Shan Herald Agency for News |
- Speech at Opening of Ethnic Armed Organization Summit
- UKRAINE-RUSSIA CONFLICT: A timeline of major events following the protests in Ukraine starting from December 2013
- Regional Powers Involvement in Ethnic Conflict: Ukraine and Burma
| Speech at Opening of Ethnic Armed Organization Summit Posted: 02 Jun 2015 11:39 PM PDT 2 June 2015 Distinguished Leaders of the Ethnic Armed Organizations, Respected NCCT members and delegates. Dear friends. I am honored to be invited here today at the Ethnic Armed Organizations summit in Lokhilar. It is a pleasure and privilege to visit Karen State at this time. I was last at the Ethnic Armed Organization Summit with you in Laiza.  I speak on behalf of my colleague, Mariann and myself to say we are deeply honored that we have been invited to observe the peace dialogue between the UPWC and NCCT as well as internal deliberations on both sides. I know how much work you have all put together during the past two years and how long a road you have traversed through the decades in order to reach this point. We have been deeply impressed with the commitment and hard work shown by the NCCT and TAT members. They are all proud members of your groups and their work and results of a draft NCA deserve your trust and support. Which is why I am today giving you an urgent and direct message. I shall be more direct than at our previous meetings, because I strongly feel that at the current stage, there is not much time left to capitalize on the work you have done so diligently for so long. I will explain why I feel this is so critical and urgent. When we entered this process it was with the intention of opening up space for ethnic groups so that they could take their rightful place at the center of national politics together with other important players. The fighting between ethnic groups and government have been going on for far too long and as a consequence the ethnic groups have remained excluded and disenfranchised in Myanmar for far too long. We all know there is no military solution to the conflict in Myanmar. The only way forward is through a political dialogue that will give everyone a voice and space to work for their political rights. The Nationwide Ceasefire is only the first step and real trust and progress can only be made through implementing a ceasefire together as well as starting a credible political dialogue. This have to be done hand in hand with other stakeholders in the country. We believe that this process has taken its first fragile steps and there is a good chance that a better future for all may emerge from this process. But the bigger picture cannot be lost sight of. Myanmar still has a long way to go to reach its stated democratic goals. Decades of military rule have left deep scars and challenges in development as well as capacity. Handling these issues in a holistic manner can only happen if the transition is peaceful. The success of reforms in Myanmar will depend on a sustained peace in the country. Every transition is deeply difficult and fraught with setbacks, but we cannot wait until everything is perfect. We cannot allow the best to become the enemy of the good. If we do that we may get neither peace nor democracy. The simple point is that the future of Myanmar rests in your hands. A huge and important responsibility rests upon you all today, not only to make the choices based on what you will regard as the best possible outcome for your respective groups individually but for all of you collectively. As responsible leaders, you have already taken a strategic decision to walk down a road of a common destiny for all of you. You do not as yet have all the details of the road you will traverse or a guarantee of when you will reach all your goals but you have a reasonably good blueprint to start with. I shall also be abrupt and say we do not know what will happen after the elections. We do not know what the country will look like a year from now. We must be optimistic, but at the same time sitting back and hoping for better opportunities may be risky. It may also diminish the opportunity for you as leaders of the ethnic groups to be at the center of this political transition. We at the UN do see the ethnic minorities as potentially playing a major role in the power equation of a new Myanmar. Clearly there are risks in any transition. The current government has made some promises that have long been asked for by ethnic groups as well as by the international community. Only by starting the process of a political dialogue can we begin to see if these promises can be delivered. If the process can be started before the elections and with the support of the international community, I feel there is a greater possibility to ensure that a succeeding government after the election to be willing to commit to it. But for all this to happen, time is of the essence. As of now there may not be much time for a lengthy process before the elections. Signing an NCA and establishing a political dialogue may serve as a stabilizing factor. It is critical that we get such a process started as soon as possible. For this to happen you will require to make some concessions. You will require to move forward even while there may continue to be fighting in some areas. But my hope is that you will be able to create a forceful dynamic that will help you deal with the challenges that remain. More than that, I will say that even if there will be many risks in this approach, they are still less than the risks of delay and of missing this opportunity So I will ask you above all to keep your courage. And also to remember that you are doing this for your own people. Your people, especially your youth and children depend on you to bring them a better quality of life for the future. Only hen will the sacrifices of your forefathers have been worth it. The UN will lend you all the support we can muster in this process. However, if such a process were to be delayed until after the elections, even we may not be able to say with certainty what the scenario from the UN angle will be. But nailing it down now, could bring greater immediate commitment from the UN as well as the international community. Many negative voices are heard about the peace process. Around the world we have seen peace processes carry on miserably for decades on end and cause frustration and disappointments. In Myanmar you have managed to come so, far in a such a small time, with so many stakeholders in the process. This is amazing by any standard. Let me assure you that I am proud to be here as an Observer at your peace talks. But you need to take one more, brave leap of faith as the Secretary-General himself has told you. I hope this meeting will help you move forward in this leap of faith. Thank you. |
| Posted: 02 Jun 2015 11:30 PM PDT November 21, 2013 The Ukrainian government ends preparations for the signing of an Association Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the European Union.  Massive protests takes place in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, with thousands of protesters occupying or blockading government buildings and demanding the resignation of President Victor Yanukovych, the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet. December 16, 2013 Russia announces that it will provide Ukraine with $15 billion in badly-needed loans in an effort to keep its moribund economy afloat, following meetings between top Russia and Ukrainian officials at the Kremlin, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yanukovych. February 18 – 20, 2014 Thousands of protesters clash with police in Kiev in Ukraine's bloodiest 48 hours since World War II. Some 88 people killed and hundreds more wounded as protesters march on the Ukrainian Parliament, or Rada, and security forces attempt to clear out Independence Square.  Yanukovych and opposition sign settlement agreement to end the crisis. It is mediated by Russia, France, Germany, and Poland, though Russia initially decline sign the document. Accordingly, early presidential elections will take place by the end of the year, a national unity government will be created by early March, and Ukraine will return to its 2004 constitution. President Viktor Yanukovych flees Kiev, following the signing of a settlement agreement. February 28, 2014 Several hundred unidentified armed men, confirmed later to be Russian forces, in military uniforms carrying military weapons take control of strategic facilities, the airport in Simferopol and a military airport in Sevastopol. March 6, 2014 In a quick vote held behind closed doors, the regional Parliament of Crimea votes to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. March 11, 2014 The Crimean parliament declares Crimea independent from Ukraine. It also affirms that it will ask to join Russia if the population votes in favor of such a move in the upcoming referendum. March 16, 2014 According to the Crimean Electoral Commission, with over 75 percent of ballots counted this evening, 95.7 percent of voters favors a return to union with Russia. Only 3.2 percent favors a return to autonomous status within Ukraine. March 18, 2014 Russian President Vladimir Putin, Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov, the Head of the Crimean State Council, Vladimir Konstantinov, and Mayor of Sevastopol Alexey Chaly sign a treaty that reunifies Crimea with Russia. April 7, 2014 Pro-Russian separatists today continue to control governmental buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk. Earlier, pro-Russian activists in Donetsk proclaim region's independence from Ukraine, and the creation of the "Donetsk People's Republic." They also set May 11 as a date for a referendum on that would allow the region to become part of the Russian Federation. May 11, 2014 The Donetsk and Luhansk "People's Republics" declare independence after referendums. They are hailed as a victory by pro-Russian secessionists and criticized as farce by their Ukrainian and Western counterparts.  Petro Poroshenko will be the next President of Ukraine, according to early polling results from today's historic election. Reports of the preliminary exit polling figures show Poroshenko winning approximately 55-57 percent of the vote, well above the absolute majority necessary to avoid a presidential runoff election. June 27, 2014 President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine signs a landmark trade deal, Association Agreement with the European Union, Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign the deal sparked the original protests in Kiev in late 2013. July 29, 2014 The EU agrees to enact broad sanctions that will target key sectors of the Russian economy. According to a pair of EU diplomats, the sanctions will include "an arms embargo, a ban on the sale of dual use and sensitive technologies, and a ban on the sale of bonds and equities by state-owned Russian banks in European capital markets." September 4, 2014 Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko expresses "careful optimism" that a bilateral ceasefire between the Ukrainian military and pro-Russian separatist forces could come as early as tomorrow following talks in Minsk, Belarus. According to Poroshenko, a ceasefire would lay a foundation for a "stage-by-stage peace plan" for Ukraine. Russia, importantly, will not be party to the negotiations, despite President Putin laying out a ceasefire plan just a day ago. September 5, 2014 Following meetings in Minsk, Belarus, between representatives of the Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian separatist forces, President Petro Poroshenko announced that a ceasefire has been reached in Ukraine. January 22, 2015 Ukrainian military officials withdraw volunteer elements from the terminal of Donetsk Airport under the combined pressures of shelling by rebels and dense fog. January 23, 2015 Having reclaimed control over the Donetsk Airport after weeks of intense fighting with Ukrainian forces, leader of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic Alexander Zakharchenko declares that his administration would no longer participate in ceasefire talks and affirmed his intention to "push the front right up to the borders of Donetsk region" as part of a revitalized rebel offensive. January 30, 2015 A round of peace talks scheduled to take place in Minsk today cancelled. According to a statement from rebel leader Denis Pushilin, the talks were cancelled due to the unwillingness of representatives from Keiv to attend. However, Ukrainian representative lays the blame for the cancellation squarely on the rebels, who they said undertook a "cynical terrorist act" intended to disrupt the peace talks.  According to multiple reports, "active and comprehensive discussions" are ongoing within the White House regarding the possibility of lethal US military assistance to Ukraine. Until recently, the Obama administration has balked at the disbursement of lethal aid, focusing instead on a policy centered on increasing economic pressure on Russia through the imposition of sanctions. February 5, 2015 EU leaders today renew efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Ukraine. During surprise visits to Kiev today and to Moscow on Friday French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel are expected to present a new peace plan to the Ukrainian and Russian leadership, aiming to establish common ground for the swift resolution of the conflict. February 12, 2015 After negotiations in Minsk, Belarus, that lasted through the night, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France have reached a new ceasefire agreement, potentially ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The agreement, which came after 16 hours of talks, lays out a plan for a total ceasefire in the coming days, as well as a longer term plan that addresses broader political concerns by the end of 2015. March 2, 2015 The United Nations said that fighting in eastern Ukraine that began almost a year ago has resulted in the death of more than 6,000 people, in what is described as "merciless devastation of civilian lives and infrastructure" and possible crimes against humanity. Compiled by Sai Wansai from various media sources (2 June 2015) |
| Regional Powers Involvement in Ethnic Conflict: Ukraine and Burma Posted: 02 Jun 2015 08:11 PM PDT The paradigm of "secession as an ethnic conflict resolution" rears its head again, as United Wa State Army (UWSA) asked for sympathy and endorsement for its aspiration of state-level administration, during the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) leaders' summit meeting at Panghsang from 1 to to 6 May.  The Wa were not even asking for secession from the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, but merely an upgrade from Wa Self-Administrative Division to a state-level status within the union, but the alarm and disapproval followed immediately from the government and as well, from Shan State politicians and resistance armies. Hkun Htun Oo has openly shown his displeasure and angst for the Wa's state-level status aspirations, which would be carved out of Shan State territory, if approved and granted by the government. In The Irrawaddy report of 6 May, Hkun Htun Oo, Chairman of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), regarding the Wa's state-level status aspiration drive, said " The situation now is already out of hand. I want to make one thing clear and that is not to become like Crimea. The recent situation is that the government doesn't have political power influence. It is affecting the regime's three guiding principles. Infringement of sovereignty shouldn't exist. All should know what will happen, if a place where government political power influence could not be reached is given a national state status ". The Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) and Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) both participants of the Panghsang summit meeting were tight-lipped and would only say that they have nothing to comment and neither endorse nor reject the Wa aspirations. The Shans, who call themselves "Tai" and the majority ethnic group within Shan State, were taken aback by the Wa's demand for they consider Wa inhabited areas are part of Shan State and shouldn't be dismembered in any way. Still the outrage and rejection of The Global New Light of Myanmar's opinion piece, on 20 May, titled, " Outcome of Pang Seng conference and the true identity of UWSA ", which is owned by the government and is seen as its mouthpiece, is surprising, given that all five out of six self-administrative areas are cut out of Shan State and naturally, many Shan patriots and politicians see this as the regime's ploy to undercut " Shan nationalism" and subdue political influence of the Shan as a whole. It writes: " In careful analysis of the behavior of the UWSA, it is quite evident that they are out of Central government control and with the expansion of their troop strength, antagonist characteristics became obvious. It can be concluded that whatever they have been saying about non-secession from the union their true intention is the opposite. It is plainly simple that they have been on the path towards secession from the union for the whole time." " Civil administrative positions are being taken by ethnic Chinese and local culture is being swallowed and overwhelmed by the Chinese one. Official language is Chinese and circulating money is Chinese Renminbi (Yuan) while local dialect and literature are also becoming Chinese." " Now is the time to monitor if they all are real ethnic Wa tribesmen or if they are (Chinese) people pretending to be (Was) and trying to use Wa image for their own selfish interests. UWSA is known to be running weapons manufacturing factories and also in possession of anti aircraft missile. News reports also indicated that they are in the possession of helicopters and armoured cars with the help of their friends across the border. Their army is reported to have a force of 30,000 troops with another 10,000 in reserve." This hysteria and angst atmosphere are compounded by the Kokang armed conflict and make the already decaying trust between the Burman-dominated military regime, which is said to be working to achieve national reconciliation, and non-Burman ethnic nationalities. The Kokang conflict that has started in earnest in early February this year, when the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as Kokang group, headed by Peng Jiasheng made a forceful comeback. He and his army were driven out by the then military government of State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and replace him with his former deputy, in 2009, to lead the Kokang Self-Administrative Zone. His homecoming or reclaiming back the authority, according to Peng's interpretation, was met with Burma Army (BA's) all-out military offensive that continues until today. But the problem becomes more sophisticated with the Kokangnese appealing to the Chinese brethren across the border and international Chinese communities to come to their aid, which they clearly see it as an act of "ethnic cleansing" meted out against the population by the BA military onslaught. Reportedly, many Chinese social network publications responded with moral backing and sympathy, mainly the Chinese from China and international Chinese communities to a lesser extent, that has complicated the already precarious situation. Some interpret the recent Chinese military drill, with live ammunition, opposite Kokang area across the border in Yunnan province, as an indication of yielding to the Chinese public uproar on the issue, apart from the security concern of the Chinese population along the Burma-China border. The ongoing military offensives of the Burma Army starting from February of this year fails to dislodge the MNDAA until today, due to the Chinese support, directly or indirectly, according to the accusation from the Burmese government quarters, which is categorically denied by China. As the Wa and Kokang situation is being compared to Crimea annexation of Russia and the ongoing war waged in eastern Ukraine since early 2014, with ethnic Russians from Ukraine and Russian armed forces on one side and the Ukrainian government troops on the other, it would make sense to look into both settings of conflict, if any generalization could be drawn to resolve this kind of conflict. Historical Background of Ukraine-Russia Conflict The ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict and the internal Ukrainian and ethnic Russian ethnic conflict that we are seeing today stems from a deadly famine that Stalin engineered back in 1932. According to Andrea Chalupa, posting in Time, on 17 December 2013, " East Ukraine was once as nationalistic and Ukrainian-speaking as Western Ukraine is today. The dramatic transformation of the area was a result of ethnic cleansing. In 1932 a famine engineered by Stalin killed up to an estimated 10 million people, mostly in East Ukraine. Beginning in 1933, the Soviets replaced them with millions of deported Russians. Western Ukraine was then part of Poland and spared. Raphael Lemkin, who first coined the word genocide, used the Ukrainian famine as an example." Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union until 1991. The country is roughly divided between pro-Russian East and pro-European West. The internal Ukrainian crisis started when in November 2013, President Viktor Yanukovych rejected a deal for greater integration with the European Union, sparking mass protests. Consequently, Yanukovych attempted to put down the protests violently. Ever since the start of this Ukrainian crisis, the United States and European Union supported the protesters, while Yanukovych was backed by the Russian. In February 2014, anti-government protests toppled the government and Yanukovych fled the country. By the end of February, Russia invaded Crimea and the following month annexed it into the Russian Federation. In April, pro-Russia separatist rebels began seizing territory in eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian government launched a military counter-offensive against the ethnic Russian rebels, that had led to the ongoing War in Donbass. From late 2014, cities outside of the Donbass combat zone, such as Kharkiv, Odessa, Kiev and Mariupol were struck by bombings that targeted pro-Ukrainian unity organizations. According to Amnesty International report, on 22 May 2015, sustained fighting erupted in eastern Ukraine that summer, amidst compelling evidence of Russian military involvement. The intensity of the fighting has ebbed and flowed since that time. To date, more than 6,200 people have been killed as a result of the conflict; over a million have been displaced—some fleeing to neighboring countries—and tens of thousands of civilian homes have been damaged or destroyed. A ceasefire agreement between the Ukrainian government and the separatists was reached on 5 September 2014 at negotiations in Minsk, Belarus; it reduced but did not stop the fighting. Additional protocols, aimed at ensuring the implementation of the cease-fire, were signed later, but these have also failed to put an end to hostilities. Most recently, on 11 February 2015, the "Minsk II" protocol was signed by Ukraine, Russia, separatists and the OSCE. Although its provisions have not been fully implemented, it has, to date, significantly reduced the intensity of the fighting. Nonetheless, armed clashes continue in some areas, and many fear that more intense fighting could recommence at any time. Crimea annexation and war in Donbass The geographically, and strategically important peninsula, Crimea, in the Black Sea has been fought over for centuries. While the world considered Crimea a region of Ukraine that is under hostile Russian occupation, Russia sees it as a rightful and historical region of Russian territory that it helps to liberate. With the internationally recognized Ukrainian territory of Crimea's annexation on 18 March 2014, Russia has de facto administered the territory as two federal subjects—the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol within the Crimean Federal District. The political crisis surrounding the annexation is referred to as the Crimean Crisis. From the beginning of March 2014, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government groups took place in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, together commonly called the "Donbass", in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution or the Euromaidan movement. The anti-government chain of protests that bloomed into the entire crisis, which begun on 21 November 2013, in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev is dubbed "Euromaidan". It is called "Euromaidan" because they were about demanding closer European integration and happened in Kiev's Maidan Nezalezhnosti, also known as Independence Square. According to Wikipedia, these demonstrations, following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation were part of a wider group of concurrent pro-Russian protests across southern and eastern Ukraine, escalated in April 2014 into a war between the separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR respectively), and the Ukrainian government. Amidst the ongoing war, the separatist republics held internationally unrecognized referendums on the status of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on 11 May 2014. These referendums, viewed as illegal by Ukraine and undemocratic by the international community, returned a result in favor of autonomy from Ukraine. Fighting continued through 2014, and into 2015, despite several attempts to implement a ceasefire. Ukraine and most of the international community said that Russia provided both material and military support to the separatists, who were largely led by Russian citizens until August 2014. Conflict dimension and Russian-speakers of Ukraine While the massive Russian intervention on the side of ethnic Russians in Ukraine seems to be the main cause of ongoing ethnic armed conflict, the secession or more equitable, power-sharing federalism movements in Donbass of ethnic Russians, on the heels of the Crimea annexation to Russian federation, were helped and empowered by the Russian Federation. Another point is that the geopolitical concern of Ukraine membership of EU might eventually become NATO member, which is highly unfeasible in the short run, but highly troubling and unacceptable for Russia. Besides, the justification of Russian's intervention is due to the President Vladimir Putin's expansive new concept of "Novorossiya", which covers a large swath of territory conquered by Imperial Russia during the 18th century from a declining Ottoman Empire. This historic Novorossiya covered roughly a third of what is now Ukraine, including Crimea. Since declaring independence in 1991, Ukraine has been divided, and the Ukraine crisis is an extension of this diversity. Most consider that this division is rooted in language. About two-thirds of Ukrainians speak Ukrainian as their native language, mostly in the country's west; and about a third are native Russian-speakers, mostly in the east. But the language divide is not a comprehensive explanation for there are much more complicated political and ideological division that are involved. In short, those in the west of Ukraine see themselves as European and want to be part of EU, while the eastern half is sympathetic to Russia and see that their countries are historically linked. Burma's armed conflict and latent conflict Similar to the situation in eastern Ukraine, Kokang conflict could be termed ethnic conflict with big neighboring country involvement, which shares the same ethnicity. Eastern Ukraine of Donbas has a high percentage of Russian ethnic population, while about ninety percent of Kokangnese are ethnically Han Chinese, within Kokang Self-Administrative Zone, like their brethren across the border in China. The Wa are national minority, who live in on both sides of China-Burma border, with a high level of Chinese influence, in all aspect of their daily lives. Both Kokangnese and Wa people were the main fighting force of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which was backed by China until 1989, when the party disintegrated and ceased to exist as a political force. Kokangnese or MNDAA has an ongoing armed conflict with the Burmese regime, trying to achieve the rights of self-determination, equality and democracy, but the Wa or UWSA, who has 26 years of ceasefire with the government in place and only has a kind of latent conflict situation. But given the regime dissatisfaction for the Wa insistence and actually governing their area as "a state within the state", open conflict could flare up, whenever the regime makes up its mind that this infringement of the country's sovereignty cannot be tolerated anymore and has to be corrected, at all cost. The Burmese regime is at war with Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA) and SSPP/SSA in northern Shan and Kachin States and also technically on war-footing with some 17 ethnic armed organizations struggling to achieve more self governance within a federal structure. Since 2011, President Thein Sein has called for peace talks with the aim of signing a nationwide ceasefire agreement. Almost all ethnic armed organizations are involved in the ongoing peace process, except MNDAA and AA, for the regime refused to acknowledge both as negotiation partners. China's policy on Burma According to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012, the security of China's energy investment and border issues have emerged as the top two priorities on Beijing's agenda. The Chinese government is highly concerned with the frequent anti-pipeline reports and protests and how they might impact the construction of the pipelines. According to a senior advisor to the government, for China, Myitsone dam is only a commercial project by one Chinese company, but the pipeline project is significant on the national and strategic levels. Therefore, all measures are being taken to preempt potential risk to the pipelines. To this end, senior Chinese leaders repeatedly re-emphasised the need to "ensure the progress and implementation of the pipeline project" (Sources: Xinhua News Agency 2012a; Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). The Burmese policy community is divided into two camps on how to deal with the Myitsone dam. Both agree that the permanent abandonment of the dam is inevitable, as it symbolises the free will of Burmese people, democratic awakening and independent foreign policy. However, they differ on the terms of the cancellation. The hawkish school argues that China should unilaterally give up not only the project but also the financial compensations to make up for its past exploitation of Myanmar if it is "genuinely interested in repairing the relationship." The more realistic camp contends that China should accept Myanmar's decision on Myitsone, "turn over the page as soon as possible" and focus on new collaborations. They also argue that Myanmar should fairly compensate the Chinese investor for the losses. But the Chinese side doubts Naypyidaw will have the financial resources to do so. (Source: SUN, Yun (2012), China and the Changing Myanmar, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs , 31, 4, 51-77) An analysis written by Bernt Berger, titled, "China's Myanmar Policy: Dilemma or Strategic Ambiguity ?" published by Institute for Security and Development Policy, on 2 March 2015, pointed out three factors that have implicated Burma-China relation. First is the China's local-level authorities having different views and not conforming to Chinese central government policy, interests and cross-border issues on Burma. According to him, local authorities are suspicious of "ongoing support for armed groups or at least connivance of arms trafficking and training, such as for the Wa ethnic group, still exists." Second, Chinese efforts to combat narcotics in Yunnan have been successful and thus have pushed the problem further into Burma creating new problems in a region, which are infested with various ethnic armed movements. Third, China's geo-strategic ambition of important regional economic linkages, including transport corridors towards India (Southern Silk Road/BCIM Corridor), raises concerns for Burmese leaders, since most planned and existing transport infrastructure and pipelines pass through Kachin and northern Shan State. Besides, there is genuine concern that Chinese representatives might promote the ethnic Chinese groups interest than those of the Naypyidaw. Apart from all these, Bernt Berger stressed the geo-political competition between the United States and China, where according to him Chinese hawkish analysts are for assertive policy of supporting ethnic groups in order to maintain leverage on Burma's military, while Burma has maintained neutral stance to remain aloof of outside powers. He summed up that China's repeatedly requested Burma to guarantee stability along the border region, while offering political support and non-interference. He wrote, "Naypyidaw in return has called on Beijing to prevent local authorities from providing any unofficial support to armed groups. Although Beijing is supportive of an autonomous (ethnic Han) Kokang region, exactly how and whether to support dubious nationalist rebel groups causes a dilemma, and its actions in this regard will inevitably send signals hinting at what other countries can expect from China's emerging neighbourhood policy." His last sentence, stressed that China might be profiting from what he called "indecisive restraint". He wrote: "At the same time, not pursuing a clear stance may also serve Beijing's interests as part of a policy of strategic ambiguity."(Source: China's Myanmar Policy: Dilemma or Strategic Ambiguity ? Bernt Berger Policy Brief – No. 171 March 2, 2015 – Institute for Security and Development Policy) But all of these may be changing, with the recent release of "China's Military Strategy", which spells out its growing internationalization of its role and "active defense". The internationalization of China's military role is stated in the Preface section of the paper as below: China's destiny is vitally interrelated with that of the world as a whole. A prosperous and stable world would provide China with opportunities, while China's peaceful development also offers an opportunity for the whole world. China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion. China's armed forces will remain a staunch force in maintaining world peace. It further outlined its armed forces strategic tasks as follows:
An analysis of Rodger Baker, lead analyst, from Stratfor Global Intelligence, recently identified four main areas that China would have to take into account. They are focusing more on the growing internationalization of its role and "active defense"; difficulties to convince and remain politically neutral and capable of protecting its interests, as China expands its economic and military activities in developing countries, especially to counter the accusations of imperialism; more involvement in global defense would make it hard to maintain its professed non-interference policies and would be forced to choose sides in political and security issues; and weaker states or groups within states will attempt to leverage Chinese power for their own interests. Perspective of Russia and China involvement in neighboring state's ethnic conflict The two countries, Russia and China, common denominators would be limited to being belonging to the same ethnic group, strengthening the global trend of ethnic upsurge, advocating political empowerment of ethnically related groups, directly or indirectly, in the neighboring country, among others. The differing part might be largely the concept or reasons of empowerment and the intended goal-setting or desired outcomes. The urge for wanting to help achieve a degree of equality and rights of self-determination for the ethnically related groups are common, while the art of the achieving the goals could differ. For example, the Russian, or better President Putin, might be empowering the secessionist movements in eastern Ukraine for its bigger plan of "Eurasian Economic Union", but nevertheless is helping them to strengthen their aspirations. Likewise, China's goals are to secure its energy supply sources, markets and industrial bases, which are closely linked to Burma's infrastructure maintenance and smooth flows of goods; and could not be implemented without peaceful atmosphere between the Burmese regime and the ethnic armed organizations, bordering China. This in turn pushes China to advocate peaceful settlement, strengthening the ethnic groups aspirations of greater autonomy within the mold of a federal structure. It is also noteworthy that Russia's demand for federalism that would benefit ethnic Russians in its ceasefire agreement with the Ukraine government. The big difference between Russia and China is that the former openly sided with the ethnic Russians of Donbass, with weapon delivery, participating with its troops, whereas the latter refrained from physical participation of the armed conflict in Burma. The Ukraine-Russia conflict has international dimension, which resembles Cold-War setting, while Burma-China's latent conflict is, more or less, bilateral at the moment, brewing to become regional and eventually internationalized, if it could not be handled carefully. It is evident that China has no territorial gain ambition, so far as Burma is concerned for two reasons. One is to prove its adherence of non-interference and territorial integrity commitment and the other, to keep its restless political entities like Tibet, East Turkestan and Taiwan under one nation-state roof, China couldn't possibly encourage the dismemberment of a country like Burma. All China now wants is a stable, peaceful border and not annexation of Kokang or Wa areas, for China's economic interest has a much more wider dimension. Of course, the priority setting could change, once it is convinced that its national interest of secure energy flows and infrastructure network would be disrupted in anyway, by the Burmese regime. This propels us to access Burma's position, vis-a-vis China's interest, which is clearly spelled out in its recent China's Military Strategy. Two of the eight strategic tasks of Chinese armed forces concerned Burma directly. One is the task of effective safeguarding the sovereignty and security of China's territorial land, air and sea, which the Chinese clearly sees as being violated, given the Burmese military repeated bombardment that have landed on Chinese side of the border, intentionally or unintentionally, while attacking the MNDAA positions. Seven people were injured in explosions on the Chinese side of the border during fighting last month between Burmese government troops and rebel forces; and five Chinese nationals were killed in Yunan province, on 13 March, when a bomb was mistakenly dropped by the Burmese military aircraft. The recent Chinese military live-fire exercise near the border across Kokang area is an indication of China's frustration, impatience and displeasure. It might well be signaling that it is serious in demanding for the return of peace and normalcy along the border. The other Chinese armed forces task is safeguarding the security of China's overseas interests, which in Burma context could mean the security of gas and oil pipelines, the delivery system cross-cutting Burma from Arakan State to Yunan province, various natural resources extraction industries, and not to forget the Irrawaddy Myitsone dam project that have been shelved, since Thein Sein regime comes to power in 2011. Given such circumstances, there could be only two scenario outcomes. The first would be the escalation of the border armed conflict blown out of proportion, leading to the Chinese invasion of Kokang conflict areas to restore peace or employing a proxy war by using MNDAA, UWSA and NDAA like during the Communist Party of Burma's days, when China openly aided the communist revolution, to push for a regime change. The second one is to resolve the ethnic conflict by agreeing to a genuine federalism based on equal national state basis, which would effectively end the conflict and create a "win-win" outcome for the Burmese regime, the non-Burman ethnic groups and China alike. As it stands, the choice of war or peace will now solely depend on how the powers that be in Naypyidaw handle the situation. |
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