Wednesday, June 1, 2016

Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News

Defining indigenousness in Burma context: The case of Kokangnese

Posted: 01 Jun 2016 05:40 AM PDT

Just recently, on 26 May, a piece of interview,  conducted by The Irrawady with the spokesperson of Ethnic Affairs Ministry and Deputy Secretary U Aye Min, concerning the view of being an indigenous people said: "Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Karen, Chin, Mon, Bamar, Arakan, Shan, including other sub-ethnic groups(races) are explicitly indigenous peoples. Some even think Bamar is not indigenous. No, Bamar is also indigenous."
A map showing the location of Burma's Kokang region. Graphic: RFA
A map showing the location of Burma's Kokang region. Graphic: RFA
He added: "Indigenous (peoples) are those that have resided in Myanmar, as their country of origin, for hundreds of years. To be frank, the Chinese moved over to Myanmar and no matter how long they stay, they are not indigenous. They have their original country, that is China. They cannot consider our country to be their own. They might become citizens but not indigenous. This has been clearly mentioned in the law."
Question arises if U Aye Min's stand point of the Chinese living within Burma is also meant to include the people of Kokang or Kokangnese, who are descendants of Han Chinese, but have been living in Shan State since the middle of 16th century, ruled by their own princely ruler or Sao Hpas. And so do many pockets of Chinese dwellings within Shan State that either have migrated since pre-colonial times and don't have the privilege of being included formally like those of Kokangnese.
Let us ponder on U Aye Min's point of view, even we are not quite sure, if this is the official government policy on all Chinese population residing within the country, and look a bit deeper from the indigenous perspective of the Kokangnese in particular.
The Kokang region and Kokangnese
Kokang is located in the northern part of Shan State, with the Salween River to its west, and sharing a border with China's Yunnan Province to the east. Its total land area is around 10,000 square kilometres and its capital is Laukkai.
"It is said that the Kokang Chinese are descendants of late Ming dynasty immigrants and that they are 'Han Chinese'. They have been recognized as one of the major ethnic groups in Myanmar since the beginning of the 1960s. Most of them are Yunnanese immigrants. Some families' records show that they have been living in the region for more than fifteen generations," according to an in-depth study written by Myint Myint Kyu, an academic who is originally a Kokangnese herself.
Historical timeline of Kokang 
  • During the period of late Ming Period (1623–1662), the followers of the late Ming Prince, Yong Li, were driven out of China. In search of a safer place to restart their lives, some arrived in the mountainous areas of northern Shan State and settled down.
  • Yang Family Rule and the British Colonial Period (1670–1948), the Kokang area, being far from both the Chinese and Burma central governments, was ruled in part by various highland chiefs, while the Kokang Chinese came under the rule of Yang, who was one of the late Ming Prince's advisors.
  • In 1739, when bandits along the Salween River raided the villages, Yang Zheng Cai, Yang's son, took a lead and attempted to protect the villagers from the bandits. Following this incident, villagers came to respect Yang Zhen Cai and acknowledged him as their leader.
  • Yang Zhen Cai also introduced an organized administration and set government standards, which were to be followed by successive 'House of Yang' The House of Yang maintained an unbroken line of hereditary rule over the region, which lasted for nearly 250 years.
  • Several years after the British annexed Upper Burma in 1885, the area was incorporated into British Burma (then a part of British India) under the Anglo-Chinese Treaty on 4 February 1897, although almost all its inhabitants were Chinese of Yunnanese origin.
  • Before the British arrived, the Burma–China border was not clearly defined and no official border line existed until 1962.
  • China Nationalist Party Era (1935–1950s), the population of Chinese migrants in Myanmar increased after the World War II, especially from Yunnan Province, with many Kuomintang (KMT) remnants settling in Kokang after Chiang Kai Shek's KMT was defeated by Mao Zedong in 1949.
  • Recent Migration (1978–2009), the Kokang region had an estimated population of 200,000 in 2010, compared to an estimated 50,000 in 1953 (Upper Burma Gazetteer). The migration of Chinese people into Kokang since the 1980s has had the most visible effect in terms of the development of the region. The population grew significantly between the 1870s and 2010, and it has been estimated that 90 % of the current population in Kokang are Chinese, with the Chinese population growing both in absolute and in relative terms up to 2010. (Source: Kokang: The Rise of the Chinese Minority—the New Neo-Liberal State? By Myint Myint Kyu)
According to the study, "Shan statistics on Kokang State show that there were 600 villages in the Kokang region when the British colonized the area, of which five were Shan, ten were Palaung, 30 were La or Wa, 50 were Miaozi, 50 were Shan Chinese and the remaining 450 were Chinese. However, an inspection of the district by British officials in 1892 gave a figure of 138 Chinese villages, with 1993 households, across the whole region."
Legal Status
In 1958, the central government sent many officials to the remoter areas of Shan State and set up immigration departments for people to register and be issued with national identity cards. The Kokang people were classified into different categories as follows:
  1. Chinese living in Kokang since the Myanmar Kingdom period; those who are descendants of refugees from the late Ming dynasty;
  2. Chinese from China who migrated to Kokang before the World War II;
  3. Chinese from China who migrated to Kokang after the political changes occurred in China;
  4. Descendants of the above-mentioned Chinese.
UN criteria of being indigenous
According to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues & Department of Public Information Factsheet, the question of being indigenous is defined as follows:
Understanding the term "indigenous"
Considering the diversity of indigenous peoples, an official definition of "indigenous" has not been adopted by any UN-system body. Instead the system has developed a modern understanding of this term based on the following:
  • Self- identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the community as their member.
  • Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies
  • Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources
  • Distinct social, economic or political systems
  • Distinct language, culture and beliefs
  • Form non-dominant groups of society
  • Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities.
A question of identity
  • According to the UN the most fruitful approach is to identify, rather than define indigenous peoples. This is based on the fundamental criterion of self-identification as underlined in a number of human rights documents.
  • The term "indigenous" has prevailed as a generic term for many years. In some countries, there may be preference for other terms including tribes, first peoples/nations, aboriginals, ethnic groups, adivasi, janajati. Occupational and geographical terms like hunter-gatherers, nomads, peasants, hill people, etc., also exist and for all practical purposes can be used interchangeably with "indigenous peoples".
  • In many cases, the notion of being termed "indigenous" has negative connotations and some people may choose not to reveal or define their origin. Others must respect such choices, while at the same time working against the discrimination of indigenous peoples.
Is Kokang indigenous?
 Seen from the point of UN Factsheet, the Kokangnese might be considered as being an indigenous group.
In the Myanmar government categorized 135 races, Kokang people is included and even has been given a Self-Adminstartion Zone. Apart from this, Kokang had been part of the Federated Shan States formed in 1922, under the British rule, completed with its own ruler Saohpa or Sawbwa. Thus the place of the Kokangnese couldn't be in doubt.
Coming back to the Kokangese being indigenous, the fact that the acceptance of the community of their self-identification; historical continuity and settlement since pre-colonial times as settlers; strong link to said territories; distinct social, language, culture, beliefs, economic or political systems; form a non-dominant group within the society; and resolving to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities; all indicated that it has been and is a bona fied indigenous group in every sense of the words.
If this is so, the spokesperson of Ethnic Affairs Ministry and Deputy Secretary U Aye Min's statement that Chinese are not indigenous should clearly differentiate that the Kokangese, although of Chinese descendent, are indigenous, including those that have been there since colonial and pre-colonial times.
This kind of clarification would go a long way not to discriminate the ethnic Chinese, either Kokangnese or other Chinese population who are citizens and have a long line of ancestral linkage since pre-colonial times, even before the modern Burma came into existence in 1948.

Shan State Parties Meet to Discuss Upcoming Panglong II summit

Posted: 01 Jun 2016 03:48 AM PDT

Over 100 representatives from a range of political parties and civil society organizations in Shan State attended a meeting in Shan State's capital Taunggyi today to discuss the upcoming 21st century Panglong Convention. The special convention which is expected to be held some time in July is being convened by Burma's State Counsellor and National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi.  This will be a follow-up to a meeting convened by her father in 1947 that was attended by representatives from the Shan, Chin and Kachin communities.
meetingThe agreement reached at Panglong in 1947, stipulated a significant level of autonomy for Burma's ethnic groups in exchange for their decision to support Aung San's bid for independence from Britain. Aung San, was assassinated just months after the agreement was reached, his successor U Nu, did little to implement the agreement before he was overthrown by General Ne Win in 1962. The subsequent military regimes that ruled Burma also disregarded the commitments made by General Aung San at Panglong.
Today's seminar, which focused on national reconciliation, the peace process, democracy and federalism, was organized by the Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU), an organization comprising of Shan parties and armed organizations which Khun Tun Oo, leader of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) is also the chairperson.
Sai Lek, a spokesperson for the SNLD and one of the meeting's organizers, said that the meeting was being convened in order to prepare discussing issues of equal rights of Shan State's people to the national conference.
"The main goal is to build unity among all ethnicities in Shan State," he said. "This is a first for Burma to hold this political conference after 70 years. It is very important for ethnic nationalities equal rights, autonomy, as well as constitutional amendments."
"In order for us to get a chance for constitutional amendments at the political conference we (ethnic nationalities) have to discuss and support the matter," he added.
The two-day meeting, which began today, was attended by nineteen political parties and eight civil society organizations from Shan State. In addition to the SNLD, representatives of the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) also attended as did members of the NLD and the military backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).
On May 29th, representatives from nineteen political parties in Shan State held a meeting in Yangon and formed a committee called the League for Shan State Ethnic Political Party (LSSEPP).
BY SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)

To Hopeland and Back: The 20th trip

Posted: 31 May 2016 09:10 PM PDT

Day Three. Wednesday 25 May 2016
Only do not contend
And you will not go wrong.
Tao Te Ching (Book of The Way and its Derivative), Chapter 8
This morning I'm attending a discussion on federalism at PI Yangon. It isn't a formal meeting, so everyone speaks what they want to. The upshot of it is  I'm learning things that I wouldn't have learned had it not been an informal one.
Speaker 1            Things certainly have changed. Until 4 years ago, federalism was a dirty word. Now the military officers are holding workshops to study it.
Speaker 2            Most Bamars, living in central Burma, away from the states on the periphery where suffering takes place, don't understand federalism. We need to make allowance for it and try to educate them.
Speaker 3            Most of the ethnic activists think they understand federalism. But I have found that their main focus is on self rule, rarely on shared rule, which is, like self rule, the most important component of federalism.
At the same time, I have questions about how useful federalism workshops and seminars organized by foreign experts are. Because each and every one of them are saying different things which I fear only serve to get people more confused about federalism.
Note: There is a Burmese saying, "saya-mya-tha-thay" (Too many                                                 doctors kill the patient)
Speaker 4            I agree. Federalism, to most of us, seems like an elephant to the six blindSix blind men and the elephant Brahmins. The first Brahmin touches the trunk and says it's like a snake. The second touches the tusk and says it's like a lance. Others touch the ears, leg, body and tail and say they're like fans, pillar, wall and rope respectively. Each one of them is right in his own way but all of them are getting it wrong as a whole. We don't want to become like them blind Brahmins.
"And so these men of Hindustanelephantblindmen
Disputed loud and long
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong
Though each was partly in the right
And all were in the wrong"
John Godfrey Saxe (1816-1889)
Speaker 1            The focus on 8 states/14 states should be later. We should instead focus first on main principles and not argue over details. Only then the process can move forward.
Federalism, on the other hand, is difficult to understand when you've been living most of your life under a centralized system.
Speaker 4            Reminds me of the story of a turtle coming back from a visit to dry land being asked by his friend the fish. No matter how hard he tries to explain, the fish couldn't understand "dry" or "walk," because all he knows are "wet" and "swim."
Note Only the Shans who had had a 25 year firsthand experience as a federation, 1922-1947, have  some understanding. But most of those who do are already gone.
Speaker 5            Speaking of which, there were several presentations on federalism during the first Union Peace Conference. We may need to rearrange them into a single text procedure.
Speaker 1            Balance between the center and states is important for a federation's sustainability. If the center is too weak and the states are too strong, the center will inevitably collapse and the states with it. The same outcome if the center is too strong and the states too weak.
We later talk about state constitutions, merits of having them and not having them, and local government, which is considered the third tier in a federal state.
In the afternoon, I'm at the first meeting of the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) which was established by the Second Summit of the signatory EAOs in March. They are finalizing the draft TOR for the PPST by the time I arrive at Green Hill Hotel, where the meeting takes place.
Following its ratification, the PPST, whose members are top leaders of each signatory EAO, go on to deliberate on the planned meetings in Naypyitaw on 27-28 May.
The PPST, headed by KNU leader Gen Mutu Saypoe and RCSS leader Gen Yawd Serk, passes a resolution that its continued participation on in the peace process will be based on a 5 point condition, which includes: Adherence to NCA and Not becoming a pawn (for other stakeholders)
The day's agenda ends with a meeting with 3 foreign generals who discuss their experience in the peace processes of Nepal, South Africa and the Philippines. At the end, we ask the organizers if they can bring presenters not only from the government side but also from the rebel side too. They promise to.
After they were gone, one grumbles that we already have too many experts coming in and scrambling over each other to tell us how they did things in their countries. "I wonder if there is a conspiracy to confuse us," he muses.
Another friend ponders over it and says, "Me too. I'm asking myself whether we should stop them from coming and just let us do things in our own way."
In the end, we conclude that the problem is not stopping them from coming but how to manage them.
With that conclusion we part, each to his room. And I go to my hotel.

Tripartite dialogue revisited or shifting alliance?

Posted: 31 May 2016 08:05 AM PDT

newspictures_saiwansaiThe Aung San Suu Kyi-headed Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), which is made up of Union Government, Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and Political Parties, with 16 members from each group, recent restructuring meeting looks like it has created an atmosphere of a tripartite dialogue, which the UN has all along endorsed to resolve the ethnic and ideological conflicts that Burma has to endure, since the military coup of 1962.
The UN had, until 2010 nationwide elections that has ushered in the quasi-civilian Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)-Military government of Thein Sein, steadfastly stood by the tripartite dialogue initiative, which should involve representatives of the government, political parties and the ethnic nationalities, to resolve the problems and conflicts surrounding the country. But started to become silent on its insistence of tripartite dialogue, after the military has allowed limited political reform and the quasi-civilian government came into being in 2011.
Perhaps the UN, together with the international community would like to encourage the nascent reform process by staying on the sideline, rather than pushing hard for the tripartite dialogue.
But whether the planned 21st Century Panglong Convention (21CPC), also dubbed Union Peace Conference (UPC) by the former Thein Sein regime, would really be tripartite dialogue in a real sense or not is a question, which needs to be scrutinized. For equal representation is the key that would make the peace process all-inclusive and not unequal or imbalance representation.
Apart from this, the speculation of shifting alliance, between the EAOs and between those of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the military also  requires careful attention, as the fate of the whole peace process would depend on the outcomes or results materializing from such interactions.
First, let us look at what the UPDJC structuring meeting of 27-28 May has changed and altered from the previous setting.
NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi's undertakings
Aung San Suu Kyi has taken the position of UPDJC chairperson with Kyaw Tint Swe, Thu Wai and Phado Kwe Htoo Win appointed as vice chairmen, and former government peace negotiator Hla Maung Shwe of the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC), now renamed as National Reconciliation Peace Center (NRPC), as secretary.
The UPDJC meeting decisions are:
  1. Confirmation of the Union Government 16 members for UPDJC;
  2. Confirmation of the 8 EAOs 16 members, that had signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA);
  3. Agreement that for the Political Parties group, 16 of its members will be chosen by the government, including consideration of at least one woman representation; and
  4. Agreement that the UPDJC Secretariat will be formed with 3 persons each from the 3 groups, of which list would be sent to U Hla Maung Shwe, general secretary of the UPDJC.
Some of the NLD or Suu Kyi's policies were spelled out as the following in the recent two days UPDJC meeting.
  • Regarding the future peace process restructuring of MPC and 21st Century Panglong Convention (21CPC) would be undertaken.
  • Suu Kyi explained that 21CPC and UPC are the same and both names are usable and accepted.
  • UPDJC role will continue but amendment would be undertaken to meet political reality and future necessities.
  • Regarding political convention participation of more than 90 political parties, as the NLD's previous policy of parliamentary representation will be norm, only political parties that have at least one elected representative, in either union, or state/regional level parliaments, will be eligible to participate in the peace convention.
  • The role of the political parties, that have no representation in the parliament, would be to compliment the convention process through participation in the Civiian Based Organization (CBO) Parallel Forum, which is open to them.
  • Suu Kyi said that many understood Panglong as secession. She took Panglong spirit as being the main core necessary factor than Panglong Agreement. Saying that the Panglong spirit had united all the ethnic peoples leading to the achievement of independence through unity and cooperation and that the same could be done to reach the goals of peace, tranquillity and development.
Other than that the UPDJC will meet non-signatory EAOs in June, from which it hopes that many will join, leading to joint-activities to alter and review the Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD), which they will also become co-ownership and participate in UPC in July, according to the secretary U Hla Maung Shwe. He said the meeting participants also agreed to this arrangement, according to RFA report of 28 May.
Under the 21CPC preparation mould, two negotiation committees, one for the 8 EAOs signatory group and the other, for the non-signatory 13 EAOs. However, it is not clear if the military rejected 3 EAOs – MNDAA, TNLA and AA – will be covered is unknown.
Even as Suu Kyi actions have been in full swing regarding the peace process, the doubtfulness on her commitment to national reconciliation are rife, especially from the ethnic nationalities' point of view.
Shifting alliance
 Looking at the indecisiveness of Suu Kyi where all-inclusiveness of all EAOs is concerned, many are doubtful of her real sincere intention, whether she meant what she said. On several occasions she said that the convening of  21CPC or UPC would go parallel with soliciting the non-signatory EAOs, emphasising and including the former regime's usage of the phrase "those who deserve and are appropriate to participate" in the peace process.
Besides, it was said to be decided that she would curtail economic incentives of the EAOs, which the former Thein Sein regime had effectively used to win over the EAOs, and that future negotiations would only be conducted within the country and not in Thailand or China,  where previous meetings were held on several occasions.
And as she seemed inclined to give in to the military demand, the MNDAA, TNLA and AA, would likely be excluded.
Although this could be a tactical move or political tightrope walking of Suu Kyi, the EAOs took it as her possible shifting of alliance from being an ally to collaborator of their adversary, the military.
The ringing of alarm bell was evident, as an ethnic leader who attended a recent meeting of the newly formed peace committee dealing with the eight groups, which signed the NCA, but declined to be identified said: "In the past the army guys all attacked her, but now they hail her in our meetings," according to Larry Jagan in his commentary in Bangkok Post, on 27 May.
He stressed: "Clearly there is a strong understanding between the military and the government and we fear we will be isolated and Aung San Suu Kyi take the military's side."
The UWSA factor
 As the shifting of alliance seems to be in the making between the Suu Kyi-led NLD and Tatmadaw from adversaries to those of actual, grand coalition partner, the non-Bamar armed ethnic front is also gearing up for a possible change.
During the last few weeks, the Kokang or Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) have tendered resignation to be excluded from 11 member military alliance, United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), of which both are members, although the decision of acceptance or approval is said to be pending for the moment.
The reason for their resignation was given as the UNFC being unable to do much for the said two EAOs practically, while they have to endure ongoing heavy Tatmadaw offensives. Besides, they didn't want to be on the way of UNFC, which has been adhering to all-inclusiveness and thus unable to sign the NCA, due to the former Thein Sein government's exclusion of the two, including the Arakan Army (AA).
The reasoning is that the new NLD regime is likely to toe the same policy line of excluding them, as it  doesn't like to upset the Tatmadaw, which had openly said that they all have to surrender first in order to be able to join the peace process.
And with the UNFC's rejection – after the 19-22 April meeting in Chiang Mai - of the United Wa State Party/Army (UWSP/UWSA) aspirations to lead the whole ethnic military alliance, it is only a matter of time that the MNDAA and TNLA would join the military alliance headed by the latter, including the Mong La or National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and AA.
During the Ethnic  Armed  Organizations Leaders' Summit  held  from 26 - 28 March  2016  at  Pang  Kham Town, where  34  representatives  from  UWSP/UWSA,  KIO/KIA,  Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA),  PSLF/TNLA,  AA and  NDAA  attended, one paragraph of the statement issued after the meeting stated:
"Conflict  between  RCSS  and  TNLA  in  Northern  Shan  State  was  discussed  at  the  meeting  and  both sides  are  urged  to  immediately  halt  hostilities.    Both  sides  are  encouraged  to  solve  the  problem through  negotiation  mean.  In  case,  one  side  keeps  creating  conflict,  all  EAOs  agreed  to  collectively prevent  and  protect  from  it.  Simultaneously,  we  demand  Tatmadaw  immediately  cease  all  military offensives in Northern Shan State for the sake of the stability for the people living in the areas."
 Following this some weeks later, heavy clashes involving some 700 troops of TNLA attacked RCSS positions, which let many, including the SNLD's secretary general Sai Nyunt Lwin, to say that other EAOs might be involved on the side of TNLA to rid the RCSS from its encroachment within the areas, which the TNLA insisted belongs to them.
The situation became even more complicated with the TNLA accusation that the RCSS and Burma Army were coordinating the assaults on its positions with heavy artillery and at time, attacking in tandem.
Thus, the UWSA military alliance, although not yet formally formed, might have already existed in practice. The inclusion of the KIA, AA and NDAA were highly likely in attacks against the RCSS, while SSPP could not be involved as it is also a Shan Army like the RCSS and also member of the UNFC, which is trying to mediate the conflict between TNLA and RCSS.
If this development process of UWSA forming a military alliance becomes real, the UNFC could be drastically weaken.
Perspective
 Given the recent military and political developments, it is a bit too early to predict if the Suu Kyi initiated 21CPC or UPC would really lead to the tripartite dialogue of the government, political parties and ethnic nationalities, as had been endorsed for decades until 2010 by the UN.
It will actually depend on equal representation on all level of the peace process  from manning the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) to overseeing its execution by two bodies: the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) that essentially deals with military matters, and the other, the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) that deals with the political ones.
Two points needed to be considered, in order to become a bona fide tripartite dialogue and would hinge on altering the following in an equal basis, acceptable to all parties.
Firstly, the restructuring of UPDJC will have to include the participation of the 13 non-signatory EAOs, which would also include the 3 left out EAOs. This would mean expanding the representatives from 16 each to 16 + 26 = 46. The added 26 representatives would come from 13 non-signatory EAOs inclusion of 2 representatives each, making it 26 altogether.
The present UPDJC is manned by 48 members, with 16 each from the government, ethnic armed groups and political parties.
Secondly, the Union Peace Conference that has been slated to be attended by a total of 700 delegates comprising 75 from the Government, 75 from the Hluttaw (Parliament), 150 from the Tatmadaw, 150 from ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), 150 from registered political parties, 50 from ethnic representatives and 50 from others who should participate, written in The Framework for Political Dialogue, would need to be adjusted to reflect the recent changing  political configuration and equality.
In the formerly UN endorsed tripartite dialogue, the three group stakeholders were the military government (State Peace and Development Council), the democratic forces (NLD) and the ethnic nationalities.
Speculation on possible de-escalation or heightened armed conflict will solely depend on how the Tatmadaw would go about with its non-inclusiveness in relation to the all-inclusiveness of the non-signatory EAOs and a not so clear stance of the NLD's stance regarding the matter.
If the Tatmadaw would continue with its strategy of side-lining the MNDAA, TNLA, AA and continues its offensives on the SSPP/SSA and KIO/KIA, the possibility that the Tatmadaw's military pressure would push the two groups into a wider alliance with the UWSA could become a reality. Then this would strengthen the hand of the UWSA and increased influence of the big regional power, neighbouring country, whether one likes it or not.
At the same time, the counter strategy of the EAOs could be like those of the Tatmadaw, which is talking peace, while fighting. In other words, the UWSA headed military alliance would tie down the Tatmadaw militarily, while the UNFC-led alliance would continue with the negotiations within the bounds of 21CPC.
But if such speculation would become a reality, where would the country's peace process lead us to?
The answer would likely be continued warfare, at the expense of the ethnic nationalities in the first place and hindering overall development and democratization process in the rest of the country.
As such, we should all take heart that compromise, or a real equal tripartite dialogue, is the only way out of this debacle and that it must be coupled with determined conviction to be able to end the decades-long ethnic armed conflict and strive to achieve durable peaceful settlement, that the people has been waiting for so long.

Movie on Shan prince and his Austrian wife shines light on Burma’s 1962 coup

Posted: 31 May 2016 07:54 AM PDT

A recently completed film made for European TV, Twilight Over Burma, based on the true story of Prince Sao Kya Seng, the ruler of Hsipaw and his Austrian born wife Inge Sargent, had its premiere in the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai this past weekend. The story focuses on Sargent who became the princess of Hsipaw also known as the Mahadhevi Dhusandi and her marriage with the prince who was jailed when General Ne Win launched a coup d'état in 1962.
Twilight-Over-BurmaAs the film, which is the first to explore the events surrounding Burma's 1962 coup, shows Sao Kya Seng died in detention shortly after his arrest under circumstances that have never been fully explained. A similar fate suffered by Burma's first president Sao Shwe Thaike, another Shan royal who was arrested in the 1962 coup, and who was also never seen alive again.
Maria Ehrich, the German actress who played Inge Sargent, was at the screening in Chiang Mai along with some of the film's producers. Many Shan living in Chiang Mai attended the screening including some who played minor roles in the movie. Apart from Ehrich most of the major roles in the film were played by Thai actors.
2.-Twilight-Over-BurmaDuring a Q&A conducted after the screening of the movie, which takes its name from Sargent's memoir, Ehrich explained that coming to Asia to shoot the film was an interesting experience. She added that the tragic nature of the script posed a challenge at times during production.
"It was always the tragic story in my mind so I could not be very happy all the time when we were shooting the movie. Sometimes, all the crew team had a difficult time to shoot, for example, when Inge gets to know Sao might be dead. Everyone was crying on the set. It really touches you very hard. You can see in the movie how we felt. So, it's real," explained the 23 year old Ehrich who has also starred in a number of German language productions including a kids film called My Brother Is a Dog.
Ehrich traveled to Hsipaw where much of the film is set, shortly after the film was completed to see the palace where Sargent lived. Like many visitors to Hsipaw she was saddened by the poor condition that the dilapidated Hsipaw palace is in. "In my mind I had already imagined Hsipaw, I was eager to see how it really is. My heart was really checking when we got close to it. We went up to the palace and talked with the person who is in charge. I told her that Inge did not take anything with her when she left and I'd really like to take something to give her but she said there is nothing left. The Burmese military took everything. I almost cried. I was really shocked because
I thought it would be beautiful from what I knew from the script and the book, but it is not. It's a little dirty and rotted……. It really made me sad", she said.
Inge Sargent eventually resettled in the US where she has lived for many years. She and her two daughters, Sao Mayari and Sao Kennari, wrote a letter to Burma's government concerning the disappearance of Sao Kya Seng. They never received a response to their inquires.
Burma's newly installed consul-general in Chiang Mai Kaung San Lwin, also attended the screening. He told SHAN that did not know about the Inge Sargent's letter and was unaware of the specific details of the case which he said took place before he was born.
It remains unclear when the movie will receive its Burmese premier but the movie which would almost certainly would have been banned in Burma had it come out a few years ago, will likely receive a much better reception under the new NLD government.
But some things have yet to change. Today more than 50 years after the 1962 coup, turmoil continues in northern Shan State where the army in recent weeks has been engaged in clashes with ethnic armed groups including carrying out airstrikes against positions held by the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).
BY Staff / Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)
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