Tuesday, June 6, 2017

The Irrawaddy Magazine

The Irrawaddy Magazine


Journalists Launch Campaign, Call for Termination of Article 66(d)

Posted: 06 Jun 2017 07:06 AM PDT

RANGOON – More than 100 journalists in Rangoon demanded on Tuesday that the government withdraw lawsuits filed against reporters under the country's controversial Article 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law.

The media representatives gathered at the Orchid Hotel in light of the recent arrest of The Voice Daily's chief editor, U Kyaw Min Swe, and columnist Ko Kyaw Zwa Naing. The two are charged with defamation, as is outlined in Article 66(d), after the military complained of an article in the publication that satirized the country's armed struggle and peace process.

Ko Tha Lun Zaung Htet, from the Democratic Voice of Burma, organized the conference and temporarily formed the Committee for the Protection of Journalists (Myanmar), which has 21 members from various news outlets.

On Tuesday afternoon, the committee released a statement with three points: firstly, to terminate statutes like 66(d) which threaten freedom of the press, to drop the lawsuits under this law which are being conducted by the Burma Army and other authorities, and to collaborate with civil society organizations to ensure that these demands are met.

According to committee members, journalists will begin a white armband campaign entitled "Freedom of Press" on June 8, the day of the upcoming court hearing in Bahan Township for The Voice Daily's detained staff.

The journalists will march from The Voice's office to the Bahan courthouse on that day and wear the armbands, but the committee stated that it would avoid any conduct that could be construed by authorities as a demonstration, for which permission must be obtained beforehand.

Ko Tha Lun Zaung Htet said, "Our movement is not a protest. We will just go to encourage [U Kyaw Min Swe and Ko Kyaw Zwa Naing]."

According to the Research Team on the Telecommunications Law, led by activist Maung Saung Kha—a poet who was himself sentenced and jailed in 2016 under Article 66(d)—seven cases were filed under the law during former President Thein Sein's administration, which created the statute. However, charges have been filed in 68 cases during the first year of the National League for Democracy's (NLD) government. Among those accused, around a dozen have been journalists.

Rangoon Chief Minister U Phyo Min Thein, the Burma Army, and even some NLD lawmakers have used Article 66(d) to initiate lawsuits. Several journalists have criticized the NLD-dominated Parliament for not yet moving to amend or repeal the law.

Myanmar Journalist Network's General Secretary U Zayar Hlaing urged the government to urgently amend the law, citing a muzzling of the freedom of expression of the public, as well as the media industry.

"Detaining people before conviction by a judge is really inappropriate. I would like to say that this law should be immediately amended," he said.

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Finance Minister Predicts ‘Take Off’ for Burma Economy 

Posted: 06 Jun 2017 05:23 AM PDT

NAYPYIDAW — The finance minister attempted to reassure investors that Burma's economy is on a promising trajectory at a trade conference on Tuesday, despite business owners' concerns that the economy has become tepid.

Minister for Planning and Finance U Kyaw Win told the first Myanmar Investment Forum in Naypyidaw that the government would improve its management of economic growth to counter high inflation, a poor trade deficit and higher inflation inherited from the previous administration.

"We see that last year the country's economy was like a plane moving on the runaway," he said. "Now this year, we will defy gravity with jet power, meaning this is the year economic development will take off."

However, not all of the 500 or so investors and businesspeople at the forum were convinced of the government's economic strategy. U Thein Tun, chairman of the Tun Foundation Bank, told The Irrawaddy he was unsatisfied with the country's recent economic growth and thought its policies were too broad.

"If the government has drawn, for instance, a five-year master plan for economic development, it should also ensure a yearly operation plan and measure its plan with a key performance indicator—this is essential," he said. "It needs to instill confidence in the investors who are worried about coming here."

The National League for Democracy (NLD) government published its 12-point economic policy last August, placing national reconciliation at the forefront of its approach toward the economy.

Last October it released a more detailed plan to expedite growth, including a promised clampdown on corruption and the promotion of investment in agriculture, small and medium sized enterprises, banking, health care and infrastructure projects.

"We have been relying on our natural resources sector to find earnings," said U Kyaw Kyaw Win, chairman of both Sinma Furnishing Co., Ltd and the ASEAN Furniture Industries Council. "So there are many problems to solve when changing the system and developing the manufacturing sector."

He said local manufacturers have faced many hurdles in trying to attract investors, such as a lack of infrastructure and an unfair tax system.

Khin Maung Aye, chairman of the Myanmar Investors Development Association, and CB Bank, hoped for "concrete discussions" at the forum, which runs from June 6-7.

He emphasized the importance of the private sector to the conference and added that Burma was ready to welcome investors.

The World Bank expected economic growth in Burma to decrease from 7.3 percent in 2015-2016 to 6.5 percent in 2016-2017 and projected medium-term growth to average at 7.1 percent per year.

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Burma Will Join Asean Forest Cooperation Organization

Posted: 06 Jun 2017 04:57 AM PDT

The Union Parliament on Tuesday approved the signing of the regional agreement for the establishment of the Asean Forest Cooperation Organization (AFoCO), after President U Htin Kyaw put forward the proposal.

Burma's Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation presented the proposal to Parliament last month.

The organization was proposed by Korea in 2009 and an agreement for its establishment was signed in 2012 at the 14th Asean-Republic of Korea Summit. Establishment of AFoCO was adopted in Sept. 2015.

Prior to that, South Korea had been providing technical support for forestry management, restoration and rehabilitation to Asean countries, including Burma, from 2009-11.

U Ohn Win, the minister of natural resources and environmental conservation, shared his gratitude to parliamentarians on Tuesday for their support. He reassured them that joining the regional organization would promote Burma's forestry sector, watershed preservation and ecotourism.

"Greater benefits will be yielded from the collaboration," minister U Ohn Win said, not only in international relations, but also in the sharing of technology and experience.

The AFoCO aims to improve sustainable forest management, preserve biodiversity, reduce climate change effects, prevent desertification, and promote research and exchange programs, explained U Hlaing Min Maung, from the office of the ministry.

The AFoCO is based in Korea. Bhutan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Timor-Leste and seven Asean countries have signed the pact to date.

"Although [Burma] is not yet directly facing desertification, this is long-term preparation as a preventative measure," U Hlaing Min Maung said, discussing the future possibility of unfertile land due to mismanagement.

Burma was approximately 60 percent forest area in 1990. That number was down 26 percent in 2015 due to deforestation, mainly from illegal timber logging, according to a UNODC report.

Burma will also benefit from the Regional Educational Training Center, which will promote capacity building and skill sharing after construction is completed on the building in Rangoon later this year.

"It will also help boost the country's image," minister U Ohn Win said, referring to a time when Burma was a destination for forestry scholars in the mid-1900s.

Nineteen lawmakers discussed the proposal favorably in Parliament on May 23.

Lawmakers supported the proposal, highlighting Burma's need to sign the agreement for the sake of forest sustainability. Lawmakers also discussed the pragmatic implementation of the proposal and the need for collaboration from civil society groups.

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KIA’s Lamai Gum Ja: Kachin IDPs Live With Fear

Posted: 06 Jun 2017 04:04 AM PDT

Tuesday marks six years since a 1994 bilateral ceasefire broke down and fighting renewed between the Burma Army and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Thousands of ethnic Kachin remain displaced, living in poor conditions in camps with no idea when they will be able to return home. Burma's peace process may be ongoing, but fighting has persisted in Kachin State where Burma Army soldiers have been accused of human rights abuses.

The KIA recently joined armed groups in Northern Burma—the United Wa State Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, the Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army, the National Democratic Alliance Army, the Arakan Army, and the Shan State Army-North—in denouncing the government's nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA).

To mark the anniversary of renewed hostilities, The Irrawaddy spoke to Lamai Gum Ja, a representative of the KIA's political wing, the Kachin Independence Organization, which has been advising on negotiating peace between the armed group and the Tatmadaw.

What is your opinion on the current peace process? Is peace getting closer or further away?

It is very difficult for us to predict—this is our situation. The United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) is negotiating for groups to sign the NCA. This is one way [to approach the peace process].

There has been a lot of fighting on the ground, and we and other ethnic armed groups saw that the Burma Army launched military offensives to put political pressure on groups to sign the NCA. Because of this, the Northern Alliance seeks another way to stop offensives from the Burma Army. This is my point of view.

All our ethnic armed groups seek peace, and do not want to use fighting to solve political conflict. It is hard to predict how the government will react to this new alliance of northern ethnic armed groups.

Conflict between the Burma Army and the KIA renewed in 2011, what were your thoughts when the ceasefire first broke down?

To begin with, we believed that we could solve this conflict through negotiations. But, the situation got worse year by year. So, we began along the NCA path, which we believed could let us negotiate for peace. But, our belief was not realized as fighting broke out again in KIA areas.

The KIA and the Northern Alliance seek a new way to make peace negotiations. We will try to negotiate to solve the conflict peacefully. We do not use fighting to solve the conflict. But, the Burma Army only accepts the NCA, and it seems to me that they do not accept the Northern Alliance's new way of approaching peace.

If we look at the current conditions, it seems to me we could have high tension again, especially as both the government and the Tatmadaw are important entities in the peace process…it depends on how they will accept the Northern Alliance's new approach. They are the 'parents' of the country—they should have an open mind in order to find the best way to peace.

What is your message to internally displaced civilians who are exhausted from living in camps for such a long time?

Both the government and the ethnic armed groups should take pity on civilians and negotiate the best they can for them. Without negotiations, our civilians have no guaranteed safety in their work or daily life: they will live with fear and eat with fear. So, the best thing is for both sides is to find a solution that truly benefits civilians.

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Karen Refugees in Canada Raise Concerns Over State Counselor’s Visit 

Posted: 06 Jun 2017 02:03 AM PDT

Ethnic Karen refugees in Canada released an open letter on the arrival of Burma's State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, raising concerns over the militarization in Karen State while the Union government pushes ahead with the peace process.

The Karen Community of Canada (KCC), an organization representing ethnic Karen refugees from Burma, said in the statement on Monday that it was concerned that this visit would be a "feel-good celebration," ignoring ongoing militarization and human rights abuses in ethnic areas, which Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s government has done "virtually nothing to alleviate."

The Karen community organization also urged Canadian government officials to pay attention to the suffering of ethnic minorities under Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's government.

"We urge you, as our elected representatives in Canada, to heed the cries of Karen and other ethnic people in Burma, who continue to suffer under military occupation," read the statement.

The Karen refugee community also urged Canadian government officials to ask Daw Aung San Suu Kyi some tough questions including how her government plans to ensure a safe return for Burmese refugees in Thailand and how her government will respond to refugees' calls for the withdrawal of Burma Army troops in Karen State.

Last month, internally displaced people in Karen State held a protest calling for the withdrawal of Burma Army units near their villages so that they could return home safely.

Although the Karen armed group the Karen National Union (KNU) signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement with the previous government in 2012, the Burma Army has reinforced its bases and built additional ones in the region, according to the statement.

The Karen community in Canada is also upset with KNU vice chairman Padoh Kwe Htoo Win who is visiting Canada on a federalism study tour but is not meeting with Karen refugee communities due to a "tight schedule."

Slone Phan, chairman of the KCC in Canada, asserted the group's disappointment with the KNU vice chairman for failing to visit the community.

Although the vice chairman did not meet the Karen community, he and other ethnic leaders did visit Niagara Falls.

The KCC also said they were concerned over a meeting between Burma Army chief Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing and Canadian Ambassador Karen MacArthur last January, where they discussed potential Canadian investment in hydropower projects that fuel ongoing war, displacement, and human rights abuses in Burma.

"This general [Min Aung Hlaing] and his army are responsible for obstructing peace and conducting campaigns of terror against Karen and other ethnic communities, so we are dismayed that Ambassador MacArthur would discuss cooperating with him," read the statement.

The Karen Community of Canada (KCC) is an umbrella organization that represents Karen people across Canada, promoting Karen culture, human rights and democracy.

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Top US Diplomat in China Quits Over Trump Climate Policy

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 10:45 PM PDT

WASHINGTON, USA — David Rank, the chargĂ© d'affaires of the US Embassy in Beijing, has left the State Department over the Trump administration's decision to quit the 2015 Paris agreement to fight climate change, a senior US official said on Monday.

A State Department spokeswoman confirmed Rank's departure, but said she was unable to verify Twitter posts that said he resigned as he felt unable to deliver a formal notification to China of the US decision last week to quit the agreement.

"He has retired from the foreign service," said Anna Richey-Allen, a spokeswoman for the department's East Asia Bureau. "Mr Rank has made a personal decision. We appreciate his years of dedicated service to the State Department."

Iowa Governor Terry Branstad, President Donald Trump's pick as the next US ambassador to Beijing, is expected to take up the post later this month.

A tweet from China expert John Pomfret quoted unnamed sources as saying that Rank had resigned as he could not support Trump's decision last week to withdraw from the Paris agreement.

Another tweet from Pomfret said Rank called a town hall meeting to announce his decision to embassy staff and explained that he could not deliver a diplomatic note informing the Chinese government of the US decision.

A senior US official confirmed the account given in the tweets but added that after Rank announced his intention to retire on Monday in Beijing, he was told by the State Department to leave his post immediately. The official spoke on condition of anonymity.

On June 1, the US State Department accepted the resignation of its top personnel officer, who had been among its few remaining senior Obama administration political appointees, another US official said.

Arnold Chacon had served as the director general of the foreign service and director of human resources.

The official said Chacon had tendered his resignation when Trump was inaugurated on Jan. 20, along with all presidential appointees, who serve at the pleasure of the president and secretary of state.

The acceptance of Chacon's resignation was first reported by the DiploPundit website.

It was not immediately clear whether he would be offered another post at the department.

Other than Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, his deputy John Sullivan and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Tom Shannon, the third-ranking US diplomat, most of the State Department's senior posts are currently vacant or filled by acting officials.

Chacon and Rank, a career foreign service officer who took over the post of deputy chief of mission in Beijing in January 2016, could not immediately be reached for comment.

Jonathan Fritz, the embassy's economics councilor, would serve as chargé in his place, Richey-Allen said.

Rank had been with the department for 27 years and served as the political councilor at the US Embassy in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2012.

 

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‘Himalayan Viagra’ is Threatened by Fervent Chinese Demand and Climate Change

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 09:46 PM PDT

At the beginning of the Himalayan summer, when the snows start to melt, all the schools close for the season and Nepali parents and children move to the grasslands with enough food for a month-long journey on a quest for a herb more valuable than gold.

To find yarsagumba, families crawl through muddy fields hoping to spot a yellowish-green mummified caterpillar that resembles a disproportionate unicorn, with a dark-colored elongated fungus growing out of a larva's head.

In Chinese, the two-faced creature is called dong chong xia cao, which translates as "winter worm, summer grass." During the winter, yarsagumba is worm-like, but by the summer, invaded by fungus, it looks more like a plant.

Mature yarsagumba resembles nothing so much as a matchstick, thin and slender, projecting two to three centimeters above the ground across the alpine meadows of the Himalayas.

(A) The stroma and sclerotium sections; (B, C) The complex of mycelial cortices and attached soil particles outside the sclerotium as indicated by arrows. (Photo: Zhang et al, 2010 / Author provided)

Himalayan Viagra

To locals, the hunt is well worth it. Just one kilogram of yarsagumba can fetch up to US$100,000. In rural Nepal, where jobs are limited, the majority of families living at high altitudes, as well as those in neighboring regions, earn their living by collecting this herb, making it by far the most valuable commodity around.

Bu why is it so lucrative? The name is a hint: yarsagumba is also known as "Himalayan Viagra" due to the aphrodisiac medley of caterpillar and fungus.

It is believed that cattlemen first discovered the pharmacological benefits of the caterpillar-fungus more than a thousand years ago after noticing their yaks becoming energized from feeding on the herb.

Starting in the 1960s, people began making tea and soups out of this mythological little plant-animal, and stuffing the belly of a duck with yarsagumba herbs before roasting.

This magic fungus was widely popularized in the 1990s, when a Chinese runner who ate it broke two world records. Since then, research on the caterpillar-fungus has intensified.

A market selling 'Himalayan Viagra' in Bhutan, and a close up of this complex chimera. (Photo: The Conversation)

The main chemical constituents of natural Cordyceps's 28 saturated and unsaturated fatty acids are palmitic acid, linoleic acid, oleic acid, stearic acid, and ergo sterol. It also includes vitamins and inorganic elements.

Chinese medicine now asserts that that yarsagumba can cure impotence, increase libido, and resolve joint pains, as well as treat cancer and obesity.

Some of these claims have been substantiated. According to a 2016 paper in the journal Pharmacognosy Review, the authors found evidence "illustrating that O. sinensis can enhance libido and sexual performance, and can restore impaired reproductive functions, such as impotency or infertility, in both sexes."

Fungus Through the Looking Glass

As Lewis Carroll writes in his book Through the Looking Glass, "It takes all the running you can do, to stay in the same place." That seems the perfect metaphor for the yarsagumba, a living relationship in which a host and a parasite are involved in a continuous arms race.

Biologically speaking, this complex chimera consists of ghost moth larvae (the Thitarodes species in caterpillar stage) infected by the parasitic entomogenous ascomycete, Ophiocordyceps sinensis.

Ghost moths are relatively large moths known for their reduced adult mouth parts and distinctive subterranean larvae, which are root-feeders of grassland soil, meaning they can feed on any parts of a plant.

The caterpillars spend several years of their lives remaining dormant in winter, and emerge as adults after pupating in early summer. Then, alas, they die; the average adult lifespan of Thitarodes is two to five days.

Thitarodes are the only hosts to the O. sinensis parasite, and young caterpillars infected by the fungal spores perish before pupation, a wildly growing mycelium having consumed the body of the larva.

After two to four weeks, a slender, sprouting body emerges from behind the head of the larva. It is an eerie death, to be sure.

Scientists do not entirely understand this spectacular co-evolutionary process. Because the fungus is highly host-specific and it is very difficult to rear moths in laboratories, its infection pathway is still under investigation.

(A) Male adult moth; (B) Female adult moth; (C) Late-instar larva; (D) Pupa. (Photo: Cannon et al, 2009)

Humans: The Final Threat

In this biotrophic system in which the parasite must kill its host to survive, humans may be considered a third trophic level: we parasitize this parasitic complex.

As the medicinal value of yarsagumba is increasingly hyped, China's massive consumer market is clamoring for the product, causing its price to rise and spurring a veritable gold rush to Nepal's Himalayan belt.

But collecting these fungi before they mature prevents dispersal of their spores, and the availability of yarsagumba is declining yearly. From a 2009 peak to 2011, the trade fell by half per annum. Due to a lack of proper regulation, over-harvesting is increasingly common.

The fungi are also vulnerable to climate change. As global temperatures rise and snowfall in the Himalayas decreases, their natural habitat suffers, limiting the breeding period.

There is a darker side to the fungus fad, too. Every year, as families race to the hills for their annual yarsagumba quest, some fungus hunters—both adults and school children—lose their lives to turf wars and the precipitous, unforgiving mountains.

In June 2009, seven Nepalese men who had climbed up the mountains to pick yarsagumba were attacked with sticks and knives, and their bodies thrown into the deep ravines.

Local Buddhists, especially those of the older generation, believe that to pick yarsagumba is a sin, in keeping with the Buddha's teaching that this seemingly natural treasure is actually a curse. China's consumers don't seem to mind.

Prayan Pokharel is a doctoral student at the Institute for Insect Biotechnology, University of Giessen. This article was originally published in The Conversation and is republished by kind agreement.

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Myanmar Deserves More Than a Miserable Media Environment

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 09:21 PM PDT

According to the recently-released 2017 World Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Myanmar moved up 12 places in the rankings since last year and stands at 131 among 180 countries. In making its assessment, RSF acknowledged that the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government amnestied journalists imprisoned under Thein Sein's government and repealed the state of emergency law. But it also pointed out, correctly, that "… self-censorship continues in connection to government officials and military officers. The authorities continue to exert pressure on the media and even intervene directly to get editorial policies changed."

RSF is right in saying that self-censorship still prevails, especially when it comes to government officials and military officers as there continued to be troubling media cases during the past year, such as "watch-gate." This was an ugly fight between Yangon Division Chief Minister U Phyo Min Thein and Eleven Media Group, where the latter essentially accused the former of corruption. This eventually led to the detention of its CEO and Editor-in-Chief for some time. While they were both released on bail, they are still facing trial. Since then, it has been rare to see anyone critically write or talk about this case and even Eleven Media itself has been silent about it.

Is Myanmar's media landscape better off now than two years ago? The answer will surely be controversial. If you are a government official or a pro-government person, you will definitely say "yes." If you are media personnel such as a reporter, producer, editor, or someone who is running a media organization, you will no doubt answer that question with reservations.

Does Myanmar's media not have freedom of speech now? The answer is yes and no. Is there any repression of the media now? The answer to this is also yes and no. In fact, Myanmar's media is enjoying a certain level of freedom and is much better off than neighbors like China and Thailand, and even better than regional neighbors such as the richest and most developed country in the region, Singapore, or the rising star, Vietnam. According to RSF's ranking, Myanmar now ranks third in press freedom among ASEAN countries after Indonesia (124) and the Philippines (127).

Since the NLD-led government took power, there has been no obvious repression of the media, as there was in the past. Myanmar has moved up from being labelled one of the worst violators of freedom of the press to one of 20 countries where a "difficult situation" still exists. That category includes all of Myanmar's neighbor countries, except China and Laos, which are labelled under "very serious situation" according to RSF.

But, is this incremental improvement good enough? Does Myanmar's media deserve only that? Does the country deserve only that? In the point of view of this author, the answer is much more than "no." Myanmar's media deserves much more than that and the country and the people also deserve more.

Myanmar people have been fighting for freedom from all kinds of fears, and for human dignity and human rights. But for a long time, we have had no idea of what freedom, human dignity or human rights would look like, let alone what media freedom or freedom of the press would entail. Many generations of Myanmar people have lived under oppressive regimes in one form or another. Throughout their entire lives, they have been familiar with government-controlled media, with little or no access to other sources of information.

The worst thing is that for generations the authorities have taken the position of assuming themselves to be superhuman. For example, during the one-party rule of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), led by the late dictator Gen Ne Win, people were not allowed to participate freely in political, social, or economic matters in the country. He controlled practically every aspect of people's daily lives. Through this era and later military governments, the authorities set the rules, made decisions for others as to what was good and bad, and created and practiced whatever policies they liked.  The reason they gave was the interest of the country and the people, and there was no space for the public to question these claims or file complaints.

There are many examples to prove this point, but one recent one stands out in particular. In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar hard. In the hours and days after, thousands of people were presumed dead and hundreds of thousands or more lost their livelihoods. The international community offered assistance right away. But, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), led by former Sen-Gen Than Shwe, denied their offers in the early stages of the aftermath, when people were in urgent need of help. Even worse, the SPDC forcibly conducted a referendum on the 2008 Constitution just after Nargis, when people were still in dire need. This showed yet again how those in power controlled people's lives.

That "black-out period" (in terms of media and information access, but also in terms of people's ability to live meaningful lives more generally) spanned more than a generation. During this time, people had to live under the supervision of those who had appointed themselves as "guardians of the public."

It is an undeniable fact that the situation is much better now than in those days. But, can we say there are not people today who act superhuman and set the rules for others, make decisions for others regarding what is good and bad and create and practice policies they choose, stating that it is for the benefit of the people? These people still exist, though not as many and not in such distinguished ways as before.

The question, then, to those government officials and pro-government people who defend the government's action or inaction, especially on press freedom, is whether this government is doing enough to guarantee press freedom and to nurture independent media so the public can be free from the hands of those superhuman beings? The answer apparently is "no" and it is a sad story.

As everyone knows, the military in Myanmar controls 25 percent of the seats at all levels of Parliament and three major ministries (Defense, Border Affairs and Home Affairs), which hold guns. This means that Myanmar's democratization work (including press freedom) can only progress 75 percent. Even in that 75 percent, progress is limited because the bureaucracy inherited from previous regimes is gigantic and still well-protected. After subtracting an additional percentage because of that gigantic bureaucracy, is the rest of the government committed to making progress on press freedom? The answer again is "no" and it is an even more sad story.

There were reports that NLD lawmakers were asked by the party hierarchy not to talk to the media on certain issues and not to appear on particular discussion programs. The right to information has still not improved, even though the NLD-led government has appointed most of the ministers. The government-owned media is still running full throttle and is even extending its reach. On the other hand, the independent media is struggling to compete with government media, especially on the revenue front.

Why is it that the so-called "people's party," the NLD, which used to be at the forefront of fighting against those "superhuman beings," has not done more for freedom of the press? What are they afraid of? Why can't they let independent media fully blossom and play its crucial role in providing information for the public to be free from fear, to fully enjoy human dignity and human rights? What are they concerned about?

As long as those questions are not answered fully and comprehensively, Myanmar's media will remain in a miserable state.

Kyaw Kyaw Thein is a broadcast journalist with more than 11 years of experience in the field. The views expressed here are solely his own and do not reflect the views and policies of the media organization for which he is currently working.

This article originally appeared in Tea Circle, a forum hosted at Oxford University for emerging research and perspectives on Burma/Myanmar.

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China and Burma: Not Only Pauk-Phaw

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 07:30 PM PDT

Part 2 of a 5-part series.

1962 to 1978: Brothers No More

It is generally assumed that Sino-Burmese relations took a turn for the worse in 1967, when anti-Chinese riots broke out in Rangoon. The fervor of the Cultural Revolution influenced the Chinese community in the Burmese capital and many young Sino-Burmese began wearing red Mao badges.

This violated an official Burmese regulation banning the display of such political symbols in public, and the young "Red Guards" were ordered to take off their badges. When some of them resisted, anti-Chinese riots broke out in June and July that year.

Chinese shops and homes were ransacked and looted, and many Sino-Burmese were killed. A mob even attacked the Chinese embassy in Rangoon before the situation was brought under control. However, the role of the authorities in this affair was a matter of dispute: the Chinatown riots in Rangoon came at a time when there were acute shortages of rice and basic food supplies in Rangoon. According to eyewitnesses, the police did not interfere with the killings and the looting until the Chinese embassy was attacked. It is widely believed that Burma's military government encouraged the riots in order to deflect attention from the country's internal problems at that time.

The incident was followed by the withdrawal of ambassadors from both capitals and the expulsion of the "Xinhua" (New China News Agency) correspondent in Rangoon. Beijing also suspended its aid program to Burma, granted under the 1960 friendship treaty. Radio Beijing began broadcasting fierce attacks on the Ne Win government branding it "fascist." On January 1968, heavily armed CPB units crossed from China into northeast Burma. The Chinese Communist Party decided to lend all-out support to its fellow communist Burmese-sister party.

However, more thorough research into Sino-Burmese relations indicates that the 1967 incident was little more than a convenient excuse for the Chinese to intervene directly in Burma's internal affairs. In reality, the new era in Sino-Burmese relations began in 1962 when General Ne Win seized power. The military takeover had upset the regional stability that existed by virtue of Burma's weak but neutral democratic government.

Furthermore, China had long been wary of the ambitious and unpredictable general in Rangoon. Six important events took place immediately after the coup in Rangoon: 1.) In the early fifties, several groups of CPB cadres had trekked to China to request assistance for their armed insurrection in Burma. However, as long as U Nu was in power, these Burmese communists—in all 143 people—were housed in Sichuan Province. There they attended communist party schools, but received no other support, and certainly not arms and military training. The leader of these CPB exiles in China was Thakin Ba Thein Tin, who later became the chairman of the CPB. He resided mostly in Beijing where he became close to Mao Zedong, and the two developed a long-lasting, personal relationship. Following Ne Win's takeover in Rangoon, the CPB was for the first time allowed to print propaganda leaflets and other material in Beijing. On August 1, 1962, Beijing-and Sichuan-based exiles published a document titled "Some Facts about Ne Win's Military Government," denouncing the new regime.

Former Communist Party of Burma Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin. (Photo: Hseng Noung Lintner)

2.) The most urgent task for the CPB exiles in Beijing was to find a way to contact the CPB units in the old base area located in the Pegu Yoma mountains of central Burma, north of Rangoon, where the once strong communist army was crumbling. There had been no links between the CPB units in Burma and the CPB exiles in China since the latter had trekked to Yunnan in the early fifties.

By a strange twist of historical events, it was the new military regime in Rangoon that unwittingly provided an opportunity for the CPB exiles in China to re-establish these links. Probably hoping that the insurgents would give up when faced with the massive force of the military government, the Ne Win regime called for peace talks after about a year in power. On July 14, 1963, the CPB, Thakin Soe's much smaller "Red Flag" communist party, the Karen, Mon, Shan, Kachin ethnic rebel armies, and some smaller groups attended the negotiations in Rangoon with guarantees of free and safe passage to and from the peace parley, regardless of the outcome.

The colorful Thakin Soe probably attracted the most attention when he arrived accompanied by a team of attractive young girls in khaki uniforms. He placed a portrait of Stalin in front of him on the negotiating table and then began attacking the "revisionism" of Soviet leader Khrushchev and the "opportunism" of Mao Zedong's China (Thakin Soe was soon excluded from the talks). However, 29 veterans from the main CPB exiles in China also arrived in Rangoon, purportedly to participate in the peace talks. Among the "Beijing Returnees," as they came to be known, were "yebaw" (comrade) Aung Gyi, Thakin Bo, Bo Zeya­—and Thakin Ba Thein Tin who did not actually participate in the talks but seized the opportunity to visit the CPB's headquarters in the Pegu Yoma, bringing with him radio transmitters and other aid from China.

According to CPB documents, the Burmese government demanded that the communists should concentrate all their troops and party members inside an area stipulated by the authorities, inform the government if there were any remaining guerrillas or cadres elsewhere, stop all organizational activities of the party and cease fund-raising. The intransigence of the military regime was a blessing in disguise for the CPB. The talks broke down in November and the various insurgents returned to their respective jungle camps. Thakin Ba Thein Tin and another CPB cadre returned to Beijing, while the other 27 returnees stayed in the Pegu Yoma where they assumed de facto leadership of the party at home.

3.) In November 1963, shortly after the Sino-Soviet split in the international communist movement, some CPB cadres who had been studying in the Soviet Union—Khin Maung Gyi, San Thu and Thein Aung—returned to Beijing. To direct the work in China, a leading group of five was set up in Beijing shortly after Thakin Ba Thein Tin's return from the peace talks in Rangoon. This group, which became the nucleus of the new leadership of the CPB that emerged during the sixties, consisted of Thakin Ba Thein Tin as leader, with Khin Maung Gyi as his personal secretary and Khin Maung Gyi as the CPB's main theoretician.

4.) In late 1963, San Thu, one of the Moscow returnees, was put in charge of a team that began surveying possible infiltration routes from Yunnan into northeastern Burma. During this period, China built a network of asphalted highways, leading from Kunming to various points along the borders with Burma and with Laos, where another communist movement was active.

5.) Nearly all the CPB cadres in China were well-read Marxist intellectuals with little or no experience in military matters. But in 1950, an ethnic Kachin rebel leader, Naw Seng and 200 to 300 of his followers, had retreated to China where they resettled in Guizhou province as ordinary citizens. Naw Seng was a decorated World War II hero—he had fought brilliantly against the Japanese—and he was exactly the kind of military commander that the CPB intellectuals needed. In early 1963—even before the peace talks in Rangoon—Naw Seng was brought to Sichuan. He was introduced to Thakin Ba Thein Tin and told that the time had come to go back to Burma and fight. Naw Seng, eager to leave his people's commune in Guizhou, readily agreed. He assembled his men and they began military training in Yunnan in 1965. On January 1, 1968, Naw Seng's Kachin warriors at last entered northeastern Burma from the Chinese side, accompanied by Khin Maung Gyi and other political commissars from the CPB.

6.) Since the thirties, small cells of ethnic Chinese communists had been active in towns in central Burma, completely separate from the mainstream Burmese communist movement. In the early sixties these entities were put in touch with the CPB for the first time. They were few in number, but the Chinese embassy in Rangoon arranged for ethnic Chinese from the capital and some small towns in the Irrawaddy delta to visit the CPB's then-base area along the Shweli River (and later to travel to the northeastern base area set up after 1968). The CPB's numbers increased after anti-Chinese communal riots in Rangoon in 1967; these riots may have provided the catalyst for the already planned China-sponsored CPB thrust into Shan State, but they were not the reason for China's support for the Burmese communists.

During the decade that followed, China provided the CPB with assault rifles, machine-guns, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns, radio equipment, jeeps, trucks and petrol. Even rice, other food supplies, cooking oil and kitchen utensils were sent across the frontier into the new revolutionary base area that the CPB was establishing along the Sino-Burmese frontier in northeastern Burma. The Chinese also built hydroelectric power stations inside this area, and a clandestine radio station. "The People's Voice of Burma," began transmitting from the Yunnan side of the frontier in April 1971. Thousands of Chinese "volunteers"—mostly youthful Red Guards from China but also regular soldiers from the People's Liberation Army—also streamed across the border to fight alongside their Burmese comrades. Within four years of the first thrust into northeastern Burma on New Year Day 1968, the CPB had wrested control over a 9,000 square mile area along the Sino-Burmese frontier.

During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese saw themselves as the leaders of the "World Proletarian Revolution" and the massive support they lent to the CPB was only one of several powerful expressions of this policy; however, it was the main element of China's Burma policy until the late seventies. The change towards a less militant foreign policy began when an internal power struggle broke out within the Communist Party of China (CPC) after Mao Zedong's death in 1976. In April of that year, when China's radical Left reasserted itself and ousted Deng Xiaoping, the CPB—unlike other communist parties in the region—spoke out loudly in favor of the hardline Maoists. On the 55th anniversary of the CPC in June 1976, the CPB offered the following congratulatory message:

"The revisionist clique with which Deng was linked headed by Liu Shaoqi has been defeated … The movement to repulse the Right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts, and the decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on measures taken against rightist chieftain Deng Xiaoping, are in full accord with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought."

In a second message mourning the death of Mao in September 1976, the CPB stated:

"Guided by Chairman Mao Zedong's proletarian revolutionary line, the Chinese people seized great victories in the socialist revolution and socialist construction in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, in criticizing Liu Shaoqi's counter-revolutionary revisionist line, in criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius and in criticizing Deng Xiaoping and repulsing the Right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus, consolidating the People's Republic of China—the reliable bulwark of the world proletarian revolution."

The CPB had reason to re-evaluate the reliability of that bulwark the following year when Deng began to return to power in Beijing. The CPB, which once had branded its own "revisionists" Yebaw (Comrade) Htay and Hamendranath Ghoshal as "Burma's Deng Xiaoping" and "Burma's Liu Shaoqi" respectively, became silent. Htay and Ghoshal were two of the founders of the CPB and they had been executed during a series of bloody internal purges in the late sixties. The "Beijing Review" and other official Chinese publications, which had previously published battle views and CPB documents, stopped printing anything about the "revolutionary struggle in Burma."

The CPB was mentioned for the last time in November 1976 when Thakin Ba Thein Tin and his Vice Chairman Thakin Pe Tint, were received by the new Chinese Chairman Hua Guofeng in Beijing, who was soon to fall into disgrace. No details about the meeting were disclosed, but it is plausible to assume that the two Burmese communist leaders wanted to ensure continued Chinese support for the CPB in the post-Mao era.

The Burmese military quickly and shrewdly exploited the CPB's rift with Beijing by lending its good offices to China in Cambodia as China shifted its focus to Vietnam's designs on its Indo-Chinese neighbor. In November 1977, Ne Win became the first foreign head of state to visit Phnom Penh after the Khmer Rouge takeover. The Chinese were no doubt behind the unusual visit, hoping to draw the Khmer Rouge out of its diplomatic isolation. Ne Win played along, for his part hoping that Beijing would further reduce its support for the CPB. He was not disappointed. In 1978, the CPB's entire China-based central office, including the "Peoples Voice of Burma" broadcasting station, was forced to move to Panghsang on the Yunnan frontier.  The Chinese "volunteers," who had fought alongside the CPB since 1968, were also recalled.

In September 1979, Burma left the Non-Aligned Movement — which it had helped form in the fifties — at its Havana summit to protest against Cuba assuming the chairmanship and its decision not to let the Khmer Rouge represent Cambodia. Burma's delegate San Yu said in a report to parliament after the Havana meeting: "Every nation has the inalienable right to freely choose its political, economic, social and cultural system without interference in any form by another state…Burma strictly stands for the solution of problems by peaceful means rather than resorting to threats or use of force."  San Yu's remarks were made with a vague reference to Vietnam's December 25, 1978 invasion of Cambodia, but they were also interpreted as a signal to Beijing that Rangoon disapproved of its continued support for the CPB—however limited it had become.

Read Part 1 of the series here. Tomorrow: Part 3. Rapprochement and Stalemate

This article was originally published here by The Project 2049 Institute, a policy group based in the US.

The post China and Burma: Not Only Pauk-Phaw appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Ten Things to Do in Rangoon This Week (June 6)

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 06:35 PM PDT

Clean Yangon Campaign | June 11

This campaign aims to work together to keep the city clean.

June 11, 4 to 6 pm. Maha Bandula Park.

Arker Kyaw Solo Exhibition | June 8-11

The inspiration for these paintings, Arker's pet Arowana fish Luckie, has been transformed by his artistry and imagination into something exotic and elegant.

June 8-11, River Gallery, 38th Street, beside the Strand Hotel.

World Lethwei Championship (WLC 2) | June 10

Burma's second World Lethwei Championship will include nine matches, with the main event featuring Burma's Soe Lin Oo and Poland's Artur Saladiak.

June 10, 6 pm. Thuwunna National Indoor Stadium (1). Tickets between 10,000 and 200,000 kyats are available at 09-451010789 or 09-965010789.

Voice of Youth | June 8

The musical performance from young musicians aims to promote freedom of expression, equality and rights of the youth.

June 8, 6 pm. People's Park. Free Admission.

 

Views for All | June 3-11

Photographer Htein Lin showcases scenery captured on his travels across Burma, Japan and Korea.

June 3-11. 43 Art Gallery, 43rd Street, Botahtaung Tsp.

 

Under Dawg Festival | June 12

This festival features K-Pop singer Cl (2NE1) and US rappers Nelly and Soulja Boy.

June 12, 4 pm until late. Thuwunnabhumi Event Park, Thingangyun Tsp. Tickets priced between 30,000 and 800,000 kyats available at 09-260702700, 09-260702800, 09-454545461, and 09-454545462.

EU International Education Fair | June 9-11

Learn about the EU's scholarship program—ERASMUS—to study at prestigious universities across Europe. ERASMUS scholarships provide free tuition, travel and living costs for the entire duration of the programs.

June 9-11. Starts at 11 am, 11:30 am and 10 am, respectively, on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. Tatmadaw Hall, U Wisara Road.

 

Engineering Career Conference | June 11

Leading engineering companies will be hiring at this event. Make sure you bring more than one CV. Register here. Details at 09-954459183.

June 11, 9 am to 6 pm. Grand Ball Room, Sedona Hotel.

 

Kin Maung Yin's Kin Maung Yin | June 10-12

This art exhibition is held in remembrance of renowned artist Kin Maung Yin who died three years ago. Sixty of his paintings will be on display—20 on each day of the three-day exhibition.

June 10-12. Peace Gallery, Maha Bandula Street, Kyauktada Tsp.

 

Give Peace a Chance | June 3-9

Artist Myint Soe's desperate longing for peace is reflected in his paintings and installations. Half of the proceeds will go to IDP camps in Kachin State.

June 3-9. Nawaday Tharlar Art Gallery, No. 304, 20/B, Yaw Min Gyi Road, Dagon Tsp.

The post Ten Things to Do in Rangoon This Week (June 6) appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

National News

National News


Skin cure fad driving Myanmar elephant poaching surge: WWF

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 02:10 PM PDT

Myanmar's wild elephants are being poached in record numbers with at least 20 killed this year due to surging demand for their hide, WWF said Monday, warning the species is facing a "crisis".

Inle Lake conservation bill to go to Hluttaw

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 02:01 PM PDT

A bill for the environmental conservation of Inle Lake will be submitted to the Pyithu Hluttaw. There have been five rounds of discussions about the bill with many stakeholders participating, a civil society representative told The Myanmar Times.

Expelled student needs to appeal sacking: deputy DG

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:58 PM PDT

Student Ko Zaw Ye Htut, who was expelled from the Sagaing Education College, needs to send an appeal and negotiate with the college administration in order to rejoin classes, U Aung Aung Min, deputy Director General at the Department of Higher Education told The Myanmar Times.

Hluttaw wants national health insurance system

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:56 PM PDT

The Pyithu Hluttaw has urged the government to establish a nationwide health insurance system to reduce the rising healthcare expenses.

Strict speed limit enforcement begins in Mandalay

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:54 PM PDT

Traffic speeds of all vehicles in Mandalay are being closely monitored by the Regional Police Force, which has deployed a device known as the speed radar gun in a bid to reduce the number of accidents.

Cycling to mark World Environment Day

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:52 PM PDT

More than 20 civil society organisations in Pyin Oo Lwin cooperated with the locals and rode bicycles around the city to educate the public on reducing the carbon footprint to mark World Environment Day which fell on June 5.

Mayor says Yangon lacks funds for flood works, awaits $125m loan

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:47 PM PDT

Yangon is unable to implement large-scale flood mitigation strategies due to a lack of funds, and heavy downpours during the monsoon season are causing havoc for the city's nearly 5 million people.

Job agencies appeal ban on workers going to Malaysia

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:44 PM PDT

The Myanmar Overseas Employment Agencies Federation (MOEAF) appealed to the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population last week to allow it to send 8000 Myanmar workers to employers in Malaysia.

More than 700 migrant households get provisions in Rakhine State

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:43 PM PDT

A total of 724 Rakhine households who arrived from Bangladesh received rice, food and cash, the Amyotha Hluttaw session was told on Monday

Ruling party urges members to bring issues to biannual meeting

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:41 PM PDT

The ruling National League for Democracy Party has urged central committee members to submit papers on issues and matters concerning states, regions, autonomous areas or the union, on national reconciliation and the peace process, and on the by-election to a conference to be held this month.

Monday, June 5, 2017

The Irrawaddy Magazine

The Irrawaddy Magazine


Businessman Reports Death Threats After Alleging Bribery Scandal in Tourism Ministry

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 08:15 AM PDT

RANGOON – The owner of Rangoon's Orchid Hotel, U Htay Aung, on Saturday accused the Ministry of Hotel and Tourism's permanent secretary U Yee Mon of demanding 16.7 million kyats (US$12,320) from him in exchange for a recommendation letter to banks regarding the provision of loans.

U Htay Aung had a 15-year lease to operate the Nan Myaing Hotel in Pyin Oo Lwin, which is owned by Ministry of Hotels and Tourism, and had applied to build an extension to the structure in 2016. In June of last year, he asked for a recommendation letter from the tourism ministry—a document that U Htay Aung hoped would serve as a guarantee for the bank in order to fund the extension.

The hotelier said he was asked to provide 16.7 million kyats to U Yee Mon, the ministry's permanent secretary. U Htay Aung agreed to the deal. However, cracks in the relationship began to show once the permanent secretary took on a supervisory role regarding the Nan Myaing project, U Htay Aung said.

"[U Yee Mon] pointed out small things [that were wrong] and we faced the challenge of continuing the project with many restrictions," he explained.

Although U Htay Aung said he had already successfully negotiated loans with two of Burma's biggest commercial banks, Kanbawza and Ayarwady, the ministry canceled the extension project for the Nan Myaing hotel within weeks of the permanent secretary's approval.

U Htay Aung said he then complained to the State Counselor's Office, the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism, as well as the Anti-Corruption Commission's office in March of this year, explaining how he felt that the permanent secretary had misused his power.

"I know I was guilty as well, for giving him a bribe," U Htay Aung said, adding that because he had engaged in the transaction, he felt he "deserved" the unfortunate turn of events.

Weeks later, he said he received death threats over the phone at the Orchid Hotel and that he—a Muslim—was called racist names by the caller.

"The caller said they could kill me anywhere. It would not cost more than 10 million kyats. And then, I told him, 'don't shoot me like U Ko Ni—give me a shot in the middle of the forehead,'" U Htay Aung said, a reference to the assassination of the National League for Democracy's legal adviser, who was murdered in January after he was shot from behind, in the back of the head, outside Rangoon International Airport.

U Htay Aung added that he had been planning to hold a press conference in Naypyidaw in recent months, but that the efforts had not been successful. He then spoke publicly about what he described as the ministry's "blackmailing" in his own Orchid Hotel in Rangoon on June 3.

After speaking to the media on Saturday, he reportedly heard that the tourism ministry had hired legal consultants in order to file charges against him.

"I won't regret my conduct and I am expecting the worst," said U Htay Aung.

The Ministry of Hotels and Tourism published a statement on Monday evening, but did not address U Htay Aung's allegations of bribery. Instead, it said that the Nan Myaing Hotel was a state-owned building, and that the company that leased it in 2013—National Trading Co. Ltd., owned by U Htay Aung—had fallen behind on payments and was required to repay its debt.

"The company hid its violations, blamed the ministry and complained about the officials and departments which could determine the case," the statement said, adding that the ministry would obtain its remaining rental fees from the company.

The Irrawaddy phoned the director-general of the tourism ministry, U Tint Thwin, on Monday but there was no answer, and reporters also were unable to reach permanent secretary U Yee Mon for comment at the time of reporting.

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Thousands of Rats Swarm Irrawaddy Division Villages

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 07:51 AM PDT

PATHEIN, Irrawaddy Division — Thousands of rats entered villages in Irrawaddy Division's Ngapudaw Township on Sunday morning, eating locals' crops.

"There were so many rats that it was impossible to count them. They ate bamboo plants, and were staying in bushes and trees outside the villages," said police lieutenant Soe Soe Min of Haigyikyun Central Police Station, located in the sub-township nearest to the infestation.

"Now we are getting rid of the rats in cooperation with the locals, and burying the dead ones," he added.

Locals, working with police, health, municipal and administrative officials killed more than 1,000 rats that had roamed into the villages of Zee Chaing and Kyauk Chaung—873 in Zee Chaing and more than 300 in Kyauk Chaung. The rest fled into the forest on Monday, according to the police.

Locals estimated that there were as many as 10,000 rats present, and interpret the influx as a bad omen. They are believed to have emerged from rocks and sea caves between the two villages, after their nests were flooded by high tides and heavy rains.

"We believe that when so many rats come into human places, it is a sign that there will be an earthquake or storm within 20 days," said Haigyikyun local U Aye Kyaw.

One male and two female rats were sent for lab testing at the township health department on Monday.

Translated from Burmese by Thet Ko Ko.

The post Thousands of Rats Swarm Irrawaddy Division Villages appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Open Letter to the State Counselor

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 07:41 AM PDT

Dear State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,

I hope your trip to Canada and Sweden is going well. I have no intention at all to bother you, as I know you will have important meetings with the leaders of those countries to discuss their own transitions to a federal democracy, and how they might inform our own.

Like many people, I understand that this is the most important issue for your government and our entire nation.

However, I'd like to raise an immediate issue that is damaging the reputation of your government, due to an unfortunate legacy.

It might not be as important as restoring the peace process or building a federal nation—priorities of yours since you assumed the role as a de-facto leader of our country. But it is also an issue that your government and Parliament should take into serious consideration without delay.

There is something ugly occurring which I, like many people, believe should not be happening. It concerns Article 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law.

You must be aware that for the past 14 months under your administration, 61 defamation cases have been filed under Article 66(d). Out of these 61 cases, around one dozen journalists were charged and many of them are still awaiting trial.

The latest targets of the statute are U Kyaw Min Swe, chief editor of The Voice, and the publication's regular columnist Ko Kyaw Zwa Naing, known by his pen name British Ko Ko Maung. They were taken into custody on Friday. The Burma Army filed a lawsuit against the pair under Article 66(d) over a satirical article that questioned the country's armed struggle and peace process.

I know that 66(d) is not a creation of your government. It was enacted by ex-President Thein Sein's quasi-civilian administration in 2013. The article bans the use of a telecommunications network to "extort, threaten, obstruct, defame, disturb, inappropriately influence or intimidate."

Many people believe that the previous government, run by ex-generals, created such a legal mechanism to be able to sue those who stood against their administration. Of the seven cases filed under the Article 66(d) during their tenure, five led to sentencing. Three cases were filed due to "defamation" against the commander-in-chief of the military while one was against then-President Thein Sein. Only one case was filed due to "defamation" against you.

I am sure you, your government and Parliament are quite aware of the previous government's intentions.

After all, 61 cases have been put forward using this article under your National League for Democracy (NLD) government to date. This has been shocking, indeed, and indicates that something has gone wrong under the NLD-government. However, I don’t interpret it to mean that your government is solely responsible for all of the cases.

According to the Research Team on the Telecommunications Law led by activist Maung Saung Kha—a poet who was himself sentenced and jailed in 2016 under Article 66(d)—the military has used the law to file seven lawsuits while members of the NLD used the article to file six lawsuits. Meanwhile, other known NLD supporters have used the article to file eight lawsuits because they believed others defamed you as the State Counselor. Thus, out of 61 cases, it is believed that around 20 of the cases were politically motivated.

What surprises me is why the NLD government or its Parliaments have let its members and supporters apply this controversial law created by the previous government against individuals today. Even high-ranking officials of the NLD administration and the party have turned to 66(d), rather than more standard defamation charges described in penal codes.

In terms of defamation, there exists Article 500 of the Penal Code. Perhaps the previous government and former parliamentary members of the then ruling military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party thought that "defamation" over the internet, through the use of social media, might have been more damaging than traditional methods of communication or media.

I can only conclude that some of the NLD government's officials and key members of the current parliaments share the view with those who enacted Article 66(d) in 2013.

That might be one reason why it has taken far too long to review this controversial law. Many activists have demanded that Parliament repeal or amend the law, so that it is not abused by influential people or institutions. Those activists are disappointed, as it seems that the current democratic administration will this controversial law to be misused by anyone.

State Counselor, I personally believe that it's high time to review Article 66(d) through concerned parliamentary committees. As long as this controversial statute is yet to be addressed, we will see more individuals, including journalists, be jailed under charges of "defamation." It's ugly, isn't it—both for our country and for your administration.

Kyaw Zwa Moe is the editor of The Irrawaddy's English edition.

The post Open Letter to the State Counselor appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

KNU Vice Chairman’s ‘Tight Schedule’ Upsets Karen Community in Canada

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 07:33 AM PDT

CHIANG MAI, Thailand — Members of the ethnic Karen community in Canada—most of whom are refugees from the civil war in Burma—are disappointed the Karen National Union (KNU) vice chairman Padoh Kwe Htoo Win will not visit them on his tour of the country, according to an activist.

Padoh Kwe Htoo Win and other leaders of ethnic armed organizations, such as Lian Sakong of the Chin National Front, Khun Myint Tun of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization, and Sai Leng of the Restoration Council of Shan State are touring Canada from June 3 to June 10 to study its federal system.

Hsa Moo, a Karen activist who works with the Karen community in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, told The Irrawaddy the community wants to hear the KNU vice chairman clarify the group's stance on Burma's on-going peace process.

"The Karen community in Canada feel [Padoh Kwe Htoo Win] does not have time for them. They want to hear from him and know about the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) in particular—about what the benefits of the NCA are for the Karen people," she said.

She added that the community would like an assurance of the safety of refugees on the Thai-Burma border who she claimed are under pressure to return their homes in Burma despite the militarization of the KNU-controlled territories in Karen State. The community wants to know how the KNU and Burma government plan to safely repatriate the refugees, she added.

Burma's State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will be in the country from June 5 to June 9 to meet Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and other officials before traveling to Sweden.

Burma's ethnic communities in Canada, including the Karen, plan to hold a peaceful demonstration in Toronto on June 9 while the State Counselor visits the city.

"They will ask for rights for ethnic minorities," said Hsa Moo, adding that the ethnic groups will also question Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's plans for refugee repatriation.

The protesters will raise concerns about militarization in Karen State and growing pressure on Burmese refugees in Thailand to return home because of cuts in humanitarian aid, according to the activist.

The EAO leaders plan to visit the cities of Toronto, Ottawa, and Quebec. In a letter written by the KNU vice chairman's assistant and seen by The Irrawaddy, Padoh Kwe Htoo Win said he could not meet the Karen refugees in Canada because of a "tight schedule," but that the EAO leaders were "open to a visit and small discussion."

"You might also hear that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is coming to Canada and her government members will be joining this study trip," read the letter. "However, she has her own schedule and I don't want to speculate if she will be traveling with the team or not."

 

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Police Open Case Against Army Battalion in Kachin IDP Deaths

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 04:26 AM PDT

RANGOON — The Mansi Township police have opened a case against Battalion 319 of the Burma Army, after its soldiers were accused of killing three internally displaced ethnic Kachin men in Mai Hkawng village, Kachin State.

"We opened charges against them for murder—Article 302 [of the penal code]," police officer Aung Kyaw Soe Win told The Irrawaddy on Monday.

He said it could not yet be confirmed how many members of the battalion might have been involved in the deaths.

The Burma Army is holding its own military investigation, according to the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing. After the investigation is completed, they will allegedly hand over the soldiers in question to the police.

"The police will do a press conference when we know more about it," Aung Kyaw Soe Win said.

Nhkum Gam Awng, 31, Maran Brang Seng, 22, and Labya Naw Hkum, 27, from Mai Hkawng internally displaced persons (IDP) camp, were reportedly arrested by Battalion 319 on May 25 near Hka Pra Yang village, about three miles away, while they were collecting firewood, according to camp officials and community elders. Their maimed bodies were found on May 28, with the victims having sustained skull fractures and knife wounds, according to a post-mortem report.

Camp officials and the victims' family members hope to prosecute those responsible for the murders in a civilian court, a member of the Kachin Baptist Convention told The Irrawaddy when the story broke in late May.

The post Police Open Case Against Army Battalion in Kachin IDP Deaths appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Human Rights Watch Defends Muslims Praying in Public

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:50 AM PDT

RANGOON — Human Rights Watch on Monday called for the Burma government to overrule local officials in Rangoon who are threatening to charge Muslims for holding Ramadan prayers in a public space.

On May 31, about 50 Muslims worshipped near a shuttered Islamic school in Thaketa Township, one of two madrassas in the area that were shut down by a ultranationalist mob on April 28. It is unclear when they will reopen.

In a statement on June 1, township authorities warned Muslims from the group they would take action under Article 133 of Burma's Penal Code for praying in public without official permission, as it said the prayers blocked the road and threatened "stability and the rule of law."

Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch (HRW)'s Asia Division, said: "ward-level officials' threats to charge and prosecute Muslims" who took part in the prayer session on May 31 was "further evidence of the Myanmar government's failure to protect religious freedoms."

"Since that day, local police and ward officials in Yangon have been consistently harassing and threatening members of the Muslim community with criminal charges and fines because they dared assemble in the street to hold prayers during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan," he said.

"These actions by local officials are an outrage that should be urgently overruled by senior leaders in the General Administration Department, or failing that, the minister of home affairs. If the ministry refuses to act within days to cease these threats of charges, then as de facto head of government, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should step in to protect freedom of conscience and religion," he added.

Robertson said mosques and madrassas that have been forcibly shuttered should be "immediately re-opened."

"Religious believers should not be threatened or criminally charged simply for exercising their fundamental right to observe and practice their religion," he said.

Local Muslims told The Irrawaddy that they do not have enough places to pray. Township authorities were unavailable for comment on Monday.

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Human Rights Activist Charged Under Article 66(d) for Live-streaming a Satirical Play

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:42 AM PDT

PATHEIN, Irrawaddy Division — A local human rights leader in Irrawaddy Division's capital Pathein was arrested on Sunday after he was charged with Article 66(d) of Burma's Telecommunications Law for live-streaming a play that was critical of military clashes with ethnic armed groups on Facebook.

Police arrested U Tun Tun Oo, leader of the Human Rights Activists Association, for streaming the drama entitled "We Want No War" staged by high school students and undergraduates of Pathein University during a peace discussion in Pathein on Jan. 9.

Personnel of the Burma Army South Western Command filed a lawsuit against him at Pathein Central Police Station under Section 34(d) of the Electronic Transactions Law. But police sought legal advice from township law officials who suggested charging U Tun Tun Oo with Article 66(d) instead.

U Tun Tun Oo was brought to trial at Pathein Township Court on Monday.

Nine students performed the satirical play in which a news agency called "Oxygen" interviewed supporters of Burma's conflict.

"I streamed it live so that my friends could watch it because my son participated in the drama. I did not intend to defame the military," he told the media.

The Burma Army also sued nine students involved in the drama for defamation.

The Pathein Township Court judge acquitted seven of the nine students but charged two—Ko Aung Khant Zaw and Ko Myat Thu Htet, who organized the play. The two are still facing trial.

Since the enactment of the Telecommunications Law in 2013, there has been a total of 67 cases filed under Article 66(d), according to a local research group led by a former prisoner Maung Saung Kha, a poet who was jailed under the same charge in 2016.

On Friday, police detained chief editor of The Voice Daily newspaper Ko Kyaw Min Swe and regular columnist Ko Kyaw Zwa Naing—also known by his pen name British Ko Ko Maung—under Article 66(d) over a satirical article about Burma's peace process.

Translated from Burmese by Thet Ko Ko.

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Trio Arrested in Burma Admit to Bar Girl Murder

Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:08 AM PDT

BANGKOK, Thailand — The three female suspects wanted for the murder of a karaoke bar girl have confessed to the charges laid against them, with one of the suspects, Preeyanuch "Preaw" Nonwangchai, insisting she had no intention to kill the victim.

Speaking at a press conference Sunday following their arrests, national police chief Chakthip Chaijinda said the death of 22-year-old Warisara Klinjui is not linked to any organized drug ring. A personal feud and an unpaid debt were the motives, he said.

The police called in the media Sunday afternoon in Bangkok, several hours after the arrests of Ms Preeyanuch, 24, Kawita "Earn" Ratchada, 25, and Apiwan "Jae" Sattayabundit, 28, were confirmed on Saturday night.

The three have been charged with cooperating in premeditated murder, concealing a body and theft. A crime re-enactment is expected to take place Monday at 7-8 locations in Khon Kaen.

The suspects were not present at the press briefing led by the national police chief. They were flown from Chiang Rai to Bangkok and then to Khon Kaen province where they were to be further interrogated by investigators in charge of the case.

The trio are among a group of five who allegedly killed Warisara, dismembered her body and buried the body parts in Khon Kaen's Khao Suan Kwang district late last month. The female trio fled across the border to Tachileik in Burma's Shan State on May 25, the day Warisara's body was discovered.

Two other detained suspects are Wasin Namprom, 25, who was arrested in Laos and his girlfriend Jidarat Promkhun, 21, who was nabbed in Ubon Ratchathani.

Thai authorities sought help from their Burma counterparts to hunt down the suspects, who hid in a vacant house in Tachileik. The trio were detained by Burma authorities on Saturday night and delivered to the Thai police Sunday morning.

According to Pol Gen Chakthip, who questioned the three suspects by himself for an hour, the suspects have confessed to all the charges and Preeyanuch has implicated Wasin as being involved in the dismembering.

Pol Gen Chakthip said Warisara's murder stemmed from a personal conflict as the victim had given police information leading to the arrest of Preeyanuch's husband in a drug-related case. Her husband is now in prison. In addition, Preeyanuch claimed Warisara owed her up to 40,000 baht for more than a year.

Quoting Preeyanuch, the police chief said she had no intention to kill Warisara but wanted to teach the victim a lesson.

"She insisted she met the victim by chance about 1 a.m. of May 25 after not having seen her for a year. So she asked her to get into the car to teach her a lesson but they had a row in the car and she strangled the victim in a fit of rage. The victim died in the car.

"The suspects thought about concealing the body by dumping it into the water but knew it would turn up. So they dismembered and buried the body," he said.

According to Pol Gen Chakthip, the suspects contacted authorities to surrender under pressure.

"They gave themselves up to authorities because we put a lot on pressure on this case. We asked Myanmar to help hunt them down. The suspects said they didn't want other people to get in trouble," he said.

"At least they had the conscience to turn themselves in," he said.

The hand-over of the three suspects was made on Saturday night shortly after 9 p.m. when Lt Col Aung Mien U, the Burma co-chairman of the Thailand-Myanmar Border Township Committee (TBC), and Pol Lt Col Ten Win, chief of the Tachilek police station, sent an urgent message to Col Kidakorn Chantra, commander of the 3rd Cavalry Task Force of the Pha Muang Force and the Thai co-chairman of the TBC.

On receiving the message, Col Kidakorn ordered Thai authorities led by Pol Col Ekkorn Bussababodin, chief of the Chiang Rai immigration office, Pol Col Songkrit Ontakhrai, the Mae Sai police chief, and Thai TBC members to receive the suspects from Burma authorities.

The hand-over was made at a bridge across the Sai River and witnessed by a large number of people including tourists on the Thai side.

A photo of Thai and Burma authorities with the three suspects went viral.

Commenting on social media calls that the trio faces the death sentence, he said sentencing is a judicial matter and said the harshest penalty in a murder case is death.

Pol Gen Chakthip also defended police treatment of the suspects, who were seen in several photos released on social media as "relaxed" and not handcuffed, saying authorities were confident the suspects would not flee.

He also claimed it was "normal" for police to let female suspects apply make-up while in detention.

Pol Maj Gen Charoenwit Sriwanich, deputy chief of Police Region 4, said no drug charge was pressed against the suspects.

Pol Lt Gen Nathathorn Prousoontorn, commissioner of the Immigration Bureau, said immigration authorities had pressured business operators not to provide shelter to the suspects.

He said the three went out with customers on May 27-28 before turning up in Tachilek.

After hearing about the arrests, the victim's family said they want to see justice run its course and the punishment must fit the crime.

Thonglom Klinjui, 67, grandmother of the victim, said the crime was "cruel and inhumane" and hoped the suspects would get what they deserve.

Sakhon Phasi, mother of Preeyanuch, said she was relieved to hear that her daughter is alive.

Sakhon said she hoped her daughter would be forgiven now she decided to pay her dues for the crime.

"She has surrendered and will pay for what she did, I hope she will be forgiven," she said.

 

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Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought in Myanmar

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 11:41 PM PDT

With Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought in Myanmar, Matthew J. Walton offers a thorough account of how Buddhist ideas have influenced political thinking and, as a result, political action, in Myanmar. Central to such an account is the argument that politics in Myanmar cannot be thought of without Buddhism, given that Buddhism, as a "moral universe," delineates what "the political" consists of, and what forms political authority and participation might take.

The phrase "moral universe" is a significant term for Walton— one intentionally used to underscore the fact that, for Buddhists in Myanmar, "political action and political change are quintessentially moral practices" insofar as the world is understood to be governed by moral rules, and a moral logic of cause and effect (8). Yet, as Walton makes clear in his successive chapters, this moral universe, and the moral-causal logic upon which it is built, is not unproblematic for Burmese Buddhists, but rather produces certain political impulses and tensions. Such tensions must be acknowledged if scholars and citizens alike are to develop a deeper understanding of Myanmar's political inheritance and still-fragile transition. This pragmatic orientation towards core concepts of contemporary Burmese politics makes Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought much more than an exercise in political theory or religious inquiry. Instead, the questions Walton seeks to answer, while lying at the intersection of Burmese political thought and Buddhist moral practice, are profoundly concrete in nature.

Take, for example, the question of human nature, as addressed within a Burmese Buddhist worldview— a topic Walton tackles in the third chapter of his book. While providing a detailed reading of two key texts addressing human nature and its relation to socio-political circumstances and modes of authority— the Aggañña Sutta and the Cakkavatti Sutta— the chapter ultimately constructs an argument with tangible consequences for contemporary politics. Given that the suttas Walton analyzes provide two notions of human nature that exist in tension with one another— the notion of humans as inherently flawed and weak, and that of humans as simultaneously powerful in their capability of achieving ultimate enlightenment—it is unsurprising that visions of the value of political authority might also exist on a spectrum that lies between two poles. When humans are envisioned as inherently flawed, then the promise of political authority is one linked to the preservation of moral and material hierarchies— a logic that resonates in the commonly-heard invocations as to the necessity of a "disciplined democracy" or for government based on the establishment of "order" (a concept discussed in detail in chapter 4). Conversely, a viewpoint that foregrounds individuals' ability to transcend their flaws posits a more complete solution linked to moral action— one that exists above and beyond the temporary and transitory order achieved by forms of political authority.

These two responses to the question of human nature, and the role of authority vis-Ă -vis a population, have direct implications for the types of political arrangements deemed acceptable or effective in Myanmar. Walton makes this clear in discussing the way in which contemporary visions of governance oscillate between an expressed goal of maintaining order and that of liberation, with governance seen as that which could free citizens to strive for moral action and, relatedly, a just and stable state. Sometimes existing in opposition, but often woven together in complex articulations as to what sort of "democracy" Myanmar might pursue, these two logics of government, and the paradoxical "moral universe" upon which they are built, must be understood if we are to assess progress toward the expressed goals of Myanmar's political actors and institutions.

Questions of human nature and the resultant goal of governance relates in important ways to how exactly "politics," as a concept, might be conceived— a point that underscores Walton's central proposal that it is only with an eye toward Buddhist thought that we might understand what "the political" consists of in Myanmar. Even at the most fundamental level, when considering the common Burmese word for "politics," nain ngan ye, "politics" articulates in significant ways with the paradoxical Buddhist conceptions of humanity and authority referenced above. Nain ngan ye, itself, implies an emphasis on kingly authority and the demarcating of the realm of "high" politics, one accessible only to elites. Such a conception echoes, in significant ways, a vision of government as that which achieves order through the actions of a highly selective group of actors, and where the moral failings of the masses render them unable to exercise political rule. It is interesting to contrast this selective, elite inflection of nain ngan ye with more recent notions of political participation as associated with individual moral practice (a phenomenon to which Walton turns in the fifth chapter). Foregrounding moral practice and meditation, and such actions' implications for the collective, this latter conception of politics counters the more dominant notion of politics as relevant only to the elites. Instead, in this second conception, one's moral practice can affect the circumstances of their community, and the collective pursuit of liberation, both in the religious and political senses of the word.

While such points represent only a sampling of the diverse, yet equally essential, religious and political concepts outlined in Walton's text, what is evident even in such a brief summary is the ways in which terms foreign scholars might commonly associate only with a liberal, rights-based theory of governance— terms such as "freedom," "democracy," and "participation"— take on new meaning (sometimes dramatically so) when considered in terms of the "moral universe" in which they function. Particularly valuable in this regard are the pages Walton devotes to the translation and explication of common Burmese language words such as the example of nain ngan ye referenced above and, relatedly, local understandings of commonly-cited Western terms. A section on the three most commonly-used notions of "democracy" as circulated in Burmese political discourse— those of a "disciplined democracy," a "rights-based democracy," and a "moral democracy"— for instance (see chapter 6), should give pause to scholars and advocates alike, reminding them to ask what exactly is meant by the unqualified use of the term "democracy" in the Myanmar context. Such insights can only come from close readings of the texts that represent both historical and contemporary political thought in Myanmar, in their original Burmese— a task Walton advances here in his engagement with Burmese language sources from the last 150 years. In addition to complicating scholarly notions of "the political" in Myanmar, Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought in Myanmar delivers a second challenge to the field of Burma/Myanmar studies by demonstrating just how crucial Burmese language materials and competencies can be in the crafting of an academic text.

Even in arguing for the conceptual and methodological advances he proposes, Walton is nonetheless keenly aware of the limitations of his study— limitations that he draws on to effectively map out the state of the research into Buddhism and political thought in Myanmar, as well as to identify productive directions for future research. Recognizing, for example, that a focus on "Burmese Buddhism," precludes him from addressing either the diversity external to such a category— such as Buddhist practices of non-Burman groups such as the Karen, Mon, or Shan—or that which lies within in— the variations in Buddhist thought and practice extant among Burman Buddhists— Walton notes the necessity for comparative scholarship that extends beyond assumptions of a single, coherent perspective on politics in Myanmar. Furthermore, while Walton furthers discussions of Burmese Buddhism's relationship to politics, arguing strongly for recognition of Myanmar's own intellectual history and the Buddhist political ideas that undergird such a history, the question of how Myanmar's dominant political and religious philosophies might have been developed in dialogue with other traditions could use more attention— a point Walton himself underscores in his discussion of twentieth century debates around the proper relationship between Marxism and Buddhism. Certainly, the fluidity with which ideas traveled throughout the colonial and independence eras, not to mention the contemporary moment— when an influx of political consultants and governance specialists brings a new language through which "politics" is discussed— speaks to a need for more fine-grained research into how Buddhist ideas exist not as a "pure" body of thought, but rather one developed in dialogue with other contradictory worldviews throughout history.

Possible expansions of this research aside, overall, Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought in Myanmar provides a much-needed accounting of contemporary Burmese Buddhist approaches to politics, and the worldview and logics upon which such approaches are based. Clearly written, yet carefully researched through both English and Burmese language texts, the book provides a foundational introduction to Buddhist thought— useful for religious scholars and those less familiar with Buddhism, alike— while also spelling out the concrete and practical implications of such a worldview when it comes to the domain of politics. Whether related to Buddhist nationalism and associated exclusionary politics, the carefully-managed transition to a "discipline-flourishing democracy," or the fraught relationship between freedom and authoritarianism in Myanmar's history, Walton's emphasis on the Burmese Buddhist "moral universe" is indispensable to any number of questions central to Myanmar's ongoing political transition.

This article originally appeared in Tea Circle, a forum hosted at Oxford University for emerging research and perspectives on Burma/Myanmar.

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SE Asian Nations Step Up Cooperation as Islamic State Threat Mounts

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 10:25 PM PDT

SINGAPORE — Southeast Asian nations plan to use spy planes and drones to stem the movement of militants across their porous borders, defense officials said at the weekend, as concerns rise over the growing clout of Islamic State in the region.

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines said they would launch joint air patrols this month at their shared boundaries in the Sulu Sea, in addition to existing maritime patrols.

Authorities in the region have urged greater cooperation to counter the fallout from a raging battle with Islamic State-linked militants in the southern Philippines, the biggest warning yet that the ultra-radical group is building a base in Southeast Asia.

"Our open borders are being exploited by terrorist groups to facilitate personnel and material," Le Luong Minh, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) told the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual regional security forum in Singapore.

The region is home to 600 million people and includes Indonesia, which has the world's highest number of Muslims. Authorities in both Indonesia and Malaysia, also Muslim-majority, have said thousands of their citizens are sympathizers of Islamic State and hundreds are believed to have travelled to Syria to join the extremist group.

Indonesian authorities blamed Islamic State for bombings last month that killed three police officers, the latest in a series of low-level attacks by the militants in the last 17 months.

In recent months, dozens of fighters from Indonesia and Malaysia have crossed from their countries to Mindanao in the southern Philippines, intelligence officials have said, easily passing through waters that have often been lawless and plagued by pirates. Mindanao is the one region in the largely Catholic Philippines to have a significant Muslim minority.

ASEAN made a joint pledge with the United States on the sidelines of the Shangri-La forum to help the Philippines overcome the militant assault in the city of Marawi.

"What featured quite strongly in the US-ASEAN meeting was the pledge by both US and ASEAN members that we stand ready to help the Philippines…whether it's information, intelligence or otherwise," said Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen.

Joint Patrols, Intelligent-Sharing

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, with the assistance of neighboring Singapore, have carried out joint maritime patrols in the Sulu Sea since last year after a series of kidnappings by the pro-Islamic State Abu Sayyaf group.

"We decided at least these three countries, to avoid being accused of doing nothing…We're doing joint maritime and air patrols," said Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein, adding that the air patrols will be launched on June 19.

"If we do nothing, they get a foothold in this region."

Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu told Reuters his country would consider deploying drones and surveillance planes at its borders with the Philippines.

The measures come amid concerns that fighters may try to escape the military offensive in the Philippines, and flee to neighboring countries.

"We believe the elements involved in the Marawi clashes may try to escape through the southern Philippines and head either for Malaysian or Indonesian waters," said Malaysia's counter-terrorism police chief, Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay. "This is one of their only ways out."

Among other measures, Singaporean and Malaysian officials said monitoring and intelligence-sharing on specific individuals had been stepped up in the wake of the fighting in Marawi.

Singapore's Home Affairs Minister K. Shanmugam on Sunday urged residents of the wealthy city-state to report friends or family suspected of being radicalized, according to local media.

Security experts have warned that Southeast Asian countries are vulnerable to the spread of Islamic State as it suffers setbacks in Syria and Iraq.

"We're seeing that, as Islamic State is losing ground on the battlegrounds of the Middle East, they're pushing their franchise overseas as energetically as they can," said Nigel Inkster of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies.

"We're seeing this in the southern Philippines but there are other countries in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, that are at risk."

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China and Burma: Not Only Pauk-Phaw

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 07:30 PM PDT

Pauk-Phaw and its Evolution

"Pauk-phaw" was a term coined in the 1950s to describe the supposedly friendly and close relationship between China and Burma. It may be translated as "fraternal" but, according to Burma expert David Steinberg, it "has a closer Chinese connotation of siblings from the same womb [and] was used uniquely for Burma." A memorial to honor the pauk-phaw relationship was erected in Mangshi in China's Yunnan province in 1956 and the term was invoked as recently as September 2010, when Burmese junta leader Snr Gen Than Shwe paid an official visit to China.

But despite such diplomatic niceties, relations between China and Burma have not always been especially cordial. China, a vast, mainly inland, empire, has always looked for outlets to the sea for its land-locked western and southwestern provinces. That policy began as far back as the 18th century and manifests itself today in the "One Belt, One Road" development strategy proposed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping to open new trade routes between China and Eurasia. The Burma corridor gives China access to South- and Southeast Asia as well as the entire Indian Ocean region, and has, therefore, always been of utmost strategic importance to whoever is in power in China.

In the 1760s, the Chinese Qing Dynasty launched four military expeditions against Burma in order to occupy the country. The Chinese were driven back after suffering extremely heavy casualties and the successful defense of the Burmese kingdom laid the foundations for today's boundary between the two countries. Burma survived as an independent nation until the arrival of the British in the 19th century. British colonization kept the Chinese even more firmly at bay, however, a new era in bilateral relations was ushered in after Burma became an independent republic on January 4, 1948 and Mao Zedong's communists proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949.

A map of the region during the colonial era. (Photo: Supplied)

After that, relations between China and Burma may be divided into five periods. In the first from 1949 to 1962, Beijing maintained a cautiously cordial but basically friendly relationship with the non-aligned, democratic government of Prime Minister U Nu, which ruled Burma from independence until Gen. Ne Win and the army seized power in a coup d'état on March 2, 1962. In the second period, during the first sixteen years of Ne Win's rule, Beijing actively supported the armed struggle of the insurgent Communist Party of Burma (CPB). China poured more arms and ammunition into the CPB than to any other communist movement in Asia outside Indochina. Following policy changes in China after the death of Mao in 1976, and the return to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the third period began as Beijing sought rapprochement with the government in Rangoon.

At the same time, however, support for the CPB continued albeit on a much reduced scale. The fourth period of relations came after the Burmese military's suppression of a nationwide pro-democracy uprising in Burma in September 1988 and the formation of a junta initially called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and then the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). When Western nations imposed sanctions on Burma, the relationship with China began to be characterized by genuine cooperation as China ramped up economic ties and politically shielded the rights-abusing military regime from international criticism. This arrangement allowed Beijing to make deeper economic and political inroads into Burma than at any previous time.

The fifth period began in 2011, when a new, quasi-civilian government led by former general Thein Sein took over and began to steer the country away from its heavy dependence on China, which had begun to alarm many fiercely nationalistic Burmese army officers. Relations with the West improved—and China's response to this new and unexpected situation came in two different forms: 1) continued support for the Burmese government, and 2) support to certain insurgent groups fighting the regime. This strategy may appear superficially contradictory, but it is a system that, under examination, has its own logic.

China may have transformed its economic system from rigid socialism to free-wheeling capitalism, but politically, it remains an authoritarian one-party state where the Communist Party of China (CPC) is above the government and military. The old policy of maintaining "government-to-government" as well as "party-to-party" relations has not changed. Even while trade with China continues to boom and the Chinese are selling fighters-jets and other military hardware to Burma, "party-to-party" relations continue to be maintained with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the successor to the CPB. The UWSA today is better equipped, with Chinese-supplied weaponry, than the old CPB army ever was. The UWSA serves as a "stick" in China's relationship with Burma while diplomacy and promises of aid, trade, and investment are the "carrot." As China sees it, it cannot simply "hand over" Burma to the West. The country is far too important strategically and economically to the PRC for that to happen.

1949-1962: The "Pauk-Phaw" Years

The relations between China and Burma in the late forties were troubled by a disputed and largely un-demarcated border, illegal immigration into Burma by vast numbers of Chinese laborers, businessmen and even farmers in search of greener pastures, and smuggling. Relations became even more uncertain when large numbers of Nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) troops of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated into Burma's north-eastern hill areas following their defeat in the Chinese civil war.

From clandestine bases in remote border mountains that were not under the control of the central Burmese government, these Kuomintang forces launched a secret war against China's new Communist government, supported by the ROC government on Taiwan, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Thailand. There was a definite possibility of a war between the PRC and the unwilling host to these forces. However, the Sino-Burmese relations that developed from this initial possibility of conflict provides a good example of how a small, comparatively weak country worked to preserve its independence and neutrality in dealing with the largest and then most powerful nation in Asia. Burma's independent foreign policy vis-Ă -vis China was all the more remarkable considering that successive Chinese governments, regardless of their political nature, always considered Burma to be a vassal state and the pre-colonial Burmese kings often had to send tribute missions to the Chinese Emperor.

A breakthrough came in early 1953 when Burma decided to take the matter of the Kuomintang presence on its soil to the United Nations. Prior to that, the fledgling Burma Army had fought several decisive battles against the Kuomintang, which clearly demonstrated that these guests were not camping on Burmese territory with the consent of the government in Rangoon. On April 22, 1953 the UN adopted a resolution demanding that the Kuomintang lay down their arms and leave Burma. Although thousands of Nationalist Chinese soldiers were evacuated to Taiwan, the UN resolution was thwarted as Rangoon was unable to stop the provision of reinforcements to remaining forces via secret airstrips in north-eastern Burma in aircraft provided by the CIA.

Regardless, the U Nu government had made its point, and on April 22, 1954, the PRC and Burma for the first time signed a bilateral trade agreement. On June 28-29, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Burma at the invitation of the Burmese government and held talks with U Nu. A joint Sino-Burmese declaration was signed by the two leaders on June 29, endorsing the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence": Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equal and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence.

Even though this policy was labeled pauk-phaw, in reality, Burma adopted a neutral stand on foreign policy, with the ultimate aim of preventing China from interfering in its internal affairs. The concept pauk-phaw relied on a deeply asymmetrical "friendship" between China—a huge and often threatening regional superpower—and Burma, a much smaller country on its periphery. The first years of Burmese independence were marked by widespread insurgencies, and the CPB was one of the major rebel forces. Although the CPB had strong Maoist tendencies as early as the fifties, Beijing refrained from supporting it.

The next issue to settle was the disputed Sino-Burmese border, which U Nu discussed in detail during a September 1956 visit to China. He returned with a tentative plan for a settlement that called for Chinese recognition of Burmese sovereignty over the so-called Namwan Assigned Tract in exchange for ceding to China three villages in Kachin State: Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang. China also pledged to recognize Burmese claims on the remainder of the 1,357-mile frontier.

U Nu's concessions provoked protests from both Burmese politicians and ethnic groups such as the Kachin, who rose up in rebellion in 1961 as a direct result of the border talks with China. However, negotiations continued for nearly four years until an agreement was eventually signed on January 28, 1960.

In 1958, U Nu was forced to hand over power to a military caretaker government, headed by army chief General Ne Win, who concluded the border agreement and signed a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression with China. In addition to the three Kachin villages (59 square miles), Ne Win also ceded the Panhung-Panglao area of the northern Wa Hills (173 square miles). In return, the Namwan area (85 square miles), which for all practical purposes was part of Burma anyway, formally became Burmese territory. More importantly, though, China did renounce all its claims to areas in northern Kachin State. Until that time, Chinese maps had shown the border to be just north of the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina and Taiwanese (ROC) maps still show the border at that point, since Taipei has never recognized any agreements signed between the communist government in Beijing and other nations.

Following a general election in February-March 1960, U Nu returned to power. With the border now demarcated, Burma launched a new offensive against the Kuomintang forces in north-eastern Burma the following year. This time, thousands of Chinese troops of the Chinese Communist Party's People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also crossed the border into Burma near the town of Mong Yang north of Kengtung in eastern Shan state, where the Kuomintang maintained a major base. Mong Pa Liao, another Kuomintang base near Burma's border with Laos, was also attacked in a campaign that was clearly coordinated with the Burmese military. It is reasonable to assume that this was part of the new "friendship agreement" between the PRC and Burma as well, although it has never been admitted officially.

Tomorrow: Part 2. 'Brothers no More'

Bertil Lintner is an award-winning journalist and author who specializes in Burma. This article was originally published here by The Project 2049 Institute, a policy group based in the US.

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National News

National News


Territorial sea law needs input

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 01:34 PM PDT

The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw meeting was told that Myanmar's Territorial Sea and Sea Zones Bill needs to be refined before a final draft can be tabled.

Six-pronged strategy aims to prevent, reduce crime in Mandalay Region: Minister

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 01:30 PM PDT

Beefing up security in the Mandalay Region is being given top priority, according to Colonel Myo Min Aung, minister for Security and Border Affairs.

Colleges to be upgraded, award degrees

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 01:26 PM PDT

Education colleges will be upgraded to degree-level institutions this academic year, according to the Higher Education Department.

Student protests college expulsion

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 01:23 PM PDT

Ko Zaw Ye Htut, who was expelled from the Sagaing Education College, said he will protest if the ministry does not allow him to attend classes.

Myanmar moves higher in global peace index, says think-tank

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 01:19 PM PDT

Myanmar has moved 10 notches higher in the Global Peace Index (GPI), performing better than its neighbours Thailand and China, even as it struggles to make peace with ethnic armed groups that are waging a decades-old war with the government, said an international peace think-tank.

State Counsellor to meet Canadian PM

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 01:16 PM PDT

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will travel to Canada this week to consult with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on constitutional reforms, his office announced on June 2.

NLD CEC meeting focuses on return of lands

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 01:10 PM PDT

The Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the National League for Democracy (NLD) met at Sibin guest house in Nay Pyi Taw on Sunday to discuss the return of acquired lands, secretary U Win Htein said.

Joint ceasefire committee will not support independent monitors

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 01:02 PM PDT

The Joint Monitoring Committee-Union (JMC-U), the authorised body to monitor ceasefire breaches, said it will not support ceasefire monitoring activities by civil society groups (CSOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs) because they create confusion in the official monitoring mechanism.

Officials consider ways to halt rise in smoking, tobacco use

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 12:59 PM PDT

Although officials are trying to bring down tobacco use and decrease smoking in the country, it remains high, say experts.

Withdraw bail for couple accused of torture: lawyer

Posted: 04 Jun 2017 12:54 PM PDT

The lawyer for a maid who was allegedly tortured by a couple, will ask the Amarapura township court to withdraw the bail it granted to the accused.