cooperation with other political forces to achieve that [reform]. Q: What is your perspective on cooperating with Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy Party (NLD) in this election and beyond? A: We used to work together with the NLD. We even joined the Committee Representing the People's Parliament formed by the NLD in 1998 [as the army ignored the 1990 election results]. The cooperation with the NLD benefited us. Some NLD leaders even recently informed me that the party won't field candidates in areas where we are contesting in light of our comradeship. I was grateful for that as it is inappropriate for the NLD to take it all, since this would generate misunderstanding on the part of the ethnic parties. The NLD might do well to take the UNA [United Nationalities Alliance, a coalition of 12 ethnic parties] into account; my advice for the NLD is to collaborate with the UNA in the future. Q: But the NLD said it is now contesting in all ethnic constituencies, including those in Shan State. What do you think of that decision? A: That's part of being a democracy. If we say 'you can't come and compete in our areas because we want no rival,' then that is not genuine democracy. We also need to care about the public's freedom to choose [a party]. We need to open up choices for the public. There are many [ethnic politicians] who tend to complain about the NLD's plan to compete in their areas. But nobody is blaming the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party in the same way. I am not defending the NLD. It is imperative that honest and qualified leaders emerge and work for our country. I don't wish to say who should and should not run in a particular area. Even if our party wins in an area, it wouldn't do much if the elected legislator representing us is not on a par with the legislators of other parties in terms of qualifications. We need to have genuine competition and respect the public's choice. Q: How do you think SNLD will fare in the election compared to your main rival, Shan Nationalities for Democratic Party (SNDP)? A: The SNDP is our main rival in Shan State, where we we are contesting 50 parliamentary seats. Even though we did not compete in the 2010 and 2012 elections, we've started organisational activities three years ago. I don't wish to criticise other parties but as far as we've gauged, we stand very well in the public opinion. Another thing is we've never been embroiled in financial scandals and never had a bad reputation. That's why about 10 active MPs representing the other party (SNDP) left theirs and joined our party – as did ordinary members of that party. Unlike the other party, we don't require the party candidates to give $4,000 or so in compensation to the party if they were to switch to another party. Q: Recently, Shwe Mann was purged as USDP chairman by President Thein Sein in a nighttime incident involving armed police forces. What's your view of this development? A: I don't wish to comment on the party's internal divisions, but I would like to say the procedures undertaken [during the purge] are wrong. [Shwe Mann] is the speaker of the Union Parliament while [his rival] is the president of the country. What is the point of security forces surrounding the party's headquarters? Were there people inside the party headquarters armed with sticks and swords, or exchanging gunfire, so much so that the police needed to intervene? The allegation against [Shwe Mann] was that he was forging an alliance with the opposition [NLD] party. It's quite natural for parties to ally with each other because there are no rules barring that. Everyone one wonders what kind of democracy we are having when you order the speaker of parliament to stay inside his home. After observing this incident, the ethnic armed groups will think twice about signing ceasefire deals with the government as they can consider what might happen to them later. Q: So far, five armed ethnic groups have declared that they would like to sign a nationwide ceasefire accord with the government, while other groups have been hesitant. What do you think will happen in the ceasefire process? A: My understanding is that the nationwide ceasefire agreement must be all-inclusive. If the groups signs the deal then all other groups should follow suit. That was the consensus the armed ethnic groups achieved in the Laiza conference [in Kachin State in 2014] and Law KheeLah base conference in Karen State. Now it seems that six ethnic armed groups haven't decided whether to sign it, while fighting still continues between government forces and smaller armed ethnic groups like the Kokang, Arakan Army and Ta'ang (Palaung) and Lahu. If these groups are not signing the ceasefire agreement, then it calls into question how lasting the peace would be. To me, I find no issue at all with all these armed groups coming onboard to sign the ceasefire agreement with the government. We have experienced all the discriminatory tactics [of the government]. So, we need to allow a small armed group, even if it is formed with just 50 people, to sign the ceasefire too. [Editor's note: The government is refusing to let some armed groups sign as they are considered too small, or still actively fighting the army.] Q: There are a number of pro-government People's Militias in Shan State. Would they pose challenges to the political parties, including yours, during the campaign period and on election day? A: First, our party has no relation with these groups. As far as I know, these groups are not opposed to our policies. During a recent campaign visit in the town of Kalaw in Kayah State, a People's Militia group there heartily welcomed us into their office and expressed support for our demands for greater equality among all ethnic groups. Q: Currently, some ethnic armed groups are relying on natural resources in their areas. What is your opinion on sharing revenues of natural resources in the ethnic areas after a ceasefire is signed? How can it be done? A: The parliamentary proposal on this topic of decentralisation and distribution of natural resources did not win support. Some ethnic MPs called for power decentralisation and a system of sharing [revenues from] natural resources, 75 percent of which would be for local ethnic groups and the remaining 25 percent for the central government. The proposal was a failure. Forests have been wiped out, leaving nothing for the locals. That has been the case in both Kachin and Shan states. The same happened in the mining sector – gold mines and gems mines [are being depleted]. This will continue to create discontent among the local populations. The focal point is to amend the 2008 constitution [to improve resource sharing], as the ethnic people bear the brunt of [resource exploitation]. Q: If the ruling USDP party managed to form a government after the November elections, what would this mean for the federalist aspirations of the ethnic groups? A: If that is the outcome, then it would be challenging to hope for a federal union. The idea of forming a federal army would not translate into reality, nor can we achieve a genuine federal system. The federal system we will end up with may be "Burmese-style" federalism – we have already seen what "Burmese-style socialism" and "Burmese-style democracy" looks like. If there won't be the genuine federal union that the ethnic people have demanded, fighting would resume, undeterred by any sort of ceasefire agreement. Q: It seems that the incumbent President Thein Sein is hoping for a second term. What do you think of his attempt to stay in power and what would it mean for Myanmar? A: The military representatives [25 percent of the legislature] might nominate him as a presidential candidate. But the country remains plagued by corruption and the legal system is still fragile. President Thein Sein did not manage to tackle these problems. A host of other issues, like land grabs, political prisoners, detained students and environmental problems, pose great challenges to the country. It's time for all of us to contemplate how to achieve lasting peace. All these issues weren't resolved and even worsened during the past five years under the rule of President Thein Sein This interview was originally published on September 4, 2015 on the website of Myanmar Now By HTET KHAUNG LINN / Myanmar Now |
| Academic: Military pullout from politics when ‘hell freezes over’ Posted: 24 Sep 2015 02:08 AM PDT A Malaysian-based Burmese academic, speaking at the Chiangmai University's Faculty of Social Sciences, on Wednesday (2 September), told his audience he didn't think Burma's military was in a hurry to leave the country's political stage.
"No way," Dr Myint Zan said in response to a student's query. "But I hope we don't have to wait until hell freezes over."The professor of the Faculty of Law, Multimedia University, from Melaka (Malacca) who finished his doctorate in Australia, was giving a lecture under the heading "A (Past-Oriented?) Glimpse of Some Aspects of Burma/ Myanmar Ethnic Conflicts." He nevertheless was "cautiously optimistic" about the ongoing democratic transition in his home country. Touching on the well-known ethnic call for federalism that had prompted the late Gen Ne Win to take over the whole country under military rule on 2 March 1962, he recalled what the dilapidated former dictator told his colleague U Chit Hlaing on 27 July 1995. "Had I known (the standard Buddhist teaching on) Anicca (Impermanence), Dukkha (suffering) and Anatta(Non-self), I wouldn't have done what I had done in 1962." The other speaker was Dr. Nehginpao Kipgen, Policy and Research Consultant for Chiangmai-based Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center (ENAC) and Editor and General Secretary of Washington-based Kuki International Forum, who spoke under the heading 'Ethnic Minorities and Peace Process in Myanmar." He is a regular contributor to Thailand's Bangkok Post. He was frank when asked by a listener about the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which was finalized on 7 August and published in government-run media on 18 August, which marked the 4th anniversary of President Thein Sein's call for peace talks in 2011. "I'm not sure whether it will be signed before the (November) elections." The ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) 5 top leaders are scheduled to meet the President and the Commander-in-Chief on 9 September in Naypyitaw in an effort to clear what is considered the last stumbling block in their negotiations: all-inclusive signing or selected signing. The EAOs are for the former and the government for the latter. |
| KhunHtunOo: “We are not going to make a coalition with any party” Posted: 24 Sep 2015 01:48 AM PDT As the November election nears, Shan State's political parties explore and reject alliances.
The leader of Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) announced that they will not form a political alliance with other partiescompeting in Burma's upcoming general election."In the past, we used to wait for NLD [National League for Democracy], for the possibility of forming a coalition, as we had the same goal to fight for democracy in our country," KhunHtunOo, the chairman of SNLD, told S.H.A.N. on September 1 in Yangon."But now, we have made the decision that we arenot going to make a coalition with any party. We will serve as an opposition party and stand on our policy in fighting for the rights of the citizens." "We have learned that the reason why the ethnic groups cannot achieve their goal is because they have different perspectives on their goals," said the SNLD chairman, who is not running for election himself in 2015. "Because of this, we will be…working by ourselves. We will not join with any party." As the November 8election nears, partyalliances are explored as a political strategy to compete more effectively. SNLD is a member of the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), a group comprising 11 ethnic political parties and of which KhunHtunOo is the chairperson. The coalition proposed an alliance with the NLD in July, on the grounds that it would create " stronger ethnic representation in Parliament," as was reported in The Myanmar Times. The NLD did not respond. Controversies regarding coalitions have also extended to other regional parties. According to a member ofthe Union Solidarity and Development Party's (USDP) management team who wished to remain anonymous, the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP)and the 23-party bloc known as Nationalities Brotherhood Federation (NBF), has formed a coalition with USDP,Burma's ruling party.An SNDP representative denied this, calling such an alliance "impossible." Some Burma watchers have also speculated that a burgeoning relationship between former USDP leader U Shwe Mann and members of theNLD suggested potential for collaboration between the two parties. However, in late August, the BBCreportedthat NLD party leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyisaw U Shwe Mann as an "ally" but that "no formal alliance" had been established. The NLD plans to compete in most constituencies in Shan State and throughout Burma in the Novemberelections. The Irrawaddyreported in July that the SNLD is competing in all constituencies in Shan State and in selected constituencies in Kachin and Karenni States. |
| No Casualties in Unexplained Bomb Blast in Lang Khur Police Station Posted: 24 Sep 2015 01:45 AM PDT Explosion within a guarded police compound causes no deaths or reported injuries but raises questions among local residents
A bomb exploded in Lang Khur Township in southern Shan State yesterday, but caused no casualties, according to local Shan Herald Agency for News reporter. The explosion took place in the police station compound located on the main road between Bok Dai and Poong Toon village. Residents were reportedly informed by Lang Khur police officers that an explosive device was thrown by a person on a motorbike at about 1:30 a.m. on September 1. There has been no further information provided by the local authorities about the blast. Residents remain skeptical of the cause of the explosion. "It's not possible that someone threw the bomb into the police station compound," said one local man who wished to remain anonymous. "The police station is guarded with tight security." "It could have been planted a long time ago," he said. "It could explode any time…when the temperature is too high." Last month, The Myanmar Times reported that northern Shan State experienced an unexplained explosion on August 24 in Muse Township, the main border gateway between China and Shan State, where witnesses claimed a person on a motorbike threw a bomb at a local bank. Local ethnic armed groups were accused of involvement, an allegation which they denied. Despite a 2012 ceasefire, the Myanmar Peace Monitor reports that Lang Khur Township has since been the site of clashes between the Burma Army and the Shan State Army (SSA/SSPP). In 2012, it was also identifiedby the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor as a "suspected hazardous area" for unexploded landmines. By SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.) |
| Fortifying or Fragmenting the State? The Political Economy of the Opium Heroin Trade in Shan State, Myanmar, 1988-2013 Posted: 24 Sep 2015 01:42 AM PDT Patrick Meehan Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, UK Published online: 19 May 2015
Leaders in Naypyitaw, especially the Tatmadaw, may not agree to Pat Meehan's conclusion that the ongoing war on drugs waged by them since Independence is not working. But they should read his 30-page paper, if they are not going to have another 5 year extension in 2019. As the author sees it, the Burma Army's paramount self-appointed mission is to expand its control over every square inch of the country's remotest areas, especially in Shan State. Accordingly, "over one quarter of the entire Tamadaw is based in Shan State, eighty-nine infantry or light infantry battalions operate in southern Shan State alone," compared to single battalion during the British days. Military expansion that came after the bloody coup in 1988 was followed by the "live off the land" policy and "decentralization of command and concentration of ministerial authorities in the hands of regional commanders, which opened up opportunities for regional commands to engage in various businesses." Curiously this move was in line with what the celebrated Chinese warrior-philosopher Sun Zi wrote in hisThe Art of War: A wise general strives to feed off the enemy. Each pound of food taken from the enemy is equivalent to twenty pounds you provide by yourself. (Thomas Cleary translation) One of the army's income generators inevitably was opium. "In some areas the Tatmadaw has collected tax directly from poppy farmers, threatening to destroy crop if taxes were not paid. This was a regular practice in the 1990s when some taxes were even paid in opium rather than cash. More commonly, tax collection is managed through the village headman who has to collect a designated amount of tax from the community for the local Tatmadaw camp." Another significant move was the upgrading of the local militias who were granted immunity for their involvement in drugs "in return for fighting insurgency, ensuring local stability, and providing access to areas under their control. In this way, Tatmadaw battalions benefit indirectly from the drug trade by creating unofficial protection rackets that allow them to profit from their connections with the militias while keeping a layer of distance and subterfuge between themselves and drug profits." These self-financing counter-insurgency militia commanders were portrayed as "national races leaders" and their involvement in drugs glossed over as long as their allegiance to the government is assured. Indeed, many of them are "elected" representatives in the Parliament that came into being after the 2010 elections. This two-pronged strategy, "Tatmadaw expansion and formation of proxy militias have increased the territorial reach of state authority by securitizing remote areas and extending control over populations and resources in these areas. The construction of the oil and gas pipelines, which tread a path through former insurgent-controlled territory, would have been unthinkable a mere two decades ago. Today they embody the very tangible consolidation of state control." However, the author's analysis is that this type of "negotiated statehood" will not be stable, due to several reasons: For one thing, it is effective at "managing conflict rather than resolving it". To put it plainly, neither the issue of power distribution with the non-Burman states or the drug problem is resolved. For another, these coalitions between the military and the local armed groups "are likely to be at their weakest and most unstable," as shown by the breakup of the 20 year long alliance with Kokang's Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in 2009, following its refusal to become a Burma Army controlled Border Guard Force (BGF). The third is "the contradiction between localized strategies of state consolidation and internationally accepted norms of the 'proper' role of the state. This contradiction makes establishing durable and stable state-society relations through interaction with the illicit trade of opium problematic." One result is the entry of the "apolitical people whose sole interest in life is trade and profit" who thrive on war and conflict. "Over the years traders and investors have shifted their allegiance to whichever groups have proved best able to secure their access to opium and cross-border markets. In southern Shan State the investments have shifted from KMT networks, to the MTA, to the UWSA, and now increasingly also to militia groups with close links to the Tatmadaw." Reading and pondering over it, one cannot help but conclude that until and unless the root causes of the conflict—broken promises of Panglong—are properly addressed, Burma will continue to be headache and a nausea both to itself and the rest of the world. |
