Tuesday, October 18, 2016

The Irrawaddy Magazine

The Irrawaddy Magazine


Arrest Warrant Issued for Helmsman of Capsized Chindwin Ferry

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 06:36 AM PDT

A rescue team tries to salvage a ferry that capsized, and killed at least 40, on the Chindwin River in Sagaing Division's Kani Township. (Photo: Pyay Kyaw/ The Irrawaddy)

A rescue team tries to salvage a ferry that capsized, and killed at least 40, on the Chindwin River in Sagaing Division's Kani Township. (Photo: Pyay Kyaw/ The Irrawaddy)

RANGOON — Police have brought criminal charges against the helmsman of an overcrowded ferry that capsized on the Chindwin River in Sagaing Division over the weekend.

"Negligence" and "rash navigation" were cited as causing several deaths, according to police authorities in Kani Township, where the incident occurred near Michaung Dwin village early on Saturday morning.

The ferry was reportedly carrying 300 passengers. As of Tuesday afternoon, rescuers had discovered 40 bodies—12 men and 28 women—but the death toll is expected to climb as several people remain missing.

A total of 159 survivors, including four ferrymen, have been identified, according to S Willy Frient, Director of the Sagaing Division's Relief and Resettlement Department. No hospitalizations have been reported so far.

Police major U Tin Maung Myint of the Kani Township police station, told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday that the 40-year-old helmsman, Ko Zaw Myo Win, is being charged under Articles 280 and 304(A) of Burma's Penal Code.

A rescue team tries to salvage a ferry that capsized, and killed at least 40, on the Chindwin River in Sagaing Division's Kani Township. (Photo: Pyay Kyaw/ The Irrawaddy)

A rescue team tries to salvage a ferry that capsized, and killed at least 40, on the Chindwin River in Sagaing Division's Kani Township. (Photo: Pyay Kyaw/ The Irrawaddy)

There is a warrant for his arrest, but it is not clear whether he is on the run, or among the passengers still missing, the police major added.

According to Article 280 of the penal code, anyone "who navigates any vessel in a manner so rash or negligent" as to endanger human life or to cause hurt or injury to others could be imprisoned for a maximum of six months. Article 304(A) imposes seven to ten years in prison "for causing death by negligence."

When asked about the ferry owner, officials said no case had yet been filed.

"He will be investigated and charged if he is found guilty of the accident," the police major told The Irrawaddy.

According to U Tin Tun Aung, head of the Sagaing Division's Inland Water Transport Department, the privately owned Aung Soe Moe Kyaw-2 ferry was registered as having a seating capacity of only 36 passengers.

The ferry left Homalin for Monywa on Friday evening. Navigating during the nighttime is, however, not allowed.

"The Inland Water Transport Authority restricts ferries from navigating in the Chindwin River during the nighttime as it's dangerous," U Tin Tun Aung told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday.

At the time of reporting, the emergency rescue team was trying to salvage the sunken ferry.

The post Arrest Warrant Issued for Helmsman of Capsized Chindwin Ferry appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Production Slowing at Wa Tin Mine

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 06:31 AM PDT

Tin mine seen in Man Maw at ethnic Wa territory in Shan State on Oct. 5, 2016. (Photo: So Zeya Tun / REUTERS)

Tin mine seen in Man Maw at ethnic Wa territory in Shan State on Oct. 5, 2016. (Photo: So Zeya Tun / REUTERS)

MAN MAW, Wa Self-Administered Division — Output from a mysterious Burma tin mine that has disrupted the global market in the metal is falling sharply and deposits could be depleted in "two to three years," senior mine officials told Reuters.

A surprise discovery of large quantities of tin has propelled the formerly isolated Southeast Asian country into the position of third largest producer of the industrial metal, and contributed to a sharp fall in prices in the last three years.

Much of it comes from the Man Maw mine deep inside the self-proclaimed "Wa State," a secretive, China-dominated statelet the size of Belgium controlled by Burma's most powerful ethnic armed group, the 30,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA).

Reuters was the first media organization to visit the mine, tucked away in cloud-shrouded hills straddling Burma's rugged eastern border with China, as the UWSA takes its first tentative steps towards opening to the world after decades of isolation.

"The production is falling sharply. It may be depleted in two to three years," said Jia Xu Bing, deputy leader of the Wa State Industrial Mining Bureau's survey team, citing estimates based on output. He declined to elaborate.

"We do not have the capacity to do a comprehensive evaluation. We will stop the operations once workers' safety becomes a concern," Jia added.

Burma's tin production has surged 10-fold of the past four years. At an estimated 33,000 tons of tin concentrates last year, the country was responsible for nearly all of China's imports of tin ore, a key ingredient for making the solder widely used in electronics such as smartphones and tablets.

Some metals analysts have previously argued that the output from the Man Maw mine was likely peaking, but the lack of geo-exploration in the Wa State and highly restricted access to the area has left much uncertainty.

The Wa region is virtually unknown to outsiders—in recent decades Westerners have had less access than to North Korea.

The UWSA is blacklisted by the United States for alleged drug trafficking, accusations its leaders deny.

Production Slowdown

Interviews with company managers and officials—and the appearance of the mine itself when Reuters visited—also suggested a slowdown.

Production from two of the seven major mining companies at Man Maw, which covers 1.5 square miles (4 sq km), had been "close to zero" since last year and they are struggling to find new resources, officials said.

While dozens of tight-packed shacks carrying signs in Chinese promising services from clinics to karaoke were seen in the Man Maw hills, the number of workers, mostly from China, has halved to about 1,000 from the peak in 2014, officials said.

Company and government officials said several large open pits had been depleted and most of the remaining mining was underground, pushing up costs for miners.

The quality of the ore now mined had also declined sharply, they said, with most deposits containing around 2-3 percent tin by weight, compared with an unusually high-grade of more than 10 percent two years ago.

"The production is certainly in decline," said International Tin Research Institute analyst Cui Lin, who visited the mine earlier this year.

"It's hard to say how long it might last as Chinese companies are unwilling to invest more in geo-exploration due to political risks in Wa."

As the largest ethnic armed group, the UWSA is key to the peace process launched by Burma's leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The group has not clashed with the military in recent years, but did not sign a landmark ceasefire deal last year.

The rise of Man Maw underscores the challenges faced by Burma's first democratically-elected government in decades, as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi tries to shore up budget revenue and control the exploitation of the country's mineral riches in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups.

"It's hard to say how much is left underneath the hills," the Industrial Mining Bureau's deputy head Li Seck said. "We are counting on China for talents, technology and money."

Ore Stockpiles

Deep in the hills three hours' drive northwest of regional capital Pangshang, the mine is controlled by the Wa State Treasury Department, whose head, Pao Yu Liang, is a senior UWSA commander indicted in the United States on drug trafficking charges.

The treasury takes an "ore tax" of a quarter of concentrates mined by the seven Wa-China joint ventures operating at Man Maw.

The authority then stockpiles the ore in a depot near its border with China and trades with Chinese buyers based on daily trading price from the Shanghai Metal Exchange.

"Tin price goes up and down, so the treasury only sells them when price is good," said Jia of the Wa treasury's Industrial Mining Bureau, adding that mining was now the top revenue source in one of the poorest regions in Asia.

The treasury declined an interview request. It was not clear how much stockpile the authority holds and how its trading decisions were made, which could affect global tin prices.

The seven companies in Man Maw are partly funded by Chinese investment and controlled by top Wa leaders, according to senior officials and people with close leadership ties.

Yun Hsin is one of the five mining firms that still sees output in Man Maw. While part of its processing facilities was shut, about a dozen of workers were seen operating grinding machines adjacent to its pits when Reuters visited.

Chen Ta Yung, manager of the firm of about 80 employees, said as the grade of ore extracted had declined, strict rules had been imposed to lower costs and limit the environmental impact of mining. Companies are now only allowed to ship processed deposits containing 18.5-20 percent tin by weight.

Sitting in a truck carrying 72 tons of tin concentrates, Tzu Pin was among 10 drivers waiting in Pangshang for China's border control to reopen after lunch.

After crossing the small river Yunnan that marks the frontier, the ore will be graded and shipped to China's "tin capital" Gejiu in Yunnan Province, where many of the country's smelters are based.

Tzu, a 26-year-old from China, hopes the Wa's tin boom will last.

"It's good for the local economy," he said. "I hope it won't be depleted soon."

The post Production Slowing at Wa Tin Mine appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Ma Thida: ‘Fear Makes People Fierce’

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 06:26 AM PDT

Ma Thida, pictured on the campus of Northern Illinois University in October 2016, where she spoke on a panel at the 12th International Burma Studies Conference. (Photo: Sally Kantar / The Irrawaddy)

Ma Thida, pictured on the campus of Northern Illinois University in October 2016, where she spoke on a panel at the 12th International Burma Studies Conference. (Photo: Sally Kantar / The Irrawaddy)

Dr. Ma Thida has served as a dissident author, editor, publisher, physician, political aide and activist—often at the same time. It is well known that she spent nearly six years in prison in the 1990s for "distributing unlawful literature"—among other charges—as an active member of Burma's student-led democracy movement in 1988. In prison, she suffered a myriad of health issues, including tuberculosis. Her release on humanitarian grounds was not in small part due to international pressure from organizations like PEN International, of which she is now a board member.

 During an October trip to the US, Ma Thida shared with The Irrawaddy her observations of society in present day Burma, particularly what she sees as an increase in aggression, rooted in fear. Overcoming this, she says, means confronting the country's "real wrongdoers"—those who have perpetuated a system of physical, structural and cultural violence for generations. 

Could you give us an overview of the different roles you hold today?

I am the elected president of PEN Myanmar, and an elected member of PEN International—a board member at large, as they say. But I think I won't be able to hold both of these titles at the same time in the long run. Coming in December there will be elections for PEN Myanmar—we have three-year terms—and I won't join the elections again. I will help them.

I'm [also] the editor in charge of the Info Digest journal. It's database journalism—a bi-weekly journal, just by subscription. We are not interested in sentimental or sensational pieces; we are just interested in defending the people's right to know.

And I'm still a general practitioner, practicing family medicine. Every time I have a chance to meet my patients, this is such a privilege. I started volunteering at the Free Funeral Service clinic [in Rangoon] ten years ago. Even though I travel a lot, I try to be there once a week. I still have some regular patients. For me, health is pure politics. It's related to everything.

In the past, you have said that your primary political aspiration was to "be a good citizen." What does that mean for you at this point in your life?

I still want to be a better citizen. But right now, my decision is to get more involved with PEN International. It's not my own personal achievement, but throughout history, I think none of the Myanmar writers have had this kind of decision-making role in an international institution. I try to be a good citizen on behalf of my country. It's something that shows we are not isolated anymore. That's the message I really want to pass on: even as just an ordinary citizen, you can do something.

You once served as an aide to Aung San Suu Kyi. In your book Sunflower [written in 1992 and published seven years later], you described her as a "prisoner of applause," due to the high expectations placed on her by the public. Now, more than six months into her government term, how would you assess her and the NLD administration's performance?

I have only one question for her: are you still free from fear? In the position of a leader, she might not have that much to fear. But as a responsible State Counselor, she might have so many fears—not to insult the citizens, not to disappoint any groups. I can empathize. I really wonder how she handles this kind of fear—it's not the same fears she mentioned in her [1991] book Freedom from Fear, but there might be different ones. That's why I really want to know about her fight against fear right now.

Do you think she is giving in to her fears?

It's hard to say. That's why I wonder—I wonder whether our current situation is related to fear or not.

Fear was also a theme of your talk on a panel at Northern Illinois University's Burma Studies Conference, in which you said, "fear makes people fierce." How have you seen this phenomenon manifested in present day Burma?

There is a short story by a well-known writer that [I heard him] share at a literary talk. At that time, [the country] was still [under] Thein Sein's government, and he said that this was a story that could give a "bold punch" to the government. It's about a clerk, Mr. B, who is the lowest member of staff at a company. And the manager is very arrogant, a pretty bad guy—Mr. A. A lot of the other employees gossip about Mr. A, but Mr. B, the clerk, never joins. He would simply accept Mr. A's bad manners. And then, after the work hours, he went to [Rangoon's] Pansodan Bridge to the manicurists and pedicurists on the street, as a customer. In our culture, taking care of someone else's feet is the lowest thing. So now, someone is taking care of him, and Mr. B is becoming like a boss. After he gives the pedicurist the money, he says to him, "bye bye, Mr. A."

[Making someone called Mr. A touch his feet] is like his own revenge. That's why I say it's so fierce. The people always have in mind a kind of revenge, even though they know it's harmful. He was so polite to the manager, Mr. A, because of his fear. He still has a spirit of revenge, but he cannot do anything about it, because he knows he would be in danger. So he carries out his revenge on another Mr. A, who cannot retaliate against him.

People love this story as a "punch" to the cronies, to the government, but for me it's not; I was so shocked by it. That's why I feel that fear makes people fierce. They really don't use their wisdom or their sense of reasoning. How do they let out their revenge? It reflects our society's handling and management of fear. Through this story, I learned more about people's psychology.

Who are people in Burma taking out their revenge on?

I think it applies to the sectarian violence, or racial and religious violence. The whole population was deeply rooted in fear. They have a high spirit of revenge, and are looking for someone who cannot retaliate. And they found the minority. That's why I say fear makes people fierce.

How do you think people should address their fears?

People say, now we have more problems. I say no, the problems are more or less the same as in the past. What we now have is more awareness and more admittance. In the past, we didn't admit we had problems—we just pretended we had no problems. Now we dare to admit the problems. Why should we keep the politeness, pretending like the clerk, Mr. B? Instead of this unwilling politeness, why don't we directly face the real wrongdoers, and speak with courage?

Who would you like to face directly in this way?

There are so many people. I have called for an official public apology [to former political prisoners]. Without an apology, even if we are ready to practice our right to forgive, it cannot be fulfilled. On the other hand, only the guilty people do repeated wrongdoings. I want them to liberate themselves from their guilt by apologizing. It is not only for our sake, but for their sake. Some people might say they are naïve, that they don’t know whether they are guilty or not, but I don't believe that. I think it would be good for them, to be let out from their guilt.

Who in Burma do you think deserves to receive an official apology?

The general population—generation by generation. We deserve it. Some people got arrested or lost their family members, but not only them—ordinary people, too. They have been under structural violence, even if it is not physical violence. Cultural and structural violence has been done to the whole population.

But is an apology enough?

Indeed not. But an apology can shake the hearts of the people, and reduce the tension and the spirit of revenge. Then it's better to apply it legitimately, or legally. An apology is the first step.

Now there is much talk in Burma of "national reconciliation." What do you make of this concept—what does it mean to you?

Without acknowledging or admitting wrongdoing, national reconciliation discussions for the future are not a healthy way to sustain peace.

You became a writer originally to share your observations about poverty. What observations do you feel compelled to share now?

Not the physical poverty, but the lack of knowledge, lack of wisdom. It's a serious problem. That's why [advocating for] the freedom of expression is at the top of my activities. I believe that even if you are rich or have a position of power, if you don't have enough knowledge, you are powerless. I really want to encourage the whole population to become powerful with knowledge. Without powerful, voluntary, responsible participation of the people, how can we make a change?

What kind of knowledge is needed?

Knowledge about the systems, about where we are heading—knowledge about their ability or capacity. Until and unless they feel they are the ones who feel they can make a contribution to change the society, they will still be powerless.

I used to ask at my talks, who is the most important person in the country? And [people] would say, Aung San Suu Kyi, U Htin Kyaw. I said, look in the mirror: you are the most important one. Every one of us should acknowledge that. If you feel you are important, you are going to make an effort. Otherwise, you'll just wait for others to do things for you. I want them to feel like they are the most important person in our country—every single one.

You've said that the issue of freedom of expression hasn't been discussed enough in Burma. What would you like to see being done in this regard?   

When we look at freedom of expression, it is not just about individual rights. It's about collective rights. Until and unless we can defend other people's rights to practice their freedom of expression, we will have no freedom of expression. We need to look at four levels: constitutional, legal, institutional and personal levels.

Why have you taken a more collective approach to this issue?

Even though you believe you can practice your freedom of expression, constitutionally, you are at risk. And legally, you are also committing a crime. Institutionally, you cannot be part of the society, because you are just practicing it on your own. When we look at freedom of expression at an individual level, we include minority language rights. So if we say, 'we have so many different periodicals now,' and 'oh, there is no censorship'—for a non-Burmese-speaking person, what does it mean? There is no press freedom for them.

Alongside the protection of free expression, you've also highlighted a need for greater media literacy among the public. Can you explain more about this?  

Many people cannot differentiate between information processed by media and by primary data sources. That's why people cannot decide what information is reliable, and what information either processed or biased. Media ownership also has a big influence on our censorship—self-censorship, peer censorship is also related to media ownership. People don't really know which media is representing what.

What would you still like to accomplish, that you have not done yet?

I would like to finish a novel. I already have a title and the design, but I haven't had enough time to do research and writing. It's about a town: the protagonist itself is a town.

Prisoner of Conscience: My Steps Through Insein is Ma Thida's most recent book, a memoir of her years as an activist and political prisoner. It was originally published in Burmese in 2012, under the title Sanchaung, Insein, Harvard and was translated into English in 2016. It was reviewed in The Irrawaddy in September.

The post Ma Thida: 'Fear Makes People Fierce' appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Company Accused of Bribing, Misleading Locals to Build Coal-Fired Power Plant

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 04:06 AM PDT

National League for Democracy lawmakers attend a session of the Rangoon Division parliament in September. (Photo: Phyo Min Thein / The Irrawaddy)

National League for Democracy lawmakers attend a session of the Rangoon Division parliament in September. (Photo: Phyo Min Thein / The Irrawaddy)

RANGOON — Questions were raised in the Rangoon Division parliament about an unnamed company using underhanded methods to induce locals of Zweba Kone village, in semi-rural Kyauktan Township on the outer fringes of the city, to consent to the building of a coal-fired power plant.

Daw Thet Thet Mu, the lawmaker representing Kyauktan Constituency-2 for the National League for Democracy, told the divisional legislature on Tuesday that the company's efforts to bribe and mislead locals—apparently carried out under the radar of local authorities—had been going on since early March.

She said that there were serious concerns over the likely impact of the power plant on the environment and rural livelihoods in the village, and asked whether the Rangoon Division government would allow it to proceed.

Speaking with the Irrawaddy, Daw Thet Thet Mu refused to name the company, purportedly because the project is at a very early stage, but said that she had not recognized the name; the companies' delegates spotted in the locality were Indian and Chinese, she claimed, adding to suspicion that it is foreign-owned.

Daw Thet Thet Mu told the legislature that the company had recently donated 4.5 million kyats (US$3,560) for fresh water excavation in the village. During the donation ceremony, 150 villagers were asked to lend their signatures to paper forms written in English signaling their support for the power plant. Although most of the villagers could not understand English, some unwittingly signed the consent forms, she said.

She added that that "the company's representatives convinced the villagers that they would share 2 percent of the power plant's profits with them," and that they would construct a new bridge linking Kyauktan with Thanlyin Township, allowing easier access to the city.

She said that more educated villagers had expressed deep worry that the power plant may pollute the soil, air and water in the village, ruining the farmland on which the villagers depend.

The Divisional Minister of Electricity, Industry and Transport Daw Nilar Kyaw responded on behalf of the Rangoon Division government, saying they would not allow the coal-fired power plant to go ahead.

The post Company Accused of Bribing, Misleading Locals to Build Coal-Fired Power Plant appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Arakan Locals Call for ‘People’s Militia’

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 02:24 AM PDT

 Government press conference on Arakan State attacks at the Ministry of Information in Naypyidaw on Monday. (Photo: Htet Naing Zaw/The Irrawaddy)

Government press conference on Arakan State attacks at the Ministry of Information in Naypyidaw on Monday. (Photo: Htet Naing Zaw/The Irrawaddy)

Local ethnic Arakanese worried about their safety following militant attacks on security posts in Maungdaw Township have asked government officials to arm them with weapons to form a militia.

This local request was revealed at a government press conference on the situation in northern Arakan State that took place in Naypyidaw on Monday.

Deputy Defense Minister Maj-Gen Myint Nwe, however, said that the idea was not possible because the government is working towards peace in the area. "The 'people's militia' strategy would be a long-term plan that needs serious consideration," he added.

"If rural villagers want to protect their villages as a people's militia, they should join the regional police under the Myanmar Police Force," said the deputy minister.

Ministers and deputy ministers from the ministries of Information, of Defense, of Home Affairs, and of Labor, Immigration and Population were at the press conference.

Ministries are working together to restore regional safety as soon as possible while providing security for government departments and securing important transportation channels, said deputy minister for Home Affairs Maj-Gen Aung Soe.

The government needs short-term and long-term plans to prevent future attacks that threaten national security and the rule of law, said Information Minister U Pe Myint.

Among the government's plans are ensuring the livelihoods of local people, monitoring displaced people's camps, mending border fences, recapturing looted weapons, as well as wiping out insurgents and identifying their affiliations in line with existing laws, he said.

Since the attacks on Maungdaw Township border posts on Oct. 9, a total of 30 attackers have been killed and 29 others, including two transferred from Bangladesh, are being held in police custody at prisons in the state capital Sittwe and in Maungdaw town.

Five Burma Army soldiers and nine police officers have been killed, and four police officers injured, according to government figures.

The Irrawaddy questioned the military over the fatal shooting by Burma Army soldiers of three alleged militants armed with knives in a Maungdaw village on Oct. 15.

Col. Zaw Min Tun of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief defended the military operations as a response to acts that "gravely threaten" the peace and stability and the rule of law of the country.

Most of the fatal attacks on security forces are with knives, said Col. Zaw Min Tun: "security forces had to shoot—it is the only choice for the military."

"Border guard forces were also attacked with knives. We can conclude that the attackers can skillfully use knives," said the colonel.

With the approval of the President's Office, the military have designated Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships as areas of military operations, with access restricted to aid groups and journalists.

Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs U Kyaw Zeya was quoted as saying, "we have requested cooperation through diplomatic means from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They have received the request and said that they would assist with the [Burmese] government's measures and cooperate."

Information Minister U Pe Myint said that the government has met with ambassadors of three Muslim-majority Asean countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei—and explained the situation. The Indonesian ambassador said that his government accepts that the actions of the Burma government is within the power of a sovereign country and that Burma government is taking actions in line with the law. The two other ambassadors shared this view.

On Monday Burma's Minister of Home Affairs replaced the Border Guard police chief of Maungdaw Township Brig-Gen Maung Maung Khin with Brig-Gen Thura San Lwin.

The government has provided 8 million kyats (US$6,320) to the family of each police officer killed and 3 million kyats ($2,370) for each police officer and Burma Army soldier injured, according to the press conference.

The post Arakan Locals Call for 'People's Militia' appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

End To US Sanctions a Boon to Burma’s Economy, But Woes Remain

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 12:06 AM PDT

Staff prepare to sell meals at a KFC branch during its opening day in Rangoon, June 30, 2015. (Photo: Soe Zeya Tun / Reuters)

Staff prepare to sell meals at a KFC branch during its opening day in Rangoon, June 30, 2015. (Photo: Soe Zeya Tun / Reuters)

RANGOON — KFC's grinning Colonel Sanders and his goatee are among the few prominent signs of US brands or business in Burma's biggest city, Rangoon.

That will likely change after President Barack Obama ended most remaining US sanctions against this fledgling democracy on Oct. 7. But much hinges on how the government led by former political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi revamps the country's outdated laws and other policies.

The US had earlier broad prohibitions on investment and trade imposed on this Southeast Asian country of around 51 million over the past two decades. The more targeted restrictions that ended earlier this month were mostly on dealings with army-owned companies and officials and associates of the former ruling junta. A ban on imports of jadeite and rubies from Burma also ended.

Up to now, the rush to invest in Burma has been dominated by Asian countries, especially China, its main investor and trading partner during its years of isolation. Most US businesses and many other Western ones stayed away, mindful of fines potentially in the millions of dollars and jail terms of up to 20 years.

Foreign investment slowed earlier this year, as companies awaited changes in the investment law, company law and other regulations.

"Genuinely a lot of American business was extraordinarily wary of the sanctions, especially for financial services because of the massive fines," said Sean Turnell, a Burma expert and adviser to the National League for Democracy (NLD) led government.

For many Western, not just US, firms, restrictions on financial transactions in US dollars, which are processed by banks doing business in the US, were the biggest constraint.

"It was too hard, the market is too small and profits were pretty small beer compared to the fines they could get," said Turnell. "You had great difficulty just moving money in and out of the country."

The garment industry could be one of the biggest beneficiaries of the end to sanctions. The United States stopped giving Burma special market access under the Generalized System of Preferences in 1989 due to workers' rights concerns. When those benefits are restored on Nov. 13 it will regain the right to export about 5,000 products to the United States duty-free.

Nay Aung, whose travel services company, Oway, has launched a car-booking app that is providing about 500-600 rides a day in Rangoon, is hoping that will help drive an export boom.

"If multinationals come in, we will benefit," he said. "For us, if the country grows, we are the beneficiary of those investments."

Burma was governed by the military for more than a half-century. Five years since it began its shift toward a civilian government and a year since the NLD led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide election, the country is still just beginning to develop a modern financial sector and rebuild its crumbling roads, ports and buildings, many of which date to Britain's colonial rule.

The new leadership is grappling with extreme poverty, civil war with several ethnic minorities, rampant corruption and narcotics and human trafficking. Massive illegal trade in goods like jade and timber continues.

The sanctions were just part of the problems laid out in a report by the American Chamber of Commerce in July. Chief complaints included a decision by the city government in Rangoon, the country's commercial capital, to stop issuing the licenses for new parking spaces that are required to buy new vehicles. That was a blow to big foreign automakers like Chevy and Toyota that want to sell new cars there, but a boon for the already thriving trade in used vehicles from Japan, left-hand cars and trucks widely used on Burma's right-hand drive roads.

Still, the country's young, inexpensive workforce and low living standards offer huge potential for growth. GE, on its website, describes Burma as a "new sweet spot" for growth in Southeast Asia.

Japanese and other Asian investors have been piling in.

Aeon, Japan's equivalent of Walmart, opened an office in Rangoon in 2014 and has a thriving microfinance business. Its first supermarket in Burma, a joint venture with a local retailer, opened in the city's Okalapa Township in late September, offering thousands of products, most of them imported from Thailand.

Even the KFC, which opened across the street from Rangoon's Bogyoke Market in 2015, is a franchise set up by Singapore-listed Burma conglomerate Yoma Strategic Holdings.

Some other major US brands got a head start, including Coca-Cola, which has a factory producing for the local market. Ball Corp. has a factory in Rangoon's Thilawa Special Economic Zone making cans for Coca-Cola. MasterCard is expanding in the area of ATM cards.

GE is active in energy and other sectors and leases Boeing 737-800s to the country's national airlines. ConocoPhillips and Chevron have stakes in oil and gas exploration and development. Some US businesses, like Caterpillar, have distribution tie-ups in Burma with local or other foreign companies.

But the total US$248 million US companies have committed since 1988 amounts to less than 1 percent of total foreign investment of about $60 billion. China has invested more than $25 billion, according to Chinese figures.

Trade with the US has also been modest.

Burma's imports from the US totaled $227 million in 2015, while exports from Burma to the US amounted to $142 million, mostly dried peas, rattan and wood products and travel goods like backpacks, according to the US Trade Representatives website.

The lifting of sanctions is bound to benefit big players no longer on the sanctions lists, like the ex-junta chief, Than Shwe, and Stephen Law, founder of one of the nation's largest conglomerates, Asia World, whose late father was once described by Treasury as one of the world's key heroin traffickers.

But at the other end of the spectrum, there likely will be little immediate impact, said Jes Kaliebe Petersen of Phandeeyar, a local non-profit devoted to helping start-ups and entrepreneurship.

Ending sanctions has a "signal value," suggesting lower risks of doing business in Burma, says Petersen, who is Danish. What remains, though, are problems typical of a frontier economy, such as a dysfunctional financial system, bad roads, and a legal system that has yet to catch up with the country's political evolution.

"It took three months to get money wired into Rangoon just to pay my rent," Petersen said when asked about the challenges of doing business in Burma. "But on a micro-level, I’ve never had a single conversation about the sanctions."

The post End To US Sanctions a Boon to Burma's Economy, But Woes Remain appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Burma’s New Economic Zone Attracts Foreign Interest But Local Ire

Posted: 17 Oct 2016 11:41 PM PDT

A man works at the site of the Thilawa Special Economic Zone near Rangoon, May 8, 2015. (Photo: Soe Zeya Tun / Reuters)

A man works at the site of the Thilawa Special Economic Zone near Rangoon, May 8, 2015. (Photo: Soe Zeya Tun / Reuters)

RANGOON — Looking north from Myint Win's farm, across rice paddies and past bamboo huts, a massive new industrial development on the outskirts of Burma's biggest city gleams in the distance.

The buildings sprang up during the first phase of developing the Thilawa Special Economic Zone (SEZ), a 6,200-acre (2,500-hectare) industrial project that is a joint venture between the governments of Burma and Japan and some private consortia.

The factories that have been built produce everything from children's toys to clothing, medical supplies to electronics.

For developing nations like Burma—which emerged from decades of economic isolation in 2011 when the military stepped back from direct control of the country—special economic zones are a way of attracting foreign investment and creating jobs.

Next month the second phase of the US$1.5 billion development begins on a site of around 5,000 acres (2,000 hectares) that includes Myint Win's farm.

Myint Win, whose family has lived on the land for four generations, and hundreds more like him will be relocated from the site which lies about 16 miles (25 kilometers) southeast of Rangoon.

Although work is meant to start in a few weeks, the 53-year-old farmer said he has not been told what will happen to him.

"This has been going on for a long time and until now there is nothing concrete they have shown us," he told the Thomson Reuters Foundation in an interview at Phalan village on the site of the next phase of the SEZ.

Land rights campaigners say local residents are often kept in the dark about development plans and lose their livelihoods and access to services when they are relocated.

But the developers say villagers are well compensated, provided with new, better housing, and have the chance to get work in new industries brought to the Southeast Asian nation with crumbling infrastructure that is seeking foreign funding.

COMPLAINTS

In Burma there are three planned SEZs, including Thilawa, that are supported by the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD), which won a historic election last year to form the first democratically elected government in more than half a century.

Thilawa SEZ will be the first to be built and operational. The smaller, first phase is 90 percent complete and as of August 12 factories had opened, with another 25 to follow soon.

Foreign investment into the first phase, which is 90 percent complete, stands at $760 million. Investment into Thilawa accounted for 12.5 percent of total investment into Burma in the 2014-15 fiscal year, ending in March, and 3 percent of total exports, the developers have reported.

A recent special report by Burma's Eleven Media Group found the Thilawa SEZ had attracted investment from up to 13 foreign countries including Japan, Singapore, China, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, Panama, Malaysia and South Korea.

But the project got off to a bad start when construction started in 2013 with the first phase beset with controversy after involving the relocation of nearly 70 families to Myan Yar Thar, 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) away.

Many residents said the compensation they received was not enough. The Thilawa site had been earmarked for industrial development under Burma's junta government in 1996 and people relocated from the land were compensated a reported 20,000 kyats ($16) per acre.

The junta's industrial project was scrapped and those who had been moved away then returned. But Thilawa's new developers say the site already belonged to the government because of the junta's deal, and offered compensation only for crops grown on the land, but not for the land itself.

Residents said the employment training they received as part of their relocation package failed to prepare them to compete for jobs in the SEZ, leaving only low-paid jobs open to them, such as clearing rubbish or working as security guards.

A lack of clean water was another problem, they said.

Daw Sanda, a member of the Thilawa SEZ Management Committee (TSMC), a government entity monitoring development of the zone, said the complaints were unfounded.

She said the compensation given in phase one was sufficient for villagers to build new and better homes. Daw Sanda added that many were in debt before they moved, and they were given financial assistance by the authorities.

She said there was employment to be found in factories in the area that did not require a skilled labor force and training would be provided to staff.

Deeper wells had been dug to address a shortage of water in Myan Yar Thar and a water supply system that will make tap water available was being developed, she said.

"(It) will be completed in no time," she told the Thomson Reuters Foundation by email.

Although there have been complaints about the first phase of the development, Vicky Bowman, head of the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business said it "should be recognized that this is actually the most advanced, transparent and comprehensive resettlement process which has ever occurred in Burma."

"But as with all such projects, there are always lessons to be learned," she said. "Government capacity to handle these large projects is seriously lacking."

Takashi Yanai, chief executive of the company developing the project, Myanmar Japan Thilawa Development (MJTD), said the company believed it had a "responsibility to ask the Myanmar government to implement such acquisition and resettlement work without violation of human rights."

MJTD was ready to "listen to the voices of the people at any time and, if necessary, we will deliver the voices to and discuss with the Myanmar government to find the solution," Yanai said in an email.

"NO HAPPINESS"

But land rights campaigners remain skeptical.

"If the second phase of Thilawa goes forward in its current state it gives a green light to irresponsible and harmful investment," Katherine McDonnell, legal advocacy coordinator at Earth Rights International, told the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

Aye Khaing Win, a 30-year-old mechanic who was relocated to Myan Yar Thar in 2013, said villagers were poor before they moved but they were able to support themselves and were happy.

"Even though before I lived in a small house of bamboo, lit by candles, my family did not have any worries," he said.

"Now, everyday, I have all these pressures. I can’t find happiness here."

The first phase of the SEZ has been hailed as a success by private local consortium, Myanmar Thilawa SEZ Holdings, one of the stakeholders in the public-private partnership that carried out phase one in the development of Thilawa SEZ.

According to its an annual report released last month, the total planned investment in the first phase is expected to reach $1 billion by 2018 with 40,000 new jobs created.

It also expects the special economic zone to process exports worth $350 million by 2018.

But last month villagers traveled to Tokyo to present their concerns to Thilawa SEZ investors, including the main conduit for Japan's overseas development aid, JICA.

JICA told the Thomson Reuters Foundation that it would not comment on whether it would invest in the second phase.

A spokesman for the company said in an email the relocation of residents for the first phase was "conducted in accordance with JICA social and environmental guidelines."

Around 4,000 people live or work on land that will be developed for the remaining phases of the Thilawa SEZ, Earth Rights International said.

U Mya Hlaing is one of them. The 70-year-old farmer, who also leads the community-based Thilawa Social Development Organisation, said consultations ahead of the second phase relocation had been inadequate.

He said the community wanted a resettlement plan that would protect their livelihoods and ensure decent healthcare and education.

He said his organization would contact businesses to tell them not to invest in the Thilawa SEZ.

"If they do not agree we will not give them our land," U Mya Hlaing said.

The post Burma's New Economic Zone Attracts Foreign Interest But Local Ire appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Ten Things to Do in Rangoon This Week

Posted: 17 Oct 2016 10:12 PM PDT

tenThe Irrawaddy picks 10 interesting events happening in Rangoon this week.

GrandRoyalMusic Unlimited

End the week bopping to tunes from more than a dozen of Burma's most garlanded singers, at the Mya Yeik Nyo Hotel. Seats cost between 20,000 and 100,000 kyats; standing tickets available for 8,000 kyats, at call center-1876.

Where: Mya Yeik Nyo Hotel, Bahan Tsp.

When: Friday, October 21 (starts at 6 pm)


Aung YinAung Yin's 32

Burmese singer Aung Yin will celebrate the 32nd anniversary of his musical career, in concert with other famous singers at Burma's handsome (to some) national auditorium. Tickets available for between 20,000 and 50,000 kyats. Call 09-451010 789, 09-965010 789, or 09-7820 97436.

Where: National Theater, Myoma Kyaung Street.

When: Saturday, October 22 (starts at 7 pm)


kiss-myanmarParty Night

Like dancing around like an idiot on Friday nights? Good, because Muse Bar is putting on an electronic dance music (EDM) party, featuring locally known (and impeccably named) DJ acts such as The Kendrick and The Bugbears, plus a special live performance from pop-star Ah-Moon. No extra charges for the party, beyond what you usually pay to get in.

Where: Muse Bar, No. 330 Alone Road, Dagon Township, Yangon International Hotel Compound

When: Friday, October 21 (starts at 10.00 pm) 


ayeyarwady-festivalIrrawaddy River Art Festival

Burma's oddball National Museum will play host to talks, music shows, and art and photography displays on the subject of the Irrawaddy, Burma's most important river, also known as the Ayeyarwady. You can check out King Thibaw's old throne in the museum's permanent collection, while you're at it.

Where: National Museum, Pyay Road

When: Sunday, October 23 to Sunday, October 30


myanmar-housingMyanmar 1st Affordable Housing Expo

Being overcharged for your dank Rangoon apartment? Well, the Construction and Housing Development Bank (CHDB) and the Ministry of Construction are jointly putting on a showcase of (purportedly) low-priced apartments available in Rangoon and elsewhere in Burma, with CHDB telling the punters about mortgages.

Where: MICT Park, Hlaing Campus, University of Yangon, Hlaing Tsp.

When: Friday, October 21 to Sunday, October 23


4th4th Natural Friends

More than 20 artists from the Danubyu Artists Association will showcase over 100 paintings, with scenic landscapes and portraits reflecting Burma's ethnic diversity.

Where: Myanmar Artists Organization (Central), Bogyoke Market

When: Wednesday, October 19 to Sunday, October 23


ArtTraveling with Art

A group exhibition, featuring over 30 oil and acrylic paintings by six artists depicting the obscure site of Bagan and other areas of rural Burma.

Where: Lokanat Galleries, 62 Pansodan St, 1st Floor, Kyauktada Tsp. Tel. 095-1382-269

When: Friday, October 21 to Tuesday, October 25


65-galleryWaves

Another group art exhibition, situated within a characterful colonial-era villa on Yaw Min Gyi, with around 50 paintings on various themes by six artists: U Hla Tun, U Win Sein, Ko Shine Lu, Triangle Tun Naing, Wi Le Linn and Nyi Htun.

Where: Gallery 65, No. 65 Yaw Min Gyi Road, Dagon Tsp.

When: Saturday, October 22 to Wednesday, October 26


think-galleryMerry Dance of Mother & Kids

Artist Aung Khaing's merrily titled solo show, featuring 43 paintings on ebullient themes. The artist will be performing demonstrations. Get on your (figurative) dancing shoes.

Where: Think Art Gallery, No. 23 Nawaday Street, Dagon Tsp.

When: Saturday, October 22 to Saturday, October 29


sunset

Sunset

Rangoon-based photographer Linaung Pyae's second solo exhibition. Stop by for glimpses of beautiful sunsets from across Burma, if you're into that sort of thing (and who isn't?).

Where: Wired on 39 Gallery, 39th Street

When: Friday, October 21 to Saturday, November 5

 

The post Ten Things to Do in Rangoon This Week appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

National News

National News


‘No choice but to shoot them,’ official says of Rakhine manhunt for militants

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 12:40 AM PDT

A senior military official yesterday defended security forces' use of lethal force in Rakhine State, saying recent killings were an appropriate response in cases where they have encountered weapons-wielding hostiles.

Govt claims media not restricted in Rakhine State conflict zone

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 12:36 AM PDT

Directly contradicting the experience of many reporters, including those at The Myanmar Times, Minister for Information U Pe Myint announced yesterday that the media has not been restricted within the conflict areas in Rakhine State. Military officials, however, did acknowledge that they have made reporters delete photos that they have deemed a security risk.

Four arrests, more bodies found after Chindwin ferry disaster

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 12:18 AM PDT

Police have announced a crackdown on ferry operators in the wake of the loss of the Aung Soe Moe Kyaw 2, which went down in the Chindwin River on October 15 with the confirmed loss, so far, of dozens of passengers.

State media gloss on Rakhine conditions blasted for ignoring ‘reality on the ground’

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 12:10 AM PDT

Rights groups are concerned that "blatant falsehoods" in state media could exacerbate tensions in Rakhine State, after The Global New Light of Myanmar published a denial that Muslim residents face restrictions on their movements and are refused access to vital services.

Landmines, security concerns prevent return for Kayin IDPs

Posted: 17 Oct 2016 11:52 PM PDT

Although the guns have fallen silent in Hlaingbwe township, Kayin State, civilians displaced by recent conflict may be unable to return home for several months due to concerns over landmines and fears that hostilities between the Tatmadaw and a Karen armed group could reignite.

Four days of clashes reported near Kyaukme

Posted: 17 Oct 2016 11:50 PM PDT

In another instance of escalating clashes around the country, yesterday morning marked the fourth day of renewed hostilities between the Tatmadaw and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army in northern Shan State.

Nationwide eye survey to be conducted next year

Posted: 17 Oct 2016 11:43 PM PDT

The Ministry of Health and Sports plans to conduct a nationwide survey of eye health in 2017 for the first time in almost 20 years.

Toe lost in firecracker accident

Posted: 17 Oct 2016 11:17 PM PDT

A man lost a toe after a firecracker exploded at his feet during a festival celebrating Thadingyut, police say.

Overseas employment agency under investigation for broken promises

Posted: 17 Oct 2016 11:16 PM PDT

Lu Htake Moe overseas employment agency is under investigation for allegedly failing to send 300 workers to Thailand and instead leaving them stranded without work in Myawady.

Regional MPs say Yangon government full of hot air

Posted: 17 Oct 2016 11:15 PM PDT

Regional MPs are working to burst Yangon City Development Committee's bubble over a slated hot-air balloon field in Kandawgyi Park.

Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News


Investment protection treaties endanger democratic reform and peace initiatives in Myanmar

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 08:01 AM PDT

In the volatile and fragile context of Myanmar's nascent democratic reform, investment protection treaties must not be allowed to negatively affect processes that would make Myanmar more peaceful and democratic.

People handing out flyers on the street to protest investment protection agreements
Following a reform process initiated by the previous military-backed government of President Thein Sein, there has been great interest among international governments and the business sector to promote foreign investment and trade with Myanmar. This momentum has been furthered by the subsequent endorsement by the country's democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi for the West to drop most of its economic sanctions. In order to facilitate this relationship, Western and Asian governments have pushed Myanmar to sign so-called "investment protection treaties". While the Myanmar military government had signed investment protection treaties with China and India, since 2013 new treaties were signed with Japan and South Korea. Currently, now led by Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, the Myanmar government is negotiating an investment protection agreement (IPA) with the European Union (EU). There is also an investment protection clause in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This is a proposed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the ASEAN member states and Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.
While the benefits of signing investment protection agreements are highly overstated, the risks are seriously underestimated, and they could have major negative impacts on democratic development and sustainable peace in Myanmar. When signing these treaties, governments give away their sovereign right to regulate in the interest of the people and the environment, and they expose themselves to expensive lawsuits. The incentives offered to foreign investors come at a high price, depriving countries like Myanmar of the necessary policy space to harness investment to serve sustainable development and peace. Under the provisions of the investment protection agreements, foreign investors can challenge almost any government intervention if they consider that it will affect its current or future profits.
These interventions by foreign interests could, for example, include challenging new policies or laws introduced by the Myanmar government around more sustainable health or environmental approaches and priorities. They could also undermine agreements that come out of the country's peace process: for instance, around natural resource management and sharing – or better regulations to make natural resource extraction more sustainable. If it signs up to these investment protection treaties, the Myanmar government may have to pay a heavy price to foreign companies or abandon policies and principles that it would like to promote in these vital situations of such importance to the country.
The investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses, which form a standard part of investment agreements, enable foreign investors to circumvent national courts and take a complaint straight to an ad hoc international tribunal consisting of three commercial investment lawyers, who will decide on whether government measures are legitimate or proportionate to their objective. These for-profitlawyers can, and do, award compensation that may run into many hundreds of millions, in some cases even billions, of dollars. These awards are enforceable and must be paid out of public budgets, reducing the funds that are available for public policies. Equally detrimental, the independence of lawyers is not guaranteed as they are paid commercial fees on a case-by-case basis in a one-sided system where only foreign investors can bring legal challenges and where there is thus an incentive to rule in their favour.
For these reasons, this week Myanmar civil society organisations (CSOs) are rallying all over the country against the RCEP and the proposed European Union-Myanmar IPA. The campaign by Myanmar CSOs is part of a campaign in most of the 16 RCEP countries. Neither details of the EU-Myanmar IPA negotiation dates, nor the negotiation text, are made public. As a result, Myanmar civil society groups have consistently raised serious concerns about the EU-Myanmar IPA and many of them refused to participate in the external EU Sustainability Impact Assessment on the basis that they can not say anything sensible as long as the negotiation texts have not been made public.

In a joint statement, the Myanmar CSOs point out:
"Myanmar is still in its very early stages of a democratization and peace building process, which will involve negotiations over ownership and revenue sharing of natural resources in the different ethnic areas. Many laws and policies still need to be revised. Signing an investment treaty like the one proposed by the EU would lock-in future policy space in Myanmar and severely endanger the prospects for democracy and sustainable peace. For Myanmar to take this course at this stage in its development appears not only inadvisable, it is also unnecessary.''
There is a long history in such international investment law that Myanmar now has to face up to. Signing international investment treaties (IIAs), in the hope of attracting foreign investment, has been a central strategy for governments looking to improve economic development. IIAs have been around since 1959, when the first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between Germany and Pakistan was signed. By the end of 2015, there were 3,286 investment agreements (2,928 BITs and 358 "other IIAs") globally. "Other IIAs" refer to economic agreements other than BITs that include investment-related provisions, such as investment chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements. The bulk of these investment protection treaties were signed during the 1990s and early 2000s when most governments believed that economic liberalism would bring development. The idea was that signing investment agreements would help countries attract foreign investment. At the time, there was no awareness of the risks involved and what governments were giving up in terms of sovereignty.
Today, more than 20 years later, the evidence that international investment agreements actually deliver on their stated purpose is at best inconclusive. Most research studies carried out by the academic community have failed to find a direct correlation between IIAs and attraction for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The experience of countries like South Africa, Ecuador, Hungary and Brazil show that increased foreign investment is not based on having IIAs. Even the European Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström recently admitted that most studies show no "direct and exclusive causal relationship" between international investment agreements and foreign direct investment.
Foreign investors, however, have already used the investment dispute settlement system to challenge environmental protections, energy policies, financial regulation, public health, land use and taxation measures.
The threat of claims can cause governments to reconsider or shelve public interest regulation. International Investment Agreements also have the effect of severely limiting a host government's ability to design a national investment strategy that involves a tighter and dynamic regulatory framework for foreign investors. In particular, many IIAs prohibit or restrict the introduction of performance requirements for companies. The government cannot impose obligations for technology transfer or demand a percentage of domestic content. This means that the host government is unable to ensure that the supply of goods or services is provided by nationals or that the company employs a certain percentage of local employees in order to promote job creation. The government is also inhibited from introducing tax measures or demanding a minimum investment in research and development (R&D) activities. Such rules combine to severely limit government sovereignty to direct investment flows towards sectors that support national or state level development objectives.
The consequences of such IIAs could be especially damaging for Myanmar. At present, the country relies heavily on the exploitation and export of natural resources as a driver of economic development. Investors in the mining and extractives industry are among the most frequent users of the investor-state-dispute settlement (ISDS) system. Any future endeavours by Myanmar to reregulate its natural resources more effectively and equitably for its peoples could be challenged by foreign investors through the ISDS system. Such challenges could halt initiatives to ensure that the management of its extraction contributes to a sustainable peace or that Myanmar's mineral commodities are not exported in raw form but that value is added domestically.
There is much international precedent in such warnings. Several mining companies, for example, lodged ISDS claims against Indonesia when it adopted a new mining law which required among other things mining companies to put in place downstream production: in other words, to refine and process minerals (for example by establishing a smelter) in the country prior to export in order to generate jobs and profits for Indonesia. The mining company Newmont used the Netherlands–Indonesia Investment Treaty to file a claim against the Indonesian government. Newmont only withdrew its case against Indonesia after it had reached an agreement with the Indonesian government, giving the mining company special exemptions from the new mining law.
This is a clear case of a regulatory chill, which is more and more used by investors to challenge proposed regulations. The impact can be immediate because of the risks to public budgets that may come under enormous financial pressures. The mere threat of a multi-million dollar international arbitration lawsuit can make governments reluctant to implement social or environmental protection measures that could affect the interests of foreign investors. For example, the government of New Zealand decided to postpone their plans to introduce stricter rules on cigarette packaging until they know the results of the investment arbitration lawsuit initiated by Philip Morris against the governments of Uruguay and Australia for their decision to change regulation on warnings in cigarette packaging.
The potential risks to governments do not end here. Often investors claim compensation not only for the actual investment made but for loss of future profits as well. In Myanmar's case, this means that a definite cancellation of the Myitsone Dam could potentially cost the Myanmar government hundreds of millions to billions of dollars, which would have to be paid from the public budget. For the moment, the Chinese investor has not threatened to bring a case and has tried to solve the issue through diplomatic means, but this could well change in the case of a final cancellation. Germany, for example, faces a 4.6 billion Euros ISDS claim from the Swedish energy company Vattenfall after the parliament decided to phase out nuclear energy in response to the Fukoshima disaster. This by far extends the actual investments made by Vattenfall.
As concerns have risen over such practices, the argument that unregulated foreign direct investment will improve a country's economic development has been widely discredited in recent years. Rather, it is recognised among communities in many countries dependent on natural resource production that the regulation of foreign investment in general, and the extractive industry in particular, is crucial in order to restrict the industry's negative social and environmental impacts and to guarantee some positive contribution to economic development. Greater government influence in the extractive industries is the current trend among resource-rich countries. For example, African countries have developed a regulatory framework for mining, the "Africa Mining Vision" aimed at enhancing development by supporting the industrialisation of natural resources.
A growing number of countries are beginning to understand the financial, social and environmental costs of the system of investors' protection — with countries as diverse as Australia, Bolivia, India, Indonesia and South Africa revising their investment treaty policies. They are dissatisfied with transnational investors challenging the legitimacy of their policy decisions and the threat to public budgets. Thus, since Myanmar is only opening up its economy recently, it can learn from experiences elsewhere in the world.
As Myanmar is opening up for business, the country is currently developing a very liberal investment law protecting the rights and property of foreign investors in the country, as well as giving very generous tax incentives. On top of this come the RCEP and the EU–Myanmar Investment Agreement, with EU actors interested in such diverse fields as Energy, Logistics, Infrastructure, Construction, Health and Agri-Food Sector. These will extend investors' rights with even more countries, and they are a dangerous step that will prevent effective regulation of foreign investments in the interests of a durable peace. Worse still, unlike the existing Bilateral Investment Treaties that Myanmar has with for example China, India and Japan, it will be much harder for Myanmar to revise its investment policies in the future since regional trade agreements such as the RCEP have no expiry date.
Myanmar is a country in transition. For the first time in decades, a democratically elected government is in place. However, the national armed forces still play a significant role in the country's political arena, and democratic reform has only just begun. The country has many outdated laws and policies that need to be reformed. At the same time, a peace process has started to finally seek a solution at the negotiating table to solve ethnic conflict in the country and end the 65-year old civil war. In this context, many new policies and laws need to be introduced. But in such a volatile and fragile landscape, it is essential that investment protection treaties do not have negative impacts on processes to make Myanmar more peaceful and democratic.


These commentaries are part of a TNI project funded by Sweden.






Oxford-Myanmar Policy Brief Series

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 06:08 AM PDT

Myanmar's new government faces a variety of challenges on its path to securing democracy, federalism, security, and equality for all of its people. The Oxford-Myanmar Policy Brief Series was created as an effort to contribute to domestic policy-makers' work addressing these many challenges.
This initiative began with a workshop on 15 February, 2016, entitled "Towards Democracy and Reconciliation: Challenges Facing Myanmar's Incoming Government." Co-organised by Dr Ma Khin Mar Mar Kyi and Dr Matthew J Walton, and co-sponsored by the Programme on Modern Burmese Studies at St Antony's College and the International Gender Studies Centre at Lady Margaret Hall, the workshop brought together over a dozen UK experts on Myanmar, drawn from academic, advocacy, and activist communities. Presenters focused on the challenges facing the new NLD-led government, identifying key stakeholders, persistent and emerging impediments, and potential policy responses. Subjects considered included military legacies, governance concerns, social issues, land and resource management, and conflict and displacement.
With the success of the event, the co-organisers saw an opportunity to effectively channel the insights of the participants into policy-making conversations in Myanmar's government, civil society, and other political institutions. They also sought to contribute to the developing public discourse on political reform in the country. Participants were asked to transform their presentations into short policy briefs that could be of use to ministries, parliament, and other decision-making bodies in Myanmar, and others who could not attend the workshop were invited to contribute briefs. The collected briefs were edited by the co-organisers and translated into Burmese. They are available to download free here and will be distributed in hard copy to lawmakers, policy-makers, and others in Myanmar's government.
With the additional support of the Irrawaddy Policy Exchange, the co-organisers plan to hold events at Oxford focused on different policy areas approximately every 6-8 months, with policy briefs to follow, along with other follow-up events in Myanmar. The second iteration was held at Oxford on 13 October, 2016 and focused on environmental issues. In addition to including several presenters from Myanmar, the workshop organisers were pleased to be able to welcome several representatives from Myanmar's Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation as well as representatives from Myanmar's Parliament. Reports on the discussions at the event will appear in the next week on Tea Circle, the Programme on Modern Burmese Studies' Myanmar blog.

Mentality of the “Tatmadaw” Through the Living History

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 05:59 AM PDT

Kanbawza Win is a survivor of the 7th July Incident when the Junta took power.
(1) Bias Interpretation of the Union of Burma History

The ancient history of Burma is a history of war between the rival petty kingdoms. Sometimes the Myanmar monarch won and sometimes the other ethnic nationalities like Shan, Mon and Arakanese won. The warrior kings either Myanmar or non-Myanmar often endeavour to subdue their neighbouring kingdoms, but the peoples of Burma always lived in the same country and no ethnic group Myanmar or non-Myanmar, can solely claim that the country has been under their rule throughout all the time. But Chauvinistic (Mahar) Myanmar who are myopically nationalist and hegemonic claiming that they have ruled the country except in the colonial period believe in the linear progression of Myanmar, and imagine themselves to be a historically cohesive nation, whose organizational integration with the ethnic nationalities in the peripheries only need to be completed either democratically or by force. General Than Shwe's Armed Forces Day speech in Naypyidaw in 2009 said, "Our Tatmadaw should be a worthy heir to the traditions of the capable Tatmadaw established by noble kings Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya," that is why the Tatmadaw set up the three mammoth statues of the warrior kings under whose shadow they marched past every annual Resistance Day (there is no such thing as Army Day in Burma). The name "Naypyidaw" in Burmese means royal capital city of kings.

Hence, the history of post-colonial Burma centers on a pathological process of neo-colonization of the non-dominant members of the Union by the dominant Myanmar elite, where the urban elites and males, and soldiers, are more equal than the other ethnic communities, classes and females. They Tatmadaw have resumed this old expansionist mission in the name of post-colonial nation-state building.

(2)  Tatmadaw is an occupational Army

The current Myanmar Tatmadaw have originated from BIA, hence it is only the Myanmar ethnic group and not a Union army. As said the Union army was originated in 1937 when the country was separated from India composed of the ethnic nationalities, known as the Burma Rifles, a sort of a federal army, under the British command. When the Allies retook Burma from Japan, the British Burma Rifles played an important and crucial part, acting as scouts and gathering intelligence and harassing the enemy from behind the line, while the BIA was still aligned to with the Imperial Japanese army.  Only when the BIA saw that the allies and the British Burmese army were winning and that Mandalay had fallen to the allies did the BIA decide to join the winning side. When the two groups were amalgamated the two Karen commanders became chief of the armed forces (General Smith Dun) and chief of the air force (Saw Shi Sho); the chief of operations was the Sandhurst-trained Karen, Brigadier Saw Kya Doe. The Quartermaster General, who controlled three-quarters of the military budget, was a Karen, Saw Donny. Brigadier Bo Let Ya, army chief of staff.

The Myanmar had considered the ethnic nationalities especially the Karen and Anglo Burman as mercenaries. Within a twelve weeks after Britain give independence on Jan 4th 1948, the Burma Communist Party revolted. This was the first Myanmar ethnic insurrection against the Union of Burma, the Myanmar Communists Parties were the only group among the insurrectionists that did not recognize the Union of Burma, while the ethnic nationalities insurrectionists recognized the Union of Burma and wanted only autonomy within the union, a sort of a Federal Republic. The second rebellion was by the PVO (part of Tatmadaw) and the third was the Red flags communist (Thakin Soe) Hence among the insurrections only the Myanmar ethnics that did not recognize the Union of Burma.

The Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) was forced to rebel in 1949, after the Karen quarters in Rangoon city (Kenmendine) and Insein town came under attack by Myanmar troops. So, unlike in Pakistan, where a professional military force became politicized, in Burma the military was politicized from the outset because of its role in the independence struggle. It may or may not accept civilian control up to this day, but at times out of conviction as well as expediency it may accept.

But up to this date the people still look at the Tatmadaw as the people's army. However Ne Win and his lieutenants were more ambitious, as they had tasted power in the form of caretaker regime and launched a military coup on March 2nd 1962 and their ugly visage on 7th July by massacring hundreds of, Rangoon University students. Since then Tatmadaw despised both nationally and internationally and came to be much feared by the people and could not rely on the popular vote to stay in power.

(3)  Attitudes towards non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities

Tatmadaw believes that the ethnic nationalities are inherently inferior (culturally/socially) and would split from the country if given a chance.  They also believe that the ethnic nationalities are distrustful and have the fear of Myanmar domination, however, they provide lip-service respect for ethnic nationalities' culture through ritualized holidays and propaganda efforts. They believe that if the Myanmar do not oppress other ethnic nationalities then they would find themselves oppressed. For them, national reconciliation means assimilation and preventing disintegration. All the ethnic nationalities and their languages, traditions, culture and values are to be assimilated into those of the Myanmar race hence, if the Tatmadaw falls everything falls. They believe that their mission is to protect the country and that the country would fall apart without them. Essentially, their power is rooted in the deep racism that has permeated Myanmar society since the beginning, the racial supremacy over the non-Myanmar, and the Divide and Rule Policy. Hence, the 3 As method of Annihilation, Absorption and Assimilation were adopted on the ethnic nationalities.

The Tatmadaw believes that the country is surrounded by enemies – real and imagined.  These    threats no longer take the form of territorial aggrandizement, but economic domination and the possibility of encouraging ethnic nationalities for separatism.  This fear is based on a reality once extant, but now completely outmoded.  These past instances of such foreign support are the American assistance to KMT forces in Burma, Pakistani-Bangladeshis' support for Muslim insurgents, the Thai's tolerance to a variety of insurgent groups (both ethnic and Myanmar), Indian backing of anti-Junta groups, some British humanitarian support for the Karen, Chinese aid to the Burma Communist Party and a general perception that Christian minorities have closer support and contact with foreigners than do the Myanmar Buddhists.

(4) Tatmadaw's Philosophy

The Tatmadaw, has no real ideology and no constituency within the society under its rule, but for a time it was successful by entrenching fear and hopelessness in the minds of the people. Even its junior and mid-level officers work mainly only for purposes of their own power or wealth. Employment in Tatmadaw is one of the few viable careers in today's Burma. As for the rank and file soldiers, many are conscripted by forced, while others are coerced or misled into believing that the Tatmadaw provides an escape from personal trouble or protection for their families.  The current generals of the Tatmadaw lack experience of independence struggle and Cold War politics, and are unable to stand on a nationalistic platform and non-alliance ideology. They are not skilful in playing political theory games. The only lessons they have learnt are some effective ways to hold on to their power.  The training and lectures given eventually instill in all soldiers a Tatmadaw mindset, which is comprised of the following features:

- We work harder than others for the sake of the country.

- We sacrifice our lives to work for the sake of the country.

- Our comrades are injured or killed by our enemies.

- The enemies, who injure or kill us are supported by a part of the population.

-We must follow orders, live under the discipline of the army at all the time.

-We are soldiers serving the country 24-hours a day.

Hence from the soldier's view, ordinary people and civil servants live more easy-going lives, indiscipline and have many leisure hours and do business just to enrich themselves. The end result is that soldiers believe they have the sole right to hold state power due to their hard work and sacrifices. These basic opinions hinder the relationship between the people and the Tatmadaw.

When the Tatmadaw cracks down on peaceful demonstrators, they viewed them as lazy opportunists, who are asking for rights without working hard and sacrificing like they do. The Tatmadaw, in a way, blames the people for failing to develop the country. They appeared to believe that the Tatmadaw as a whole works hard, the people and civil servants do not work hard. Foreigners work and think smarter than do the lazy people of Burma, and these are the reasons why developed countries are ahead of Burma is their rationale. However, when ordinary people go abroad to seek job opportunity, they see them as betraying the country by opting for a foreign one. The soldiers work industriously, because they receive advantages from their work. They are disciplined, because they are simply reaping the advantages from performing well. Clearly, the Generals followed the dictum of Mao Ze Dong: "Crack down on the extreme minority, leave the educated to live in illusion, and label the majority of ordinary people as supporters."

(5)Tatmadaw's Perspectives on Economics

The Tatmadaw view economic progress, reform, or liberalization as secondary to maintenance of political control. They believe that the primary function of an improved economy is greater military power, general political acquiescence of the population to Tatmadaw control through military delivery of greater economic rewards for loyalty, which improves their political legitimacy, but not the betterment of the human condition.  To this end, the Tatmadaw leaders believe they must control the economy and thus they have set up direct and many indirect mechanisms for control e.g. such as UMEHL (Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings) and MEC (Myanmar Economic Corporation), in short they deliberately set up a crony capitalism. The Tatmadaw view any form of pluralism, within the administration at any level, in the dissemination of information and within non-governmental organizations as a threat to the state and their control.

(6) Is Myanmar Tatmadaw, the Guardian of the country?

" If the hypothesis that the Tatmadaw should take temporary control, when a civilian government strays from its 'national ideal' or obligation, is correct," then it should have already solved the country's problem long ago as any genuine guardian might do. For example, when there was a dilemma in civilian rule in the years from 1950 to 1958 when the ruling party AFPFL split, the pro-West faction wanted to take aid from the West and Japan, but the neutral faction wanted to remain non-aligned, Tatmadaw, joined the winning side of the pro-West faction to wipe out the ethnics and the communist. This is the first proof that Tatmadaw is not a genuine guardian and has no basic loyalty to the country as it claims.

The second proof is when Ne Win and Sein Lwin were forced to resign in 1988 the Tatmadaw move against their own civilian government of Dr. Maung Maung.  The third is when Tatmadaw's pet party NUP won only 10 seats compared to the pro-democracy party of the NLD 392 the Tatmadaw broke its own promise to hand over power to the winner and changed the rules of the game. The fourth is current 2008 Nargis Constitution of occupying 25 % of seats in all the elected bodies, is the authentic proof that the military was determined to hold on to power, at any cost through its sham democratic-trappings.

The fifth was as lately as August 2015 Shwe Mann was ousted from the pro-Tatmadaw party, the USDP, by force, not only because he was too close to the NLD party of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but also he had angered the military by supporting an attempt to amend the 2008 Nargis Constitution.

Tatmadaw's continuing presence provides one of the greatest obstacles to the aspirations of those committed to democratization and federalism in Burma.

(7) Targeting Education

After the 2nd World War, during the Cold War period, democracy, in the newly emerging nations of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries were not strong and naturally there were military coups e.g. Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram, came to power in Thailand, General Ayub Khan in Pakistan, General Suharto in Indonesia and in Burma, General Ne Win. But looking back at these military coups in these neighbouring countries, we find that they always bounced back to democracy within a decade or two, except in Burma. Why? One of the answers is because the Tatmadaw targeted the higher education system, where the young brains are hatched to think, as number one enemy. Starting from 7th July 1962 waves after waves of students were killed and persecuted. The Tatmadaw believes that students and educated class went into politics because of their misconceptions and that universities were, and are the birth place of dissent against autocratic rule, hence the Burmese generals have sought to subvert education  for their own purpose, - to keep them in power in perpetuity. The Tatmadaw has kept bonded the rights to education hostage, to be kept in permanent captivity. If the university were not closed, they were isolated and separated from one another and so that they would not be able contact one another. Iron fences were built around universities campuses. The universities were sent to remote places and were closed down at the slightest sign of any trouble. This prolonged closure of schools and universities has affected the future of almost all the young people of Burma and except for those with political influence, such as the children of the generals and those rich enough to send their children abroad, continue to enjoy uninterrupted and quality education. The Tatmadaw controlled education system has resulted in sub-standard education and critical lack of teaching facilities, stymied by unskilled teachers, and lack of job opportunities after graduation, corruption and bribery.

(8) Tatmadaw's New Weapon (The Rapist Army)

Sexual violence as a weapon of war in ethnic cleansing was implemented, as girls and women have been singled out for rape because women are viewed as repositories of a community's cultural and spiritual values. Due to the well-known impunity for rape, survivors and families are extremely reluctant to complain about rape. In the rare cases where victims do complain, the military often responds with violence. The UNHCR found that refugee families frequently cite rape as a key factor in their decisions to seek refuge. Tatmadaw is overtly targeting civilians; says Benjamin Zawacki, Southeast Asia, researcher for Amnesty International "The violations are widespread and systematic.'' A well-documented phenomenon for at least a decade, "License to Rape" report inspired a level of interest and outrage on the part of the international community.  A well-documented rape and murder of the two Kachin missionaries Tangbau Hkawn Nan Zing (21) and Maran Lu Ra, (20), in the Church compound, of Kwang Hka village, Nam Tao Township, by the soldiers of the 503rd Light Infantry Regiment, under Northeast Regional Command, was never admitted nor its DNA results made known. Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has said he also wants the truth to be known, but the case was shut up to this day. This explicitly means that the Generals themselves were involved in this ethnic cleansing policies, which the Tatmadaw has been doing all these years since 1962.

Several NGOs and independent organizations have examined the structures, policies, and practices of the Tatmadaw, and concluded that it was designed to target the non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities.

Before 1988, a secret order was issued that any Myanmar soldier, who is able to marry an ethnic woman would be rewarded a handsome amount of monetary prize, but this happened to be difficult and slow. Therefore, when the Tatmadaw took over the administration, it encouraged raping the women of the ethnic nationalities. This message was received by the lieutenants, and captains, and hence it was these ranks, who committed most of the rape cases. It was hoped that in the long run if there were only one race 'Myanmar', one religion 'Theravada Buddhism' and one country, 'Burma', they would be able to govern and stand tall in the international community. This was basic idea of Tatmadaw's rape.


 (9) Child Soldiers

Even animals do not kill their young or bully them instead they shield them up and help them to grow but Tatmadaw, not only torture and kill but also send the children to the front lines. The worst thing is that it has forced the children to become child soldiers. In March 2007 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on Burma, for "the continuing recruitment and use of child soldiers". The report: "My Gun Was as tall as me", estimated that 70,000 or more of the Burma army's estimated 350,000 soldiers are children."  Human Rights Watch research has shown that boys, as young as 10, continue to be forcibly enlisted into Tatmadaw by a network of predatory recruiters, often soldiers themselves, who lurk at train stations and outside cinemas and tea shops looking for vulnerable young males to coerce into the Tatmadaw. Once forced into the Tatmadaw they were not permitted to contact their families, their ages were fabricated on enlistment material, and receive harsh training before being deployed to bleak and dangerous outposts throughout Burma's hinterland. Boys are used to fight ethnic insurgents, mete out punishment to civilians, and as porters to support frontline troops.  It is hard to imagine the psychological trauma and damage these experiences are inflicting on children. The problem of child soldiers is hidden from the eyes of many international observers and Burmese citizens in towns and cities. Once impressed into the army, child soldiers often eke out a desperate existence fishing and hunting for food and stealing from villagers, surrounded by malarial forests, landmines and ethnic insurgents.  Their plight is so desperate that many of their victims of crimes committed by these boys have pity for them. The victims know that these young boys are being brain washed by their commanders.

Despite official regulations within the Tatmadaw prohibiting the use of child soldiers and frequent promises to the UN to erase the practice, it did not appear to be at all serious about curbing the practice. It is almost impossible to place a figure on how many children under 18 were in the Tatmadaw, but there are certainly thousands. As the Tatmadaw expanded rapidly; desertions increased and volunteers decrease. A system of incentives and punishments was in place to encourage recruiters to fill their quotas. Some local authorities were reportedly pressured by the Tatmadaw to produce a certain number of recruits per village, some of them children. Nowhere is there a more disturbing, if not horrifying example of the relationship between a culture of cruelty and the politics of irresponsibility than in the resounding silence that surrounds the torture of children under Myanmar Tatmadaw. There is an undeniable pathological outcome when the issue of Tatmadaw becomes more important than the survival of morality itself, resulting in the deaths of thousands of children  A 29-page report, "Under the Radar" on ongoing recruitment and use of children by the Tatmadaw, by the UK-based NGO Child Soldiers International, shows that military officers and civilian 'brokers' continue to use deliberate misrepresentation to entice new recruits, including children. Poor and uneducated boys continue to be frequently intimidated and coerced and lured them to the nearest recruitment centre or battalion.   Until safeguards within recruitment procedures are implemented in practice across the country at all levels and until effective age verification mechanisms are put in place and properly enforced, the situation will not significantly improve.

Epilogue

In short, there is no Union of Burma Army (Federal Army) in Burma the current Tatmadaw is held together not by patriotism but by a mixture of patron-client ties, personal power, economic privileges, fear of  severe punishment complete and total obedience" of the subordinates in the chain of command. It is a cruel occupationaly army with the highest records of human rights violations, which has never fought an external enemy but used all its resources to surpress the pro democratic and ethnic nationalities. It is the roots of all evil in Burma and need to be replaced by a Federal Army.

Democracy is seen as a threat to the existing order because it would deprive the ruling elite of power. The Tatmadaw and their families are "second state" of approximately two million out of a total population of 50 million plus.  It will be a great mistake for any country to have military to military relations with Myanmar Tatmadaw because Burma will never be peaceful, democratic or federal if there is an occupational Myanmar Tatmadaw.

This paper was read at the 12th International Burma Studies Conference at Northern University of Illinois Dekalb on Oct.8, 2016 attended by several experts (both Burmese and international). Meticulously answering every question and criticism proves its authenticity beyond doubt.

By Kanbawza Win

Anybody is free to republish this paper    prof.unclewin80@gmail,com   sd. Dr. Ba Thann Win

IS PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE POSSIBLE? : Mounting offensives against ethnic armies and new violent outburst in Arakan State

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 05:38 AM PDT

Quite a lot of happening have been unfolding during the last few days. But the most outstanding one is the new conflict in Arakan State, between the militant "Rohingya", that the Burmese government and the Arakan nationalist prefer to dub as "Bengali", and the government's security forces. And thus, the previous headline hitting news of the Tatmadaw's (military) offensives in Kachin, Shan and Karen States, followed by the anti-war demonstrations in Myitkyina and elsewhere were somewhat pushed back to become a back burner.

The 14 October meeting of National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), the first of its kind since Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) regime comes into power, followed by the 15 October, first anniversary of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signing occasion has brought back the back burner issues to light, portraying the woes that the country is facing, into a package as a whole, which needs to be resolved earnestly and speedily.

The national defense and security affairs meeting of 14 October that was attended by the President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, U Htin Kyaw, the State Counselor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Commander in Chief of Defense Services, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Deputy Commander in Chief Vice Senior General Soe Win, Union Minister for Ministry of Home Affairs Lt-Gen Kyaw Swe, Union Minister for Ministry of Defense Lt-Gen Sein Win, Union Minister for Office of the State Counselor U Kyaw Tint Swe, touched on the following issues, according to the Presidential website.

·         The situations of the battle occurred in Kachin State and the Northern Shan State
·         The situations which occurred in "Wa" Special Region (1) and "Mailar"(Mong La) Special Region (4)
·         The management procedures in order to enhance the capacity and ability of the Myanmar Police Force.
Remarkably, the said meeting didn't mention the issue of recent Arakan conflict that has already taken place on 9 October.
It is not clear, whether concrete directives or solutions have been made, but seen from the speeches delivered the following 15 October, on the occasion of the first anniversary NCA, the NLD regime and the Tatmadaw don't seem to have a clear understanding of cooperation, on how to go about with the country's woes, in a coordinated manner.
Thus, it is necessary to study the speeches delivered at the occasion, as a clue on how each stakeholder is gearing up to go about with overcoming the obstacles.
Aung San Suu Kyi
In her speech, Suu Kyi reiterated her former position of all-inclusiveness and advocate, or one could even say plead, for the culture of altruism in peace-building.
"All inclusiveness is very important to our country. Peace is a treasure which cannot be exchanged for whatsoever thing. Reflecting in the wording NCA, the notion of fire struck my mind," she emphasized explicitly.
In trying to instill the culture of altruism, she said: "Should we want peace and ceasefire, we had better start with extinguishing of anger and prejudice which are likened to fire burning inside our heart and soul. So, only when all the individuals and organizations involved can subdue their fire-like anger and prejudice, will we be able to achieve the genuine peace."
Her ultimate message was outlined when she stressed: "We have our own opinion, we can't deny. But I'm confident we are all able to overcome these bitter experiences. What we ought to compete is who the most forgiving individuals and / or organizations are. We are not to compete in our firing power. We need to vie with one another for our fire-extinguishing power. The whole country is watching us with great expectation."
Buttressing her plea, laced with urging she said. "Instead of competing with one another in firing power, we'd better vie in fire-fighting power."
In addition Suu Kyi talked about the seven-point road map to amend the military-drafted constitution, which includes the following:
1.       To review the political dialogue framework
2.       To amend the political dialogue framework
3.       To convene the Union Peace Conference—the 21st century Panglong in accordance with the amended and approved political dialogue framework
4.       To sign union agreement— the 21st century Panglong Conference Agreement based on the results of the 21st Century Panglong Conference
5.       To amend the constitution in accordance with the union agreement and approve the amended constitution
6.       To hold the multi-party democracy general elections in accordance with the amended and approved constitution
7.       To build a democratic federal union in accordance with the results of the multi-party democracy general elections (Source: Global New Light of Myanmar – 16 October 2016)
Min Aung Hlaing
The Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing's speech on the NCA first anniversary occasion centered on the concept of the present union being the continuous legacy of immemorial time; urging the EAOs to sign the NCA, give up the armed struggle and make use of the multi-party democracy platform to address their grievances; and acceptance of the military's six guiding principles to achieve peace.
He said: "Our country is a Union which has been formed since yore (immemorial). Any regions and states in the Union are home to all ethnics, not for a single ethnic specifically."
To make his point that armed struggle is out of place, he said: "I would like to say the attempts to grasp the opportunities through armed struggle line by turning a blind eye to the actual rights and opportunities is opposition to the people's desire."
"Therefore, if we accept democracy, we need to abandon the obsession to the armed struggle line which is the opposition of democracy," he stressed.
"Ethnic‐minority areas where armed groups are based are peaceful and have no more fighting since the groups signed the ceasefire. Mutual trust proves that. So I am urging other armed groups to learn from the 
example," Min Aung Hlaing also said, luring the non-signatories to sign the NCA.
The most important message that he put across is the often reiterated military's controversial six guiding principles to achieve peace, which is the actual stumbling block in the peace process, as far as the EAOs are concerned. They are:
1.       To have a keen desire to reach eternal peace, 
2.       To keep promises agreed to in peace deals,
3.       To avoid capitalizing on the peace agreement,
4.       To avoid placing a heavy burden on local people, 
5.       To strictly abide by the existing laws, and  
6.       To march towards a democratic country in accord with the 2008 Constitution.

Mutu Say Poe

The Karen National Union (KNU) leader Mutu Say Poe is a close confidant of Min Aung Hlaing and is even jokingly depicted by many as a sample pupil of the Tatmadaw's peace process structure. Now even he was forced to protest the Tatmadaw's heavy-handedness on the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), as it begins to directly attack the NCA signatory the RCSS and the KNU indirectly.  The Karen Border Guard Force (KBGF), which is jointly commanded by the Tatmadaw conducted offensives against the splinter group of Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), intruding into the KNU controlled area of Hat Gyi, where a dam is scheduled to be built by the government.

The KNU and RCSS are two core EAOs, from a total of eight EAO signatories of the NCA, that have thousands of troops, while the others only have token armed forces with only few soldiers, except for the DKBA.

Mutu outlined his plea in his recent speech during the NCA anniversary as below.

·         It is necessary to avoid the use of force in our attempts to adopt and exercise the new political culture of the NCA and in finding political solutions through political means.
·         For instance, it is necessary to stop the ongoing armed conflicts in northern Myanmar.
·         Although incidents are understandable, intentional attacks are not acceptable. Leaders from both sides are responsible to reach an agreement on interpretation of the NCA.
·         Therefore, on behalf of NCA signatories, I would like to call for the government and the Tatmadaw with all seriousness to ease policies and suspend the use of force in order to pave way for non-signatories to sign the NCA.
United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC)

The UNFC, an alliance of seven ethnic armies, that is the non-signatory of the NCA didn't attend the occasion even though it was invited. But immediately after the NCA anniversary occasion, the government's Peace Council (PC), headed by Dr Tin Myo Win, and the UNFC's Delegation for Peace Negotiation (DPN), led by Khu Oo Reh met in the afternoon.

After a few hours of meeting the DPN's joint-secretary Tun Zaw was interviewed by the BBC, in which he said that the talks were about accommodation of the UNFC's eight point proposal that was already handed in to the government a few weeks ago. Accordingly, if the said points could be negotiated satisfactorily, another point of signing the NCA would be included, making the eight point proposal to become a nine point agreement.

The UNFC proposal centers around all-inclusiveness, unilateral or bilateral ceasefire and a tripartite dialogue proposal to make each level of the peace negotiation to be fair and equitable.

However, Tun Zaw said that the important point discussed was said to be on how Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) should be empowered to make it workable.

The DPN was said to proposed that the role of international participation in the mechanism of JMC implementation and enforcement, so that positive achievement could be evaluated, as the recent self-employed peace keeping structure, given the inability to end the  some seven decades old ethnic conflict  and not producing satisfactory result and achievement.

The idea was said to be met with cold shoulder from the part of the military and meeting ended without any resolution, with an understanding to meet again to resolve the remaining issues between the two parties in the coming November.

Reportedly, four out of eight point proposal was said to be resolved, although both sides did not spell them out.

The Rohingya conflict

Another issue that has thrust forcefully into the political scene is the Rohingya conflict, equally alarming if not more than the ongoing EAOs and Tatmadaw (Burma Army) conflict.
On October 9, around 400 militants in a coordinated action targeted three Burma border posts along the border with Bangladesh and killed around nine soldiers.
The President's office has also released an official statement detailing information obtained through interrogation of apprehended suspects, as well as apparent intelligence sources.

However, the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), based in London, on 17 October, refuted the statement of Burma President's office described a well organized armed group called Aqa Mul Mujahadeen, whom they said were funded by middle eastern sources and connected to proscribed terrorist groups.
The BHRN questioned the validity of this uprising being a well-planned military operation, as its statement said: " If the men in the video are assumed to be responsible it should also be noted that they depict only a few dozen adult men with assault rifles and that the vast majority seen in the videos are children armed with swords, sticks and farming tools. This again draws questions into any accounts describing the group as well organized, well funded or well trained."

Whatever the regime likes to portray the situation, the recent violence outburst of the Rohingya is the product of the successive military governments side-lining and oppressing of said ethnic group. There might be some elements that have received training somewhere abroad. But according to available data, it seems to be more of a home-grown rebellion due to the injustice and oppression, rather than a well-planned military operation, involving only rebel combatants.
According to the New Delhi based The Wire, "After this major border incident, Bangladesh had moved swiftly and arrested two of the attackers and handed them over to Myanmar."
Accordingly on 16 October, Dhaka "unequivocally" condemned the attack and promised to help track down the perpetrators. "Bangladesh follows a 'zero tolerance' policy towards violent extremism and terrorism of any form and manifestation," said a statement issued by Bangladesh foreign ministry.

Outlook

Taking cues from the events that have been unfolding, assessment on stakeholders' political stance; the government and military policy in dealing with the EAOs; and the government's handling of the Arakan conflict involving the Rohingya's spontaneous rebellion or armed outburst would be in order.

First let us look at the issue of the stakeholders political positions in relation to the contemporary political happenings.

Suu Kyi could be said to have reiterated her previous commitment of all-inclusiveness and genuine ceasefire achievement, although she is powerless to rein in the military to stop its offensives in Kachin, Shan and Karen States, excluding Arakan State, where the government seems to be working in tandem with the military on the recent Rohingya uprising.

While the military is trying to project its image that the offensives in the Kachin, Shan and Karen States are with the blessing of the government, Suu Kyi's recent speech indicated that it might not be the case. Because her clear urging that the conflict and warring parties should compete more in extinguishing the flames of war and not firing power or escalating the conflict showed that she couldn't have agreed to the heightening of armed conflict that the military has decided to implement. And clearly, especially the offensives in Kachin and Shan States are the handiwork of the military and not an accidental armed engagement, while patrolling. Apart from that, the conflict in Karen State between the KBFG and the splinter group of DKBA unfolded as an intentional encroachment of the KNU territory, which is against the NCA.

It should also be noted that the RCSS and the KNU are signatories of the NCA.

The Commander-in-Chief has clearly indicated that it is not going to abdicate from the military's self-employed national savior role and protector of the multi-party democracy, sovereignty and national unity, even though this image projection of the military is highly debatable and controversial.

Its mentioning, as if it is part of the multi-party democratic system is deplorable, as the military occupied twenty-five percent of the MP seats in all parliaments without election; having a bigger say in NDSC that is existing parallel with the government, where no such structure is allowed in a real democratic system of governance; and also the parallel military court together with the country's judicial system. As such, the Commander-in-Chief taking cover and leaning on the elected civilian government to blast at the EAOs has no bearings and moral weight, so to speak.

Finally, justifying the military's offensives in the name of protecting the ethnic population is an undue credit accumulation, as all know that how much human rights violations have the military committed on the population during these years of war in ethnic states. One only needs to go through tons of documentation compiled by the UN and reputable rights organizations. Besides, even a child knows that opening war front on the EAOs is not conducive to the peace process and trust-building and could even be seen as sabotaging the deliberation that otherwise might lead to peace.

As for KNU leader Mutu Say Poe, it has made a plea that the military allowed all-inclusive participation of all EAOs and to stop the military offensives nationwide. But whether his plea would be heard and implemented is totally another question.

The UNFC has not budged from its demand for either unilateral or bilateral ceasefire to be in place first, coupled with an eight point proposal to amend the NCA, if it were to sign it, according to the government and military wishes. But it has made clear that military pressure on the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), with the extension of all the UNFC members, would be counter-productive as a means of pressure to sign the NCA and would be met with only stiff resistance.

In sum, the government and the military positions in Kachin, Shan and Karen States seem to differ, as the military is bent on "negotiated surrender" stance, while the NLD is for all-inclusiveness and negotiated settlement. And this seemingly uncoordinated strategy is not leading the country to peaceful settlement and successful political outcome.

Still no one is quite sure whether the NLD government and the military are doing things in cooperation or the government just being dragged into a mum or tight-lipped situation and has to act as if it is agreeing to what the military has been doing in ethnic states, with the exception of the Arakan State on Rohingya issue.

Regarding the Rohingya rebellion situation, the military and the government seems to be on the same page so far.

The violent protest, with no doubt,  stems from the building up of the tension all through theses years that has finally exploded.  The 1982 citizenship law of General Ne Win era, that have stripped all the Rohingya of their citizenship and eventually lumped all the Muslims with origin from Bangladesh into an illegal immigrant category, might be the main culprit.

While Islamophobia and xenophobia definitely might be playing important roles in this racial and ethnic conflict, it is simply not correct not to differentiate those who are entitled to be citizens and those who enter the country illegally, after the independence from the British in 1948.

The angst of over foreignization or xenophobia is understandable, especially for the Arakanese. But lumping the whole ethnic group, legal and illegal, into inhumane treatment of illegality might not also be correct and could even become an act of racial discrimination, leading to racism.

As such a new set of conceptual thinking which could accommodate the liberal democratic principles and preserving the ethnic identity of the indigenous Arakanese must be found. All know that assuming the policy line of Ne Win's side-lining and oppression would only breed animosity and rebellion, as is evident by the recent violent outburst. It might even be considered as an  act of despair and disappointment.

In a concrete term, filtering out the illegal immigrants with the cooperation of the neighboring country and reinstating the citizenship rights of those who are entitled is the only way to go. As to how this could be achieve would be entirely up to the government and stakeholders concerned, including those at the receiving end, depending on their creativity, degree of harmony aspirations of peaceful co-existence and innovation.

To conclude, the unless the military could make an about turn from its "negotiated surrender" stance and top-dog, preconceived posture, the war with the EAOs won't end and the peace process would remain a pipe-dream. The same goes for the resolution of Rohingya issue, so long as only side-lining and oppression is used and not humane accommodation.



Thousands of Red Shans demand self-rule

Posted: 18 Oct 2016 03:37 AM PDT

Thousands of ethnic Red Shan people have marched to demand the creation of a new autonomous state.


According to Naing Naing Kyaw, the leader of the demonstration, marchers came to the town of Moenyin last Thursday from as far afield as northern Sagaing Division to join Kachin-based Red Shans in calling for their own self-administered state.

"Throughout history, this area was ruled by the Shan," he said. "Therefore, we want to govern our own territory.

"In Kachin, the KIA [Kachin Independence Army] controls the region; in upper Sagaing, the Naga and Kuki ethnic groups control large areas. But the Shan people have been oppressed, particularly in Kachin State. We are gradually dying out," Naing Naing Kyaw said. "That's why we staged this rally."

The protest leader added that this was the second time that Red Shan people had taken to the streets demanding self-rule. A previous demonstration took place last month in Homakling Township in Sagaing Division.

The Red Shan, also known as the Shan-ni in Burmese and Tai-leng in Shan language, was among a handful of ethnic groups that demanded their own self-administered region during the 21st Century Panglong Conference in Naypyidaw from August 31 to September 4.

The other militias that stood up to demand an ethnic state for their nationality are: the United Wa State Army (UWSA), arguably Burma's strongest ethnic armed group; the Ta'ang [Palaung] National Liberation Army (TNLA); and the Pa-Oh. Meanwhile, the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) based in Mong La demanded a self-administered zone for ethnic Akha people.

Currently, Burma recognizes self-administered zones within Shan State for the Danu, Kokang, Pa-Oh and Palaung ethnic groups; the Wa group has its self-administered division and a self-administered zone for the Naga in Sagaing Division.

In January, Shan Herald reported that the Red Shan had formed their own army to protect the minority's interests and stand up for its claims of autonomy.

With a population estimated at 300,000, the Red Shan people have sizeable communities in upper Sagaing Division and Kachin State, particularly in Moenyin (known as Mong Yang in Shan), Moegaung, Myitkyina, Puta-O and Bhamaw.

By Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)