| INVITATION: Professor Kenneth Holland of BSU to speak at JGU Posted: 16 Jan 2017 06:02 AM PST |
| 3 killed, 7 wounded by Burmese air strike in Kyaukme Posted: 16 Jan 2017 02:04 AM PST Burmese military fighter jets killed three villagers and injured seven others in a bombing mission in Kyaukme Township, northern Shan State, the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) said in statement released today.
 | | Photo by SHRF- Nang Khin Than Nu was injured by Burmese army air strike. |
According to SHRF, the air strike took place in Pang Mark Mur village on December 26 last year. It said that Burma's Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 506 used jets to attack the village.
"A bomb landed directly on the house of [villager] Lung Jeak Da, killing three men instantly, including Lung Jeak Da, and injuring two women, a 5-year-old boy, and another man. A cow was also killed," read the statement. "Three bombs landed around the village monastery, injuring four monks sheltering under the temple building. Apart from the monastery, altogether 16 houses in the village were damaged by the bombing."
Monday's report said that Burmese soldiers buried the bodies of the deceased immediately upon entering the village.
"The troops did not let the villagers hold a proper funeral ceremony," said the statement. "The bodies were simply wrapped in mats and buried."
Sai Hor Hseng, the spokesperson for SHRF, emphasised that human rights abuses, including killings and the destruction of private property, continue to occur across Shan State, particularly in the northern region.
"The government should take responsibility for these people's losses," he said. "Since this incident, there has been no report about support from the government. Only local charity groups are helping the victims," he said.
"Villagers are intimidated and afraid as the Burmese army is still stationed in their village."
Sai Hor Hseng noted that Yanghee Lee, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights, is currently on an official visit to Burma, but that Shan State is not included on her itinerary.
He said that the Korean diplomat's report on the human rights situation in the country will not accurately portray the abuses in Shan State.
Shan Herald has reported throughout the past month that hostilities between government armed forces and ethnic armed groups have compelled hundreds, if not thousands, of families to flee their homes.
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| To Hopeland and Back, the 25th trip Posted: 15 Jan 2017 10:38 PM PST (8-11 January 2017)
This time even before the journal on the 24th trip was properly finished, I was back in Burma/Myanmar again.
And since the strategic planning meeting, due 9 January, was postponed at the request of two signatory organizations, there was only a few other informal meetings left for me to attend.
As usual no individuals, organizations and places will be named so I don't end up killing the goose that is laying a golden egg for all of us each day.
Day One. Sunday, 8 January 2017
A great country is like the lowland toward which all streams flow. Hence, if a great country can lower itself before a small country, it will win over the small country; And if a small country can lower itself before a great country, it will win over the big country. The one wins by stooping; the other by remaining low. Tao The Ching, Chapter 61, John C.H.Wu translation
 | The government Peace Commission and the United Wa State Army, including vice chairman Xiao Mingliang, in Panghsang on Dec 30, 2016. / UWSA / Facebook |
My arrival in Hopeland is followed by mutual updates of information with friends. As always, I have much to learn from them, most of whom are younger, energetic and eager for peace.
Here are some of the things I have learned and would like to share with all:
§ During the December visit to Panghsang (officially, Pang-Kham), the United Wa State Army (UWSA) reportedly for the first time spoke about signing the NCA. Their problem however was with the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) which, according to the Tatmadaw's presentation at the (31 August-3 September 2015) 21stCentury Panglong, must come first. U Thein Zaw, the government's chief representative, was able to relieve their worry by convincing them that although the DDR first is the Tatmadaw's expressed wish, what is certain is that the EAOs would implement the DDR only at the 7th and final phase of the NCA roadmap.
For those who are unfamiliar with the NCA, an official translation of the political roadmap in the NCA is reproduced here:
The political roadmap
20. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Government and the Ethnic Armed Organizations shall abide by the following political roadmap:
a) Signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement b) Drafting and adopting the "Framework for Political Dialogue" by representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations. c) Holding national political dialogue based on the adopted Framework for Political Dialogue, and negotiating security reintegration matters and undertaking other necessary tasks that both parties agree can be carried out in advance. d) Holding the Union Peace Conference. e) Signing the Pyidaungsu Accord. f) Submitting the Pyidaungsu Accord to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw for ratification. g) Implementing all provisions contained in the Pyidaungsu Accord, and carrying out security reintegration matters.
(According to the 36 resolutions attached to the NCA, "security reintegration matters" means SSR 'security Sector Reform' and DDR)
The Wa leadership then proposed a visit to Naypyitaw to present a 7 point proposition to the State Counselor and the Commander-in-Chief, if possible, before the Chinese New Year (28 January).
NoteTo this date, the visit is yet to take place.
§ Relationship between the SD and the CinC has yet to improve, despite a meeting in November. which produced a statement eulogizing the Tatmadawmen. "When the hero and the heroine are locking horns against each other," says a friend, "anything can happen, like beating somebody up just to spite the spouse." That, several express concern, may adversely affect the peace process. § One encouraging but unconfirmed report is that the CinC was not reacting negatively to the idea of constituent states having their own constitution, after the inter governmental workshop on federalism was held on 13-15 December. "If he's going to go along with another one: The Right of Self Determination, that is the right to exercise three political powers (executive, legislative, and judiciary) in accordance with the agreed common principles for the Union constitution, the rest will be plain sailing," comments an academic. "Because other principles are just Ta-Nwe-Ngin-Tazin-Pa (Pull one string of the creeper and the rest will come along)." § The problem is that none in the room is sure whether or not the Union Peace Conference (UPC) #3, aka 21st Century Panglong (21CP) #2, is going to take place in February at all. Apart for the "lover's tiff" between the SC and the CinC, there is fighting up in the north, where China and Wa are suspected of involvement, and the UNFC saying if it is invited only as observers it won't come. Economy is yet another "big,big headache," calling for prompt action. "She needs some notable achievements," says one. "Right now, there isn't anything to show." § Interestingly, there is difference of opinion as to how powerful the CinC is: In 2011, when he was pulled up from the bottom of several other senior generals to become the Senior General by the outgoing Senior General Than Shwe, it was clear, he was entirely dependent on "the Old Man" to be able to command. But some think the situation has changed. "He has removed most of the officers senior to him throughout the past 4 years and replaced them with his own men," says one. "Today, if U Than Shwe speaks 100 words to him, I'll be surprised if he listens to more than 10 of them." Others however point out that incidents like the overthrow of U Shwe Mann, and later, U Thein Sein, as heads of the USDP, followed by the appointment of Gen Myint Swe as Vice President, wouldn't have come about without personal intervention by the former strongman.
All in all, everything seems to be hanging in the balance, some are betting that there'll be no UPC 21 next month.
One bright side is that the National level political dialogues (ND) is starting to take place, beginning with the PaOs and Karens. The Shans and others are due to follow soon. "We will know what our people want it said, whether or not there is a Panglong in February," declares a Karen friend. |
| AUNG SAN SUU KYI IS A DISGRACE Posted: 15 Jan 2017 07:37 AM PST There is an idea, widespread in some quarters, that criticizing Aung San Suu Kyi helps the military dictatorship - that it plays into the generals' hands. This idea is false. The reason it is false is because it is based on an incorrect assumption, that Suu Kyi is part of the Burma pro-democracy movement. (The underlying value is that in support of unity, we shouldn't criticize other members of the movement, even if we disagree with their tactics.) Suu Kyi is not - more accurately, she is no longer - part of the democracy movement. Amazingly, while she may head a government in which a majority of the MPs were democratically elected, she herself acts as a dictator. She personally sets all policy. Everyone in her party, the NLD, including in Parliament, must follow her lead. Notably, she has blocked any consideration of Burma's most important issues, including the genocide against the Rohingya, the Civil War in the North, and ethnic questions more generally. Indeed, the last reflects her long-standing lack of cooperation with the ethnic resistance groups. She avoids contact with ethnic nationality representatives (and activists more broadly), so much so that it is as if she considers them the enemy. She has also appointed many members of the military regime to critical government positions. And, she has purged the NLD, both in the past and since the 2015 general election, of officials who dare to challenge her authority. More fundamentally, Suu Kyi is not part of the democracy movement because she rejects its basic premise. A "movement" means opposition, in support of a cause. Movement members act to change what they view as wrong, and their actions involve both risk and sacrifice. In Burma, the movement opposes the dictatorship, starting with its security organs the Tatmadaw and the police, because it has perpetrated so many crimes and caused so much suffering. Suu Kyi had a choice when she assumed formal power (beginning with her election as an MP in the 2012 by-election). She could stand against the regime, or join it. She chose the latter. Suu Kyi's government does not oppose the dictatorship, even through the mildest of criticisms. Instead, she is actively working to cover up its crimes (most obviously through her office's Information Committee). The situation in Burma now is astonishing. Glowing reports about new economic deals notwithstanding, it is falling apart. There are so many things going wrong: The land thefts; the blockade on freedom of speech, starting with for the media; the new political prisoners, including those prosecuted under the notorious 66(d) provision in the telecommunications law, it just goes on and on. The Rohingya repression and the Civil War, though, have an entirely different character. They are crises. 65,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh since October. The stories of the genocide - the village destruction, slaughter and rapes - are undeniable. The Burma Army is even kidnapping Rohingya girls to keep as sex slaves. What Suu Kyi's beloved Tatmadaw is doing is despicable beyond belief. For the Civil War, the Army has engaged in unprecedented escalation. It has never before attacked from the air as it is doing now, on a daily basis, with helicopters and jets. The war in Northern Burma is at such a level that it is the most active conflict in the world after Syria and Iraq. The day-to-day aggression against the Northern Alliance, and the Rohingya, exceeds even the actions of the Taleban in Afghanistan. Because of Suu Kyi's censorship, there is virtually no media coverage. Even more, the silence from U.S. and European diplomats is solely due to her. They look to her for guidance. If she acts like something isn't a problem, then they can safely ignore it, too. Suu Kyi had her puppet, President Htin Kyaw, spout pro-dictatorship propaganda at this month's "Independence Day" observance. He said that the country has been a Burman empire for ages, which directly contradicts the fact that the Union of Burma only came into being through 1947's Panglong Agreement. Then, to add insult to injury, he gave awards for bravery to Tatmadaw war criminals. The ethnic nationalities need to think about all of this carefully. Suu Kyi and the generals have set a basic position that the ethnic peoples will always be second class citizens - subjects - of Burman rulers. According to Suu Kyi, the country is to have institutionalized racism, in perpetuity, not only against the Rohingya but against anyone who is not Burman. This means that the matters at hand extend well beyond the issue of the non-NCA signatories making their excuses not to attend the upcoming UPC. All the ethnic nationalities, including all the resistance armies, both signatory and non-signatory, and all the civil society groups, need to plan for a future with open, nation-wide conflict, and a situation where - as with Yugoslavia - only the breakup of the Union will bring peace. Suu Kyi's actions are destroying the viability of the Union of Burma. It is now possible that it will reach the point where the ethnic peoples will no longer be able to coexist with the Burmans. Conclusion What is happening in the country is Aung San Suu Kyi's fault. She is part of the overall dictatorship. She never, ever should have surrendered, by ending the election boycott. She never should have agreed to the end of the sanctions. By doing all of this, she stabbed the Burma pro-democracy movement in the back. Why has she acted this way? Why is her leadership so bad? One explanation is that she is getting old. She was afraid that she would lose her chance at power. (Other possibilities include Stockholm Syndrome, or even that she is in the early stages of dementia.) I think the deeper or core problem, though, is that she conflates herself with the nation. What is good for her is good for Burma, not what is good for Burma is good for her. She confuses the two, sees the world solely through her own self interest, which apparently is just to be a show leader in a country that is clearly still an absolute dictatorship. She goes to her meetings and thinks she is a big shot, and that Burma is normal. Since the genocide against the Rohingya and the Civil War mean that it is not normal, she has to ignore them, even deny them. Actually, she goes further. She swallows the dictatorship's lies. Maybe she really believes that the Rohingya are burning down their own homes and that all of the rape claims are false. Maybe she believes that the Sit-tut is "valiant," and that the Northern Alliance and UNFC are "insurgents." Maybe she believes "Burmans Uber Alles." Who knows. Who the hell cares!!! She is wrong. She has made the worst mistake imaginable, and she is too stubborn to admit it. She has made a deal with the devil, and now she is surprised that her own clothes are stained with blood. There is a simple fact. Burma will not be able to advance until Suu Kyi is gone. I'm not saying that it will advance when she is gone - the risks are profound - the dictatorship will of course continue to be brutal, the country may even split up. I'm just saying it cannot really and irreversibly get better until she is gone. She has personally blocked progress in an entire country for what is now going on 30 years. Link story : http://www.dictatorwatch.org/prsuukyidisgrace.html |
| Commentary on “Time for the NLD to change” Posted: 13 Jan 2017 08:27 AM PST There is no arguing that the National League for Democracy (NLD) need to change. But we should ponder on whether the micro-politics - formal and informal power by individuals and groups to achieve their goals in organizations - or macro-politics -decision making is conducted at district, state, and federal levels - is more essential to facilitate the "change" that the NLD had advocated as its "main campaign slogan" during its election campaign in 2015, in its Election Manifesto. To be logical and also from the point of facilitating to get things done, of course, both are equally important. Still, this writer is of the opinion that "macro" political commitment or theoretical underpinning should take the lead; or should we say the "grand strategy" of the party in power has to be in place. In other words, the grand strategy of the NLD that it envisioned and how it would like to implement must be spelled out, as is the case in all democratic society. Generally speaking, there are two major issues at hand that the NLD must tackle that are within the category of the macro-politics. One is rewriting the constitution and the other ending the civil war. It goes without saying that meanwhile everybody knows that the root cause of the country is anchored in the amendment of the military-drawn, 2008 constitution, which is neither democratic nor federal in a true sense of the words . And in trying to address this, which is to fulfill one of its election campaign promises, the NLD has drawn back from its commitment by saying that the peace settlement must come first and only after that could the constitutional amendment be tackled. It has clearly put the issue on the back burner or should we say, going back on its campaign promises. State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi's excuse of drawing back from the NLD's constitutional amendment with the pretext that it is a delicate matter and takes time is hardly encouraging for the electorates that have pinned their hope on her and the party she leads to usher in a speedy change. Again regarding another crucial issue of ending the civil war which is the national reconciliation pledge, NLD has done next to nothing to withhold the Military or Tatmadaw on not to conduct offensives in ethnic areas. It is clear that the NLD is powerless, but from the moral and ethnic point of view and as a government, it has to take up position to show where it stands. But this is not to say that the NLD or Suu Kyi is to be blamed for the past woes that have been carried into the era of her administration, as it is the "systemic problem" that has made the party so powerless. And by system problem, it is meant to say, the "constitutional crisis" that the NLD and the ethnic opposition groups have long identified. In a nutshell, the military-drawn constitution is anti-democratic and as it is, it cannot usher the country into a democratic one, much less a genuine federal union. Thus, it is the main source of systemic problem. And if we cannot tackle this problem at its roots, the country's spiraling fall into abyss of civil war followed by chaos that we won't be able to stop. The point is, if the NLD is unable to induce "change" as it has campaigned for, at least, it should be a leading "agent of change". Nobody is heaping the blame on NLD, but only as an agent of change, it is doing too little. What the Frontier Myanmar Editorial urging of "The ideal place to start would be a review of the cabinet and the replacement of ministers who are not up to scratch," is a positive suggestion, but the NLD would be better served, if it would play its role as an agent of change effectively., rather than just indulging in acts of appeasement by following the Tatmadaw's lead, especially where making war and offensives on ethnic homeland are concerned. In sum, for the remaining legislature period of its administration, the NLD should put its energy on macro-politic management as an agent of change effectively and not unclear political positioning just to stay in power, which in anyway wouldn't be able to deliver on its campaign promises. Link to the story : http://frontiermyanmar.net/en/time-for-the-nld-to-change |
| Myanmar Media and Society Project Working Paper 1:2 Posted: 13 Jan 2017 08:19 AM PST Dear friends and colleagues,
With apologies for cross-posting, I'm very pleased to be sharing Working Paper 1:2 from the Myanmar Media and Society (M.MAS) Project, written by me, Matt Schissler, and Ma Phyu Phyu Thi.
"Failed riots: successful conflict prevention in four Myanmar cities" looks at cases where large-scale violence was seemingly averted by the actions of particular groups or individuals, trying to draw some insights for conflict de-escalation and peacebuilding in Myanmar. Please feel free to share it with anyone who might find it useful or interesting. As always, we welcome comments and feedback. We hope to have a Myanmar language version published soon.
You can download the paper here .
The M.MAS home page is here , providing updates on the project's current second phase.
With best regards,
Matt Walton |
| Shans prepare for next ‘21st Century Panglong Conference’ Posted: 13 Jan 2017 02:16 AM PST Several Shan groups including political parties, civil society organizations and academics, will hold a meeting in late January in order to prepare for the 2ndround of national dialogue which is slated to be held in February.
The first round of the 21st-Century Panglong Peace Conference, known as the 21CPC, was led by Burma's State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, and was held on August 31 last year in the capital Naypyidaw.
Sai Lek, the spokesperson for the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), said this conference concerns every Shan nationality, and therefore their voices are needed.
"What the ethnic armed organizations (EAO) and political parties can do is raise the issues linked to ethnicity," he said. "The issues we will be discussing include politics, economics, social welfare, and land and national resources. We have already discussed security issues."
The meeting is scheduled to take place in Shan State capital Taunggyi from 23 to 27 January.
SNLD spokesperson Sai Lek, who also currently serves as general secretary for the Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU), a group comprising Shan political parties, Shan armed groups and Shan civil society groups, said that in order to hold the conference in late January they will need to form at least 13 working groups in order to engage public consultations.
"There will be 13 groups. Each group will consist of 15 members which include a team leader and a financial manager," he said, adding that each group will be expected to take a field trip to gauge public opinions. These public consultations will be held both inside and outside Shan State."
He elaborated in detailing these areas of public consultation: two townships in eastern Shan State; three townships in northern Shan State; and four townships in southern Shan State. Outside the region, talks will take place, he said, in Mandalay, Moe Nyin in Kachin State, Homalin in Sagiang Division, Loi Kaw in Karenni State, and Chiang Mai, Thailand.
On 11-12 December last year, Shan leaders held a meeting in Taunggyi to begin drawing up plans for the 21CPC.
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| To Hopeland and Back, the 24th trip Posted: 13 Jan 2017 02:05 AM PST Day Nine-thirteen. Saturday-Wednesday, 17-21 December 2016
Troops, backed by jets and artillery, capture Gideon outpost near Laiza. (AFP, 17 December)
I have breakfast with a Thai expert, who has been holding several technical workshops with a certain union ministry. "I don't know why I have been doing this," he says. "Because they have yet to implement the lessons they have learned. When I asked them why, they told me they could do nothing until there was a directive from above. And there hasn't been any."
It seems I have been hearing the same story in different versions from other people.
Starting today, we are holding a 3-day strategic planning workshop. And as strategic plannings go, they mostly talk about one's weaknesses, so ways may be found to overcome them.
Understandably, I'm not going to dwell on them much, not only because they are distasteful, but they also are supposed to be confidential. Except for the essentials, on a need-to-know basis.
So here we go:
§ The first step is to establish the main Aim (and what is behind it). A constitutional change in accordance with NCA Article 1.a and Article 22.d before 2020 elections § The second step, according to the 9 step method outlined by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation/ Stiftung (FNS), is to establish the facts, following by selections of strong points and weak points, both for others and yourself.
Here are some of the interesting points that the planners come across:
1. The powers of the PPST chair are still unclear 2. CT members wear too many hats 3. The UPDJC seems to be depending too much on relationship orientation than principle orientation 4. In the JMC, we have good relations at union level but poor relations in state and local levels, probably due to different interpretation of the NCA and the JMC ToR
During the three days of planning, the planners also focus on the strong points and weak points of the other side:
1. For the Tatmadaw, its empire building mindset is both a strong point and a weak point 2. The same for NLD, which despite being a party for democratization, is built upon "one blood, one voice, one command" discipline 3. As for the 3 levels of legislature, ethnic parties are poorly represented. (They should try to win the most at state level, and at least 25% at union level, remarks one. "Then, both the military and the NLD will be forced to negotiate with them for any change they want to make.")
Here are some of the interesting comments I overhear there:
§ The 2008 constitution assumes a human shape. But it still lacks the heart of a human being. This is what we must try to implant.
§ Federalism alone is not sufficient to roll back the role of dictatorship. We also need democratization to do that.
§ We should also try to make use of the present constitution to bring about change. Like, election of Chief Ministers, General Administrative Department (GAD) to be under state government, separate state finances, etc. Because complete change may take time.
§ Of the 5 Ms (Man-power, Material, Money, Management, and Morale), what we have is only the last M.
§ On 16 December, the State Counselor was reported to have said: Those who wield big power should also be big-hearted. But on the contrary, those who have big power don't seem to have big hearts. If she really walks her talk, then there is hope for peace.
§ On our side, we have divided ourselves into two different camps: One is made up of risk takers and the other sure thing operators. The result is, like Michael Jackson's famous moonwalk, we may be moving backward although we appear to be walking ahead. "That's what I call 'losing your way on a superhighway,'" quips one, who is the only guy in the room older than me.
§ According to one Chinese expert, it will be a long, long way to peace. So, to be on the safe side, the EAOs on the Chinese border who are still fighting against the government, will have to be tolerated so long as Beijing is unconvinced about Naypyitaw's friendship.
Unfortunately, we don't have time to complete the required steps. So 9 January is named the day for the next meeting.
For me, it means I leave for home the next day. Only this time, I'm flying to Tachilek, instead of Chiangmai, for I have a lot of friends, both old and new, whom I haven't met since January 2015. |
| China: Protect Ethnic Kachin Refugees Fleeing War in Northern Myanmar Posted: 12 Jan 2017 11:24 PM PST Prevent forced returns, allow humanitarian agencies unfettered access to displaced communities
(YANGON, January 13, 2017)—The Government of China should ensure protection for thousands of ethnic Kachin civilians fleeing ongoing armed conflict in Myanmar and prevent forced returns, Fortify Rights said today. Chinese state security forces reportedly forced back to Myanmar approximately 4,000 Kachin civilians on January 11, a day after they fled to China to escape fighting in Myanmar's Kachin State.
"China should provide asylum seekers with sanctuary, not send them into the line of fire," said Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer of Fortify Rights. "The Myanmar military is effectively forcing civilians out of the country while China pushes them back in."
On January 10, an estimated 4,000 civilians—the majority of whom are women, children, and the elderly—fled Myanmar military air strikes and heavy artillery attacks in the Nagyang area, which is close to Zai Awng/Mungga Zup and Hkau Shau IDP camps in Kachin State. The Joint Strategy Team (JST)—a collective of nine local organizations—reported that villagers from Hkau Shau and displaced civilians from the two nearby internally displaced person (IDP) camps began to cross the border into China at approximately 4 a.m. on January 11. Fortify Rights received reports that Chinese state security forces initially allowed some families seeking asylum to cross into Chinese territory. Shortly after dawn on January 11, Chinese state security forces began turning back refugees at the border and forcibly returned all who had crossed earlier.
Representatives of the JST told Fortify Rights that an additional 2,500 IDPs residing in Maga Yang IDP camp near the Myanmar-China border are also preparing to flee in light of recent attacks. The JST will hold an urgent briefing on the humanitarian situation at 1 p.m. today in Yangon.
Given the escalating conflict in Myanmar and the lack of protection in China, there is a growing sense of insecurity among Kachin communities living in the conflict zone.
"We are not allowed to go into China," a 20-year old displaced Kachin man living in Pa Kahtawng IDP camp near Maijayang town in Kachin State told Fortify Rights. "If a mortar falls in this camp and there is fighting around us, where will we flee? There will be nowhere for us to run. I'm afraid the Chinese government won't accept us. Whenever there is fighting around here, the border is full of Chinese soldiers and they won't allow anyone to pass."
Fighting between the Myanmar military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)—the primary ethnic armed opposition group operating in Kachin State—has displaced more than 23,000 people during the past several weeks. The JST reported that an estimated 2,560 IDPs fled Zai Awng IDP camp, north of Laiza, on December 27 after several mortar shells landed nearby. Similar attacks forced several hundred other displaced civilians to move from Mung Lai Hket IDP camp to Woi Chyai IDP camp in Laiza, the administrative capital of the KIA. In early December, the Myanmar military reportedly bombed churches, schools, and other non-military targets in northern Shan State during counter attacks against the Brotherhood of the Northern Alliance (BNA)—a coalition of four non-state ethnic armed groups, including the KIA. These attacks displaced 15,000 Kachin and Shan civilians, who likewise fled into China.
Myanmar authorities, including the civilian-led government, continue to effectively restrict humanitarian aid groups from operating freely in Kachin State and northern Shan State, resulting in avoidable deprivations of food, healthcare, and other humanitarian provisions for displaced communities.
"This is an abusive strategy. The Myanmar military is putting the squeeze on civilian populations, bombarding them with attacks while cutting off humanitarian aid," said Matthew Smith. "Chinese authorities should do the right thing and provide protection."
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee is currently in Myanmar on a 12-day monitoring mission and was in government-controlled areas of Kachin State while attacks continued closer to the China border. The Government of Myanmar denied the Special Rapporteur access to certain conflict-affected areas of Kachin and Shan states.
Fortify Rights calls on the Government of Myanmar to immediately grant the United Nations and international humanitarian aid groups free and unfettered access to all conflict-affected areas in Myanmar. Fortify Rights also calls upon the United Nations, international aid groups, and donor governments to redouble their support for Kachin-led relief efforts.
Armed conflict has raged in Kachin and northern Shan states since June 2011, when the Myanmar Army attacked several KIA outposts near a hydropower dam financed and operated by a Chinese company, breaking a 17-year-long ceasefire agreement. More than 120,000 ethnic civilians are now displaced and residing in more than 170 displacement sites in Kachin and northern Shan states.
In February 2015, more than 50,000 ethnic Kokang fled into China from Myanmar military attacks in Shan State, and Chinese authorities provided them with food, medical supplies, and shelter. Since 2011, however, Chinese authorities have denied entry and forcibly returned thousands of ethnic Kachin civilians fleeing fighting between the Myanmar Army and KIA.
Returning asylum seekers to a conflict zone without properly assessing the risks is a violation of China's obligations under international law, Fortify Rights said.
China is a state party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. As a party to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, China is legally bound to facilitate the right to asylum and ensure protections for refugees. However, China has yet to enact legislation to properly assess asylum claims and ensure protections in line with international standards. China is further obligated under the principle of nonrefoulement, which is protected by customary international law, not to forcibly return refugees to places where their lives or freedom would be threatened.
"In the past few years, Chinese authorities pressured Myanmar to deny the U.N. and aid groups access to border areas, and Myanmar obliged," said Matthew Smith. "Denying a sizable civilian population access to protection and aid is not only legally problematic, it's also against the interests of Beijing and Naypyidaw." For more information, please contact:Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer, +66 (0) 87.795.5454, Matthew.Smith@fortifyrights.org; Twitter: @matthewfsmith, @FortifyRights
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| 2017 Myanmar Update - Myanmar Research Centre - ANU Posted: 12 Jan 2017 07:04 PM PST The 2017 Myanmar Update will be held at The Australian National University on 17-18 February 2017. The formation of a new government in Myanmar, led by the National League for Democracy, is a crucially important milestone in the country's political transformation. This profound change is being matched by similarly far-reaching shifts in Myanmar's economic, social and cultural landscape. The 2017 Myanmar Update will address these multiple transformations. The conference will be hosted by the ANU Myanmar Research Centre, supported by the Department of Political and Social Change, in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs and the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. For further information, please contact the conveners: Chit WinResearch Scholar Department of Political and Social Change The Australian National University E chit.win@anu.edu.au Gerard McCarthyResearch Scholar Department of Political and Social Change The Australian National University E gerard.mccarthy@anu.edu.au |
| Burma army road-building project could cause conflict: SSPP/SSA Posted: 11 Jan 2017 05:29 AM PST The Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) say it is worried about a resumption of hostilities as the Burmese army reinforces its troop strength in the area as part of a plan to reconstruct roads.
 | | A map shows the location where the road will be built. |
According to an official from SSPP/SSA who spoke under condition of anonymity, Shan army representatives met yesterday with Brig-Gen Htet Htun, the head of Central Eastern Command, which is based in Kholam Township, Shan State. The sides discussed the road construction in SSPP/SSA territory, he said, adding that the commander said he will order troops into their areas of control whether the Shan army agrees or not.
"We, the SSPP/SSA, has been active in these areas before we signed a ceasefire agreement with the Tatmadaw[Burmese armed forces] in 1989," he said. "This road was built by us after signing that ceasefire with them.
"They said that they would reinforce soldiers in our areas whether we agree to it or not. This could cause a conflict," he told Shan Herald. "In 2011-12, they also attacked us.
"The way they are acting will disrupt the planned by-election in this area."
This road in question is located 10 miles north of Monghsu Township between Loi Nai and Loi Kyo mountains.
According to a source close to Central Eastern Command, Brig-Gen Htet Htun is expert in this region. He was previously head of Military Operations Command (MOC) No 2 which is stationed in southern Shan State's Mong Nong Township. The source said the brigadier-general has long held a strategic plan to build this road even before clashes broke out in 2011.
"He wants to start building it now, because the time is right," said the source.
During the general election last year, the Burmese armed forces launched heavy offensives against the SSPP/SSA, including assaults on its Wan Hai Headquarters in Kesi Township.
The SSPP/SSA, or Shan State Army-North, is a member of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), a bloc comprising 12 ethnic armed organizations that opted not to sign the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) with the Thein Sein government on October 15, 2015.
By Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)
|
| Commentary on "It’s time to close the vicious circle in the search for peace" Posted: 10 Jan 2017 07:34 PM PST Well said Sithu Aung Myint, when you wrote: "It does not help the peace process to stand for one side and blame the other." But the problem is when you insisted that " except for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD, almost all other stakeholders in the peace process stand for one side and criticise the other," I am afraid it is misleading. What about honorary, bravely title given to scores of Tatmadaw troopers at the Presidential Palace by President U Htin Kyaw, on 4 January – Independence Day, that have fought the ethnic armies, which are union citizens also? Would you consider praising and giving prize to one party, in the armed confrontation between union citizens, an appropriate act or a justified undertaking of the country's President? How would you answer Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's praising of the Tatmadaw, which she said were protecting the civilian, when exactly the opposite was happening on the ground, while blaming the Northern Alliance combatants, who are also union citizens? Don't you think, the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should be neutral and act as mediator, rather than siding with the Tatmadaw? Why is Daw Aung San Suu Kyi so deafeningly silent, when the KIA was subject to heavy bombardment, airstrikes and massive infantry assaults, three months in a row and blame the Northern Alliance, when they acted in self-defense? Would you consider the Northern Alliance counter-offensive an unjustified response? Finally, you know that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is dangerously navigating the troubled political waters, between clinging on to some limited ceremony power of State Counselor by giving in to the Tatmadaw's wishes on crucial matters like peace process and constitutional amendment and walking on a thin red line, with the possibility to be co-opted into the military camp any time soon. And last but not least, do you really think Daw Aung San Suu Kyi could deliver, when her hands are so tied up? You would need to ask and answer yourself the above critical questions, if you are to be proven an investigative journalist, at least, who is trying to be without bias, in shaping your opinion as a well known political analyst and commentator. Link to the story: It's time to close the vicious circle in the search for peace |
| THE FORCED-COALITION THAT DOESN'T WORK: The case of NLD-Military administration Posted: 10 Jan 2017 07:05 PM PST People are generally at a lost on why the National League for Democracy (NLD) party that won the 2015 nationwide election on a landslide couldn't deliver its Election Manifesto of political change that it has promised to the electorate.
The 2015 Election Manifesto clearly campaigned for the change of the people's lives, where the NLD promised to strive for:
· Ethnic affairs and internal peace; · A constitution that ensures that all the people of our country can live together in tranquility and security.; · A system of government that will fairly and justly defend the people; and · The freedom and security to prosper.
Regarding the ethnic affairs specifically, the Manifesto said the following actions will be taken for ethnic affairs and internal peace:
· Work towards a peaceful, prosperous and durable Union, through solidarity with all ethnic groups. · Hold political dialogue based on the Panglong spirit in order to address the roots of internal armed conflict and enable people to live in security and tranquility. · Strive for the establishment of a genuine federal democratic union based on the principles of freedom, equal rights and self-determination. · Lay down transparent projects for the balanced development of all the States and Regions. · Work to ensure a fair distribution across the country of the profits from natural resource extraction, in accordance with the principles of a federal union. · Resolve problems between ethnic groups through dialogue based on mutual respect.
But as all know, in addition to the Rohingya spontaneous uprising last October, followed by the drastic oppression in Arakan State that has received international condemnation and further tarnished the already nefarious country's image on human rights violations, peace in ethnic areas has not been forthcoming and instead just the opposite is happening.
The armed conflict that has been ongoing ever since the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) military regime, prior to the quasi-civilian Thein Sein government took over in 2011, continuing until today under the Aung San Suu Kyi headed civilian NLD administration. The situation worsened after the 21st Century Peace Conference (21CPC) was held, initiated by NLD, which was attended by most ethnic armies four months ago, as the Military or Tatmadaw went on with its heightened offensives in the Kachin and northern Shan State.
Last year, following the three months military onslaught on the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) positions in Kachin State by the Tatmadaw, the KIA, on 20 November last year, launched counter-offensive in Muse Township, northern Shan State, with the strategy to lessen the military pressure, together with the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) or Ko Kang and Arakan Army (AA), calling itself the Norther Alliance – Burma (NA-B).
The purpose of the NA-B counter-offensive was said to be also to project more visibility on the three Ethnic Armed Organizations' (EAOs) – MNDAA, TNLA and AA - demand for the participation in the peace process, which the Tatmadaw has decided to exclude and the NLD is powerless to go against it.
The counter-offensive only angered the Tatmadaw more, which led to the escalation of offensives against the KIA. To date, several KIA outposts along the Burma-China border, close to its Laiza headquarters, were overran by the Tatmadaw at a high financial cost and human toll as well. Speculations are that the Tatmadaw is determined to recover its lost of face from the NA-B counter-offensive, which showed its inability to protect one of its most important economic trading zone, by overrunning KIA isolated outposts manned by just few soldiers, at an extremely high cost.
The Tatmadaw has overrun seven bases in total, including two strategic mountain outposts - Laing Paung and Gideon.
Another crucial campaign promise of constitutional amendment or change by the NLD, which it said would fulfill is still nowhere in sight and it has been even indicating achieving peace is the first priority to the amendment task, indicating it has pushed the issue to be a back-burner, angering the electorates that have voted for the NLD to usher in a speedy change constitutionally.
It might seem if one looks generally at the prevailing situation, NLD leadership or the administration is to be blamed. But a closer observation shows that it is the "systemic problem" or failure that has made the NLD so impotent to pull through all of its crucial campaign promises.
Coalition partner and coalition contract
Although people generally are inclined to called the present government as being a civilian one, headed by NLD regime, the reality is, it is a NLD-Military coalition government. And with it, normally there has to be a "coalition agreement" or "coalition contract". But there has been none, whatsoever officially, and so one could safely say that the situation in Burma is a coalition government, without coalition contract. In other words, the most essential part or component in running the administration is missing, which is a glaring handicap to get things done in a coalition government, so to speak.
"In multiparty democracies, a coalition agreement is an agreement between the parties that form the cabinet. It codifies the most important goals and objectives of the cabinet. It is often written by the leaders of the parliamentary parties," according to the Wikipedia.
As all know the military-drawn constitution of 2008 has allotted the Tatmadaw or Military the three most important ministries of the country, namely, the home, defense and border affairs, apart from being represented by 25% MP seats in all levels of the parliament, without having to go through the election process. Besides, any crucial constitutional amendment would need more than 75% of the parliamentary representative's vote even to sail through the first motion, which means the constitution cannot be amended.
In a normal democratic system of governance, coalition governments are regulated to govern by a so-called "coalition contract", that is to say how basic, controversial issues that concern the government should be implemented through commonly agreed government programmes. And even if through such previously agreed issues or challenges would need adjustment or refining, according to the situation, intensive negotiation has to be considered and conducted between coalition partners to iron out the issues in question. To put it differently, a compromised directive that should be applied for the benefit of the country and the people have to be worked out transparently.
Looking at what has been happening on the ground, especially where the peace process is concerned, the NLD and the Tatmadaw doesn't seem to have any such consultation, much less a "coalition contract".
But as the coalition is a "forced-coalition", due to the military-drawn constitution and not a "voluntary-coalition" as in the real multiparty democratic countries, there is nothing much the NLD regime could do, to limit the power of the military bloc. And thus, we are pushed back again into the the arena of "constitutional crisis" or how to correct the flawed constitution, if this undemocratic way of doing things is to be addressed.
Because of the military-drawn constitution that seeks to empower the military bloc and control the political process, it could be taken as a non-democratic constitution. And trying to build a democratic society and federal system with an undemocratic constitution is next to impossible. Thus, whenever we start trying to think of formulating a federal and democratic system of governance, we will repeatedly fall back on the amendment or rewriting the military-drafted constitution.
It should be noted that the Military has repeatedly made known that it is strictly against amendment and is ready only to make minor, cosmetic changes and not the structural alteration.
Systemic problem
Seen from this perspective, the military-drawn constitution could be termed as the main source of "systemic problem" or failure the country is facing, as it is not built to create a democratic society as it has claimed but to control the democratic and ethnic opposition and maintain its group supremacy stance or political edge in Burma's political arena.
According to the vocabulary.com: "The adjective systemic is often used to describe diseases or disorders; a systemic illness affects your whole body or an entire system — like your digestive system. Any kind of system can experience systemic problems. For example, crime is a systemic problem in a community because it affects everyone from individuals to families, businesses, and tourism, just to name a few groups harmed by the problem."
Thus, systemic means affecting most or all of a system rather than a small portion of the system.
In an essay "The Necessity of Social Structural Change", Michelle Maiese wrote: "Since instituting fundamental social structural changes is extremely difficult, these structural and systemic problems are often a main cause of protracted, intractable conflicts. Indeed, any set of institutions and social relationships that deny identity, social recognition, autonomy, or preconditions for human development, creates an environment of conflict. Structural conflict is likely to result whenever patterned social relationships fail to satisfy basic needs or secure vital human interests. Any society that aspires to meet the needs of its citizens, deal with serious social problems and avoid violent conflict must address these issues."
The two core problems of ending the civil war and constitutional amendments couldn't be addressed as there is no agreed common programmes that would guide the coalition government's policy implementation and enforcement, which actually should be derived from the coalition agreement. As such, the NLD-Military coalition administration has been going about resolving the problems, each in its own way, with its own individual policy, without coordination and cooperation and sometimes even contradicting each other.
The cases in points are the issues of all-inclusiveness of all EAOs and ending the civil war, apart from the big picture of all-encompassing constitutional reform, even though the NLD has not explicitly spelled out its position. Further, it seems to be weighing the pros and cons of having to endorse the Military's position of exclusion, regarding some of the EAOs that the Military dislike; and its negotiated surrender position of the non-NCA-signatory EAOs, coupled with forcing them to sign the agreement, without consideration of any amendment from the non-signatories.
While this is not quite clear, the fact that Tatmadaw and the NLD never have common agreed position is a very clear general knowledge, the guidance and implementation of the government on pressing issues as a whole are non-existence.
Consequently, without the coalition contract, no control mechanism is available and both parties are just muddling through with the hope that one would be able to co-opt or out do the other, in the long run, at the cost of the people's aspirations of social structural change that they have voted for the NLD to fulfill on their behalves.
Thus the inability of the government to deliver is anchored in the "systemic problem", which in another clear interpretation could be termed as the "constitutional crisis", as all along have been identified by the ethnic and NLD camps as the root cause of the country's woes.
And without altering the weak points of the systemic failure or problem, that is embedded in the need for social structural change, the civil war couldn't be stopped, national reconciliation would be just a pipe dream and democratization process would remain elusive.
Perspective
To wrap up the argument, the NLD inability to deliver is because of systemic problem. And if it is to overcome the root cause has to be identified, which we have already pinpointed out as the need for constitutional amendments or rewriting it altogether. Thus, only the appropriate amendments and alteration of the military-drawn constitution will correct the systemic failure and the country would be able to move forward.
In sum, the NLD regime would be able to deliver, only if the constitution is amended that is in tune with the multi-party democratic system of governance, not the anti-democracy, half-baked hybrid quasi-civilian-military system of administration, that could only beat around the bush without coming to the root cause of the problem.
Thus gradual withdrawing of the military from the political scene, Suu Kyi advocated coaxing the military to give up its illegally held political decision-making power with knitted gloves, which would take years, are not the solution to the spiraling armed conflict and socioeconomic woes that need urgent attention.
The solution is to move from present state of chaotic to goal state of solution, And only then the undoing of systemic problem or tackling the social structural change could start.
"Bad governance is a form of injustice that must be corrected. Thus, one very broad type of social structural change is state reform and democratization. State reform must involve more than just reorganization of the administrative system or the system of resource allocation. These social structural changes should contribute to the establishment of participatory nation-building processes by fostering democratic development, nonviolent and just dispute resolution systems, the participation of the population, and rule of law," wrote Michelle Maiese. Her pointing out or underlining of the deep-sitting structural change is worth emphasizing. She wrote: "Constitutional reform can help political systems and the institutions within them to evolve in response to demands that reflect human needs. In the South African case, for example, systemic change came in the form of major constitutional reform and reallocations of power. The abandonment of apartheid is a prime example of major social structural change." Finally, taking cue from the South African experience, we should now deeply consider, whether we would like to conduct our peace process and structural change in a leisurely and non-committed way by beating around the bush, as is now the case, or take a bold, drastic and radical move by tackling the systemic problem at its roots. |
| Mantong villagers fear returning to conflict zone Posted: 10 Jan 2017 02:15 AM PST Some 150 villagers who fled their homes in Mantong Township last month due to fighting between Burmese government forces and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) say they are now afraid to go home.
 | A makeshift refugee camp in Hsipaw Township
where the villagers are staying |
According to Sai Win Aung, an aid worker who is assisting the displaced persons in northern Shan State's Hsipaw Township, the families are unwilling to chance going back due to the uncertain conflict situation.
"Although they [the Burmese army and TNLA] are not engaged in hostilities at this very moment, the situation is still very tense," he told Shan Herald. "The villagers are worried that if they go back and the clashes resume, they will be caught in the middle and unable to get out."
He added: "The villagers are also afraid of a new wave of conscription and tax collection in the area [by the TNLA]."
According to Nang San San Aye, an MP from the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) representing Hsipaw Township Constituency No 2, local community leaders have gathered to discuss ways to resolve the problem.
"As the villagers are unable to go home, we are now discussing ways to help them," she said. "We are also examining the possibility of expanding the village where they are sheltering or creating a new village for them, and we are checking to make sure it can be done in accordance with the law."
On January 5, Shan Heraldreported that since the beginning of January some 1,300 civilians from Mantong Township have fled their homes. They are currently sheltering at six camps in Namtu Township.
Civilians in the townships of Namsan, Namtu, Mantong, Kyaukme and Kutkhai have been regularly displaced since November 20 last year due to fighting between government troops and the newly proclaimed Northern Alliance, which comprises the Arakan Army (AA), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the TNLA.
By Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) |
| Challenges of teaching ethnic language in Burma Posted: 09 Jan 2017 05:28 AM PST In October 2016, more than 5,000 people took to the streets of Namkham, northern Shan State, when the township's education officials failed to pay ministry-allocated stipends to ethnic language teachers.
 | Photo Jai Jai Lao Mong- an evening Shan language school
in northern Shan State's Mong Ngaw Township. |
This was not the first scandal related to the teaching of native language in the region. A few years ago, a high school principal in a small town in southern Shan State was caught embezzling funds for the 2014-2015 academic year. After one of the political parties in town pointed the finger at him, the principal promised to return the money.
The corruption was fueled by the fact that ethnic language teachers are not paid monthly salaries like other teachers, and schools must apply for funds to pay them retroactively at the end of the year. This discriminatory practice is just one of many problems within the current system of ethnic language teaching in Burma that urgently needs to be addressed.
Ethnic language teaching was banned in public schools for four decades after the military seized power in 1962. To accelerate a policy of "Burmanization," the military regime adopted Burmese as the official national language and forced schools throughout the country to employ it as the language of instruction. Tutors and activists who taught ethnic languages were threatened or jailed.
Changes began after the 2010 elections and the opening up of Burma to the world. Beginning in 2012, ethnic languages were allowed to be taught in government schools, but only outside school hours, and with no budget from the Education Ministry.
But ethnic schools lacked textbooks. The government had arranged for Burmese-language curriculum books to be translated directly into ethnic languages, but no one used them as the translated texts did not follow the natural alphabet of the respective languages. A Burmese kindergarten textbook was translated into Shan by the Shan Literature and Culture Association, but never used. Ethnic literature and culture associations had to try to develop their own textbooks and then request they be authorized by the government.
Finally, after being banned for over four decades, ethnic language teaching was formally recognized under Article 44 of a new Education Law, passed in September 2014, which declared that "in Divisions or States, teaching of ethnic languages and ethnic literature can be implemented by state governments, starting from Grade 1 and gradually expanding [to higher grades]."
Schools were still only allowed to teach ethnic languages outside regular school hours, and only until grade 2. However, for the first time, a budget was allocated for this subject. Starting in the 2014 academic year, the education ministry began printing ethnic language textbooks which were mostly developed by groups supporting ethnic literature and culture. Initially, the texts were printed in color, but for the 2016-2017 academic year they reverted back into black and white, and were printed in a smaller size.
Over the past few years, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), working in cooperation with the government, has been conducting curriculum training for ethnic language associations so that they have the capacity to develop textbooks. However, the government has not taken any responsibility for ethnic language teacher training, which respective ethnic literature and culture associations have had to organize on their own, and many ethnic teachers have not had the opportunity to join.
A recent study by ethnic researchers, "The impact of centralized education in rural ethnic schools in Burma," focusing on eight government schools in rural Shan, Pa-O, Kayan and Kachin areas, found that in 2015 only four of these schools taught their own ethnic languages. Major challenges included a lack of teachers, negative perceptions by both parents and educators towards the benefits of ethnic education, and students' inability to attend classes outside regular school hours. In two post-primary schools in Pa-O areas in southern Shan State, Pa-O language was not taught. There were no native Pa-O teachers at the schools, and parents did not actively support their children learning their language, the report said, noting that parents and school committees were waiting for support from the government in providing teachers, while the principals, who were not from the local area, did not prioritize ethnic language teaching.
Similarly, two post-primary schools in Kachin State were unable to arrange local language teaching. Although local teachers were available, students were exhausted after their long official classes, and only a few could join ethnic language classes after school. When teachers tried to teach in the morning before school, students were unable to come earlier as they lived too far away.
The two post-primary schools in Shan areas covered in the study were able to teach Shan language, as there were local teachers available, and the school committees, including parents, were supportive of teaching their native tongue. Local villagers also contributed to the stipends of the ethnic language teachers, as government salaries did not come through until the end of the year.
Karenni language was being taught in the two schools in Karenni towns covered by the report, mainly by government-employed teachers, some of whom were not locals and did not speak the local language properly. This was following a directive from the Department of Education requesting schools provide opportunities for government-employed teachers.
This policy had encouraged some Burmese teachers to join Karenni language teacher training hosted by the Karenni New Generation Youth group and the Karenni Literature and Culture Association. While it was a positive step that these teachers were trying to learn Karenni language, it was unclear whether they were motivated by the commitment to the community or by the chance to earn extra money. A more effective policy, it was concluded, would be for ethnic languages to be taught by those naturally fluent in the language and with an understanding of local culture.
The designated salary for ethnic language teachers is significantly lower than for regular teachers. Ethnic language teachers are entitled to only 30,000 kyat (about US$23) per month for eight months, even though classes are taught for nine months of the year. Regular teachers are paid a monthly salary of 180,000 kyat ($138) throughout the year.
Evidently, ethnic language teaching is not being adequately financed by the central Union government. Even though Article 44 of the Education Law allows ethnic languages to be taught, the state governments are not being given authority to collect taxes to finance the proper implementation of this policy. The state governments have to rely entirely on the union government for expenditure, while resource allocation from the union-level to the state-level has no transparency or accountability. It appears the central government has no long-term sustainable vision to promote ethnic language teaching. Rather than having ethnic languages taught out of school hours, mother-tongue-based multilingual education should be practiced, giving every student the chance to learn their own language at school. Schools should also have the authority to decide how many languages they teach, depending on the ethnicity of their students, and to recruit teachers based on their needs.
The current top-down approach is ineffective and ignores the interests of local people. Only a decentralized, bottom-up approach towards ethnic language teaching will promote peace and sustainable educational development in Burma.
By Mwe Khur |
| ROHINGYA GENOCIDE TIMELINE Posted: 08 Jan 2017 07:41 AM PST There have been many developments with the genocide of the Rohingya people of Burma, so many in fact that it is easy to lose track. This update is a summary of the most important events. The Rohingya have suffered periodic bouts of severe repression dating back decades, at the hands of both the military dictatorship and racists among the Rakhine community with which they share Arakan State. Hundreds of thousands had fled to Bangladesh, with many still living there in squalid refugee camps, and with others having moved further afield notably to Malaysia and throughout the Middle East (the Rohingya diaspora). The latest repression began in the summer of 2012, when Rohingya men were falsely accused of raping a Rakhine woman. This led to riots and slaughter - a series of anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim pogroms not only in Arakan State but in other parts of the country as well. Over 140,000 Rohingya were driven from their homes, with the majority moving to internally displaced person camps, which are nothing less than concentration camps. The rest fled to Bangladesh or were trafficked to Thailand, with hundreds dying at sea or being abused and then killed in forest camps near the border of Malaysia. This repression was ideologically motivated by racist Buddhist monks, notably Wirathu, and with the backing of the military dictatorship. It was state-sanctioned and organized violence. At this time, Aung San Suu Kyi was a new MP, having just won her seat in a by-election. She chose not to speak out about the violence, which inaction was generally presumed to reflect a fear of angering both the military and the faction of her followers who agreed with the racist monks (some of whom no doubt also participated in the pogroms). This was her first major human rights failure following her formal ascent to power. Later on, she went from being a silent bystander to an active proponent of the repression, arguing that the word "Rohingya" should not be used, and that the Rohingya people were not the principal or disproportionate victims of the violence. In effect, she supported the claim that members of the group, whose families have been resident in Burma for centuries, were in fact illegal immigrants and could therefore be detained and expelled. Things stayed this way - in this terrible, precarious state - following the lessening but not the cessation of anti-Rohingya violence in early 2014. The Rohingya homelands were blockaded, including for aid shipments; apartheid was established between Rohingya and Rakhine villagers; and the Rohingyas in both the concentration camps and those who remained in their homes were systematically abused and denied access to health care and their sources of livelihood. In October 2016, the regime reported that three police posts had been attacked in Arakan State, and blamed the Rohingya. These attacks have never been substantiated - they could have been staged, or - if they did occur - if Rohingya were truly responsible (and, if so, why they did it). The regime then used the purported attacks, just as it had the rape claim in 2012, to launch a scorched earth offensive. The Burma Army destroyed dozens of Rohingya villages. Initially, they were burned down, but later when this was identified through satellite imagery collected by Human Rights Watch, torn down (often by the villagers themselves after being forced to do so at gunpoint). Hundreds if not thousands of villagers were murdered. (There is no possibility of an accurate count - these villages and their inhabitants have been wiped from the face of the earth.) Hundreds of Rohingya women were also rounded up, publicly humiliated, and raped - many were gang-raped to death. This level of violence precipitated another exodus with an estimated 50,000 fleeing to Bangladesh, and with countless shot and killed as they attempted to escape, including in boats crossing the border Naf River, which river became clogged with their bodies. The violence was so extreme that it became clear that state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing - genocide - was being perpetrated. With all of this underway, new developments came fast and furious. - The International State Crime Initiative of Queen Mary University of London analyzed the violence and concluded that it fit the legal definition of genocide. - Dictator Watch called for an investigation of Suu Kyi for complicity in the genocide and for United Nations Security Council action. - Suu Kyi, in a Channel News Asia interview, denied the genocide and defended the military dictatorship. - Burma Army and regime police continued their violence against the Rohingya. - The International Crisis Group, friends to dictators everywhere and which has parroted the propaganda of the Burmese generals for years (notably on sanctions), released a ludicrous report saying that a serious Rohingya insurgency was developing, thereby justifying even more state violence, all the while ignoring the genocide. - Regime police perpetrated the Naf River atrocity. - Suu Kyi defended the military at an Asean ministerial meeting that she herself convened. The dictatorship also organized a media tour of Rohingya areas (which had and continue to be off limits to reporters), following which the few villagers who were willing to be interviewed were arrested and beaten. (One was found beheaded.) - Suu Kyi's office released a statement saying that the rape claims were fake, without conducting a serious investigation, thereby enabling even more rape. - A collection of Nobel Prize laureates and other notable individuals criticized Suu Kyi and called for Security Council action. - Anders Corr of Forbes revealed hitherto secret documents between Burma and Bangladesh which confirmed that the Rohingya are citizens of Burma, and which disclosed that there was an agreement between the two states to allow the refugees in Bangladesh to return home. Later, Bangladesh issued a statement saying that all the Rohingya in their country, even refugees from many years earlier, should be allowed to return to Burma. - The dictatorship conducted an "investigation," of itself, and within a couple of days announced that there was no genocide. - It was further announced that new villages for the Rakhine people would be built on the Rohingya ruins. - A regime police "selfie" video was released which showed one of the many, many village raids and villager abuse. Suu Kyi's office, forced to acknowledge the video since millions of people around the world had watched it, said it was an isolated incident. - John Kerry, Secretary of State of the United States Government, wished "Myanmar" a Happy Independence Day, with no reference at all to the Rohingya genocide. Conclusion Edmund Burke's famous saying goes that for evil to triumph all that is required is for good people to do nothing. The Rohingya genocide is still in progress. There are daily village raids, and more murders, rapes, assaults and robberies. The dictatorship has reportedly identified over 1,000 additional homes for destruction. However, no one - not one single person - who is in a position to make a real difference is willing to do anything to stop it. For Suu Kyi, she is an essential part of the problem. Following the 2015 general election result, one can no longer argue that she refuses to address the issue because of election politics. She is indubitably a racist herself. She may be in denial about this, as so many racists are, but her words and actions, and inaction, paint a crystal clear picture. She is no less racist than the dictatorship stormtroopers who are committing the murder and rape. Were Rohingya girls to be raped literally on the ground in front of her, she would still deny it. The only positive step would be if she were gone. The same culpability holds for the International Community, meaning the U.S. and Europe. Sporadic, mild criticism notwithstanding, they will not do anything to help, including in the Security Council. This therefore empowers the dictatorship. Also, even though we do not know what U.S. policy on Burma will be under Donald Trump, given his pro-business slant there is no reason to believe that it will change. In conclusion, and overall, this is a true disaster. The worst possible mass human crime is being perpetrated, and no one with an ability to help is willing to do anything. Suu Kyi herself has sided with the killers. I'm not normally at a loss for words, but I really don't know what to say. Even as a cynic, I never imagined that the leaders of our world were this despicable. Frankly, I don't know what we should do. We just have to keep pushing until something in the pro-genocide alliance breaks. This has to end. http://www.dictatorwatch.org/prgenocidetimeline.html |
| To Hopeland and Back, the 24th trip Posted: 07 Jan 2017 07:54 AM PST Day Eight. Saturday, 16 December 2016
Rohingya insurgency in Burma is a "game changer", says ICG. The attackers on 9 October are Saudi-backed Harakah al-Yaqin ("Faith Movement") that recruits and trains fighters in Bangladesh and northern Rakhine. (AFP, 15 December 2016)
 | Professor Marc Weller (Photo: youtube) |
Today, I'm back in Rangoon, back at the Green Hill Hotel and back to work with my other friends. And here are some of the things I have learned from them:
· The relationship between the State Counselor and the CinC is in need of patching up. But as yet there's no one to bell the cat (to be sure, two cats). According to a lieutenant general, the target deadline for the peace process may be 3-5 years, but supporting another tenure for The Lady has become untenable. This has in turned adversely affected the peace efforts.
· Still there's no denying the two are dependent on each other, particularly the military. "As far as the generals are concerned," says one, "she's their #1 laundrywoman. They're also crushing and grinding her like a sugarcane handmill for the last drop of the juice."
· There is also an unconfirmed report the generals were terrified when Professor Weller, the resource person at the three-day workshop on federalism, suggested constitutions for states and regions. "Maybe they may accept other options," comments one. "Like calling them regulations or acts instead of constitutions like the British did, or packaging them all in the union constitution."
 | Myanmar Air Force Continues Air Campaign Over KIA Outposts (Photo: burmalink.org) |
· As for the non-signatories, the Lady is trying to get the non-signatories back on board by inviting those who were in the Burmese delegation to South Africa in October, to attend a soon to be held review meeting in Naypyitaw, according to a report. Another report, unconfirmed, also says one of the Kachin strongholds, Gidon, has fallen today, following saturation bombings for months.
If it's true, the whole negotiation process between the non-signatories, especially the UNFC, and the government is at stake. Will there be another 5 month hiatus like it did in 2014, after the negotiations broke down in August? Of course, nobody can tell. Especially not me. |
| PEACE PROCESS OUTLOOK IN 2017: Stakeholders' views don't look promising for the country Posted: 06 Jan 2017 06:57 AM PST As 2017 begins, speculation and assessment on which way Burma's political wind might be blowing becomes an important task to determine for stakeholders and opinion-makers alike, in order to map out and adjust their political moves accordingly to their advantage.
In trying to determine it, let us look at the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi's peace talk discussion with the youths, President Htin Kyaw's independence day anniversary speech, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing's speech on the occasion of inferring honorary bravery titles to some 15 soldiers and some ethnic leaders opinions concerning the ongoing peace process, which have just recently taken place over the new year.
Aung San Suu Kyi's peace talk discussion with the selected youths
Although State Counsellor was not giving a new year speech, on 1 January, in Nay Pyi Taw, she did held a peace talk discussion with eighteen selected youths from, eleven states and regions, excluding the Karenni, Kachin and Chin, across the country, where critical questions were posed by the youths.
During the peace talk discussion with the youths State Counsellor said that the need for peace has to be reiterated and repeated, as often as possible, so that those who intended not to hear or deaf would be alerted and awakened, or something to that affect.
Responding to the discussion of a youth from southern Shan State, where he said that without stopping the war there could be no peace, Suu Kyi said: "Say it (the importance to achieve peace) repeatedly. Some are deaf, so they might hear it only by repeatedly saying it."
Earlier, the Shan youth pointed out how racial hatred has been on the rise, due to the war in ethnic areas by giving an example that even a child would show facial expression of dislike when he or she hears someone speaking Bamar language.
She made it quite plain the need to have nationwide ceasefire in place if the country is to achieve peace through negotiation, when she stressed: "In order to hold 2nd Panglong Conference, there are many steps that have to be taken. Among these steps, nationwide ceasefire is one of them. We could only achieve genuine peace after the ceasefire. Peace cannot be realized by continuing to fight and shoot at each other. Genuine peace can only come through discussion."
In her closing speech, Suu Kyi said that all should ponder even though there have been common ideas and aspirations why peace is still elusive.
"Is it because the urge for peace is still weak within the groups of people that ought to be involved in achieving the peace or not? If it is still weak, not only the youth (should be enthusiastic), all the citizens should all help out together to strengthen it with support and voices. (Making it known by demanding that) we want peace, we want unity," she pointedly urged.
She added: "The people should coordinate and voice their concern that they want a smooth and civilized change for all to know."
During the talk, one of the participants, Nang Mwe Hseing, a 34‐year‐old delegate representing Northern Shan State, raised the issue of ongoing civil war and recent air-strikes conducted by the Military, also known as Burma Army or the Tatmadaw. She said the Military should be under the control of the government in order to achieve ceasefire and peace, according to the report in The Irrawaddy.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi told the participants that amending the constitution and implementing federalism were some of her NLD's main electoral pledges and the government was seeking an appropriate approach that would not harm the public. "Such an approach needs more time," she said.
President Htin Kyaw's independence day speech
On 4 January, the independence day, President Htin Kyaw made a four point pledge on how the NLD planned to go about with the country's future. They are:
· to build a genuine Union in future in accordance with the mutual agreement of the 21st century Panglong Peace Conference (21CPC); · to safeguard non-disintegration of the union, non-disintegration of national unity, perpetuation of sovereignty through efforts of all national people; · to strive for the emergence of appropriate state constitution in accordance with norms of democracy to build a federal democratic state; · to strive for the betterment of economic development among regions and states equally in accordance with the objectives of the State's economic policy.
He also outlined in his speech the accepted notion that Burma has been an empire or a country that since time immemorial ruled by the Bamar kings.
The speech said: "Myanmar is the motherland where our national brethren live in unity in successive kingdoms of magnificence and grandeur for millennia, occupying a proud position in the world."
He buttressed his believe by saying: "Myanmar became a colony in the late 19th century when the colonialism had a strong influence all over the world. Throughout the colonial period when Myanmar lost its independence and sovereignty, all the national people motivated by a strong genuine Union Spirit and an intrepid National Spirit fought against the colonists and they had to make best endeavour and take risk on the way to regain the independence."
It is indeed a far cry from the non-Bamar ethnic nationalities' believe and concept that the country is a new political entity forged by voluntary participation of ethnic states – Federated Shan States, Karenni State, Kachin and Chin Hills as it were than called - with Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma – covering all the rest of ethnic areas, heartland Burma included - to form a union, prior to the British granting of independence in 1947, through the Panglong Agreement. Thus, Panglong Agreement is the genesis of the present day Burma, so far as the ethnic nationalities are concerned. The fact that the Karenni and Shan States have been granted a secession rights clause, in the 1947 Union of Burma Constitution, is the case in point that the ethnic states and Burma Proper were separate entities all along and the on and off suzerainty arrangement between the Bama kings and the ethnic enclaves were in no way a testimony that the ethnic areas belonged to the Burmese empire as a compact nation-state, in the sense of modern day politics.
Thus, President Htin Kyaw's concept of the emergence of Burma or Myanmar today is very different from those of the ethnic nationalities or ethnic states.
Honorary prize given to 15 Tatmadaw soldiers by the President
According to The Global New Light of Myanmar of 5 January, President Htin Kyaw made an address and presented titles for bravery at a ceremony held in the Theater Room at the President's Palace yesterday morning.
The President noted that the ceremony was held on Independence Day, a way to further highlight the importance and reverence for those who have served Myanmar or Burma with distinction.
"The present ceremony is a specific and extraordinary one, in which persons who contributed their arduous effort and unchanging enthusiasm in building up the nation and those who served the country bravely without having any thought for their personal interests, will be presented with honorary awards," the President said on 4 January.
Afterwards, the President conferred the Thiha Thura title and Thura bravery awards on 15 soldiers. Relatives of fallen soldiers received the posthumous awards presented by the President.
The honorary titles were given to Tatmadaw soldiers that have fought against the Ko Kang or Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) led by Peng Jaisheng and ethnic armies that operate in northern Shan State and Kachin State, involving the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA) also.
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other union ministers, including President, two Vice-Presidents, two House Speakers and Deputy Commander-in-Chief were present at the ceremony.
Critics have voiced their opinions on the first civilian government for doling out such bravery honorary titles that it was quite inappropriate and senseless to just praise the Tatmadaw, as it was a war between the citizens of union or Burma Army against non-Bamar ethnic groups, which were killing each other and nothing to be proud of.
President of the Generation Wave, Ko Moe Thway said that it was ugly that the Tatmadaw soldiers be given honorary titles for attacking the union citizens and killing each others, according to the BBC report of 4 January. He added that the act of the government contributed only to the hopelessness of achieving national reconciliation.
The Irrawaddy on 6 January report filed a report, which were pointed out by analysts and an influential ethnic leader the inappropriateness of President Htin Kyaw's actions.
"It seems that by giving an award for being a hero to someone who the other side recognizes as the enemy, it could create bitterness. […] This is a time to be sensitive," said Aung Myo Min, human rights activist and director of Equality Myanmar.
"It is not suitable to give award to the army for fighting with the ethnic people while the government is engaging in the peace process with ethnic armed forces," said Maung Maung Soe, an ethnic affairs analyst."This problem will continue to exist unless the Constitution is amended," he added, pointing out that neither the President nor the Parliament had the power to stop the Burma Army from fighting.
Vice chairman of the ethnic armed alliance the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) Nai Hong Sar said that he feared fighting would intensify following the recognition given to the Tatmadaw. "They intend to boost morale for their army," he said, when asked about the military awards presented by President U Htin Kyaw. "This will not lead us to have peace—it will lead to more fighting. To us, it looks like they want to create a bigger conflict. They came to fight our ethnic people; we were not the people who made the problems." Min Aung Hliang's harsh words
During the honorary bravery title inferring occasion at President's Palace, Min Aung Hlaing accused the ethnic armies of being narrow minded, radical and lawless organizations, infringing on national sovereignty, besides not having interest to achieve peace.
He said that until today, some narrow-minded leaders of the ethnic armies, instead of striving for peace to achieve democracy, were ruining or destroying the people's lives, properties and the country's economy using destructive schemes. Apart from this, they have very weak inclination to achieve peace, thereby pushing the Military to resort to use of armed confrontation, which is still continuing, as it has no other choice left.
The talk of a justified war against the ethnic armies was unmistakably in the air.
Ethnic response to 21st Century Panglong Conference (21CPC)
Three ethnic leaders opinions on the President's urging or soliciting to go through the 21CPC were almost the same, although slightly different on the approach.
Dr. Tu Ja of a former Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) leader and now Chairman of the Kachin State Democracy Party said: "For the moment the KIO/KIA could not sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) yet. Deliberation to achieve genuine peace through Panglong Conference is good and I also supported it. But the said Panglong Conference needs to be meaningfully held. In order to do it, regional tranquillity is important. After that there has to be ceasefire, with ethnic representatives, who ought to be involved, participating altogether. If we are unable to build up these steps, we would be holding the conference, but there won't be any real benefit."
Khernsai Jaiyane, decades-long Shan resistance fighter turned peace mediator and now Director of the Pyidaungsu Institute bemoaned: "We, as a (supposed to be) free people are facing a condition that is worse than when we were not free. If there is no peace what is the use of having freedom. Without peace development is not doable. That's why peace is important. The important thing for the time being is to achieve a nationwide ceasefire."
Htun Zaw, Joint-Secretary of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), an ethnic army alliance of seven, said that he understood President Htin Kyaw's urging holding the 21CPC as a way to achieve peace, with our cooperation, as the ethnic nationalities have been denied the fruits of independence for 69 years.
He pointed out: "Our opinion is affirmative to the participation of 21stCentury Panglong Conference. But it will depend on if all-inclusiveness is accepted by the government. If the government only based its way of finding answer to national reconciliation solely on NCA, the possibility of achievement would be quite minimum."
Outlook for 2017
The dilemma with Suu Kyi is understandable as her intention from the outset might have been on how to wrestle the real decision-making power from the Military, having won the 2015 nationwide election on a landslide.
But on the other hand, she won't be able to do anything worthwhile without rewriting or change the military-drawn constitution, which again will angered the Tatmadaw and could even stage a military coup.
Her strategy for the moment seems to be not to ruffle the Tatmadaw's feathers while buying her time and considering on how to wrestle back the decision-making power for the civilian government.
And thus, she is facing the dilemma either to undertake nothing to anger the Tatmadaw and preserve the existing status quo, enjoying limited power without real decision-making power or do something, to wrestle her justified political decision-making rights, as winner of the 2015 election, back and risks a military coup, which would spell the end of her regime.
Of course, another version of choice would be to yield or agree to be co-opted into the Military bloc and cement the NLD-Military genuine coalition of two most influential Bamar political and military groups, effectively living the ethnic nationalities out in the cold.
As for President Htin Kyaw, his adhering to the concept that the non-Bamar ethnic areas has all been part and parcel of today's Burma since immemorial time, which was ruled by various Bamar kings, starkly contrasted with the ethnic nationalities' view that Burma is a newly constructed political entity, made possible by virtue of voluntary participation of the ethnic states anchored in the Panglong Agreement or treaty signed in 1947.
Besides, the honorary titles given to the Tatmadaw's soldiers made it clear enough that he considered the ethnic armies as destructive elements and enemy of the union, except of course those signatory ethnic armies that might be ready to dance to the government's tune or co-opted to participate according to its game plan. In short, he left no doubt that his government is siding with the Tatmadaw and not a mediator, that the ethnic have at least hope for, if not their political alliance, as it used to be when the NLD was in the opposition and the Military the government.
Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, apart from demanding the adherence of military-drawn constitution without question, has time and again made his position known that he considered the Tatmadaw to be the sole protector of the country's sovereignty and has steadfastly only aiming at achieving either a negotiated surrender kind of peace settlement or total annihilation of the ethnic armies. And he seems to be making headway in trying to co-opt the NLD regime to his way of thinking.
For the ethnic armed groups, that have still to yield to the NLD-Military government's pressure of accepting its game plan of not agreeing to the all-inclusiveness participation, forcing them to sign the NCA without amendments and not agreeing to the tripartite dialogue composition in peace negotiation process, would be hard to swallow. And the likelihood would be the on and off NCA amendment negotiation between the government's Peace Council (PC) and the UNFC would drag on, as the fighting would also go on in Shan and Kachin States, according to the desire of the Military.
As it is now, like it or not the NLD, headed by its de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi, is tilted towards the Tatmadaw ways of policy implementation, if Suu Kyi's praising of the Tatmadaw regarding the November armed conflict in northern Shan State of Muse Township, while blaming the Northern Alliance – Burma (NA-B) for launching the counter-offensives, to take away the heat of military onslaught on KIA in Kachin State, is to be taken as an indication.
The UNFC and the government's PC negotiation to alter the NCA through the former's 8 point proposal would likely go on, on and off, while the Tatmadaw's offensives in Kachin and Shan States against NA-B would continue. Adding perhaps, a government offer for the non-signatory EAOs to join the 21CPC or Union Peace Conference (UPC) as observers to appease the foreign donors.
Already there is a preposition to include the non-signatory ethnic armies in funding management, which would be contributed for the peace process from the foreign donors.
The 21CPC would be carried out, possibly in February, and the state and region level political dialogue in selected areas would be conducted, as pilot project, to lend inputs from the basis for 21CPC.
Summing up, the prospect of peace process or negotiation is far from rosy, if one looks at the contemporary indications available on the ground. Only radical turn around or change, from the present government-military self-prescribed game plan to commonly-owned game plan, which emphasizes all-inclusivity, tripartite dialogue composition – government-parliament-military; ethnic armed organizations; and political parties - and previously agreed basic federal form of government – meaning: not applying unitary or semblance of federal structure but not federal in real essence - would usher the country into a new era of national reconciliation in a true sense. Or else, we all will continue to be bogged down with civil wars and hatred that won't do any good to the country and the people inhabiting it.
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