Shan Herald Agency for News |
| The Peace Process: Dangerous quotes Posted: 29 Sep 2014 03:40 AM PDT Some sayings and quotations are easier said than done. Like the one quoted from the late Nelson Mandela by the Burma News International (BNI) in its Deciphering Burma's peace process 2014:  If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then (your enemy) becomes your partner. It goes admirably together with other quotations oft-cited by negotiators: § Get to know your opposite numbers at all levels socially. Friends take longer to fall out. § Keep your friends close, but your enemies closer. Even the Buddha who taught his pupils: Hatred is not appeased by hatred in this world. It is appeased by love. This is the eternal law, would have agreed with them. All of them, as several negotiators on both sides in the current peace process have found out, are very practical and valuable. However, as worldly sayings go, they are not without negative results as well. When Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), the father of India, made peace with Muslims, he was assassinated by a fellow Hindu. So was Egypt's President Anwar Sadat (1918-1981) by his fellow Muslims after he signed a peace treaty with Israeli. Even the highly successful British-American alliance that had won the war against Germany during World WarII was not without its sad consequences, as reported by David Irving in his bestseller The War between the Generals. One former British general was punished by the British army after the war for his close collaboration with the Americans. When we look into the ongoing peace process that began in Burma in 2011, we are seeing signs of history repeating itself on both sides. Negotiators who are adhering to the dictum: Successful negotiations require "relationship orientation" rather than "deal orientation" are being viewed and snubbed as turncoats by their own colleagues. There's no denying that some of them may defect to the other side, but sweeping generalization based on a few facts will turn out to be self-defeating. At the same time, implementing the "relationship-orientation" to the other extreme, too many secret meetings and too many informal gatherings, especially by top leaders will be counter-productive. Because successful negotiations not only rest on trust by the other side but trust by one's own side. Once again, it is high time SHAN's earlier counsel: There is a great need for a proper balance between confidentiality (of the negotiations) and transparency (for one's own people at all levels) is taken into serious consideration if peace in our long-suffered land is to be achieved. |
| BURMA PEACE PROCESS: Third party mediation would help move the process forward Posted: 29 Sep 2014 03:31 AM PDT The latest round of ceasefire talks, known as Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), held from 22 to 26 September for five days came to an end without any significant agreement being reached. The irony is that the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordinating Team (NCCT) and as well, the Union Peace-making Work Committee (UPWC) were both reluctant to admit that the talks have produced no progress, whatsoever, and that they are a long way from from signing the said agreement. Although in a closing statement, the two sides have agreed, in general, to a fourth draft of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), it did not provide any details on how they arrived at the new draft during the talks.  According to the report from Eleven Media Group, on 26 September, U Aung Min, chief of the UPWC, said: " The discussion, which has been held, by allotting more time, understanding, trust and respect, is itself an achievement. We all have decided to go hand-in-hand to strive for peace and are convinced that all our efforts will be successful. Only the two negotiating parties understand most of the difficulties surrounding the discussion, challenges and nature. Basing on the trust achieved, the two negotiation parties would have to work for the solid backing -endorsement- of their concerned organization." Nai Hong Sar, head of the NCCT also said: " We could understand the fear and worry of the public caused by the recent problems adjourned to our area and we could understand this. On the other hand, our discussion, if compared to the previous one is faced with some difficulties. But if we compare the 60 years of hardship in the front line, it is not that difficult. We will be able to overcome these problems." The report also mentioned that since the UPWC and NCCT were having problems, where the interpretation of principles on both sides is concerned, and have agreed behind closed door discussion agreeing not to abandon the peace process altogether. While it is somewhat convoluted on what issues are at stake, the problematic or themes needed to discuss, according to various media, they are said to be - the inclusion of the word "revolution" in the text; formation of a federal union; military code of conduct for both parties; deployment of troops; transitional period arrangement for the ethnic armies; who should be involved in the signing of NCA; political framework; and whether the political dialogue should be tripartite, as demanded by the NCCT, or eight parties, as foreseen by the UPWC, among others. The latest Irrawaddy report, on 27 September, said that the UPWC has agreed to come down to five parties involvement in forthcoming political dialogue, instead of eight, which means the army, government and the parliament will form as a group and not three separate ones as previously demanded. At the end of the latest round of ceasefire talks, on 26 September, a video interview of DVB, with Dr Lian Sakhong was said to have indicated that the main obstacle was on agreeing to the political roadmap tabled by the UPWC. The real hindrance to the agreement is the acceptance of federal union and federal army formation, although it has been agreed in the previous round of peace talks in August. The change of heart and going back on its promises and reconfirming the adherence of the Commander-in-Chief's six guiding principles and the demand to adhere to the military-drawn, 2008 Constitution, which the military previously have agreed to drop, added more uncertainty to the peace process. And thus, the situation seems to be pushed back to the start or square one again. The peace talks has been ongoing,since the last three years. And at this rate, it is hard to imagine, if the contending parties could be able to sign the NCA anytime soon. It is quite evident that this "self-help" peace-making initiative is not producing the wanted result and that it is now time to look for third party mediator to break the ice. The main problem is the interpretation of the concept of power-sharing or federal form of government, the main demand and aspiration of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities The Burma Army top brass sees it in the light of win-lose aspect, although the government faction, headed by President Thein Sein and his top trouble-shooter, seems quite acceptable to the concept. It was evident during the second last round of peace talks, when the NCCT hailed as a breakthrough success for securing the agreement to include the discussion of the federal union set up and formation of a federal army, at the phase of political dialogue, after signing the NCA. At that time, the participating Burma Army representative didn't utter a word and left after the end of the meeting, without giving interview or any comment. Nai Hong Sar, when asked if the Burma Army also was in agreement to the said issue for later deliberation, said that it would only become clearer in the next round of meeting. And as he had said, it turned out that the Burma Army refused to even talk about the issues and terminated the second day meeting, when the NCCT brought up the issue of federal army formation. The situation now is that the army faction is undoing the agreement that the government faction has agreed upon. In short, there is a real problem on the part of the UPWC or government, which the army is also a part, to accept federalism in words and deeds for it sees this in the light of win-lose or zero-sum game and not win-win outcome. From the NCCT side, the concept of federalism could create a win-win situation, ending the ethnic conflict, where all will benefit from the power-sharing and resources-sharing in equitable manner. Another point is although it is said to be negotiating using the single text method, it is mostly not adhering to its theoretical principle and implementation. The ongoing peace process differ from One-Text Process in the following points.
The ongoing single text approach used by NCCT and UPWC differs in a lot of approaches from the real theoretical underpinnings. The procedure and implementation are outlined by The Negotiator Magazine as follows. The one-text procedure is a systematic process for shifting negotiators away from thinking about concessions, by using a neutral, third party facilitator to elicit underlying interests and to simplify the process of jointly inventing many options and deciding on one. After eliciting the issues and interests of all the parties, the facilitator drafts a proposal and presents it to the parties as a draft for their criticism. The parties may not accept or reject any part of the draft at this stage of the process; they may only criticize. The process is called the "one-text" procedure because quite literally there is only one text. All the parties get a copy of the facilitator's draft, but they are not allowed to keep it, revise it, or add to it. They must return the draft at the end of the session. The only people who can revise, delete, or add to the draft are the facilitators. This process helps prevent people from taking positions or getting a vested interest in particular language or proposed terms. It allows them to criticize freely without damaging their working relationships. It also allows them to learn that they often share the same interests, and only disagree about the means used to achieve them. The facilitators continue to revise and resubmit drafts to the parties until the facilitators feel the draft they have reflects the best they can do to meet all parties' interests. Then and only then, they offer the parties an opportunity to say "yes" or "no." At that point, the parties have a clear choice; either I say yes to this or I start over. This procedure was used at Camp David in the negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat. President Carter and Secretary of State Vance created 23 drafts in 13 days before they had a proposal to which both sides could say yes. Such being the case, the two negotiating parties need to rethink the single text approach seriously and adhere to the basic rule prescribed, by employing a third party mediation team to help move the stalled peace process further forward. The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor |
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