Monday, July 24, 2017

Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News

BURMA ARMY DISRUPTION OF SHAN CONFERENCE: Intentionally creating distrustful atmosphere?

Posted: 24 Jul 2017 03:10 AM PDT

When the Shan's Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU) has to withhold its meeting that was planned to take place from 20 to 22 July by the Burmese military attaché Brigadier General Khin Zaw, through the Thai military, it was said to be because of the planned meeting would involve the illegal organizations and also it would be infringing the country's election law that could disrupt the peace process, many were at a loss what he really meant to say by such kind of accusations.

While by mentioning illegal organizations he might have Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) in mind as it hasn't signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) yet but in the process of negotiation with the government's Peace Commission (PC), under the banner of United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), and also has state-level and union-level ceasefire agreements in place since 2012. Besides, the SSPP even have several liaison offices to coordinate in military matters with the Burma Army, also known as the Military or Tatmadaw, in government's control towns in Shan State.

Thus, the argument that SSPP is an illegal organization holds no water and is not convincing.
"I have my doubts [about the Tatmadaw's sincerity] when they accuse us of endangering the peace process," General Yawd Serk who heads the CSSU said on July 21 at a press conference in the northern Thai capital. "If this is the case, they should contact our office," according to the recent report in Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN).

"The military attaché says that the meeting was to include a non-NCA signatory group. This group is the SSPP. However, it should be noted that the SSPP regularly attends meetings within the UNFC [United Nationalities Federal Council, a coalition of ethnic armed groups who declined to sign the NCA with the government in October 2015].

"So how can this be hindering the peace process if the UNFC regularly meets with the Tatmadaw and the government?"

Regarding the statement of Khin Zaw that the CSSU meeting would be against the election law no one really has a clue by what he means. But if he meant it is against the NCA then he is totally wrong, as the meeting is held in accordance with the NCA guidelines. CSSU was scheduled to discuss about the five topics of Political Affairs, Security Matters, Economic Affairs, Social Issues, and Land and Natural Resources Management, to achieve a common goal and later table it in a wider representative audience within Shan State. And as all know, earlier the Tatmadaw has rejected the venue of Taunggyi or Panglong proposed by the CSSU by saying that the planned gathering should be held in a remote region of Shan State, where the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) – a signatory of the NCA – is in control but not suitable, as there are no facilities to hold such a massive gathering estimated to be more than 600 participants.

Following the cancellation of the meeting the CSSU in Chiang Mai a seven-point statement in Burmese was issued, which pointed out that although the Burmese military attaché argument holds no water that the CSSU meeting would disrupt the peace process, for the benefit of the two countries relationship it has opted not to hold the meeting. Furthermore, the statement said that it would inform and coordinate with the government's National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC) and PC in the peace process. It also urges the government bases its actions with broad-mindedness and careful consideration and that if there are any doubts, clarification should be requested.

Background on Military-Shan interaction

Now let us look at on how it has come to this by going back a little into the past to determine why the Tatmadaw's mindset has been so obsessed with anti-Shan, anti-federalism tendencies, in addition to be so scared that the Shan would achieve unity.

·        The 1962 military coup that has its roots in the Shan spearheaded Federal Proposal to amend the 1948 Union of Burma Constitution was and still is seen by the Bamar military class as clipping the wings of the Bamar political supremacy and monopoly, while the non-Bamar ethnic nationalities are convinced that it is designed to make Burma Proper a Bamar State so that a level playing field of political arrangement, within the mold of ethnic-territorial-based federal union could be achieved.
·        It should be noted that the Panglong Agreement of 1947, the Union of Burma Constitution 1947, and Federal Amendment Proposal of the ethnic nationalities agreed in 1961 are the basis of achieving a justified and equal federal union from the view point of the ethnic nationalities.
·        The Bamar military following the anti-federalism advocacy of the then Bamar political elite headed by Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein tried to whitewash all the historical treaties and legacies to rewrite the history to its advantage, which in turn led to the full blown ethnic resistance countrywide.
·        In February 2005, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) chairman Hkun Htun Oo and seven other Shan leaders, including Sao Hsur Ten, leader of the SSPP/SSA, were arrested, convicted of high treason and sentenced to jail terms ranging from 79 to 106 years. On February 7 they were discussing to work out common positions among the Shan people on how to go about with the the then ongoing National Convention tasked with drawing a new constitution, under the military government,  in Nyaung Nabin and were arrested with the accusation of endangering the existence of union.
·        In March 2016, the CSSU meeting in Rangoon was also disrupted by local authorities possibly on the orders of the Tatmadaw.
·        Repeated requests of the CSSU to allow Shan National dialogue to be conducted either in Taunggyi or Panglong towns, prior to the second 21st Century Panglong Conference held from May 24 to 29, was rejected by the Tatmadaw until today.
·        On 2017 July 19, CSSU planned meeting in Chiang Mai from July 20 to 22 has to be cancelled, due to the disruption of the Burmese military attaché  to the Thai government.

Possible reasons and way out of distrustful atmosphere

While there could be many reasons to hinder the Shan National Dialogue by the Tatmadaw,  speculations like the Military not really believing in federalism and giving only lip service; having Military and Bamar supremacy aim as its strategic goals; Seeing the Shan as a main culprit in ethnonationalism and separatism; and suppressing and getting the Shan checkmated would ensure Bamar political edge and also control the other restless non-Bamar ethnic nationalities are rife, if impossible to verify.

But the historical backdrop and the indications that followed in chain have proven the Tatmadaw's anti-Shan and anti-federalism tendencies. Again, all these points to the lack of  Military's commitment and political will to really work for the political settlement through the formation of a federal union that is embedded in equality, rights of self-determination, universal human rights and democracy.

It is clear that distrust has to be eliminated and trust-building nurtured, if we are to move forward. But what exactly is the distrust between the Military and the Shan?

The Shan are distrustful that the Military won't be sincere to resolve the conflict through political dialogue and its commitment on a genuine federalism, while the Military never is convinced that the Shan would not opt for a total independence that would break up the union.

When the issue of non-secession was discussed and the Shan rejected the inclusion of the clause in the Union (Pyidaungsu) Accord during the second 21CPC, the SNLD made it clear that it is for the solution of a voluntary participation of the union, as agreed in Panglong Agreement of 1947 and nothing has changed.

On the government non-secession demand the SNLD made a press conference on June 1, 2017, at its headquarter, where Party spokesman Sai Nyunt Lwin said: "We never demand secession from the union. We are already there to cooperate," adding, "this is to clearly dispel accusation and rumors that we are not demanding secession."

All this come about as SNLD rejected the non-secession clause demanded by the government to be included in the Union Accord.

Sai Nyunt Lwin made his point by arguing that no such words that could hold back participation of the EAOs that are still negotiating and about to negotiate be used during this period, as this would discourage them from joining the peace conference.

"If we want to secede from the union, we only need to do one thing. We would disregard the treaty (Panglong Agreement) signed in 1947. Until we haven't done that, it is going to be normal as it used to be," he stressed as a matter of fact.

Now the Military would need to show that it also meant business by halting the ongoing offensives in Kachin and Shan States, while making assurance that it is really for the genuine federal union by withdrawing its commitment to protect the military-drafted constitution, which is neither democratic nor federal in any sense of the words.

In sum, it is the turn of the Military to agree and support the State-level Shan National Dialogue and not disrupting it, if it is really following the NCA guidelines. This would be the start in dismantling distrust from the point of the Shan organizations. After this all the other measures to build trust on the ground by halting offensives and cooperation in peace talks for the all agreeable political system could be worked out.


Thus, until the distrust elimination measures are first taken by the Military, there is no hope for trust-building to take place, as the saying "you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs"  hasn't been there for nothing.  

Did Aung San Lead at Panglong - or Follow?

Posted: 23 Jul 2017 08:34 PM PDT

LONDON -Visitors to Yangon, Myanmar will quickly find that one name carries more weight than any other: Aung San. Cutting west to east across the city is Aung San Road. Downtown, there's Aung San Market, a sprawling space with merchants hawking everything from fresh vegetables to jade trinkets. If you want to top your day off with a Myanmar National League soccer game, try Aung San Stadium.



Major General Aung San is revered by Myanmar's Bamar majority as the Bamar nationalist leader who guided the country from British colony to independent state after World War II. Some of that sentiment, like the affection Americans have for John F. Kennedy or the veneration that Israelis share for Yitzhak Rabin, are rooted in a life cut tragically short by an assassin's bullet. In fact, it was 70 years ago this week, as Aung San presided over a meeting of his Executive Council, that an armed gang led by a rival politician stormed into the building and killed Aung San, a bodyguard, and six government ministers.

The anniversary, which Myanmar commemorates as Martyrs' Day, signifies a dream deferred. If only Aung San had survived, many believe, the promise of a strong, unified nation would have been achieved, with lasting peace between the ethnic Bamar majority and the roughly 135 ethnic minorities that have been part of this land for more than a millennia - instead of the near-perpetual war that many of them have fought against the state since 1947. It's a story that suits the Bamar majority, but one many ethnic minorities - the very groups necessary to make Myanmar a truly unified nation - vigorously contest.

At the heart of this legend is Aung San's role in a 1947 conference between the Bamar majority and ethnic minorities, known as the Panglong Conference, which produced a blueprint for a unified Burma. Until three months ago, I had no reason to doubt Aung San's leadership role in Panglong. Now I'm not so sure. As Aung San's daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, leads Myanmar today, reportedly pursuing a new "21st Century Panglong, getting this history right is the key to understanding what's really at stake in Myanmar - and how to move forward.

For the Bamar, Aung San has long represented the highest aspirations of nationhood. And because the Bamar have dominated the state and represented the country to the world, it is their identity and their historical narratives that color Western understanding.

As I've written before, the present conflict goes back to 1886, and - like many modern conflicts rooted in decisions made during this period - starts with the British.  When Britain conquered the Burmese monarchy, British leaders feared empowering the majority of the population that were ethnic Bamar, choosing instead to put ethnic minorities in important colonial positions. During World War II, ethnic minorities fought with Britain while Aung San led the Bamar who sided with Japan, switching sides aft the last minute when the allied victory seemed assured. As I described in a column last April:

[F]or their loyalty, the hill tribes expected British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to make them independent territories. But when Clement Attlee and the Labor Party won the 1945 British general election instead, Attlee not only turned his back on ethnic minorities, but invited the leading Burmese general to meet with him in London - where he offered to give Burma, led by Burmans [the Bamar ethnic group], complete independence. That general's name was Aung San.

In the Bamar version of the story, upon returning home, Aung San wisely and benevolently recognized the interests of the ethnic minorities, leading him to convene the February 1947 Panglong Conference with Shan, Karen, Chin, Kachin, and Karenni ethnic minority leaders. There, he negotiated an agreement that would lead to the creation of the Union of Burma, which the ethnic groups could opt out of after 10 years if they felt mistreated. This paved the way for the creation of a true nation, but Aung San's untimely assassination as he prepared to take over from the British voided the promise of Panglong and led to the conflict with ethnic minorities that bedevils the country today.

It's a story line that I and many others have taken on faith and supported for many years. As I wrote in April:

Aung San brought several of the hill tribes together in the Shan town of Panglong in February, 1947, where he negotiated a power-sharing agreement. But it was not meant to be: Aung San was assassinated, derailing Panglong and leading most of the hill tribes to declare war against the Burman majority.

After that column ran, I received an email from my friend Harn Yawnghwe, the respected son of the revered Sao Shwe Thaik, the long-time Shan leader and first president of the Union of Burma, who ruled from 1948 through 1952. His short note startled me. "Aung San did not bring the hill tribes together at Panglong in 1947," he wrote. "After World War II, ethnic leaders were restive. They knew the British might abandon them, especially after the July 1945 elections. It was my father who organized an ethnic leaders conference in Panglong in February 1947 to see if they could work together to preserve their status."

In 1947, Attlee called Aung San to London for talks on the future of Burma - without inviting any of the ethnic minorities.  According to Harn Yawnghwe, his father, leading the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples, cabled Attlee in London to make clear that Aung San did not represent the minorities. His intervention led to the inclusion of an article in the January 27, 1947 agreement between Aung San and Attlee, stating the objective "to achieve the early unification of the Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma with the free consent of the inhabitants of those areas." In other words, as Harn Yawnghwe's note to me made clear, Aung San had nothing to do with organizing the Panglong Conference - instead, he was forced to rush to the ethnic leaders' conference already occurring at Panglong to fulfill his vision for independence.

If true - and I have little reason to believe Yawnghwe isn't being truthful - it's the equivalent of learning that John F. Kennedy wasn't primarily responsible for saving the crew of PT-109 after it was sunk by a Japanese destroyer in 1943, as legend goes, but instead played a supporting role.

Why does this matter? One, because it dramatically changes our understanding of Aung San and his legacy. Two, because it shows how the lessons today's peacemakers have learned from Panglong may not be the right ones.

Two months ago, Aung San's daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, convened the second round of her "21st Century Panglong" peace talks with ethnic groups. Thus far, like Suu Kyi's leadership, the conference has seen more pomp than purpose. "It was organized as if the leaders of the groups were treated like lower segments," one attendee from a non-governmental organization told me, "and the NLD [Suu Kyi's party] and others got the red carpet while the ethnic groups didn't even know where they should sit."

Perhaps the real lesson of the 1947 Panglong Conference is this: make yourself heard or you'll be left out of the equation. Only when the ethnic groups made it clear to Attlee that Aung San didn't represent them did the U.K. change course, forcing Aung San to the negotiating table. Maybe it's time for the ethnic leaders of today to send a similar message to the United States and others: Aung San Suu Kyi does not represent us. And maybe it's time the United States insist more forcefully that Suu Kyi - and Myanmar's true source of power, the military - heed the interests of minority groups. Foreign investment from the United States and other Western powers matters to a military deeply entrenched in Myanmar's economy; that gives us leverage. Our investment and aid should come with conditions.

In Myanmar's Mon State, across the Thanlwin River, a steel bridge connects Mon State with Belugyun Island. In April, thousands of local people came out in protest. Why? Myanmar's Lower House had approved legislation from Suu Kyi's party naming the bridge after Aung San. "The protesters said they wanted their ethnic Mon culture and heritage to be respected in the naming of the bridge," one article explained, "and they meant no disrespect to General Aung San."

Today, as the Bamar celebrate the legacy and achievements of their fallen hero, it's worth remembering that there are many hundreds of other values, stories, and interests in this ancient land. Whether Myanmar can ever become a unified nation - and I'm not optimistic - will depend on whether the ethnic minorities have the same rights as the Bamar.

Only then will Myanmar build not just stadiums, markets, and roads in memory of a distant past, but real bridges to the future, ones that everyone is allowed to cross - as equal citizens.

Stanley A. Weiss, a global mining executive and founder of Washington-based Business Executives for National Security. His memoir, "Being Dead is Bad for Business," is available  online and a collection of his selected writings, titled "Where Have You Gone, Harry Truman?" will be published by Disruption Books on July 31.

By Stanley A. Weiss
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