Shan Herald Agency for News |
- BURMA'S CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT: One text procedure, trustworthiness, area cleansing & control policy
- Opium, Logging and Gas: the Burma Army’s predatory rule over the people of Burma
- BURMA: SURRENDER TIMING
- SSA building homes across the border
| BURMA'S CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT: One text procedure, trustworthiness, area cleansing & control policy Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:43 AM PDT By: Sai Wansai Tuesday, 18 March 2014  Sai Wansai In a recent statement, reported by Xinhua/Global Times, on 10 March 2014, issued at the end of the preliminary meeting between UPWC led by Vice Chairman U Aung Min and NCCT at the Myanmar Peace Centre, both sides agreed to form a team including nine members each from the government and NCCT to draft single text document that includes seven sections. Accordingly, Eleven Media Group's published news on 11 March 2014, a team will be formed with three representatives from the government, three representatives from the parliament, three representatives from the military, and nine members from the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) on behalf of ethnic armed groups, to draft the ceasefire agreement together. "The government and ourselves have different ceasefire drafts. We submitted the Law Khee Lar draft. The government also has its own draft, so both sides were holding onto their own drafts. As it was difficult to negotiate like this, we have agreed to draft a new agreement by forming a new group with people from both sides," said Naing Han Tha aka Nai Hong Sar, leader of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT). DVB report of 10 March also said that Ministers Khin Yi (Immigration), Thet Naing Win (Border Affairs) and Lt-Gen Myint Soe of the Ministry of Defence were present at the meeting, alongside NCCT leaders Nai Hong Sar of the New Mon State Party the Karen National Union's (KNU) Kwe Htoo Win and Lian H. Sakhong of the Chin National Front. Trustworthiness The crux of the problem is trustworthiness and so far it has not been forthcoming, according to Karen National Union (KNU) Major Saw Kler Doh when he said, "The government thinks we should trust each other; but they should prove that they deserve our trust," in an interview, published in Mizzima Daily on March 10. "So far, they have never complied with the demands we made during our peace talks," he said. Major Saw KlerDoh said the Tatmadaw had more than 80 positions in the 5th Brigade area. "We demanded that they withdraw seven of them, but they never did," he said. "They even expanded their presence. If they act like this, how can we trust them?" the commander said, acknowledging that he doubted the Tatmadaw trusted the KNU. Area cleansing and control Another obstacle is the Burma Army policy of "area cleansing and control" of resistance movements within the areas sized in ethnic homelands. No wonder, despite of ceasefire agreements, armed clashes occurred hundreds of times with the SSA -South and SSA -North in Shan State that have already signed union-level ceasefire agreement with the government, needless to say about the ongoing armed clashes with the KIA and TNLA, which have still not inked the ceasefire agreement. The agreement to de-escalate the armed conflict between the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and Burma Army signed months ago have also proved to be ineffective, for armed confrontation continue to occur in Kachin and Shan states. And so the immediate pressing two issues to tackle prior to the joint-ceasefire agreement draft is the lack of "trustworthiness" and the Burma Army policy of implementing "area cleansing and control" in ethnic homelands. In other words, from the Armed Resistance Movements' (ARMs) point of view, the government and Burma Army should show that they mean business by physical withdrawal of their troops from immediate contested areas and stop military operations altogether to give up their area cleansing and control policy. The ARMs' see the ongoing conduct of Burma Army as an intruder and occupation force waging wars within their territories, while the Burma Army would argue that it is protecting the national sovereignty. This two different line of thinking or concept needs to be ironed out beforehand, if the drafting of a single text document for the nationwide cease-fire proposal should materialize and pave way for further political settlement that lies ahead. The best way might be to accept the notion of "shared-sovereignty" between the ethnic nationalities and the Burman-dominated center, no matter if it is headed by military-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) or the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD). Time and again, the ARMs have pointed out that the military needs to show some good will by withdrawing from contested areas for a few kilometers and stop the offensives altogether, to pave way for a further consolidation of ceasefire agreement. And as the KNU commander Major Saw Kler Doh rightly put it, the military still needs to show its trustworthiness, if real ceasefire agreement is to be implemented in words and deeds. At the end of the day, it is like what Khon Ja from the Kachin Peace Network told the panelists, during the recent DVB Debate, on 12 March, regarding internal conflict in Burma, that there should be less discussion about the peace talks and more focus on ending the conflict in reality. "Whether they sign the ceasefire or not is not important. What is important is to actually stop the fighting," she said. One text procedure The hope that one text negotiation procedure could break the ice seems to be quite high, given the remarkable success of Camp David Accord signed between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat on 17 September 1978. It would do us good to look at a little more at the principles surrounding the approach. Fisher and Ury explain that a good agreement is one which is wise and efficient, and which improves the parties' relationship. Wise agreements satisfy the parties' interests and are fair and lasting. The authors' goal is to develop a method for reaching good agreements. Negotiations often take the form of positional bargaining. In positional bargaining each part opens with their position on an issue. The parties then bargain from their separate opening positions to agree on one position. Haggling over a price is a typical example of positional bargaining. Fisher and Ury argue that positional bargaining does not tend to produce good agreements. It is an inefficient means of reaching agreements, and the agreements tend to neglect the parties' interests. It encourages stubbornness and so tends to harm the parties' relationship. Principled negotiation provides a better way of reaching good agreements. Fisher and Ury develop four principles of negotiation. Their process of principled negotiation can be used effectively on almost any type of dispute. Their four principles are 1) separate the people from the problem; 2) focus on interests rather than positions; 3) generate a variety of options before settling on an agreement; and 4) insist that the agreement be based on objective criteria. The one-text procedure is a systematic process for shifting negotiators away from thinking about concessions, by using a neutral, third party facilitator to elicit underlying interests and to simplify the process of jointly inventing many options and deciding on one. (Source: Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In - by Roger Fisher and William Ury) This procedure was used at Camp David in the negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat. President Carter and Secretary of State Vance created 23 drafts in 13 days before they had a proposal to which both sides could say yes.( Source: The Negotiator Magazine - 2003) Meanwhile, the NCCT optimistic mood for the participation of the Burma Army in the process of one text procedure might be short-lived, for the Burma Army recent statement contradict with at least two of the four principles spelled out in the negotiation approach. RFA reported on 16 March, speaking on behalf of Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, Northern Regional Commander Tun Tun Naung, when asked about nationwide ceasefire in Myitkyina, Kachin state, said: "The military's part is after signing the ceasefire, to discuss the deployment of troops". He further explained the position of the military regarding the peace process as follows. "Not to take advantage of the peace agreement and be a burden to the concerned ethnic population; to follow the existing laws; to follow the three duties - non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of National Solidarity, non-disintegration of Sovereignty - and essence of democracy by adhering to the 2008 Constitution in the process of democratization together. These are the military policies laid down regarding the peace process." The 2008 Constitution, Chapter VII, Defence Services, writes: "The main armed force for the Defence of the Union is the Defence Services." "All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services." One couldn't imagine, with this rigid positioning of the Burma Army, whether the much publicized drafting of one text negotiation procedure could successfully be drawn, leading to the resolution of the conflict. Concluding note Actually, to break the ice on this stalemate, there has to be a political will and real desire to compromise. In practical terms, it would mean the shelving of Burma Army's "area cleansing and control" under the pretext of protecting or upholding sovereignty and started withdrawing from immediate, contested areas and stop all offensives altogether, to give this one text procedure on ceasefire agreement draft a chance. If progress could be made on one text procedure and nationwide ceasefire could be inked, we could go on to the next step of political dialogue in the same manner. Apart from this, another sticking point, however, would be on how to determine the role of mediator or facilitator. So far, no one has heard of the third party mediator participation. And if government run Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) or any of its affiliated groups would enter the fray is also anybody's guess. Besides, if these groups could even be considered as neutral body is also a big question. And again, in the end all these deliberation will boils down to constitutional amendment or rewriting it, with special emphasizes on the form of political system - unitary or federal - and the formation of national army - federal or Burman-dominated army - to encompass and address the ongoing political woes in Burma, so that durable solution could be found. But one thing is clear that digging-in in one's pre-conceived, entrenched position won't do us any good and will only be a hindrance to the reconciliation process. The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor |
| Opium, Logging and Gas: the Burma Army’s predatory rule over the people of Burma Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:41 AM PDT 17 March 2014 Kachin State, Burma Dear friends, We have just returned from a series of relief missions to the Kachin and Shan States. There the Burma Army continues its attacks on ethnic minorities. Please see our reports and video of these attacks at www.freeburmarangers.org . The Burma Army also over-watches opium production and logging, and protects a gas pipeline that profits them but few others. This report will be the first in a three-part series that documents the Burma Army's predatory rule of this part of Burma. Part one is "Opium, Burma Army-controlled narcotic militias and real people," part two is "Attacks on the people and logging" and part three is "The Shwe Pipeline and the oppression of the people."  Opium fields in Northern Shan State, Burma 20 February 2014 After conducting medical and Good Life Club (GLC) programs and documenting the Burma Army attacks in southern Kachin State, we moved to northern Shan State to work with the Ta'ang, Shan, and Kachin people there. On this mission Arakan, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Shan and Ta'ang FBR team members served the IDPs and villagers we met. After conducting more programs with the Ta'ang people in northern Shan State, we moved to an area of opium production. We were accompanied by elements of the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Shan State Army North (SSA-N). These groups are united in their struggle for freedom in Shan State and all of Burma. They also have a policy to eradicate all narcotics. We went to the Pang Say area of Nam Kham Township, northern Shan State. Here there were opium fields around every village that we encountered. The Chinese families producing the opium are uniformly poor and some wretchedly so. Most are living in dilapidated shacks of wood, thatch, stone and tattered plastic sheeting. They are all under the control of the Burma Army-supported People Militia Force (Bi Thu Sit or Ta Ka Sa Pha in Burmese). The militia is led by an ethnic Chinese man named Kyaw Myint, who is also a member of Parliament representing Namkham No.2 constituency for the Burma government-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Namkham is situated on the China-Burma border close to the Muse-Riuli crossing.  Opium Harvest 21 February 2014, Northern Shan State, Burma. The Ta'ang resistance has an anti-narcotics education program and every Ta'ang village we visited had a large vinyl poster educating people on the evils of narcotics and the policy of the Ta'ang against it. They have a program to educate, provide subsidies and crop substitutions and to conduct enforcement. As we prepared to go, the local leaders told us that the Ta'ang Army was planning to start destroying all the opium fields in the area later this month. We planned to document that too, if it happened while we were there. We started the movement into the opium area and by the second day began to see opium fields. We stopped at the first large field and began to take photographs. We had only been there 20-30 minutes before we were told that the Burma Army in a camp to the north had word we were there and were coming to attack us. We finished our documentation and moved on deeper into the opium growing area with a rear guard watching for the Burma Army.  Opium fields below Opium Militia camp 21 February 2014 Pansay area, Northern Shan State, Burma. After about an hour of taking photos and gathering information, the leader of this part of the mission said we would stay here one night and the next day go to do a reconnaissance of the nearby militia camp. To our surprise we were told we would be sleeping in the house of the family with the jeep – the same family I had spent time documenting and had looked down on. "We have control right now, and unless the militia or Burma Army comes we will sleep here," our local Ta'ang leader told us. "We have told the people here to stop growing opium and we are trying to help them find other ways. Still they do not listen and keep growing the opium. At some point if they do not stop, our Ta'ang troops will destroy it. But for now we just document it." I felt awkward as we entered the house of the opium growers but we smiled and in limited Chinese thanked them for their hospitality. My wife led the way in establishing friendship and was soon sitting around the fire with the women of the house. As she shared with smiles and hand signals and then later through one of our team who could speak Chinese, the family began to warm up and became very friendly towards us. On my part, I began to like them and by that night felt warm and close. Opium farmers are still people and I was finding that out. It was not a simple, "good guy-bad guy" situation. We told them we were here to find out about the situation and they did not need to be afraid of us. Our local Ta'ang leader told them the same. We all knew the Ta'ang had a plan announced to destroy the fields but did not know when that would happen. For now we were becoming friends. The next morning we took some of the teams and climbed up toward the Militia camp. The camp squatted on a mountaintop that over-watched all the land below it. It can be seen from miles in each direction and it reminded me of a feudal fortress dominating all below. "It looks like Mordor," said one of our team members. It did. A bare, tree-stripped, scared, fortified mountaintop stronghold, ruled with bad purpose, subjugating the people below it. Opium fields were arrayed below the camp coming up the mountain to within a few hundred yards of the outside fence. We approached the camp carefully and spent most of the day filming and photographing the camp and the soldiers in it. The new flag of Burma, yellow, green and red with a white star, was on the flag pole. The militia troops were in dark green uniform similar to Burma Army uniforms. After gathering all the documentation we could, we started the walk back to the village we had come from. When we arrived we were greeted with smiles by the family we stayed with. They, my family and the teams that had stayed back had become closer. This good feeling was interrupted when a new column of Ta'ang troops came into the village. They were from headquarters and were on orders to begin the destruction of the poppies today. We were all surprised and I said, "Yes, it is good to destroy the fields but please not now. We have been taken into these people's homes, and they have shared their food with us. We told them they did not need to be afraid of us. They knew they needed to do something different but please give them more time. If the destruction starts now, with no other kind of help, they will feel like we betrayed them."  Ta'ang National Liberation Army destroying Opium fields 21 February 2014, Northern Shan State, Burma. As I was thinking these things, the Ta'ang army was advancing through the fields and knocking the poppies off the stalks with sticks. I prayed about what I should do. We agreed with the Ta'ang anti-drug policy, they are our friends and teammates and earlier we had hoped to document the destruction of poppies. At the same time, here were people in trouble. What can we do? "Comfort them and give them love," was the answer I felt. I looked up and saw the woman of the house burst into tears and run away. Her daughter followed her sobbing. "Why why, why now, we are not ready, I have lost everything, how will we eat, how will we feed our family?" she cried. I went up to her and held her hand, telling her I was sorry and that we would help some way. Her brother looked at me stone-faced and walked away. We gathered around the mother and daughter and tried to comfort them. My children had tears running down their faces and said, "We know opium is wrong but why now, why didn't they have more time, these are our friends, what can we do?" I prayed with the mother and through one of our Kachin team members told her that God had a way for her. She could ask God what to do, and God would show a new way. She wept as she answered me, "How will we eat and most of all how will we get my son out of prison? He is being held by the Burma Army and they have demanded $100 to get him released." I asked our team if this was a true story and they said it was. "How can we save him, now all our way to make money is gone?" she cried. I told the woman. "I will give you money for what you lost. Not because I think opium growing is right. I do not. It is wrong and our Ta'ang friends are right to destroy it. But we said that you did not need to fear us and we became friends with you and now this has happened. I am giving this money to help you set your son free, for food for your family and to encourage you to find another way. God will help you do that if you call on Him." I gave her $230 which is about what she could have got with her crop. I explained why I did this to the Ta'ang leaders and soldiers and they all agreed it was okay. The mother stopped crying and thanked us, saying, "I have nothing to give you but I will never forget this, thank you so much for this help." My wife sat with her a long time encouraging her that this was an opportunity to make a new start and praying with her. As we left to go to the next area I thought about this incident and it came to me that if you want to stop people from growing opium, loving them is the most important thing. For me, I see a five-part policy is needed:
While in this village we interviewed some of the opium farmers. Most of the people here were too afraid to answer questions about opium. A few, however, were willing to talk and here is what we learned.  Family harvesting Opium 21 February 2014 Shan State, Burma. A. Opium is the main thing in this area. Here rice does not grow well and so opium is the way we know to grow for money. We buy rice from other villages. Note: Some here said they have been growing opium for 5-6 years while others said over 16 years. Q. Who owns this land and where do you sell the opium you farm here? A. This is our land, we own it. Nearby villagers come and buy the opium but we don't know who they are. They are Chinese, Ta'ang and Lisu people. But most the people here are Chinese and are all considered to be Kyaw Myint's people. Q. How much do you produce here? A. The crop depends on the weather, but we average about 3 viss (7.5kg) a season. The price is usually 600,000-700,000 kyat (or about $600-$700USD) per viss (about $2800 a year). Last year we made 800,000 or 900,000 kyat ($800-900USD). Q. How is production? A. Opium production is up and down depending on the rains. We try to harvest during February and March before the rains. During the rainy season we can't harvest because it washes away the opium residue on the bulbs. During harvest time they we do 4-5 harvests a month. Q. Who is the authority in this area? A. The Burma Army's militia has control here. They are a Chinese militia under Kyaw Myint, who work under the Burma Army and they control the opium. Q. Are there taxes on the opium? A. Yes, the Peoples Militia Force (Kyaw Myint group) collects taxes once a year – they collect 10,000kyat per family. The militia who collect the taxes are stationed at Wa Ya Bum camp on Wa Ya Bum mountain. There are more than 10 militia troops fulltime at Wa Ya Bum camp and over 60 who patrol the area. The militia are Chinese, but they are a different clan than we are. They all belong to the militia group headquartered in Pang Say led by Kyaw Myint. Q. What is the role of the Burma Army? A. The Burma Army has overall control. The militia works under them. The Burma Army doesn't usually come to the village, but five months ago they came on a patrol. Nothing happened. Those Burma Army soldiers were from Kutkai. Other times the Burma Army comes and takes and destroys things. One family described the opium harvesting process: The opium plant flowers, then the petals fall away and the bulb ripens. Opium is then harvested from the bulb. A multi-bladed scoring tool is used to score the bulb, usually twice on one side, making six scores. The raw opium oozes from the bulb scores and is then twice-scraped from the bulb with a short, wide, curve-bladed knife. The opium oozes out white, and is gathered on the wide knife where it turns brown. One bulb can be harvested from four to five times a month for about two months a year. It is sold by the viss for 600,000 -700,000 kyat per viss ($600-$700). One viss is about 2.5kg. Burma Army controlled narcotic militias The Burma army controls and supports the People Militia Force (Bi Thu Sit or Ta Ka Sa Pha in Burmese). The militia is led by Kyaw Myint who is a ethnic Chinese but who is a Burma citizen and a member of parliament. Second-in-command of the militia is his younger brother, Kyaw Htwe. Two other brothers, Jang Kwey Ching and Jang Lu, are next in the chain of command of the militia and they also have the duty of overseeing the illegal logging in this area. The militia is headquartered in Pang Say town, Nam Kham Township, and has camps in three other locations south of Pang Say along mountain range that rises over 6000 feet high. The militia is also co-located with Burma Army troops in Mong Wi Village in the Mong Wi valley southeast of Pang Say. The Shwey gas pipeline runs through this town and valley on its way from offshore Arakan State in southwest Burma to China.  Opium Militia Army Camp on hill above opium fields Burma flag wrapped on pole Pan Say Area Shan State, Burma. (From "Still Poisoned ," a report by the Palaung Women's Organization (PWO). According to this report, in the 2010-11 season, 1,109 hectares (about 4 ½ square miles) of land in 15 villages were now being used for opium cultivation, as opposed to 617 hectares two years ago in the same 15 villages. On this mission we saw eight of these villages and there were opium fields around each of them right up to the houses. According to another report by the Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) documented that Shan State accounts for over 90% of the opium production in Burma and that in 2010 the total area under opium poppy cultivation across Shan State increased by 20% from the year before. Also in this report, the UNODC reported that Burma's share of world opium production had increased from five percent in 2007 to 12 % in 2011. Opium farmers pay taxes of up to 8,000 kyat (US $10) per day to the militia. Some say they pay only a once a year tax of 10,000 kyat or more. The militia also controls methamphetamine trafficking and in this area a pill costs between 2,500 kyat- 3,000 kyat ($3.00- $4.00). The most common is the WY brand.  Opium Militia oversee Opium fields in Pan Say area Northern Shan State Burma 21 Feb 2014. "Let my people go," has been on my mind and heart for Burma. Whether the issue is opium, gas pipelines, logging or outright attacks, there is a way through this. For me it means listening to God and repenting of my own sins. It means asking God how to stand with the oppressed and against oppression of all kinds. It means praying for our enemies and trying to be friends. Everyone counts and together we can find a way forward – the Burmans and ethnic groups, the Burma Army and the pro-democracy movement, business and the welfare of all people. Burma is big enough for everyone. Love should be the center of any solution and is the way to find the balance between freedom and responsibility, conservation and progress, justice and mercy. Our prayer is that God will lead us to better understand and help each other work towards reconciliation for all people in Burma. Thank you for helping us do that. God bless you and love, Free Burma Rangers |
| Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:36 AM PDT By Roland Watson March 16, 2014 There is now a desperate push by Burma's military dictatorship, including one of its public faces, the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC), and also ethnic traitors, to complete a nationwide ceasefire by early April. All sorts of announcements have been made saying that this timetable will be achieved. Of course, there have been months of such announcements regarding earlier deadlines, all of which were nothing less than regime propaganda, and which due to the insistence by the ethnic nationalities for achieving a fair deal for their people and for all of Burma, were not realized. The question should now be asked: Why does the regime view April as being so important? The first thing to understand is that Burma's generals are demanding a unilateral or one-sided ceasefire, in other words, a complete surrender. The push for April therefore is nothing less than a negotiation over the surrender's timing. The regime is yielding nothing! It will not stop Burma Army attacks against the ethnic forces and peoples. Indeed, it has publicly stated, even in the face of unassailable evidence, that it is doing no such thing. Similarly, it will not stop its never-ending commission of gross human rights crimes, including murder, rape, arrest and torture, destruction of villages, extortion of and theft from villagers, etc. Nor will it agree to remove its forces from the ethnic areas, or even genuinely discuss the establishment of codes of conduct, which codes it has already agreed to negotiate and implement in its separate ceasefire agreements with the different ethnic armies. Ultimately, it is demanding that the ethnic forces disperse, give up their arms, and "join the legal fold." Moreover, the regime refuses to discuss, much less agree to, the different ethnic demands including not only the cessation of attacks and abuses, and creation of codes of conduct, but also the drafting of a completely new Constitution to consign the military to its appropriate role in a democracy, and to establish a truly federal state and federal army. In view of its continuing if not perpetual obstinacy, there is no reason for the ethnic groups to agree to anything, and given that the rightful representatives of the ethnic peoples can hold off the traitors, they won't. The ethnic nationalities have now agreed to establish a joint committee with the regime to continue the discussions. From the regime's perspective, not to mention MPC and the traitors, the function of this committee is to prepare the specific terms of the surrender. It is therefore essential that sincere, uncorrupted representatives of the ethnic peoples are appointed to the ethnic side of the committee, not the corrupt traitors, so that ethnic and real Burma-wide interests are served. This still leaves the question, though, why is the regime pushing for April? The answer to this is simple. The dictatorship knows that the upcoming census will be fraudulent. Its plans for this are already set. It further understands that much of the fraud will be uncovered, and that this will precipitate a popular reaction. In such an environment, an ethnic surrender will be precluded. The regime has seen that its separate ceasefire agreements effectively defanged the resistance groups. Even in the face of the Burma Army repeatedly breaking and otherwise failing to fulfill the agreements, the ethnic forces, other than in Kachin and Northern Shan States, have done nothing. The dictatorship is confident that with a nationwide ceasefire/surrender in place, the ethnic forces, under the command of traitorous leaders, will also not react to the census fraud. The ethnic groups should not agree to anything until after the census is completed and the results have been publicized, and further not until after any proposed deal has been presented for comment to the ethnic publics and civil society organizations. Indeed, for the census, Kachin groups have already said that they will not recognize the results, and Karen groups have called for it to be postponed. Shan and Mon groups are planning their own count, to counter regime lies. Even worse, the regime has announced that Burma's most oppressed group, the Rohingya, will not even be counted. Burma is still a military dictatorship, with a civilian facade. The recent announcement that the rights of the military to veto any constitutional amendments, will not be changed, not to mention its constitutional ability to act with impunity and with no legal consequences, is proof of this. This leaves us once again with elementary arithmetic. For Burma to be freed, there must be a new popular uprising, and/or renewed armed resistance. Nothing less will suffice. For an uprising, a trigger is required. The people of the country, from all ethnic groups, both ethnic nationality and Burman, are very angry, but something is needed to take them over the edge into large-scale action. While it is impossible to predict what will set a subjugated population off - witness Tunisia - a number of potential flash points in Burma are clear: - If the constitution is not amended to permit Suu Kyi to become President (or for that matter if it is not redrafted to reflect fundamental democratic principles). - If Suu Kyi realizes the folly of her ways, returns to her real pro-democracy advocacy of 1989, and calls for protests. - In response to the census fraud. - In response to fraud in the upcoming election (which personally I give only a 50/50 chance of even being held - at least under the dictatorship's control). In other words, they should once again protest for freedom and democracy, not only against land thefts and other types of abuse. To kick all of this off, one can only ask: Where are Burma's revolutionary graffiti artists? |
| SSA building homes across the border Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:34 AM PDT More than one and a half years after agreement was reached in Kengtung, between the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) and Naypyitaw's Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC), construction of the planned 200 homes for displaced families in Monghta sub-township, opposite Chiangmai's Wiang Haeng district has begun, according to a SHAN reporter that visited the area last month.  Signboard at the entrance: Monghta Town, 14 January 2011 (Day of Establishment), 1400ft above sea level The 200 homes on completion would add to the 40 homes already established there since early 2011, a few months after Monghta and its surrounding area were designated as a second sub-township of Mongton township. The other sub-township is Pongpakhem, opposite Chiangdao district, east of Wiang Haeng.  Today's Monghta It still had about 100 homes in 1994 during the late Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army period. Armed conflict in the area had begun following declaration of Independence by Khun Sa, who used to be a militia leader under the control of the Burma Army. "It was then that Sao Yawd Serk (then a major in the MTA and now the leader of the RCSS/SSA) became famous after his daring capture of the Burmese army stronghold at Loi Hin Kawng, near Mong Kyawd (some 25 miles east of Monghta)," the reporter remembered. "The Burma Army had to use bombers to dislodge him."  The said battle and another one in 2002, following the MTA's surrender, had devastated the area and by the end of 2010 when it became a sub-township there were less than 10 houses. "The Burma Army managed to bring in Lahus from Nakawngmu and Pongpakhem, with assurances that they would be allowed to grow poppies," a local source told SHAN. Mongton township, except for parts under the control of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), is known as a major opium producer in Shan State. Monghta, about 25 miles north of the former border checkpoint of Lak Taeng, is also connected to Mongpan in the north, Nakawngmu in the east, Thailand's Wiang Haeng in the south and Homong (former MTA headquarters) in the west. "The Burmese officials told us a new bridge across the Salween at Ta Hsop Pard crossing would be constructed and completed within 3 years," another visitor reported.  The road from Monghta to the Salween Crossing going to Mongpan The 12 point agreement signed between Naypyitaw and the RCSS/SSA on 19 May 2012 includes Point # 10- to establish an industrial zone in the Monghta area.  The new road: From Monghta to Mongpan |
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