The Irrawaddy Magazine |
- Achieving Burma’s Energy Goal Will Be ‘Very Tough’: Report
- The Spoils of Aid in Burma: Transition a Boon for Former Dictators
- Petro-Pirates Plague Busy Southeast Asia Shipping Lanes
| Achieving Burma’s Energy Goal Will Be ‘Very Tough’: Report Posted: 10 Jul 2014 05:59 PM PDT  Women cycle past a gas power plant in Rangoon's Thaketa Township. (Photo: JPaing / The Irrawaddy) Burma faces a "very tough task" to achieve the Ministry of Electric Power's ambition to develop a modern national energy infrastructure in the next 15 years, an industry report said. The ministry has outlined plans to increase Burma's power-generating capacity to nearly 25,000 megawatts by 2030. At present, the national capacity is only 4,360 megawatts—barely one third of the capacity of tiny Singapore, which has a population of 5.3 million. "Asia's new economic frontier Myanmar, seeking to attract tens of billions of dollars in investment, is also one of the darkest places in the world with an electricity capacity which reaches only one in five of the estimated 60 million population," said Asia Power Monitor, an international energy industry weekly newspaper. "The Ministry of Energy has outlined vague plans for 40 power projects across the country to achieve the 2030 generating target—which is less than neighboring Thailand's today with a similar population," it said this week. "Myanmar faces a very tough task in reaching its 2030 electricity goal without a huge injection of financial largesse from traditional donor countries like Japan and the string-attached loans of others, like China." Last December, the Asian Development Bank provided a loan of US$60 million to help pay for grid infrastructure repair and refurbishment, and the World Bank has provided $140 million in credit to finance refurbishment of a 106 megawatt gas-fueled plant in southern Burma's Mon State. The ministry has acknowledged that up to 20 percent of power generated is lost in transmission through decrepit equipment. Even in the most populated Rangoon-Mandalay corridor, where much of the existing dilapidated transmission grid is installed, blackouts and restrictions are frequent, forcing thousands of businesses and factories to use back-up diesel generators. Large swathes of the country have no access to mains electricity and have to rely on age-old natural resources for energy. "Traditional biomass and waste consisting of wood, charcoal, manure, and crop residues is widely utilized and accounts for about two-thirds of Burma's primary energy consumption," said a June report by the US Energy Information Administration. "Such a poor level and standard of electricity is hampering efforts by government departments to attract big-name, big-ticket investors into the country," said the Asia Power Monitor report. "A number of large foreign companies—from Japan to Indonesia—have voiced interest in investing in Myanmar, but after assessing prospects many have fallen silent. "Beyond Myanmar's traditional backer, China, and the generosity of Japan, it's hard to see where the investment will come from to build capacity—and a new grid transmission infrastructure," the report said. The Ministry of Energy proposes a mix of energy resources, including coal and gas and renewable systems, but still with a considerable emphasis on hydropower dams, which are very unpopular in the country because of land losses and population relocation. The ministry suggests that 37 percent of the 25,000 MW would come from hydropower, 20 percent would be fueled by natural gas, 33 percent by coal and the remainder from renewable energy sources. At present, about 70 percent of Burma's power is generated by river-based hydroelectric turbine systems. There are plans to build more such systems which would add 10,000 MW of capacity. Work on one massive hydroelectric project with a capacity of 6,000 megawatts, at Myitsone on the Irrawaddy River, which feeds a large rice-growing delta, has been suspended by the President Thein Sein, at least until the end of his term in 2015. The Myitsone project, in northern Kachin State, was commissioned by the last military regime in a secret deal with Chinese state-owned China Power Investment Corporation (CPIC), in which about 80 percent of the electricity would be transmitted out of the country to China's Yunnan Province. Similar large hydropower dams proposed for the Salween River in eastern Burma involve Thai firms who want to pump most of the electricity generated into Thailand. "CPIC continues to press for a resumption of the Myitsone project, having already spent millions of dollars in land clearance, but in a more liberal environment after the military era vocal public opposition grows," said Asia Power Monitor. "The Naypyidaw government has already signaled that much more of the country's future energy resource production, notably offshore natural gas, must be retained to fuel domestic economic revival, but it must also be careful not to offend China, one of its biggest backers. China has bought virtually all the 50 billion cubic meters of gas due to be pumped out of the Shwe field in the Bay of Bengal, and Thailand buys most of the gas from two other productive offshore fields." A recent study by London-based analysts Business Monitor International (BMI) concluded that much future investment in Burma is "significantly dependent" on the successful completion and smooth operation of the Thilawa Special Economic Zone. Burma is suffering from a "severe deficit in infrastructure," BMI said, and many overseas businesses are waiting to see how successful the Thilawa project turns out to be. So far, the Burmese government has opted for quick-fix power boosts in the form of rented mobile units, such the 100-MW temporary gas-fueled power plant installed in the Mandalay region in June by APR Energy of Florida. The APR contract to supply electricity is for two years only, after which the equipment will be dismantled unless the contract is renewed. A similar temporary boost to electricity supply is now planned for Kyaukphyu—the site of another planned special economic zone—where the government has just invited bids to supply a 50-MW gas-fueled mobile plant. The post Achieving Burma's Energy Goal Will Be 'Very Tough': Report appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| The Spoils of Aid in Burma: Transition a Boon for Former Dictators Posted: 10 Jul 2014 05:36 PM PDT  The Rangoon office of Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), which is rented from the family of Burma's former spy chief, Khin Nyunt. (Photo: Jonathan Hulland) Just as Burma began opening up a little more than two years ago, aid agencies, donor organizations and international NGOs were already champing at the bit, ready to rush in at a moment's notice. For these organizations, Burma represented one of the last "development" frontiers, a vast wasteland of opportunity for maternal health projects, capacity building initiatives, microfinance schemes, election monitoring programs, an array of rule of law projects, the list goes on. A country destroyed by more than a half century of ruthless, self-serving dictatorship needed rebuilding, and the aid industry was eager to swoop in to help, grant writers at the ready. Now, two years into Burma's aid rush, some of the very people responsible for this wasteland, Burma's aging dictators and their business cronies, are cashing in on their country's "development" by renting out properties for top dollar to the very same aid organizations there to help rebuild the country. But rather than enriching these tyrants, doesn't the international aid industry have an obligation to help Burma break from its dictatorship past? The large white house at 70(P) Golden Valley Avenue is located in the middle of an exclusive Rangoon neighborhood called "Generals' Village"—locals gave it the nickname for its preponderance of mansions owned by members of Burma's military elite. In "Generals' Village," well-maintained streets are uncharacteristically litter free, barbed wire curls around gaudy homes like creeping ivy, and luxury Germans cars sit idle in driveways. Today, 70(P) Golden Valley Avenue is the Burmese base of operations for Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), the private American self-styled "global development company" and a regular recipient of funds from the American government's aid agency USAID (more than US$350 million in 2010 alone) and its British equivalent DFID, among others. According to several sources that wish to remain anonymous, including one close to the rental arrangement, the house belongs to the family of Gen. Khin Nyunt, a Prime Minister during Burma's military dictatorship but better known as Burma's notorious head of military intelligence. During his long reign of terror as chief spymaster from 1988 to 2004, Gen. Khin Nyunt is thought to have personally overseen the arrest and detention of 4,000 people, mostly for political activities, according to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Burma's political prisoners were subject to torture and many spent up to 20 years in prison under abysmal conditions. Just a short drive from DAI's office through swankiest Rangoon sits Unicef's sleek modernist Rangoon headquarters on Inya Myaing Road. When I visited in May to snap a photo of the blue Lego-like complex, a silver Mercedes was parked conspicuously in the driveway. Soon after, the United Nations' Children's Fund confirmed that it is renting the property from former Agriculture Minister and top general in Burma's dictatorship, Nyunt Tin, for the "very competitive" (in Unicef's words) rent of $87,000 a month, more than $1 million a year. And it doesn't end there. The Irrawaddy reported at the end of May that the EU Ambassador to Burma is renting a home on Inya Lake that belongs to the family of Burma's first modern dictator, Ne Win, who overthrew Burma's first democratic government in 1962 and ruled with an iron fist until being deposed by a junta in 1988. Apparently, EU regulations which set caps on rental fees had to be rewritten given the high rental cost, thought to be around $80,000 a month. Rumors are also swirling that the World Health Organization's Rangoon office, which costs the organization $79,000 a month, is connected to the family of Snr-Gen Than Shwe—Burma's head dictator from 1992 to 2011—though this allegation hasn't been confirmed. The money spent on these rentals is scandal enough, given that millions of US and EU taxpayer dollars a year are going to pay the excessive rents of "development organizations" in a country where the GDP per capita hovers around $1,200 per year. Paying these high rents also serves to increase rents everywhere in Rangoon, fueling a free-wheeling market controlled by the city's powerbrokers (and former dictators) that is already having a severe impact on local people and organizations that can't compete with international donor dollars. But the real scandal is that money is flowing from development agencies' coffers into the bank accounts of the very individuals and families responsible for Burma's development deficiency in the first place. Does Unicef, champion of the world's children, not see the hypocrisy in paying a general who helped lead a regime known for its flagrant use of child soldiers? Poetic injustice indeed. USAID, one of the biggest aid donors in town and DAI's main source of funding, recently requested proposals from international NGOs and its coterie of private contractors that include DAI (yes, they are businesses, not non-profits) for a $20 million project entitled "Accountable to All (A2A): Strengthening Civil Society and Media in Burma Program." The language in the proposal strikes all the right notes to this human rights activist, stating, for instance, that "[u]ntil very recently, the operating environment for civil society and media in Burma was extremely repressive, and many political activists lived in fear." And that "it remains to be seen whether the [government of Burma] authorities will fully give up controls on the media, civil society, and civil liberties." The key to a successful political transition in Burma, the proposal argues, is accountability: "USAID/Burma aims to support a civil society led strategy of public engagement with the Government of Burma, to foster accountability around the reform process." Sounds great. But what about USAID's own accountability? By funding DAI, USAID is indirectly funding the very forces that threaten a successful transition to democracy in Burma. Perhaps these organizations are paying exorbitant rents to unsavory landlords in exchange for access and protection from the men who continue to rule the country from behind the scenes. Here, we'll give you a million dollars a year for your house, but please let us get on with doing our job (the job they never did themselves). If that's the case, it's a dirty trade off that will only perpetuate the ancien régime's staying power and Burma's problems both. In recent weeks, the popular media narrative of Burma's steady transition from dictatorship to democracy is finally starting to crumble as irrefutable evidence piles up that Burma's transition is fraught with problems and has been steadily reversing for more than a year. Yet the aid money continues to flow. Burma (or more accurately its former capital) has changed a great deal in the last two years, remarkably so compared to my first visit to the country in 2003. However, much about this country remains entirely unchanged. Real political and economic power remains firmly in the grip of former generals, their business cronies, and the military-dominated government in the new capital of Naypyidaw. With that in mind, shouldn't aid agencies be wary of cutting deals with former dictators and their kin, or at least refrain from renting their properties? To be sure, Burma needs international aid and assistance. But it also needs responsible donors who understand what (and who) brought this once-prosperous country to its knees in the first place. The overwhelming trend of newly arrived aid agencies and international NGOs (INGOs) in Burma these days seems to be to move in big and fast, ignore the past, and help establish Myanmar Year Zero. Hardship pay negotiations and the need for DSL-ready offices are taking priority over the very real needs of this country, foremost of which should be how to address the legacy of six decades of brutal military rule. Yes, there is high demand and low supply for modern office spaces desired by aid and UN agencies and inevitably many such properties are going to be owned by former generals and their cronies, but that isn't an excuse for negligence. Burma's international aid industry, on the whole, seems befallen by a self-induced tropical amnesia. These egregious office rentals are simply a symptom of their disregard for Burma's very recent history. If Burma's international aid industry wants to help build a new foundation for this country, and not just reap the rewards of the world's newest aid gold rush, then it must start by remembering who turned Burma upside down to begin with and act accordingly. But it likely won't do that willingly. Organizations such as DAI and Unicef claim to be working in the best interests of Burma's people. But they aren't really accountable to anyone. Burmese civil society is the only force in the country with the legitimacy and capability to make the aid industry accountable and transparent. But Burmese civil society actors must act soon before they are further compromised by that very same industry in the form of grants and contracts, as happened in Nepal when I worked there and no doubt everywhere else the moveable feast of aid has descended. It's time to remind the donor organizations, UN agencies, and INGOs filing into Burma that justice, transparency, and accountability are not just words in a grant proposal. Simply put, Burma's civil society leaders must demand that aid entering the country be used to build a new Burma, and not more houses in "Generals' Village." Jonathan Hulland is an independent human rights consultant and analyst. The post The Spoils of Aid in Burma: Transition a Boon for Former Dictators appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
| Petro-Pirates Plague Busy Southeast Asia Shipping Lanes Posted: 10 Jul 2014 04:43 PM PDT  An oil tanker sails past Chemoil’s Helios oil terminal on Singapore’s Jurong Island February 28, 2008. (Photo: Reuters) BATAM, Indonesia — In the dead of night, as his fuel tanker sailed through the narrowest section of one of the world’s busiest waterways, Captain Thiwa Saman was wrenched from sleep and pitched into a waking nightmare. Three men with guns and swords were banging on his cabin door. Other pirates had already stormed the bridge, seized the duty officer and smashed up the radio and GPS equipment. Over the next 10 hours, mostly in daylight, the pirates held Thiwa and his 13 crew captive while siphoning off 4 million liters of diesel, worth around $2 million on the black market, to another tanker. They even re-painted the name of Thiwa’s ship to confuse anyone searching for it. Then they vanished. The May 27 attack on the Orapin 4 was one of a spate of well-organised fuel heists that are reviving Southeast Asia’s reputation as a global piracy hotspot. Since April, at least six fuel tankers have been hijacked and drained in the Malacca Strait or nearby waters of the South China Sea, according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which in mid-June warned small tankers to maintain strict anti-piracy measures in the area. None of the perpetrators has been caught. The most recent attack was last Friday, when armed pirates boarded a tanker in the South China Sea, took the crew hostage and stole part of the cargo. That incident is being investigated by Malaysia’s Maritime Enforcement Agency. About a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes through the Malacca Strait, a choke point on the route between the Middle East and the energy-hungry economies of East Asia. The Orapin 4 was boarded just north of the freewheeling Indonesian island of Batam, a pirate lair for centuries with sketchy law enforcement and unrivalled views of passing ships. Singapore’s skyscrapers crowd the distant horizon. In 2013, piracy attacks worldwide declined 11 percent to 264 reported incidents due to stricter law enforcement in the Indian Ocean off Somalia, according to the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur. But attacks rose dramatically in Indonesia, where 106 of those 264 incidents took place – a seven-fold increase in five years. The Malacca Strait acquired a reputation as a modern piracy hotspot after another spike in ship boardings in the late 1990s. Back then, the attacks were mostly hit-and-run robberies – the latest outbreak appears to be more sophisticated. A third of the 106 incidents in 2013 were reported in the last quarter of the year, suggesting "a potential for such attacks to escalate into a more organized piracy model unless they are controlled," said a report by German insurer Allianz. The IMB has called the rise of petro-piracy "alarming". 'We Want Only Your Fuel' Thiwa, 66, a Thai national and seafarer for 30 years, said he and his crew were so shaken by the attack that nobody felt ready to return to work. The Orapin 4 was carrying diesel between Singapore and Pontianak in Indonesian Borneo. Tankers are relatively slow and have low freeboards – the distance from the waterline to the upper deck level – which makes them easier to board. "Off West Africa, tankers have always been an attractive target for pirates," said Sven Gerhard, Allianz’s hull and marine liabilities chief. He suggested this "business model" could have prompted copycat attacks by Indonesian pirates. Thiwa’s crew were forced at gunpoint into his cabin. Some were blindfolded, while others had their wrists bound with plastic cable ties. "The pirates said, ‘We won’t harm you. We only want your fuel’," said Thiwa. Around dawn, he felt the thump of another fuel tanker mooring alongside. Two crew members were taken away to help the pirates open the valves. Fuel oil or diesel was an attractive cargo for resale because it was in high and constant demand, and its original ownership was difficult to identify, said Gerhard. It was also easy for pirates to go undetected, even in daylight. "Ship-to-ship onloading and offloading of fuel oil is not unusual," he said. "Many vessels are fuelled by special bunker tankers whilst moored." The pirates who attacked the Orapin 4 wore the same overalls as Thiwa’s crew. "There was no way outsiders could know what was happening," said Thiwa. By simply painting over a number and two letters, the pirates changed the ship’s name to Rapi, which means "neat" in Indonesian. By 9 p.m., the pirates had siphoned off the fuel and looted the cabins of watches, cellphones, money and other valuables. Then they slipped away into the darkness. Thiwa and his crew freed themselves and, aided by an undamaged radar, sailed to a port near Bangkok. Pirate 'Shopping' "Stealing fuel is a recent trend. It never happened in my time," said Aga, 62, the nickname of a Batam shipping agent and former pirate who still counts many pirates among his friends. "Our targets were only money, the safe, or anything valuable on the ship." In pirate parlance, thieving valuables is "shopping", said Aga. Stealing fuel is known by the Indonesian phrase "kapal kencing," or "ship (is) pissing". There were three main pirate gangs active in the area, said Aga. They hailed from all over Indonesia, although Batam boatmen were recruited for their knowledge of local reefs and coves. Petro-piracy is an organized crime, requiring good logistics and networks to steal and re-sell the fuel. Local police investigated just one piracy incident in 2013 and arrested five men, said Yassin Kosasih, Marine Police director for Riau Islands Province, which includes Batam. To catch more pirates, said Kosasih, he needed patrol ships with a greater range, better communications technology – and more fuel. Aga said pirates choose their targets carefully, aided by live updates on websites such as marinetraffic.com, and by informants at shipping companies or among crews. On April 22, in the Malacca Strait, pirates stole 2,500 tons of marine diesel oil from a tanker. They also took three Indonesian crew in what was initially described as a kidnapping. It is now believed the three men conspired with the pirates. Stolen diesel is sold to dealers serving Batam’s dozens of ports and shipyards for use in trucks, boats or generators, or to black marketeers in Singapore where legal fuel is more expensive, Aga said. It fetches between $400 and $650 per tons on the black market, so the Orapin 4′s cargo was worth anything up to $2.2 million. Pirates fear the naval ships that patrol the Strait, said Aga, but still usually manage to outmaneuver them. "Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelago, with thousands of islands," said Jarek Klimczak, a master mariner and senior risk consultant at Allianz. "The proper control and monitoring of all of its waters is nearly impossible, even for an advanced navy. And Indonesia’s navy is far from advanced." On June 14, off Malaysia’s eastern coast, pirates boarded a Honduras-registered tanker called Ai Maru carrying 1,520 tonnes of marine gas oil. The Malaysian coastguard and the navies of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore dispatched six ships. They found the Ai Maru less than five hours later – a relatively swift response – but the pirates had already fled along with a third of the fuel. Two years ago, in Malaysian waters, pirates boarded and robbed another oil tanker captained by Thiwa Saman. Then, the pirates had carried only knives. Now they had guns, too. "My family don’t want me to go back (to sea) because it’s too risky," he said. The post Petro-Pirates Plague Busy Southeast Asia Shipping Lanes appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine. |
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