Shan Herald Agency for News |
- New bridge slated for Mandalay-Muse highway
- Learning to share: About low hanging fruits
- BURMA PEACE PROCESS CRITICAL PATH
- Union Peace Conference Set to Begin on August 31
| New bridge slated for Mandalay-Muse highway Posted: 09 Aug 2016 01:15 AM PDT A new concrete bridge will be built on the Mandalay-Muse Highway, the main route for border trade through Shan State to China, according to a statement by the Ministry of Information on Friday.  The bridge will incorporate a two-lane highway as well as hard shoulders in both directions, making it the main trade route between Burma and China. Meanwhile, the 689- meter Goteik Bridge, which was built in 1899 during the era of British colonisation, will be closed to all traffic but will continue to serve as a tourist attraction. The Oriental Highway Company, a former subsidiary of the Asia World Group founded by late businessman Lo Hsing Han and his son Stephen Law, will design and build the bridge, which is slated to be constructed between Mile No. 72/5 in Nong Khio Township and No. 92/5 in Kyaukme Township. The bridge will be 875 metres (2,800 ft) in length when completed. On June 9, Shan Herald reported that residents in Muse Township had made a complaint claiming damage to their properties due to expansion of the road linking Mandalay to Muse, part of the same project undertaken by Oriental Highway. To date, no action has been taken to indicate the complaint is being dealt with. By: Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) | ||||||||
| Learning to share: About low hanging fruits Posted: 08 Aug 2016 09:07 PM PDT Good speech makes no one feel bad Bad speech makes no one feel good (Shan proverb) Today's session begins with yesterday's exercise results from 4 discussion groups. I have put them together here. (Some of which are my own input, as readers who have seen my earlier article, Scholar: Why Burma won't allow Shan secession, 5 July 2016, will immediately recall.) Perceived Tatmadaw's core interests 1. Its mindset: to maintain the 4thBurmese empire. The previous three were established by kings Anawrahta, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya, all Burmans. Which means Burmans have the historic mission (like the long ago White Man's Burden) to lead and the non-Burmans have to follow. 2. Greater acceptance by the international community 3. Monopoly of the country's natural resources 4. No structural change (meaning no SSR) but only DDR 5. Survival of the true Burman state which is surrounded by non-Burman states It appears to be almost fanatically interested to keep the Shan State away from China, which is bordered in the north and Thailand, which is bordered in the south, both of them its historic adversaries. "
Among the three, "there seems to be no political or economic reason—historic or current—to warrant the creation of a Laos-Shan union." With the other two countries, the situation is different: "In military terms, it (a merger) would bring China or Thailand into the heartland of the Union, and it would create such an exposed border that defense of Burma would be nearly impossible." After re-reading the article, I began to understand what the Tatmadaw's "Three Sacred Causes": Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of National Solidarity, and Perpetuation of National Sovereignty, was all about. That it was just a plain corollary of its principal aim: The survival of the Burman State. Which wasn't different from what Bangkok had done when the British were pushing from the west and the French from the east in the 19th century. King Chulalongkorn (1853-1910) knew that had he allowed his northern and northeastern tributary kings to maintain their independent status, it was highly likely they would choose to join either the British or the French, leaving Bangkok exposed to eventual subjugation. And he set out to establish plans to reduce the tributaries into total submission. The result was Siam or Thailand as we know today. Perceived Tatmadaw's fears 1. Losing power and leadership 2. Unity of the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) under the "Federal Union Army" banner 3. Losing its business interests 4. Transitional justice 5. Decentralized federalism 6. Shan State independence 7. Civilian control Moreover, the Tatmadaw appears to be suffering from a chronic siege mentality, "a defensive paranoid attitude based on the belief that others are hostile toward one," according to its definition. No doubt, for peacemakers, it would pose as a formidable challenge to decide how best to minimize these fears. Low hanging fruits "So far it has made some concessions with regards to formation of semi-autonomous armed units," said Steve, pointing out the emergence of People's Militia Forces (PMFs), Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and Special Combat Police Forces. U Aung Min, the former peace negotiator, had also mentioned the planned resurrection of ethnic armed units which were disbanded later, such as Chin Rifles, Kachin Rifles and Shan Rifles. "Signing the NCA which contains acceptance of federalism and the call to negotiate SSR/DDR may also be considered as signals that there are several things it is ready to offer." He then gives us a short presentation of case studies which include El Salvador, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nepal, the Philippines, and Burundi. We then go into another group exercise on hypothetical options spectrum: How the former foes in Burma can merge with each other. The following is the result.
By the end of the day, Steve still has a lot to tell us. But it is already 17:00. I hope we see him again. | ||||||||
| BURMA PEACE PROCESS CRITICAL PATH Posted: 08 Aug 2016 06:28 PM PDT Burma's Ethnic Armed Organizations have completed their latest summit. They are once again talking with the government about the nation's peace process. An excellent analysis of the summit is available in Sai Wansai's article, Mai Ja Yang EAOs' Plenary Meeting: Successful but need time to iron out common positions, available on the Shan Herald Agency for News website. This statement abstracts from the article the different steps that now lie on Burma's critical path to peace, including who holds the responsibility for seeing that they are achieved. Ceasefire - There can be no effective peace process until there is a ceasefire on the ground. As the conflict is the result of the military dictatorship's continuing offensives against the EAOs, it must suspend its attacks, and withdraw Burma Army troops, before there can be any hope of peace. Inclusion - There can also be no peace process unless the EAOs that have been excluded are allowed to participate. As they have been banned by the dictatorship, the responsibility for this step lies solely with it. No inclusion means no peace process, ever. Peace Principles - Referred to at the summit as the "Panglong Handbook," these are the principles and provisions that the EAOs expect to see incorporated into any ultimate peace agreement (many of which date to the 1947 Panglong Agreement). As these represent the rights that are the foundation of Federal Democracy, they are all completely justifiable and must be accepted. Therefore, once again, it is the military dictatorship which must give, and embrace the fact that Burma can only have peace if it implements real democracy. Federal Constitution - The peace principles in turn can only be realized if the nation's constitution is either rewritten or substantially amended, which again the dictatorship must permit. National Structure - Related to this is the issue of Burma's organization into States and Divisions, and which currently embeds a bias in favor of the Burman ethnic group. Equality for the ethnic nationality peoples can only be achieved if this structure is altered, and which too will require constitutional change. The dictatorship in this case must accept this need, and which in turn should begin with the government publishing the ethnic census data, as it is required to properly evaluate such national redesign. Security Issues - The dictatorship has demanded that the EAOs disarm (including by becoming Border Guard Forces under Burma Army control), which falls under a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration approach (DDR). The EAOs have countered that to accomplish federal democracy the country requires security sector reform (SSR), starting by placing the Burma Army under the control of the elected civilian government. As the country's Civil War is solely due to the dictatorship's 1962 takeover and subsequent decades of atrocities, it must accede to this position. Political Dialogue - In addition to all of these factors, peace in Burma will require extensive dialogue as the country transitions to a truly democratic system. Aung San Suu Kyi has implied that to participate in such dialogue those EAOs which did not sign the so-called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement must do so. (This is coercion. Also, strictly-speaking, they may participate without signing, but only as observers.) A second issue is which specific interest groups will participate in the dialogue, meaning whether it will be tripartite (the EAOs, the government and the military, and registered political parties), or the seven groups envisioned in the NCA. While it is certainly legitimate to include as broad a representation as possible in the nation's peace discussion, it is actually much more likely to succeed if the negotiation is limited to the parties who can directly influence the war. For this reason the EAOs prefer the tripartite structure, and which in varying forms the pro-democracy movement has been advocating for for years. This is the simplest approach to what will undoubtedly be an extremely complex negotiation. Finally, there is the issue of who will design the dialogue (the Framework for Political Dialogue). At present, only NCA signatories may be involved. (This is a second aspect of Suu Kyi's coercion to get the non-signatories to sign the NCA - she is trying to force them to follow the regime's blueprint.) This too is unacceptable. On all of these issues both Suu Kyi and the military dictatorship must relent. Otherwise, the dialogue planned for the 21st Century Panglong Conference will achieve nothing. In summary, while progress was certainly made on the EAO side at Mai Ja Yang, there are many significant blockades to peace, all of which the dictatorship controls. Unless it, and Suu Kyi where appropriate, alter their positions, peace is not possible. It is this writer's view that the dictatorship will never change. While the decline in repression in Burma for some (largely the Burmans) is welcome, it is still the case that the most straight-forward route to real nationwide peace and freedom remains the EAOs fighting offensively as a comprehensive force and either defeating the Burma Army or triggering among the generals a top-level pro-democracy coup. It is also this writer's view that all of these barriers are in fact the main elements of the dictatorship's underlying strategy never to allow real democracy. They are designed to postpone such change. To the extent that the above issues are not addressed before the new Panglong Conference, it will only serve the regime as yet one more delaying tactic. It is therefore a waste of time to hold the conference until the dictatorship does compromise. Ref: http://www.dictatorwatch.org/prpeacecriticalpath.html | ||||||||
| Union Peace Conference Set to Begin on August 31 Posted: 08 Aug 2016 06:23 PM PDT Burma's Union Peace Conference will begin on August 31, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi announced during a meeting of the conference's central committee in Naypyidaw on Monday.
The central convening committee—formed on August 3 by an order from the President's Office—is chaired by the State Counselor, who is also the head of Burma's peace negotiation center. Kyaw Tint Swe, Minister of the State Counselor's Office, is the vice chair of the newly-formed committee, which also includes Union ministers and deputy ministers. Khin Maung Tin, Deputy Minister of the State Counselor's Office, serves as the committee's secretary, and former Lt-Gen Khin Zaw Oo is the joint secretary. Under the central committee, working committees are also formed with respective ministers and departmental heads. Since May, the new government has formed multiple committees dedicated to peacebuilding, involving a variety of stakeholders. A series of meetings on the political dialogue framework review and the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee are also scheduled to be held within three weeks of the conference's August 31st start date. Also on Monday afternoon, Suu Kyi met with Burma Army chief Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing at the President's Office. They reportedly discussed issues ranging from a potential ceasefire in Kachin and northern Shan states, to national reconciliation and the rule of law, to preparatory issues related to the upcoming peace conference. Other meeting participants were Burma Army Vice-Snr-Gen Soe Win, Union Minister for Border Affairs Lt-Gen Ye Aung, Attorney General Tun Tun Oo, peace commission chair Dr. Tin Myo Win, Lt-Gen Mya Tun Oo from the Burma Army commander-in-chief's office, and Lt-Gen Soe Htut, the military attorney general. Ref: http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/union-peace-conference-set-to-begin-on-august-31.html |
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