The Irrawaddy Magazine |
- American, 2 Others Held over Marijuana Plantation in Mandalay Division
- The Wa Flex Their Muscles on The Hill
- Three Dead During Military Detention in N. Rakhine
- Irrawaddy Gov’t to Sue Foundation to Reclaim Missing 1.8 Billion Kyats
- Prison Strikes and Riot Following ‘Unfair’ Presidential Pardon
- ‘China Doesn’t Want to be Perceived as an Enemy’
- Delayed Repatriation Risks Breeding Rohingya Terrorists: Bangladesh Official
- Sri Lanka Warned of Threat Hours Before Suicide Attacks — Sources
- Thai Election Commission Moves to Disqualify Anti-Junta Politician
- Facebook’s Flood of Languages Leaves it Struggling to Monitor Content
| American, 2 Others Held over Marijuana Plantation in Mandalay Division Posted: 24 Apr 2019 07:56 AM PDT MANDALAY—A U.S. citizen was among three people detained under the Anti-Narcotics Law for allegedly operating a marijuana plantation in Mandalay Division's Myotha Industrial Park, the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) said on Wednesday. The committee said U.S. citizen John Fredric Todoroki, 63, was arrested with Ko Shane Latt, 37, and Ma Shunlae Myat Noe, 23, while another American, Alexander Skemp Todoroki, 49, was still at large. The announcement said that the four responsible for the marijuana plantation. Three detainees were arrested with over 300,000 marijuana plants, 380 kg of marijuana seeds, formic acid, acetone, acetonitrile concort water, methonal liquid, 270.5 kg of dried marijuana and related chemicals and materials at the 20-acre plantation of III M Global Nutracetical Company, located in Myotha Industrial park of Myinchan District, Mandalay Division. The arrest followed a report widely circulated among Burmese netizens on Facebook about the alleged marijuana plantation earlier this week. On Wednesday morning, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced that a team of police, anti-narcotics officers and officials from the FDA went to the plantation to conduct an investigation and found hemp-like plants believed to have the same content as marijuana. The announcement of the ministry also said that some chemicals and materials were seized and the plantation is believed to have been planted for medical usage to cure cancer. According to the ministry, about 60 acres of land for plantation were leased from Mandalay Myotha Industrial Development Public Co.,Ltd (MMID) by U.S. citizens John Fredric, Thomas and Alexandra Skemp. Daw Ni Ni Aye, the Director of the FDA, who went to the plantation, also told The Irrawaddy that the seized materials and the plants are under investigation by the anti-narcotics team. "The manager there said the plantation was set up to do \research for medicinal purposes to cure cancer. For that they will need permission. Now, we found they are producing oil from the plants," said Daw Ni Ni Aye. "However, to do the laboratory test is out of the FDA's hands; it has not become medicine yet, so the anti-narcotics team is handling it," she said. In Myanmar, the plantation of marijuana is illegal. The legality of planting hemp is unclear. The post American, 2 Others Held over Marijuana Plantation in Mandalay Division appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| The Wa Flex Their Muscles on The Hill Posted: 24 Apr 2019 07:46 AM PDT PANGHSANG, Wa Self-Administered Zone—U Than Soe Naing, a former Communist Party of Burma member, was impressed to see how much Panghsang had changed since he and his comrades stayed there in the 1980s when they fought against the socialist regime led by General Ne Win. "It's impressive," said the 73-year-old, who now lives in Yangon, upon his return to the town after three decades of absence. Many ex-CPB members who returned to attend the United Wa State Army (UWSA)'s 30th anniversary celebration felt the same. Thirty years ago this town on the Chinese border, now the site of the UWSA's headquarters, was a small village of clay houses and dirt roads with no electricity and very few vehicles. Soldiers, CPB politburo members and Wa and Shan villagers strolled around its streets. Since then, Panghsang's residents have seen dramatic changes after Wa leaders reached their first ceasefire agreement with Myanmar's ruling regime, then known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). There have been no serious clashes between Myanmar and Wa forces since then.  In contrast to the Shan village it was in the 1980s, Wa police now direct traffic and visitors can see Chinese-style shop houses, hotels, casinos and small and medium-sized shopping malls. Underground cables are in place, and luxury four-wheel drive cars ply the roads. There is a taxi service, well-constructed paved roads, nightlife entertainment and Chinese restaurants. Located in northeastern Shan State, Panghsang remains isolated, however. Aside from the many Chinese visitors from across the border, there are no tourists on the streets and very few Westerners have been there. Despite the beauty and landscape of the region, Wa leaders are reluctant to allow tourists to come and see it and anyone who does visit must be cleared by both the Myanmar and Wa authorities. According to the Myanmar government, the Wa region is still a restricted area, so foreigners need permission to visit. Panghsang itself is now indistinguishable from any Chinese city; even the shops signs are all in Chinese. But this area is part of Myanmar, known officially as the Wa Self-Administered Zone. The population of Panghsang includes several of Myanmar's ethnic groups including Wa, Shan, Lahu, Akha and Palaung. There are also sizable Bamar and Panthay Muslim communities living in some quarters. With a population of around 500,000, Wa region may be off limits to tourism but it is expected that in the near future many more Chinese investors and migrants will flock in. Wa leaders have transformed this little village into a bustling city. There are many ongoing construction projects and in the next 10 years the city will no doubt undergo many more changes, with new infrastructure projects connecting northern ethnic cities along the border with China and Thailand.  The promise of economic prosperity has seen a steady stream of economic migrants from Shan State and central Myanmar arriving in Panghsang, where they can earn more money and save more. As soon as we entered the Wa region, the roads improved compared to those on the Myanmar-controlled side. The ride from Mong Mao Township to Panghsang on the highland road constructed by a Chinese company is surprisingly smooth. Chinese is an official language in the Wa region, and residents use Chinese currency, the WeChat Chinese social media application, and Chinese mobile networks. However, the Wa are not Chinese—they are a Mon-Khmer-speaking group whose closest ethnic relatives in Myanmar would be the Palaung or the Mon. But they have definitely compromised and are paying a heavy price for being too close to China. Once you arrive in town, you feel you are visiting China, not Myanmar; Chinese and Wa are the most commonly used languages, though you can hear Burmese in some quarters. Recently, however, Wa authorities ordered that shop signs must be displayed in three languages: Chinese, Wa and Burmese. This was interpreted by many in Panghsang as a signal that the Wa region is still under Myanmar sovereignty. The Mutiny of 1989 In February 1989, CPB leaders faced a mutiny as Wa leaders seized its headquarters. The CPB leaders, who were mostly Burman, fled to China unharmed. CPB leaders captured the Wa hills as early as the 1970s but after the mutiny they took sanctuary in China.  Since then the former CPB has split along ethnic lines into four different forces. The Wa region was designated as a special region along with those of the Kokang and some other ethnic groups. Subsequently, the ethnic Wa minority was among the groups who reached a ceasefire with the SLORC military regime. General Khin Nyunt, the highly feared intelligence chief and Secretary 1 of the SLORC, led the negotiations and reached a ceasefire deal with several ethnic groups in the north including the Wa. Gen. Khin Nyunt's faction assisted the Wa region with development aid, building schools and hospitals and sending supplies there. The Wa enjoyed a special relationship with the Gen. Khin Nyunt-led faction and still see him as the godfather of peace in the region. Even today, Wa leaders speak fondly about Gen. Khin Nyunt, who has been accused of turning a blind eye to illicit trade in the region. Since the collapse of the CPB and the ceasefire deal with the regime, Chinese investment has surged and cross-border trade has skyrocketed. Prosperous China stands behind the Wa region and there is no doubt that the Wa have benefited from China's economic growth since the time that Beijing, under paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, launched many changes including its open market economic policy. Chinese companies from Yunnan in particular have developed strong business ties with the Wa and other ethnic groups and have been involved in mining, logging, crop substitution and many construction businesses; to engage in these businesses one doesn't need approval from the central government of Myanmar. Since the ceasefire the Wa have had no serious clashes with the Myanmar Army. In fact, they fought alongside Myanmar troops against drug lord Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army.  Khun Sa surrendered to Myanmar authorities in 1996. In 1999, Gen. Khin Nyunt allowed the United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army to relocate over 80,000 Wa villagers to southern Shan State along the border with Thailand across from Chiang Rai province. This area became the "southern Wa region" known as Mong Yawn. The area is controlled by warlord and senior UWSA commander Wei Hsueh-kang, who is still wanted by the U.S. on drug-trafficking charges. Today, Wei is still at large. But he is extremely wealthy (some in Wa circles claim that he is a billionaire businessman and he is believed to have investments in China). The shadowy figure asked Wa leaders not to publish any of his photos in official versions of a book published to mark the UWSA's 30th anniversary. He remains a mysterious figure and the subject of much speculation. He lives in Panghsang and frequently travels to the southern Wa region and China. Researchers' repeated requests to visit the southern Wa region are routinely denied. The area is also believed to be a main center of yaba and crystal meth production. Wa leaders now say they want to improve their image. They claim to have banned the drug trade and insist they now invest in rubber and tea plantations, tin mining and cross-border trade. Cross-border trade between Wa and China in Panghsang is worth more than US$1 billion. In recent interviews, Wa leaders have tried to show that the wealth they are building is not based on drugs. But this hasn't convinced skeptics and some other observers; in Myanmar, many militias and ethnic armed groups are implicated in the drug trade—this is a simple fact. Many ethnic armed groups in the north, including the Wa, are heavily involved in illicit trades including drugs; not surprisingly, improvements in infrastructure in recent decades have also facilitated this lucrative business, which is worth billions of dollars.  According to a recent report from the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) titled "Fire and Ice: Conflict and drugs in Myanmar’s Shan State", "Good infrastructure, proximity to precursor supplies from China and safe havens provided by pro-government militias and in rebel-held enclaves have also made it a major global source of high purity crystal meth." The report goes on to say, "There is comparatively little direct violence between drugs trade actors, who prefer stability. But lucrative revenues earned by various armed actors are helping to fund and sustain Myanmar's 70-year-old civil conflicts," the ICG report said. The drug trade is no doubt a main source of revenue for armed groups and militias. The ICG cites "huge profits fueling greater militarization in Shan State", thereby undermining the peace process. Indeed, militias allied with the Myanmar Army and ethnic armed groups in the north are involved in producing crystal meth and yaba, and the profits are likely to be several billion dollars per year. According to the ICG report, "a significant proportion of these profits may remain outside Myanmar, laundered through casinos in border zones and kept in bank accounts in regional financial centers." One can see ongoing construction projects in Panghsang and in surrounding areas. They are civilian and military facilities; more and more upscale villas have been built in recent years, visitors have noted. Military vehicles are busy and soldiers are always moving to unknown destinations and undergoing training. In restricted military areas one gets the impression that the Wa are definitely digging in. Ups and Downs with Central Gov't Relations between Myanmar authorities and Wa leaders deteriorated in late 2000. Gen. Khin Nyunt was purged in 2004 and the entire intelligence apparatus was terminated. In April 2009, the regime's leaders announced a plan to transform ethnic armed groups into the Border Guard Force, or BGF. Some ethnic groups agreed to the proposal but the Wa and other ethnic groups such as the Kokang (known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army or MNDAA), and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) refused. The Kokang are the Wa's closest allies. The Kachin and Wa are still competitors, but both belong to the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), the alliance of groups based in the north established by the Wa in April 2017.  In the past, the Wa's sweet deal with Gen. Khin Nyunt saw the region receive aid and development assistance from Myanmar, including the stationing of teachers and nurses there. But there have been restrictions on the Wa region since the outbreak of its conflict with the MNDAA in 2015. The conflict erupted in February 2015 when MNDAA troops tried and failed to retake the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. The Myanmar Army suspected the Wa of helping the MNDAA fight against Myanmar troops. Since then, rice, cooking oil and other goods have not been allowed to enter the Wa region. Wa leaders bitterly complain that the central government and military have imposed sanctions on the region. "This is part of the 'four cuts' campaign," a senior Wa leader told The Irrawaddy, referring to the military's infamous four cuts counterinsurgency strategy. Nonetheless, social and cultural connections with central Myanmar remain. Wa leaders send their children to study in Yangon and Mandalay. Currently, over 300 Wa students are studying in Yangon. Wa leaders also feel that in negotiations with Myanmar they need to speak Burmese, some ex-CPB observers noted. Perhaps the new generation of Wa is trying to catch up by learning Burmese and integrating. The establishment of the FPNCC by the Wa was a bold political move. The bloc comprises seven ethnic armed groups: the UWSA, KIA, MNDAA, Ta'ang National Liberation Army, Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army, National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and Arakan Army. The UWSA serves as the chair of the FPNCC and has built liaison offices for all member groups at a base in Panghsang.  Since the formation of a new group known as the "Northern Alliance" they have entered several rounds of talks with the government and military leaders, but so far there has been no breakthrough. But Wa leaders quietly say they don’t have to sign the NCA, as they reached a ceasefire agreement 30 years ago, and just want to be involved in the decision-making process in political dialogues and peace conferences, as other NCA signatories are. As a rule, non-NCA signatories are merely observers and not allowed to make decisions in dialogues. The government and military refuse to allow the MNDAA, AA and TNLA, which are relatively new groups, to participate in the peace talks. The Myanmar Army refuses to recognize new armed groups set up during the government led by former President U Thein Sein. In any case, these three groups have received strong backing from the Wa. Among the FPNCC members the Wa are the heavyweights; it is hardly surprising that many in the alliance secretly admire the Wa's rising power and its self-administrative political system. For instance, the Arakan Army leaders have said openly they want to obtain for Rakhine State a confederate status similar to the one the Wa region has. But Kachin leaders prefer equality and federalism, and it is not certain that the Wa have complete trust in the Kachin. Among the Northern Alliance groups, the Kachin have strong connections with the West. Military Strength The UWSA has 30,000 soldiers and 20,000 auxiliary troops, making it one of the strongest ethnic armies in Myanmar. Wa leaders now want to equip their forces with even more sophisticated weapons.  Journalists and visitors are not allowed to visit military camps and bases in the Wa region. This is understandable, but we managed to observe during our visit that the Wa have been purchasing more weapons from China and are also producing heavy weapons in their own factories. Chinese technicians are invited to provide advanced training in the production of artillery and other weapons. Informed sources said the Wa produce 122-mm howitzers in their own factories. They have also hired Chinese military drone specialists. Panghsang reportedly has three helipads where Myanmar government and military officials' helicopters land when they visit. In the past, U.K.-based Jane's Defense Weekly reported that China delivered several Mil Mi-17 "Hip" helicopters (some reports said five helicopters) to the UWSA in late February and early March 2013, citing sources from the Myanmar government and the military wing of an ethnic rebel group. Mid-ranking Wa officials we spoke to would neither confirm nor deny the report, but informed sources close to the Wa said it is highly unlikely, as the Myanmar armed forces would never allow ethnic insurgents to operate helicopters or jet fighters in its air space.  Myanmar bought 16 Joint Fighter-17 (JF-17) aircraft from Pakistan to protect its air space to deter foreign threats. The JF-17 Thunder (also named the FC-1 Xiaolong) multi-role fighter was developed by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) of China and is jointly manufactured by Pakistan and China. Myanmar Army leaders are also buying more advanced jet fighters from Russia. According to news reports, Russia has begun assembling six Su-30SM fighters for the Myanmar Air Force. But Wa leaders are flexing their muscles. As the region's prosperity grows, some Wa leaders have begun thinking about acquiring sophisticated military drones and helicopters. But the Wa will no doubt ask for training and support from Chinese technicians. Some observers also believe the Wa will keep some of its heavy weapons in neighboring countries such as Laos. Intelligence reports suggest the Wa are building a small airfield between Mongmao and Panghsang. In the past, any suspicions that the Wa might be building an airfield in their region would prompt the Myanmar Army and officials involved in peace talks to immediately ask the Wa to stop the construction project.  The UWSA was expected to flex its military muscles during the parade on April 17 by showing off its arsenal. According to Asia Times, the UWSA's arsenal includes new batches of basic infantry systems fielded in the CPB era: light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars, and recoilless rifles. But there are other entirely new systems and these include more modern Chinese infantry weapons such as the QBZ-95 assault rifle only adopted in bulk by the People's Liberation Army in the early 2000s. The new QBZ-95 has been acquired to supplement locally produced Wa copies of the Chinese T-81 assault rifle. Modern Chinese CS/LS06 9mm sub-machine guns and M-99 12.7mm anti-materiel rifles also mark new additions to the Wa arsenal, Asia Times reported. The UWSA has also installed an air defense system, which incorporates radar stations and MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems) and bought anti-tank missiles. According to an Asia Times article published a few weeks ago, "The acquisition of new tactical trucks and, more strikingly, China's Xinxing (New Star) wheeled armored personnel carriers (APCs) have given a new boost to infantry mobility." However, in spite of the high expectations that the Wa would show off its latest purchases of arms and weapons at the 30th anniversary, it was a surprisingly modest show of force. A senior Wa officer told The Irrawaddy, "We are not so imprudent as to show our weapons at the anniversary," then smiled and walked away. The UWSA definitely doesn't want to make it easy for the Myanmar generals to estimate its strength. This is seen as a wily decision by the Wa, who are eager to shed their image as "wild tribesmen and headhunters" and demonstrate that they are no longer prone to acting in an ill-advised manner. Indeed, the UWSA now routinely hires Chinese military advisers, many of them retired defense industry employees.  So what do they want? Separation or autonomy? Even if the Wa declared itself separate from Myanmar, China would not accept it, so this move is unlikely. China can't afford to antagonize the government and military in Naypyitaw, which would be at odds with its interest in building stronger economic and geopolitical strategic ties with Myanmar. The Chinese, who are now playing the role of "peace broker" between the Myanmar government and ethnic armed groups, will be happy to keep the Wa—whom they view as indispensable and a "little brother"—as a buffer on the border. Wa leaders know they can't entirely trust China. Each time Myanmar generals pay a visit to Beijing, they are anxious and agitated. Before the Wa anniversary, Myanmar military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited Beijing, where he held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. He also met with Central Military Commission member and Joint Staff chief Genera Li Zuocheng, held talks with leaders of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and toured training schools, factories and other significant places. This move no doubt agitated Wa leaders. Even at the 30th anniversary, Wa leaders were anxiously awaiting final confirmation that Sun Guoxiang, special envoy for Asian affairs of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would show up. But the Chinese did show up at the last minute, so the Wa and other ethnic alliance members were happy. During the celebration, Wa leader and commander-in-chief Bao Youxiang demanded autonomy for his region. "What we need is ethnic equality, ethnic dignity, ethnic autonomy, and we ask the government to give the Wa an autonomous ethnic state; then we will fight for our lives." He added: "Until our political demands are realized, we will hold high the banner of peace and democracy on one hand, and armed self-defense on the other, and maintain the status quo." The Wa no longer feel like outcasts, but declare their presence with full pride. This is going to be a serious challenge to Naypyitaw. They will keep building their forces as leverage in negotiations with the Myanmar government and military, neither of whom are trusted by the Wa. The message is clear: There will be no surrender. The Wa want to improve upon the status quo. In order to negotiate from a position of strength—and not necessarily to fight—they feel they must build up the strongest army they can. Aung Zaw is the founder and editor-in-chief of The Irrawaddy. The post The Wa Flex Their Muscles on The Hill appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Three Dead During Military Detention in N. Rakhine Posted: 24 Apr 2019 05:38 AM PDT YANGON — The bodies of three men from northern Rakhine's Mrauk-U Township, who had been arrested and detained by the Myanmar military, have turned up at Sittwe General Hospital in recent days, according to a member of the local parliament and other local sources. Military spokesperson Brig-Gen Zaw Min Tun from the Office of the Commander-in Chief confirmed they were part of a group of 27 people arrested by government troops in Mrauk-U Township's Let Kar Village on April 10. They army accused them of having connections with AA. The arrests follow an AA attack on two Myanmar military artillery positions on April 9 in which the AA claims at least 20 Myanmar soldiers were killed. The military spokesperson told The Irrawaddy Burmese edition on Wednesday that the three locals—Zaw Myo Tun, 25, Thein Tun Sein, 35, and Maung Than Nu, 41—died of heart attack, suicide and drug addiction withdrawal. "The cases have been filed at the police station," he added. A staff member from Sittwe General Hospital confirmed that the bodies had been transported to the hospital in recent days. When The Irrawaddy's Sittwe correspondent went to meet the hospital's superintendent he refused to answer questions, saying he is not authorized to speak to the media. On April 10, Myanmar's military announced a list of 23 suspects who were being held for having connections with the AA. On Wednesday, the military spokesperson confirmed that a total of 27 people were arrested. A few days later unverified information circulated on Facebook claiming one of the detainees had been killed during interrogation. Regional lawmaker U Tun Thar Sein of the Rakhine state parliament said that on hearing about the incident he informed state house speaker U San Kyaw Hla and called for an inquiry via the state's border affairs minister Col. Phone Tint. U Tun Thar Sein and the relatives of the dead had not yet seen their bodies as of Wednesday and had been given no explanation as to the cause of the death of their loved ones. He said the border affairs minister Col. Phone Tint did not disclose information on the results of the postmortem examination of the bodies. The Irrawaddy was unable to reach the family members of the dead as most of them do not own phones. U Tun Thar Sein said that following the news of the suspicious deaths while in detention, the family members of the 24 other detainees are now overwhelmingly concerned for the safety of those still in detention. As of Wednesday, the military has not announced where the detainees are being held or whether they are in prisons or interrogation camps. The post Three Dead During Military Detention in N. Rakhine appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Irrawaddy Gov’t to Sue Foundation to Reclaim Missing 1.8 Billion Kyats Posted: 24 Apr 2019 04:31 AM PDT PATHEIN, Irrawaddy Region—The Irrawaddy regional government is planning to sue a local foundation, led by ministers of the previous government, that failed to fully comply with an order to return missing development funds. The Ayeyarwady Health and Education Multi-Developments Foundation, previously known as the Ayeyarwady Multi-Developments Foundation, was ordered by the regional government to return a total of 5.2 billion kyats that former Irrawaddy Region Chief Minister U Thein Aung allegedly transferred to the foundation before handing power to the new administration in early 2016. The previous administration raised development funds by organizing concerts and soliciting contributions from local businesses. The foundation last November returned some 3.4 billion kyats to the current government, and has yet to return nearly 1.8 billion kyats, regional officials said. "We have given them enough time to return the money. We will sue the responsible persons of the foundation within a few days, and we have sought legal advice," Irrawaddy Regional Minister for Planning and Finance U Htay Win told The Irrawaddy. The investigation into the missing funds started after U Zayar Min Thein, a lawmaker representing Pyapon (1) constituency in the local legislature, asked the Irrawaddy Parliament in 2016 whether the previous administration had handed over the regional development funds to the new government. On instructions from the President's Office, the Auditor General's Office carried out an investigation and reported back that the funds should be reclaimed from the foundation. The Auditor General's Office discovered that the foundation had deposited nearly 4 billion kyats with private banks, invested around 400 million kyats in joint ventures with three private companies, and lent nearly 1 billion kyats for 28 regional development projects. The President's Office then instructed the current regional government to reclaim the funds. The foundation offered to provide records of the savings accounts, accounts receivable and loan contracts, but the current administration insisted that the funds be returned in cash. U Kyi Aung, secretary of the foundation, said when the Ayeyarwady Multi-Developments Foundation assumed its current form, it was only given cash and accounts receivable. "So, we can only give back cash and accounts receivable. If they sue us, we will face it. What else can we do?" said U Kyi Aung. While the regional government says the foundation still has to return nearly 1.8 billion kyats, the foundation says the outstanding amount is only 1.6 billion kyats—800 million kyats of which it lent to businessmen, and another 800 million kyats of which it spent on rural electrification and regional development works. Irrawaddy Regional Minister for Electricity, Industry and Transportation U Win Htay said 3.4 billion kyats returned to the current government will be used to upgrade bridges in the region in fiscal 2019-20. "We will upgrade 34 bamboo bridges into permanent structures in fiscal 2019-20," the minister said. The post Irrawaddy Gov't to Sue Foundation to Reclaim Missing 1.8 Billion Kyats appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Prison Strikes and Riot Following ‘Unfair’ Presidential Pardon Posted: 24 Apr 2019 03:06 AM PDT YANGON—Inmates at Shwebo Prison and Mopalin Labor Camp have staged demonstrations and called for a review after they were excluded from this year's presidential pardons. The demonstrations were mainly staged by those serving their time under articles 15 and 16 of the 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law. The demonstration at Shwebo Prison in Sagaing Region on Monday morning, which called for equality in the presidential pardon, led to a prison-wide riot. The region's chief minister and lawmakers met the inmates at their request, according to U Moe Kyaw Thu, a lawmaker in Shwebo Township, Sagaing Region. "They complained that they missed out while others who were given the same punishment under same charge, articles 15 and 16 of the drug law, were granted presidential pardons. Therefore, they feel it is unfair, and called for a review. The chief minister will report it to the President's Office," said the lawmaker who negotiated with inmates following the prison riot. Last Wednesday, President U Win Myint pardoned 9,551 prisoners, including two political prisoners and 16 foreigners, under the New Year amnesty granted every April. Most of the prisoners released were serving long sentences on convictions related to illicit drugs, according to U Min Tun Soe, deputy director and spokesperson of the Myanmar Prisons Department under the Ministry of Home Affairs. "They staged a demonstration because they were not released while others were. Their demands have been presented to the President's Office," U Yu Lwin Aung, a member of Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC), told The Irrawaddy. The riot that broke out at the Ward 1 of Shwebo Prison at around 8:30 a.m. on Monday quickly spread to other wards. Around 720 inmates from Shwebo Prison were released under the presidential pardon on April 17, and there are around 1,000 inmates in the prison at present, said U Moe Kyaw Thu. Around 400 inmates in Mon State's Mopalin Labor Camp also held a strike due to what they are calling inequality in the presidential pardon. The MNHRC met them on Friday. "I'm concerned that such riots will spread to other prisons and motivate hardened criminals," said U Moe Kyaw Thu. Inmates in Mopalin demonstrated for the same reason as fellow inmates who were serving the same term for same offences were released. The post Prison Strikes and Riot Following 'Unfair' Presidential Pardon appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| ‘China Doesn’t Want to be Perceived as an Enemy’ Posted: 24 Apr 2019 02:58 AM PDT From the Myitsone Dam in the country's northern Kachin State, to the Muse-Mandalay railway project running through northern Shan State into the Irrawaddy valley, to the Kyaukphyu deep sea port on the country's western coast at the Bay of Bengal, Myanmar is one of China's most important strategic partners in its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While some BRI projects here are still in the planning stages, others are already underway and some of these are surrounded by intense controversy, including the stalled Myitsone hydropower project. With Myanmar State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's arrival in Beijing on Wednesday to attend the second Belt and Road Forum, Chinese projects in Myanmar will surely be on the agenda when she meets Chinese President Xi Jinping. Ahead of the meeting, The Irrawaddy's Nan Lwin talks to Yun Sun, co-director of the East Asia program and director of the China program at the Stimson Center, about issues surrounding Belt and Road projects in Myanmar and the future of China-Myanmar relations. Myanmar State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is scheduled to attend the second Belt and Road Forum. As BRI projects face rising resistance in many countries due to "debt trap" fears, Myanmar is expected to sign agreements on a number of megaprojects, including the Muse-Mandalay high-speed railway, during the trip. Do you think Myanmar is the latest victim of China's "debt-trap diplomacy"? Myanmar has been highly alert and sensitive toward Chinese projects that could have major potential financial security implications. The [downsizing] of the Kyaukpyau deep sea port is a good example at hand. Without seeing the terms of the new projects, it is very hard to speculate as to whether they are going to put Myanmar in "debt traps." I also personally do not agree with the "debt trap" narrative. "Trap" by itself suggests intention—that China intentionally set up traps for others to jump in. I don't think it is the case here. And if they are indeed traps, why would Myanmar even consider them knowing that it will be trapped. Myanmar also has a well-developed civil society and media monitoring these types of projects. It is difficult to imagine that these megaprojects will escape public question and scrutiny. The previous Thein Sein administration was the rockiest period for China-Myanmar relations, particularly due to the suspension of the Myitsone hydropower project. What is your opinion on China-Myanmar relations under the National League for Democracy (NLD) administration? The relationship has been quite good since the NLD took over. China believes that it has regained influence in Myanmar, maybe not to the level during the junta years, but at least China is once again the most influential player in Myanmar. [Daw] Aung San Suu Kyi has been trying to build good ties with China, attested by her many visits to Beijing, her participation in the BRI forums and other high-profile events. China is also able to maintain good ties and strong influence over the Burmese military. Looking at current Chinese involvement in Myanmar's peace process and its economy, what is the future of China's role in Myanmar economics and politics? It depends on what role Myanmar is willing to let China play. For example, if the Burmese people believe that Chinese projects bring them economic development, they will be more receptive to a bigger role for China. As for domestic politics, I don't think China aims at dominating or determining the future of Myanmar's politics. As long as China's interests are covered, I don't think Beijing really cares about who is in power in the country.  Myanmar successfully renegotiated the Kyaukphyu SEZ (special economic zone) agreement. Government officials claim there is no risk of a debt trap under the new agreement terms. The deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu is a potential hub for China that would give it direct access to the Indian Ocean and allow its oil imports to bypass the Strait of Malacca. Apart from debt risks, what are the other problematic issues when it comes to Kyaukphyu? What has surprised me is how long the negotiation has taken. At this rate, any projects signed between China and Myanmar will take an exceedingly long time to implement. It decreases the appeal of Myanmar as a destination for foreign investors. This doesn't mean that Myanmar should rush into any project without understanding and/or eliminating the potentially harmful elements. But it does mean that Myanmar will need to have a better calculation between what it is willing to give and what it wants to take before it goes into the negotiation. Recently, China has become more aggressive in pressuring Kachin leaders and the Myanmar government into reviving the Myitsone hydropower project. Chinese officials have claimed that it is part of the BRI under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor agreement, a claim that's never been heard before now. What are the reasons for China holding the Myitsone project under the BRI umbrella at this time? There are a lot of projects signed [for] before 2013 that were later categorized under BRI, but Myitsone is a special case. Making it a BRI project ostensibly enhances its importance in the Chinese system, implying that China has to push for its resumption because of how important it is. However, anyone who understands the history of the anti-Myitsone sentiment should tread carefully about its resumption. In fact, there have been revised plans to build smaller dams to replace the original mega-dam design. If it is a new design, there is no need to associate the new project with the social stigma of the previous design, hence no need to deem it as a "resumption" of the Myitsone [dam]. Experts speculate that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is going to discuss the most controversial Chinese projects, particularly the Myitsone dam, during her Beijing trip. In your opinion, what solution is most likely to solve the Myitsone issue? [As well as the aforementioned revised plan,] the most face-saving way out for everyone is to transform the project into a new project, better-designed, better serving Myanmar's power needs and with less environmental impact. The disbursed investment from China will be transformed into shares of the new project. If China is interested in moving away from this thorny issue, and moving the bilateral relations forward, which I believe it does, it will be interested in a mutual compromise. China has always stood up for Myanmar on the international stage, especially when it comes to the Rakhine issue, including with its vote against the UN Human Rights Council's move to establish a body to investigate possible genocide in Myanmar. Given that kind of Chinese support, is it difficult for the Myanmar government to turn down controversial Chinese projects in the country at the public's will? I don't think it is hard. China stood [up] for Myanmar during and after the 2017 Rakhine crisis. [Yet] the agreement over Kyaukphyu signed in 2018 still cut the size of the project by 90%. Myanmar still will defend its interests coming to investment projects. That is determined by the democratic system and public supervision of the government. Myanmar is a developing country and half of its existing foreign debt is held by China. Does Myanmar need to impose a certain type of policy for BRI projects and other Chinese investments to avoid an unsustainable debt trap in the country? There is a reason why China holds the largest amount of Burmese debt. Debt traps and lending trap are two sides of the same coin. Lending too much money to Myanmar, which cannot repay the debt, is not a sound financial decision for China either. My suggestion would be for Myanmar to diversify its inward FDI. With competition, the Chinese will have to improve their terms. Myanmar's Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, visited Beijing last week. He told Chinese President Xi that China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative includes a host of projects that could benefit Myanmar and that Myanmar's military is ready to cooperate on implementing them. What is your opinion on this? The Tatmadaw (Myanmar's military) wants a good relationship with China. There is nothing new to it. In the context that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is sweetening ties with China, the Tatmadaw feels the need to catch up and match the civilian government's level of efforts at least. International Growth Center's 2018 report said there is an explicit bias against Chinese investment in Myanmar due to past experiences. The Myitsone issue has again sparked anti-Chinese sentiment among Myanmar citizens even though China said they are changing their policies on the ground, including on public engagement. However, China's new efforts are unsuccessful as the people are still suffering from what they have done in the past. Myanmar people even complain about the NLD government when it comes to considering Chinese investment. What is your opinion on this? Chinese investments in the past did have some negative impacts on the country, but it doesn't mean that China cannot make positive contributions to Myanmar's development down the road. The key is how to monitor and manage the Chinese projects, not how to shut them out. This is particularly true when international investors are deterred by things including the Rakhine crisis. Does the Chinese government need to adopt a new policy when approaching Chinese investments and megaprojects in Myanmar? I think Beijing has. The fact that there have been no new megaprojects signed or implemented in the past several years suggests that China has adopted a new policy of caution and restraint. The Chinese don't want to run into the situation again where China becomes the perceived enemy of Myanmar for its mere commercial interests. That serves nobody's interests. The post 'China Doesn't Want to be Perceived as an Enemy' appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Delayed Repatriation Risks Breeding Rohingya Terrorists: Bangladesh Official Posted: 23 Apr 2019 11:42 PM PDT DHAKA—Bangladesh's top-ranking counterterrorism police official on Tuesday expressed concern that Rohingya children would be at risk of being lured into extremism as they become youths if their repatriation to Myanmar is delayed for too long. Monirul Islam, the chief of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police's Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime Unit, said the presence of the Rohingya presented "a big a problem" for Bangladesh, adding that the government was trying to find a way to send them back to Myanmar "peacefully". "As you know, the senior [UNHCR] officials are coming to Bangladesh. We are optimistic that they [Rohingya] will be repatriated in the shortest possible time," he said at a press conference in the capital. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi, International Organization for Migration Director General António Vitorino and UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock were due to arrive in Bangladesh on Wednesday for a three-day visit. "The aim of the visit is to highlight the need to continue strong international support for the humanitarian response while solutions for the Rohingya are pursued, including the creation of conditions in Myanmar's Rakhine State that would allow for the voluntary, safe and dignified return of refugees to their homes," the UNHCR, IOM and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said in a joint statement. The CTTC chief said international terrorist organizations were targeting vulnerable Rohingya, adding that until they were repatriated, police along with the other security and intelligence agencies would cautiously monitor the situation. "In future, those [Rohingya] who are now children are likely to get involved with extremism…if enough monitoring is not done," Monirul said. So far, Rohingya refugees have not been involved in extremist activities, he said. The UN visit comes a week before a meeting of the Bangladesh-Myanmar Joint Working Group on Rohingya issues in Naypyitaw, which according to Bangladesh diplomats is slated to take place on May 3. There has been no progress in repatriating the Rohingya, after the first attempt to send them back to Myanmar failed in mid-November last year. The UN delegation plans to call on Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen to explore ways in which the international community can provide further support for Bangladesh on the Rohingya issue. The delegation will then travel to Cox's Bazar to meet with the displaced Rohingya, assess preparations for the monsoon season and visit projects to distribute food and provide shelter, among others. They will also talk to Rohingya who are working as volunteers, and observe a UNHCR-Bangladesh government registration exercise to provide identity cards to all displaced people, ensuring their access to aid services and protection as well as establishing their right to return to Myanmar. Dhaka-based daily New Age on Tuesday quoted a senior Bangladesh diplomat as saying UN officials recently had to scale back a survey they had planned to conduct in 120 villages in Rakhine to assess immediate humanitarian needs. The Myanmar authorities allowed the UN to complete the survey in about 50 of the 120 villages, which were spared the Myanmar military's clearance operations in late 2017. More than 730,000 Rohingya have entered Bangladesh since the security operations began on Aug. 25 of that year. Bangladesh and Myanmar signed an instrument on Nov. 23, 2017 to facilitate the repatriation of the Rohingya people in "safety, security and dignity". It covers those who crossed over to Bangladesh from Rakhine State after the events of Oct. 9, 2016, and Aug. 25, 2017. The post Delayed Repatriation Risks Breeding Rohingya Terrorists: Bangladesh Official appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Sri Lanka Warned of Threat Hours Before Suicide Attacks — Sources Posted: 23 Apr 2019 10:25 PM PDT COLOMBO—Sri Lankan intelligence officials were tipped off about an imminent attack by Islamist militants hours before a series of suicide bombings killed more than 300 people on Easter Sunday, three sources with direct knowledge of the matter said. Three churches and four hotels were hit by suicide bombers on Sunday morning, killing 321 people and wounding 500, sending shockwaves through an island state that has been relatively peaceful since a civil war ended a decade ago. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks on Tuesday, without providing evidence of its involvement. Indian intelligence officers contacted their Sri Lankan counterparts two hours before the first attack to warn of a specific threat on churches, one Sri Lankan defense source and an Indian government source said. Another Sri Lankan defense source said a warning came “hours before” the first strike. One of the Sri Lankan sources said a warning was also sent by the Indians on Saturday night. The Indian government source said similar messages had been given to Sri Lankan intelligence agents on April 4 and April 20. Sri Lanka’s presidency and the Indian foreign ministry both did not respond to requests for comment. Sri Lanka’s failure to effectively respond to a looming Islamist threat will fuel fears that a rift between Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and President Maithripala Sirisena is undermining national security. The president fired Wickremesinghe last October over political differences, only to reinstate him weeks later under pressure from the Supreme Court. Opposing factions aligned to Wickremesinghe and Sirisenahave often refuse to communicate with each other and blame any setbacks on their opponents, government sources say. Sri Lankan police had been warned weeks ago about possible attacks by a little-known domestic Islamist group, according to an Indian intelligence report given to Sri Lankan state intelligence services, and seen by Reuters. Sirisena, announcing plans on Tuesday to change the heads of the defense forces, said his office never received the Indian report. Junior Defense Minister Ruwan Wijewardene, an ally of Wickremesinghe, told Reuters that he was also not privy to the Indian intelligence findings. The post Sri Lanka Warned of Threat Hours Before Suicide Attacks — Sources appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Thai Election Commission Moves to Disqualify Anti-Junta Politician Posted: 23 Apr 2019 09:43 PM PDT BANGKOK—Thailand’s Election Commission on Tuesday accused a prominent anti-junta politician of breaching the election law, moving to disqualify him from parliament almost a month after the disputed March 24 election. Rising political star Thanathorn Jungroongruangkit, 40, is accused of holding shares in a media company after registering his candidacy, which would violate the election law. The outcome of the first national election since a 2014 military coup is still unclear. Final results due on May 9 will indicate whether a pro-army party has enough seats to allow junta leader Prayuth Chan-ocha to remain in power. Thanathorn’s progressive, youth-oriented Future Forward Party came third in the election in a surprisingly strong showing. His party has joined an opposition “democratic front” with a party loyal to Thaksin Shinawatra, ousted as prime minister by the military, to try to block Prayuth, who led a 2014 coup against a pro-Thaksin government. The Pheu Thai Party loyal to Thaksin won the most seats in parliament but not a majority. The pro-army Palang Pracharat party came second. Thanathorn, the heir to an auto parts fortune, has brought a new element to Thai politics that have for 15 years been divided between the royalist-military establishment and the populist “red shirts” linked to Thaksin. “The evidence has shown that Thanathorn is the owner or a shareholder of V-Luck Media company,” Sawang Boonmee, deputy secretary-general of the Election Commission, told reporters. “This disqualifies him from having the right to become a candidate for member of parliament based on the constitution and the election law.” Thanathorn has previously denied breaching electoral law, saying he sold his shares in the media company on Jan. 8, prior to registering as a candidate. He has seven days to submit evidence to the Election Commission to refute the allegation. If found guilty, Thanathorn would be banned from running for election for one year. He could also face criminal charges for contesting the election knowing he was ineligible, punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a ban from politics for 20 years. Thanathorn, who was travelling back to Thailand from the Netherlands, posted on Facebook: “I was just told from Thailand to quickly return to prepare for an unexpected situation. See you in Thailand.” Thanathorn faces two other criminal charges, one of sedition for allegedly aiding anti-junta protesters in 2015, and another for cybercrime for a speech he made on Facebook criticizing the junta last year. In a separate legal proceeding, the Thai Supreme Court on Tuesday sentenced former premier Thaksin in absentia to three years in prison for conflict of interest by ordering a state-owned bank to lend money to Myanmar so it could buy products from Thaksin’s own business while he was in office. Thaksin, who was overthrown by the military in 2006 and lives in self-imposed exile, has already been sentenced to two years in prison in a separate 2008 corruption conviction. He said the corruption cases were politically motivated. The post Thai Election Commission Moves to Disqualify Anti-Junta Politician appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Facebook’s Flood of Languages Leaves it Struggling to Monitor Content Posted: 23 Apr 2019 09:19 PM PDT NAIROBI/SAN FRANCISCO—Facebook Inc.’s struggles with hate speech and other types of problematic content are being hampered by the company’s inability to keep up with a flood of new languages as mobile phones bring social media to every corner of the globe. The company offers its 2.3 billion users features such as menus and prompts in 111 different languages, deemed to be officially supported. Reuters has found another 31 widely spoken languages on Facebook that do not have official support. Detailed rules known as “community standards,” which bar users from posting offensive material including hate speech and celebrations of violence, were translated in only 41 languages out of the 111 supported as of early March, Reuters found. Facebook’s 15,000-strong content moderation workforce speaks about 50 tongues, though the company said it hires professional translators when needed. Automated tools for identifying hate speech work in about 30. The language deficit complicates Facebook’s battle to rein in harmful content and the damage it can cause, including to the company itself. Countries including Australia, Singapore and the UK are now threatening harsh new regulations, punishable by steep fines or jail time for executives, if it fails to promptly remove objectionable posts. The community standards are updated monthly and run to about 9,400 words in English. Monika Bickert, the Facebook vice president in charge of the standards, has previously told Reuters that they were “a heavy lift to translate into all those different languages.” A Facebook spokeswoman said this week the rules are translated case by case depending on whether a language has a critical mass of usage and whether Facebook is a primary information source for speakers. The spokeswoman said there was no specific number for critical mass. She said among priorities for translations are Khmer, the official language in Cambodia, and Sinhala, the dominant language in Sri Lanka, where the government blocked Facebook this week to stem rumors about devastating Easter Sunday bombings. A Reuters report found last year that hate speech on Facebook that helped foster ethnic cleansing in Myanmar went unchecked in part because the company was slow to add moderation tools and staff for the local language. Facebook says it now offers the rules in Burmese and has more than 100 speakers of the language among its workforce. The spokeswoman said Facebook’s efforts to protect people from harmful content had “a level of language investment that surpasses most any technology company.” But human rights officials say Facebook is in jeopardy of a repeat of the Myanmar problems in other strife-torn nations where its language capabilities have not kept up with the impact of social media. “These are supposed to be the rules of the road and both customers and regulators should insist social media platforms make the rules known and effectively police them,” said Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia Division. “Failure to do so opens the door to serious abuses.” Abuse in Fijian Mohammed Saneem, the supervisor of elections in Fiji, said he felt the impact of the language gap during elections in the South Pacific nation in November last year. Racist comments proliferated on Facebook in Fijian, which the social network does not support. Saneem said he dedicated a staffer to emailing posts and translations to a Facebook employee in Singapore to seek removals. Facebook said it did not request translations, and it gave Reuters a post-election letter from Saneem praising its “timely and effective assistance.” Saneem told Reuters that he valued the help but had expected pro-active measures from Facebook. “If they are allowing users to post in their language, there should be guidelines available in the same language,” he said. Similar issues abound in African nations such as Ethiopia, where deadly ethnic clashes among a population of 107 million have been accompanied by ugly Facebook content. Much of it is in Amharic, a language supported by Facebook. But Amharic users looking up rules get them in English. At least 652 million people worldwide speak languages supported by Facebook but where rules are not translated, according to data from language encyclopedia Ethnologue. Another 230 million or more speak one of the 31 languages that do not have official support. Facebook uses automated software as a key defense against prohibited content. Developed using a type of artificial intelligence known as machine learning, these tools identify hate speech in about 30 languages and “terrorist propaganda” in 19, the company said. Machine learning requires massive volumes of data to train computers, and a scarcity of text in other languages presents a challenge in rapidly growing the tools, Guy Rosen, the Facebook vice president who oversees automated policy enforcement, has told Reuters. Growth regions Beyond the automation and a few official fact-checkers, Facebook relies on users to report problematic content. That creates a major issue where community standards are not understood or even known to exist. Ebele Okobi, Facebook’s director of public policy for Africa, told Reuters in March that the continent had the world’s lowest rates of user reporting. “A lot of people don’t even know that there are community standards,” Okobi said. Facebook has bought radio advertisements in Nigeria and worked with local organizations to change that, she said. It also has held talks with African education officials to introduce social media etiquette into the curriculum, she said. Simultaneously, Facebook is partnering with wireless carriers and other groups to expand internet access in countries including Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo where it has yet to officially support widely-used languages such as Luganda and Kituba. Asked this week about the expansions without language support, Facebook declined to comment. The company announced in February it would soon have its first 100 sub-Saharan Africa-based content moderators at an outsourcing facility in Nairobi. They will join existing teams in reviewing content in Somali, Oromo and other languages. But the community standards are not translated into Somali or Oromo. Posts in Somali from last year celebrating the al-Shabaab militant group remained on Facebook for months despite a ban on glorifying organizations or acts that Facebook designates as terrorist. “Disbelievers and apostates, die with your anger,” read one post seen by Reuters this month that praised the killing of a Sufi cleric. After Reuters inquired about the post, Facebook said it took down the author’s account because it violated policies. Ability to derail Posts in Amharic reviewed by Reuters this month attacked the Oromo and Tigray ethnic populations in vicious terms that clearly violated Facebook’s ban on discussing ethnic groups using “violent or dehumanizing speech, statements of inferiority, or calls for exclusion.” Facebook removed the two posts Reuters inquired about. The company added that it had erred in allowing one of them, from December 2017, to remain online following an earlier user report. For officials such as Saneem in Fiji, Facebook’s efforts to improve content moderation and language support are painfully slow. Saneem said he warned Facebook months in advance of the election in the archipelago of 900,000 people. Most of them use Facebook, with half writing in English and half in Fijian, he estimated. “Social media has the ability to completely derail an election,” Saneem said. Other social media companies face the same problem to varying degrees. Facebook-owned Instagram said its 1,179-word community guidelines are in 30 out of 51 languages offered to users. WhatsApp, owned by Facebook as well, has terms in nine of 58 supported languages, Reuters found. Alphabet Inc.’s YouTube presents community guidelines in 40 of 80 available languages, Reuters found. Twitter Inc.’s rules are in 37 of 47 supported languages, and Snap Inc.’s in 13 out of 21. “A lot of misinformation gets spread around and the problem with the content publishers is the reluctance to deal with it,” Saneem said. “They do owe a duty of care. “ The post Facebook’s Flood of Languages Leaves it Struggling to Monitor Content appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
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