The plot has thickened as the 21st Century Panglong Conference (21CPC), acknowledged as the only game in town is being threatened into a situation to accommodate another game plan headed by the Wa from their mini-state capital, generally known as Panghsang but now changed to Pangkham.
The seven Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), United Wa State Party/Army (UWSP/UWSA), United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA), Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA), Peace and Solidarity Committee/National Democratic Alliance Army (PSC/NDAA) and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) held a meeting from February 22 to 24, with New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) absence, although the two sent in position papers to the gathering.
In all thirty-seven delegates attended the meeting, including two specially invited guests, from the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA).
The ethnic leadership meeting, a third one of its kind came up with a call for a new approach rather than just following the government initiated 21st Century Panglong Conference based on Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which the Wa initiated meeting opted to boycott or not to sign it unless a new compromised agreement could be agreed upon.
The nine point statement of February 24, 2017 basically argued that in spite of NCA deliberation, the armed conflict along the Burma-China border in Kachin and Shan States have escalated with no sign of stopping, while on the eve of the second 21st Century Panglong Conference the country is loaded with difficulties and unresolved problems. Thus, the necessity to call for a three day conference, leading to the following agreed statement, signed as the "Ethnic Armed Revolutionary Leaders Third Meeting".
1. The ethnic armed revolutionary leaders attending the meeting commonly agreed on the political definition of Wa State's (UWSP/UWSA) "Panglong Spirit" that is based on its discussion paper, "Wa State's general principle and detailed demands".
2. To immediately withdraw the identification as terrorist groups on the MNDAA, TNLA and KIA of December 7, 2016 by the Shan State Parliament that is against the will of the people.
3. To immediately stop all military offensives, in order the country to be peaceful and start the reconciliation process.
4. Implements the principle of all-inclusiveness to all armed revolutionary organizations and urges equality-based modal negotiation. In pursuing to achieve peace, resolving political problems, employing military means and threatening attacks are rejected.
5. Under the acceptance of "Wa State's general principle and detailed demands on political negotiation", formation of a political negotiation group, initiated by Wa State, to negotiate with the Burmese government is being agreed.
6. Depending on the development of the situation, the participants of the ethnic revolutionary organizations would discuss and adjust the Wa State's general principle and detailed demands and accept it as "general political principle and detailed demands of the ethnic armed revolutionary organizations on political negotiation".
7. The meeting participants of the ethnic armed resistance organizations are of the opinion, regarding the NCA as follows:
(a) The Burmese government aim to replace the historic Panglong Agreement with the NCA could not accepted.
(b) The meeting participants of the ethnic armed revolutionary organizations demand that the NCA be replaced with a more justified ceasefire agreement.
8. The meeting participants of the ethnic armed resistance organizations call on the United Nations and People's Republic of China to look upon as arbitrator in Burma's peace process.
(a) To urge for a new ceasefire agreement between the Burmese government and the non-ceasefire ethnic armed organizations.
(b) To urge for speedy realization political negotiation, leading to the formation of a genuine federal union, based on the already signed different levels of ceasefire agreements between the Burmese government and the ethnic armed revolutionary organizations.
9. Regarding capital investment and developmental projects, the opinion of ethnic armed resistance organizations attending the meeting are:
(a) China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy is peaceful equal development of all neighboring countries. This policy is necessary for Burma's economic development and security and as well benefits the arbitrator.
(b) It is believed that China's OBOR policy could successfully be implemented within Burma and beneficial for ethnic areas.
(c) The ethnic armed resistance organizations agreed that security of the foreign investments will be guaranteed. (Unofficial general translation from Burmese text by this writer – February 27, 2017)
In addition to the major call of the meeting statement on Panglong Spirit – according to the Wa definition includes rights of self-determination, ethnic equality and democracy - to be adhered, the dossier distributed to the invited participants prior to the Wa initiated third meeting, dated January 15, 2017, accused the Aung San Suu Kyi headed National league for Democracy (NLD) regime as being ethnocentric like its predecessor Thein Sein government, toeing and implementing the NCA line rigidly, which only benefits the Bamar ethnic group at the expense of the non-Bamar ethnic nationalities.
Responses to the Panghsang statement
One top United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) leader, who is also the vice-chairman of the NMSP told 7 Day Daily on February 26: "We just can't hold on indefinitely only to NCA. There are quite a lot that have not sign the NCA. It is important that all could participate. If we are to build peacefulness, all ethnic armed revolutionary organizations need to be involved. For this we need broad-mindedness and find ways."
He further said that he didn't like to give opinion on Panghsang statement for the time being. NMSP did not attend the meeting but sent in its position paper.
On February 25, according to Mizzima, UNFC general secretary Khu Oo Reh said: "Concerning UNFC, there will be no changes and would continue as originally planned."
The UNFC is scheduled to meet the State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi on March 1 to discuss policy matters, which is likely to be ironing out its nine point proposal to be able to sign the NCA.
Regarding the Panghsang statement Shan nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) general secretary, Sai Nyunt Lwin according to Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) February 25 report said: "I think they are looking for a new approach. The government side, especially the Tatmadaw, would not be able to accept it. But the good thing is that this search for a new approach would still go back on negotiation track. As it is (the statement) is not abandoning the negotiation, I am not sure whether we could welcome it or not. I think we should look into this approach. One thing that irked me is that probably Chinese influence seems be a little bit too much in it."
The same DVB report wrote that presidential spokesman Zaw Htay said: "I believe that it is (the statement) not following the 21stCentury Panglong line. It is directly contradicting it. We are moving accordingly to the commonly agreed tripartite dialogue – government, parliament, military; EAOs; and political parties, which will go if needed up to the constitutional amendment."
When asked if the planned March 1 meeting between the State Counselor and the UNFC could be affected because of the Panghsang meeting, as UNFC key players are involved in it, he replied that it won't be affected and that the meeting would take place as scheduled to discuss policy matters.
Perspective
Following the Panghsang meeting and statement a lot of questions are stirred up such as, whether the UNFC would follow the UWSA lead and opt for a new approach in going about the peace negotiation process; if China with its self-projected neutral mediator stance going to go so far as to persuade the Tatmadaw and government make concession for another ceasefire deal on behalf of Panghsang that doesn't need to go through NCA signing; and whether the UNFC's nine point proposal be considered by the government and Tatmadaw positively.
For now, the UNFC members would need to digest the Panghsang meeting outcomes and thrash out any misunderstanding among themselves that might arise on how to position itself in the choice of whether to go on pursuing the NCA line or opt for a new approach as prescribed by the latest ethnic leadership meeting, in Panghsang.
Regarding China, it might be in a bit of awkward position, as it only wants to be an active neutral mediator, where its main concern is its national interest tied closely to its economic scheme and keeping Burma as a political entity out of the Western orbit, actions which would seem openly taking sides with the armed ethnic groups could jeopardize it interest on Burma as a whole. Still, it would be interesting to see how China would react to this Panghsang's initiative as becoming an important arbitrator, in collaboration with the United Nations in Burma's peace process undertakings.
Now that the new game plan or alternative way out of the NCA deadlock is being proposed, the government and Tatmadaw are faced with a choice to either agree to the UNFC nine point proposal, so that its members would join the NCA fold or rejecting it and push the UNFC further into the arms of Panghsang initiated approach, which calls for a new set of ceasefire agreement without having to sign the NCA, leading to the participation in the peace process.
As it is, all is now open to speculation and until the March 1 scheduled meeting between the State Counselor and the UNFC that is to take place and the amount of compromised outcomes that would follow and made publicly known, all will be left to be indulged in a guessing game, whether we like it or not.
