The Irrawaddy Magazine

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• The Right Kind of Generosity
• Opium Cultivation Stabilizes for First Time Since 2006: Report
• NLD Member Prosecuted for ‘Wounding Religious Feelings’
• 2 Dolphins Killed by Electro-Fishing in Irrawaddy River, Conservationists Say
• Burmese Migrants Plead Innocence as Koh Tao Murder Trial Begins
• Pegu Police Sue Myanmar Herald Reporter
• Ethnic Armies ‘Breaking Their Promise’: Ne Win’s Grandson
• Rangoon Govt Targets Idle Industrial Plots
• Where Next in Burma’s Peace Process?
• Myanmar Officer Jailed for Backing Smaller Army Role in Politics
• Burmese Rock and German Punk Hits Rangoon’s Kandawgyi Park
• Govt Should Investigate Girl’s Killing by Army, Say Rights Groups
• Ex-Czar’s Arrest Makes China’s Xi Stronger
• Japan PM Abe on Track for Landslide in Weekend Poll
• No Major Damage in Philippine Typhoon, at Least 3 Dead
• State of Anarchy

The Right Kind of Generosity Posted: 08 Dec 2014 03:00 PM PST Tony Preston, head of the British Embassy's Prosperity Team. (Photo: Supplied) It's fair to say that some level of corruption exists everywhere. That, sadly, reflects the human condition. But not all governments and societies are equally imperfect either. The latest version of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index came out on Dec. 3. Of the 174 countries measured, the UK and Burma occupied places 14 and 156 respectively. This index is not definitive but it allows us to see how countries are perceived to be performing in tackling, or not tackling, corruption. There is a view that corruption is a fixation of developed countries; a stick to beat developing countries and to congratulate themselves on their supposedly superior moral values. But protests and campaigns show that people in developing countries do care about corruption. Indeed, if you believe that things like the provision of public goods and services, the protection of basic rights, the preservation of functioning markets and of the rule of law are important for development, then you have a clear case for corruption mattering. And corruption isn't just a moral issue. If good economics is about the most efficient allocation of resources, then corruption tends towards the opposite: it depletes a country's wealth, diverting revenue and resources from the public purse to corrupt pockets. Corruption thwarts efforts to alleviate poverty, disproportionately impacting on the poor and disadvantaged who literally can't afford to take part in this illicit game. Corruption is therefore not just stealing; it can also amount to the rich stealing from the poor. Corruption is also a transaction cost. The World Bank estimates that corruption adds at least 10 percent to the cost of doing business – a cost usually passed on to customers. Maybe some think that corruption is somehow a victimless crime: the company gets its contract, the official or politician gets his or her kickback, and life goes on—business is business, so what? But when contracts are awarded on the basis of personal gain, then everyone suffers. Bribery and corruption mean decisions are made for the wrong reasons and that the public good is suppressed. What can we do to tackle corruption and keep it to a minimum? There are two overarching approaches. Firstly, minimise the opportunities for it to happen through strong institutions with good systems that catch and bring offenders to book and, secondly, create a culture which unambiguously teaches that it is wrong to be corrupt and enables people to blow the whistle on corruption when they see it. What does this mean in practice? Well, it includes having an incorruptible and demonstrably politically neutral judiciary. It includes having a fearless, trusted anti-corruption agency with the right mandate and full political and public support. It means replacing opaque procurement mechanisms with transparent tendering processes; it means wherever possible putting services online; and it means regular intrusive oversight. But I would argue that the cultural aspect of tackling corruption is even more important than these mechanisms. If any state official is not given, and then repeatedly reminded of, a code of ethics that stresses integrity, honesty and impartiality as prime values, then it won't be surprising if they don't live up to them. Another vital question is whether those caught indulging in corruption are charged and if found guilty are they severely punished? Proper sanctions can have a huge deterrent effect. The opposite of that—in effect, impunity—can send an equally powerful message: namely, that such behaviour is somehow acceptable, unremarkable, or at least unpunishable. It's a choice ultimately—between a zero tolerance and a 'we tolerate anything' approach. Burma was recently voted the joint most generous country on earth—deservedly in my view. My hope is that this light of generosity can shine on the darkness that provides cover for corruption. Tony Preston is head of the British Embassy's Prosperity Team. This article has been published to mark International Anti-Corruption Day on Dec. 9. The post The Right Kind of Generosity appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Opium Cultivation Stabilizes for First Time Since 2006: Report Posted: 08 Dec 2014 06:12 AM PST A farmer in southern Shan State's Pekhon Township collects opium resin from a poppy in November. (Photo: Steve Tickner / The Irrawaddy) RANGOON — Opium cultivation in Burma stabilized in 2014 and the area under poppy remained roughly the same as last year, marking the first time since 2006 that cultivation did not expand, a report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) said on Monday. A total of 57,600 hectares was under opium poppy in northern Burma this year, according to the UNODC's annual Southeast Asia Opium Survey, which based its estimates on satellite imagery and field and village surveys. It noted the area was 200 hectares smaller than last year but discounted the decrease as "non-significant" as it fell within the margin of error of the survey. The findings "represent the first year of stabilization following consecutive year-on-year increases since the low of 21,600 hectares in 2006," the report said. The vast majority of the opium is grown in Shan State, followed by Kachin State, where production is expanding and reached some 5,100 hectares, while smaller areas were found in Karenni State and—for the first time—in Chin State. Burma's overall opium harvest declined by an estimated 200 tons compared to last year due to poor climatic conditions this growing season, falling to 670 metric tons with a wholesale value of around US$340 million, UNODC said, adding that the 2014 harvest volume is roughly similar to 2012. Burma is the second biggest global opium producer after Afghanistan, where the bulk of the world's opiates are grown. The UNODC survey found that poppy cultivation rose this year in northern Laos, although the area is much smaller than in Burma. In the Golden Triangle region, comprising northern parts of Burma, Laos and Thailand, a total of 762 tons of opium was produced in 2014 that is likely to be refined into 76 tons of heroin, UNODC said. Tens of thousands of poor ethnic farmers in remote areas of Burma grow poppy, which serves as an essential cash crop that is hardy and more profitable than other crops, while it also provides seasonal jobs for many landless families. The UNODC estimates that the average opium production in Burma was 11.7 kg per hectare and that farmers on average earned $414 per kg of opium this year. "[S]uccessful reduction of the cultivation and production of opium can only be sustained if alternative livelihoods are available to local communities. Farmers are very vulnerable to losses in income derived from opium," the report said. "Furthermore, opium cultivation is generally linked to the absence of peace and security, which indicates the need for both political and economic solutions." UNODC warned that drug use among communities in poppy-growing areas in northern Burma is rapidly rising. It found that opium, heroin and meth use more than doubled between 2012 and 2014, with 1.6 percent of all villagers using opium, 1.1 percent using meth and 0.6 percent using heroin. In the past few years, ethnic minority civil society organizations have repeatedly warned that drug abuse is taking on epidemic proportions and ravaging ethnic communities of the Palaung, Shan and Kachin. They have accused authorities of turning a blind eye to the issue. Northern Burma has long been a regional hub for the illicit production of opium, its derivative heroin and methamphetamine, most of which is destined for China, Thailand and the wider region. China accounts for nearly 58 percent of the 3.33 million estimated heroin users in Asia in 2014, according to the UNODC, providing a massive market on the other side of the long and porous Burma-China border Burma's illicit drug trade is directly tied to the country's decades-old ethnic conflict, which continues in many parts of Shan and Kachin states in the absence of a nationwide ceasefire. Opium production fell from 1998 to 2006 after some armed groups and the then-military regime came under growing international pressure to stem the flow of drugs, but the production resurged in southern Shan State and most recently in Kachin and Chin states, and in Northeast India. In the past decade, meth production in Shan State soared as pro-government militias, criminal gangs and rebel groups churned out millions of pills at hidden meth labs. In June, the Home Affairs Ministry acknowledged that a 15-year drug elimination program started in 1999 had failed, and it announced plans to extend the deadline for eliminating all drugs in Burma to 2019. A Change of Tack? Tom Kramer, a leading researcher on Burma's drug trade, said a range of interlocking factors had caused the opium trade to flourish since 2006, notably poverty and isolation of rural communities, strong demand from the region and growing domestic demand, and ongoing conflict and instability. "Most farmers grow opium as a strategy for food security and as a cash crop… For many, opium is a solution, not a problem. It also has medicinal value in areas without health care, it has cultural value such as during ceremonies," he said, adding that small-scale opium traders offered incentives by offering loans to farmers. "In Shan State, most, if not all conflict actors, including the Myanmar Army, are involved," he said, adding, "High-level corruption among authorities in neighboring countries also contributes." Opium and heroin trade, he said, "Still goes a lot to China, and some goes on to Laos and Cambodia and the wider region. We think that a lot of Chinese gangs are involved—but it's hard to get data on that." Kramer, who works with the Amsterdam-based Transnational Institute, said drug elimination policies in Burma and in the region had further contributed to the drug problems as these have been "deadline-oriented" and repressive, and failed to prioritize socio-economic development of poppy-growing areas. "We have been promoting a 'development-led approach,' the government has taken this up on a policy level, but there now needs to be a strategic plan," Kramer said, adding that authorities were open to begin consultations with poppy farmers to gain a better understanding of how to stem production and provide alternative livelihood options. The post Opium Cultivation Stabilizes for First Time Since 2006: Report appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

NLD Member Prosecuted for ‘Wounding Religious Feelings’ Posted: 08 Dec 2014 05:12 AM PST Htin Lin Oo (center) at a National League for Democracy fundraising event in Rangoon's Mayangone Township. (Photo: Facebook) RANGOON — Columnist and National League for Democracy member Htin Lin Oo has been subjected to a lawsuit for contravening the Burmese Penal Code's statutes on religious offence, after a speech last month provoked outrage from Buddhist groups. An officer from the Department of Immigration in Sagaing Division's Chaung-U Township has filed a lawsuit against Htin Lin Oo under Article 295a, which prohibits "deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings", and Article 298, which proscribes "uttering words [...] with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings". Both charges are punishable by fines or imprisonment of up to two years for the former and one year for the latter. "The Township Sangha Nayaka [Buddhist clergy] requested for me to sue him, since his speech disgraced their religion," said Tun Khaing, the officer who filed the charge on Nov. 20. Htin Lin Oo told The Irrawaddy on Monday that he had received news that the case was proceeding but had yet to receive a court summons. "I didn't speak to disgrace [Buddhism]. Those who listen the original full video of my speech will know whether I disgraced it or not," he said. The prominent author gave a two-hour speech to over 500 people at a literary event in Sagaing Division's Chaung-U Township on Oct. 23, during which he criticized the use of Buddhism as fig leaf for prejudice and discrimination. "Buddha is not Burmese, not Shan and not Karen—so if you want to be an extreme nationalist and if you love to maintain your race that much, don't believe in Buddhism," he said at the time. After a 10-minute excerpt of the speech was widely shared on social media, the Patriotic Buddhist Monks Union denounced his speech in a statement last month. "If they accuse me of insulting the religion…I will also defend that," Htin Lin Oo said. "I didn't intend to target monks, I only intended to discuss those who don't obey the Buddha's words and do whatever they want. Everyone already knows that but they just ignore it." He added that the Buddha instructed his followers to have mercy on all beings, and those who argue that some should be shown kindness to the exclusion of others do not live up to Buddhism's precepts. "There are both good people and bad people in all religions," he said. "We can't insult other religions for having some bad people and also say that others can't insult Buddhism for having some bad people. I believe I did my duty." After the NLD investigated Htin Lin Oo's speech, he was relieved of his position as an information officer for the party. U Wirathu, a Mandalay-based monk and prominent member of the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, said that his organization had planned to sue the author before action was taken by Tun Khaing. "We planned to sue him," U Wirathu said. "But since the Chaung-U Township's Immigration Department did it first, we won't sue him again." He added that the lawsuit was an appropriate sanction against Htin Lin Oo in accordance with existing criminal statutes. "I prefer taking legal action to warn him not to disgrace [Buddhism] again in the future," he said. The post NLD Member Prosecuted for 'Wounding Religious Feelings' appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

2 Dolphins Killed by Electro-Fishing in Irrawaddy River, Conservationists Say Posted: 08 Dec 2014 04:56 AM PST The carcasses of two Irrawaddy dolphins were discovered on the bank of the Irrawaddy River last week. (Photo: Courtesy of Wildlife Conservation Society) MANDALAY—The already dwindling population of Irrawaddy dolphins in Burma now faces a new threat: electric shock. Two young carcasses of the rare species were found late last week on the bank of the Irrawaddy River in Min Gun Township, just north of Mandalay. Locals said the bodies were believed to have died from electric shock, an illegal fishing method used to shore up a quick and abundant catch. "The dead dolphins, one male and one female, were just about one year old. They have no injuries or diseases and are believed to have died by electric shock," said Maung Maung Oo, a member of a local conservationist group, Green Activities, which researches the species. "It means a lot for the entire population," he continued, "we wonder how many of them have died but didn't reach the shore." Researchers and wildlife protection advocates told The Irrawaddy that despite legal restrictions and targeted awareness programs, some fishermen still use high-voltage shock methods to yield a higher catch. The practice threatens both dolphin and fish populations, and is an ultimately unsustainable technique, they said. "Fish resources in the Irrawaddy River are declining because electric shock kills almost everything within a certain range," said Kyaw Hla Thein, a member of Burma's Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) chapter. The local chapter of the New York-based organization collaborates with Burma's Department of Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development on conservation projects, including protection of the Irrawaddy dolphin. The most recent WCS figures, gleaned from research collected early this year, count the total population of the dolphin around 63 between Mandalay and Bhamo, in northern Burma. A 370km (230 mile) stretch of the river from Min Gun to Kyauk Myaung in Sagaing Division was designated as a wildlife protection zone in 2005. The area has many strict measures in place to protect them, but the rules go largely unenforced. Catching or killing dolphins is prohibited, as is trading their meat. Electro-fishing and the use of large nets are strictly forbidden. Using gillnets longer than 91 meters (300 feet) or spaced less than 180 meters apart is punishable, and release of dolphins caught in fishing nets is mandatory. Upstream gold mining operations are also forbidden to use mercury during extraction. But dolphin defenders said the rules aren't working. Fishermen using illegal tactics have been said to work in large alliances and threaten locals not to report violations to authorities. "The fisheries department and NGOs have no power to arrest [fishermen using illegal methods]. We plan to focus on educating locals, but that alone is not enough," said Kyaw Hla Thein of WCS. "We want the government to begin serious involvement in the conservation of the Irrawaddy dolphins." The Irrawaddy dolphin, small in size and with an atypically short beak, is a species found mostly in the rivers of Southeast Asia and estuaries near the Bay of Bengal. The species is classified as vulnerable by the World Wildlife Fund, but populations outside of Bangladesh and India—where some 90 percent of the entire population lives—are considered critically endangered. The post 2 Dolphins Killed by Electro-Fishing in Irrawaddy River, Conservationists Say appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Burmese Migrants Plead Innocence as Koh Tao Murder Trial Begins Posted: 08 Dec 2014 04:36 AM PST Chief of Royal Thai Police Gen. Somyot Poompanmuang, center, and his team address reporters in Bangkok on Oct. 7, 2014. (Photo: Reuters) CHIANG MAI, Thailand — The trial of two Burmese migrant workers accused of killing a pair of British travelers on Thailand's Koh Tao island began on Monday in Koh Samui, where the suspects were officially informed of the charges brought against them. "It is seven charges against each of the accused," said Aung Myo Thant, a Burmese lawyer who is part of the Burmese Embassy's special support team for the defendants, Zaw Lin and Wai Phyo, also known as Win Zaw Lin. The charges include murder, rape, illegally entering Thailand and theft. According to court attendees, the judge read the charges against the suspects on Monday morning and asked whether they had committed the crimes alleged. The judge told the defendants that an admission of guilt could result in less harsh sentencing if they are ultimately found guilty. The embassy team members said Zaw Lin and Wai Phyo pled not guilty to all of the charges. A second hearing is scheduled for Dec. 26, in a case in which the defense says it is having trouble enlisting witnesses. "They are afraid that if they help on the case, they might be denied entry to the country [Thailand], where they are currently working to support their families," Aung Myo Thant said. The families of the victims, David Miller, 24, and Hannah Witheridge, 23, on Friday threw their support behind a much-maligned investigation by the Thai Royal Police, according to AFP, which reported that the families were "confident" of the case built against the defendants after evidence was shared with them. The bodies of Miller and Witheridge were found on a Koh Tao beach in the early hours of Sept. 15. Thai authorities have faced criticism over their handling of the case, and a supposed confession by the two migrants was later recanted. The defendants have claimed that they were tortured in police custody. The post Burmese Migrants Plead Innocence as Koh Tao Murder Trial Begins appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Pegu Police Sue Myanmar Herald Reporter Posted: 08 Dec 2014 04:15 AM PST The Myanmar Herald has been hit by two cases of defamation under the Media Law. (Photo: Sai Zaw / The Irrawaddy) RANGOON — A Pegu-based reporter with The Myanmar Herald said on Monday that he is being sued under the Media Law by a local police commander for a report that allegedly negatively affected the officer's reputation. Than Myat Soe, who reports for the paper from Pegu town, said that Pegu Division's Letpandan Township Police Col. Bhone Myint had filed a case against him after he wrote an opinion article on Nov. 15 that included unconfirmed claims that local police force and Special Branch were taking bribes from illegal gambling rings. "On Nov. 17, I received a call from police officers and was asked about the article, and on Nov. 28 I received a letter from Letpandan Township Court to come because I am being sued by police Col. Bhone Myint," he told The Irrawaddy. It is the second legal case being brought against the newspaper under the Media Law, which was promulgated earlier this year, after the Information Ministry in September decided to press charges against 11 members of the organization for negatively affecting the reputation of President Thein Sein. The Myanmar Herald drew the ire of the ministry after it published an opinion interview with the opposition National League for Democracy's lead researcher Myo Yan Naung Thein on Aug. 9, criticizing Thein Sein for waffling in his statements about whether he would seek re-election in 2015. In both cases, charges have been filed under the law's Article 9 and Article 25(b), which sets a fine ranging from about US$300 to $1,000 for a reporter found guilty of breaching a number of media rules. In the cases, reporters and editors have been accused of producing an article that "deliberately affects the reputation of a specific person or an organization." Thant Myat Soe and his lawyer Tin Hlaing said they attended the first hearing on Dec. 5, adding that the plaintiff had not been present. Tin Hlaing said the judge had ordered two guarantors to promise to pay a surety bond of about $1,000 each in case the defendant does not appear in court. He added that the next hearing was scheduled for Dec. 17. The post Pegu Police Sue Myanmar Herald Reporter appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Ethnic Armies ‘Breaking Their Promise’: Ne Win’s Grandson Posted: 08 Dec 2014 03:08 AM PST Ne Win's grandson's Aye Ne Win (second from left) and Kyaw Win (second from right) stand with former Lt-Gen Tun Kyi (right) at a service for fallen soldiers in Rangoon on Sunday. (Photo: J Paing/ The Irrawaddy) RANGOON — Ethnic leaders and politicians have hit back at comments made by a grandson of former head of state Gen. Ne Win during a memorial service for fallen soldiers in Rangoon. Staged near Shwedagon Pagoda, Sunday's service was organized by former military servicemen and attended by a collection of former senior army officials, including Lt-Gen Tun Kyi, who was purged by the former military regime for corruption, and their family members. Serving military personnel were also present. Organizers said the aim of the event was "to honor the soldiers who sacrificed their lives for the country." Aye Ne Win and his brother Kyaw Ne Win, the grandsons of the country's leader during the turbulent years of the Burma Socialist Programme Party, came to pay their respects to the soldiers who died while serving the military their grandfather helped to found. At the conclusion of the service, Aye Ne Win offered his thoughts on the country's prospects for a durable nationwide ceasefire agreement, laying blame squarely at the feet of ethnic armed groups. "We still don't have peace because the other parties [ethnic armed groups] really don't keep their promises and act in an undignified manner," he told assembled media. "What happened two or three weeks ago, it's quite shameful." Aye Ne Win told The Irrawaddy that the attack on a Kachin Independence Army (KIA) training center near Laiza last month, in which 23 cadets from armed groups allied with the KIA were killed in an artillery bombardment, was evidence that ethnic armies had reneged on their promise not to increase their size. "They have army cadets under training. That simply shows they are expanding their forces and breaking their promise," he said. The attack on the Laiza camp was condemned at the time by ethnic groups and political parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD). "We are not countering those condemnations, but I have to say we are inspired to hold a memorial service to honor our fellow army men who sacrificed their lives for the country," said Ye Moe, one of the event organizers and a former Military Intelligence captain, who was purged in 2004 by the military government, during a press conference after the event. More than a dozen ethnic armed groups have signed bilateral ceasefires with the government since President Thein Sein took office in 2011. The KIA and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army have yet to conclude ceasefire agreements and have frequently clashed with government troops in recent months. Aye Ne Win's comments were rejected on Monday by Secretary Pado Kwe Htoo Win of the Karen National Union, the political wing of Karen National Liberation Army, which signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government in 2012. “What he said is not true," he said. "The civil war and the conflict are due to the governments both old and new using armed power to suppress ethnic groups' demands for their rights." "It doesn't mean the ethnic people don't want peace. Given past experience, we haven't had situations in which we could trust each other for ceasefires and talks. What the successive governments promised had never happened. That's why ethnic people are sceptical," he added. Tin Oo, a patron of the NLD and former commander-in-chief of the Burmese army, who was forced into retirement by Ne Win in 1976, said Aye Ne Win should have instead said something that encouraged the peace process. "He shouldn't say things like that at any time," he said. "Even if we have differences, we have to negotiate. We have to respect what minorities need." Ye Moe added fuel to the fire at the press conference after Sunday's service, saying that ethnic armed groups needed to present more realistic demands to move the peace process forward. "They routinely ask to be given the commander-in-chief position for the army," he said, referring to demands that the position be rotated among different ethnic groups. "They also ask for the formation of a federal army. Our Myanmar army is made up of different people from inside the country. So we don't need a separate federal army. That kind of demand creates obstacles to peace." Pado Kwe Htoo Win countered on Monday that Burma still lacked an army that represented the entire country. "If the Burmese army represented the whole country, the army would have protected ethnic rights," he said. Tin Oo welcomed the idea of honoring fallen soldiers, but added that yesterday's service had a more problematic subtext when compared to services held for military personnel in other countries. "Here we have had a few wars with other countries. But most of the wars we fight are amongst ourselves," he said. Aye Ne Win and Kyaw Ne Win, two grandsons of former dictator Ne Win, were released from Rangoon's Insein prison last year after being convicted of high treason for plotting to overthrow the former military regime in 2002, shortly after Ne Win's death while under house arrest. Four family members of Ne Win were arrested at the time in relation to the coup d'état plot. Ne Win's son-in-law Aye Zaw Win and another grandson, Zwae Ne Win, were released from prison in Jan. 2012. Ne Win's daughter Sandar Win was released from house arrest in 2008. The post Ethnic Armies 'Breaking Their Promise': Ne Win's Grandson appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Rangoon Govt Targets Idle Industrial Plots Posted: 08 Dec 2014 02:36 AM PST Construction equipment operates in the Thilawa special economic zone outside of Rangoon. (Photo: Steve Tickner / The Irrawaddy) RANGOON — In a move targeting speculators, the Rangoon government will require idle landholders in the division's industrial zones to present a detailed business plan for how they will use the real estate or see it seized. The divisional Industrial Zones Management Committee, under Rangoon's Department of Human Settlement and Housing Development, announced late last month that the owners of idle industrial plots would be required to submit their business plans by Dec. 15. "As we've discussed, the land owners who are not running businesses on their land will have to submit a detailed business plan. If not, or if the proposal seems like nonsense, those [lands] all will be taken back by the government," said Myat Thin Aung, chairman of the Hlaing Tharyar Industrial Zone's management committee, whose members met with their division-level counterparts on the matter. "[The government] has been trying to take action on these lands. If owners are not intending to run a business, they will have to give back the lands to the government and they will get a land price that is fixed by the government," he said. According to Myat Thin Aung, there are more than 2,400 acres of idle land in Rangoon's industrial zones. "The government can take back these lands if the landowners are not running a business within the time the government sets for them," he said. Though the Hlaing Tharyar Industrial Zone, Rangoon's biggest, is believed to be operating at full capacity, with some 500 factories setting up shop since the zone was created in the early 1990s, an excess of idle properties bedevils smaller industrial zones. "The government aims to give these lands to people who earnestly want to do business. Some people are playing the [property] market without running businesses in these industrial zones," Myat Thin Aung said. The divisional government would fix land prices at around 12 million kyats (US$12,000) per acre, he said, but rates would vary depending on the location. Sai Khung Noung, managing director of the well-known Rangoon-based Sai Khung Noung real estate agency, said fixing prices at such a rate would put the properties far below current market valuations, which have been in decline since the government announced last month that it intended to target idle landholders. "Land owners who have no plan to run a business on these lands are now urgently selling their lands. I've received a lot of offers from them in recent weeks," he said. "That's why industrial land prices have fallen by about 25 percent," Sai Khung Noung said. Among the industrial zones in Rangoon, the most expensive lands are in Hlaing Tharyar Township, where a one-acre plot can sell for as high as 800 million kyats. In Shwe Pyithar, East Dagon, South Dagon and Dagon Seikkan townships, prices are averaging 300 million to 400 million kyats per acre. "These land prices are seeing the most significant drop that I've ever seen. Though prices have been decreasing, people dare not buy land due to the government's latest policy," he said, noting a general decrease in what his clients were asking for after the policy was made public. "Some land owners told me that they can't invest in their lands as they do not have viable business plans. That's why they find it's better to sell their lands on the market before the deadline on December 15," he said. The government has not yet indicated whether it plans to hold onto the seized lands or sell them back to other buyers. Sai Khung Noung said he expected industrial real estate would continue its decline until early next year, in contrast to a still booming residential property market in the commercial capital. The post Rangoon Govt Targets Idle Industrial Plots appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Where Next in Burma’s Peace Process? Posted: 08 Dec 2014 02:10 AM PST A delegation of Karen leaders meeting with government representatives in Rangoon on April 6, 2012, early on in Burma's peace negotiations. (Photo: The Irrawaddy) Over the past few weeks, government, parliamentary and opposition leaders have presented various proposals for high-level political dialogue, possibly leading to constitutional change in Myanmar, also known as Burma. Although significant differences remain between the different proposals, one thing they share is the exclusion of ethnic armed groups. This indicates that the window of opportunity to achieve political dialogue shaped by Ethnic armed groups as part of the peace process is rapidly closing. There may well be political dialogue in Myanmar—probably after the elections—but it seems unlikely that ethnic armed groups will play a leading role. Before the window of opportunity closes, ethnic leaders should focus on securing a comprehensive ceasefire agreement with the government, and above all with the Myanmar Army. With consideration to the peace process, perhaps more interesting than who participated in high-level political talks in Naypyidaw on Oct. 31 was who did not. The 14 "roundtable talk" participants included President U Thein Sein, the top two Myanmar Army leaders, Union Parliament Speaker U Shwe Mann, and political party leaders, including, of course, democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Strikingly absent from the talks were representatives of ethnic armed groups. Similarly, recent proposals from parliamentary leaders for 6-party talks excluded ethnic representatives, beyond one political party leader (Rhakine parliamentarian U Aye Maung). Perhaps this is a model for political dialogue in Myanmar: elite-level, multi-stakeholder discussions toward an eventual political pact. However, key participants probably have limited interest in moving ahead with substantial political dialogue before elections scheduled for the end of next year. It seems unlikely that the NLD or other opposition parties would be willing to contribute significantly toward the success of an initiative led by the current president, in the run-up to elections. They are more likely to wait until the smoke clears after the polls before beginning substantive political discussions. There may be some value in continuing efforts to map an agenda for future political dialogue, but the opportunity has already passed to undertake substantial discussions and reach agreement before the elections. Furthermore, while talks between the government, army, parliament and political parties could be a good way of moving forward on national reconciliation in Myanmar, they nevertheless risk marginalizing those on the ethnic side who have shown commitment to the peace process. Continued progress toward negotiating a comprehensive Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) between the government and Ethnic armed groups is proving difficult. This should not be surprising, given the complexity of Myanmar’s armed and state-society conflicts, and the many substantive issues and stakeholders involved. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that much has been achieved already—despite recent serious setbacks, such as the Nov. 19 Myanmar Army attack on a Kachin Independence Army officer training school, in which 23 cadets from various ethnic armed groups were killed. The original plan was to start a process of political dialogue after the signing of an NCA, and agreement of a framework for participation. With the clock ticking, and peace talks going slowly, the president and his advisers seem to have decided to begin political dialogue in parallel to negotiations toward an NCA—or even as an alternative route toward achieving a peace legacy, before this becomes a lame duck administration in the run-up to elections. However, the window of opportunity has probably already closed. It is unlikely that substantial discussions can be started (beyond preliminary agenda-setting), and almost impossible that any substantial outcome can be reached, before the elections. While the prospect of substantive and credible political dialogue before 2016 is remote, recent manoeuvring among the Myanmar political elite should nevertheless cause alarm in ethnic circles. The recent roundtable talks may not amount to much in themselves, but they do offer a glimpse of the future of political dialogue in Myanmar—one in which ethnic armed groups (or for that matter civil society actors) have rather limited roles to play. Until recently, the government's interlocutors in relation to political dialogue have been ethnic leaders, because of the assumed linking of ceasefires and political dialogue. However, not everyone in Myanmar (or in the international community) regards ethnic armed groups as unproblematic legitimate dialogue partners. Increasingly, challenges are raised to the assumption that ethnic armed groups can and should represent ethnic communities in political negotiations. On one hand, such caveats are quite reasonable: Ethnic armed groups are just one (albeit particularly important) set of stakeholders among ethnic political actors; furthermore, some armed group leaders have significant economic agendas, and questionable records in terms of human rights and governance in their areas of authority—as do other key players in the peace process. Nevertheless, several ethnic armed groups do enjoy significant (albeit often contested) legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent. Unfortunately, however, the window of opportunity for these key stakeholders to play a leading role in political negotiations is rapidly closing. Perhaps ethnic armed groups in Myanmar have miscalculated their point of greatest leverage, which may be coming to an end as the government looks around for alternative dialogue partners. It seems unlikely that a future government would accord the same degree of privilege and credibility to ethnic armed groups as the current military-backed regime has done. Any future government will have a large number of issues on the political agenda, and may not prioritize the peace process and ethnic issues in the same manner as the present regime. Indeed, a future government (particularly if NLD-led) is likely to press the 'reset button' on political negotiations. If Myanmar had a few more years under the current government, it might be possible to conclude negotiations towards an NCA and begin substantial political dialogue involving ethnic armed groups as key interlocutors. However, there is no realistic scenario under which the elections could be suspended, without causing well-founded outrage both domestically and internationally. Does it really matter if ethnic armed groups are increasingly marginalized? Perhaps not, although—as noted above—it should be recognized that the larger groups enjoy significant political legitimacy, especially among conflict-affected communities. There is also a risk that excluding ethnic armed groups from the political process may empower 'hardliners,' possibly leading to renewed cycles of violence in ethnic nationality-populated areas. The Myanmar Army is presumably prepared for such a scenario, which might suit its long-term plans. In the meantime, given the near impossibility of achieving a credible political dialogue between now and the elections, ethnic armed groups should focus on more immediate and concrete goals. There are a number of outstanding issues in the peace process, of great concern to ethnic communities—for example, regarding land rights (the widespread threat of land-grabbing in newly accessible, conflict-affected areas)—which could be 'fast-tracked' for discussion, if there was political will among key actors. Ethnic armed group leaders should also concentrate on negotiating an agreement with the Myanmar Army—particularly a Code of Conduct for armed personnel, and ceasefire monitoring. This will not be easy, given the Tatmadaw's'hardline' positions in recent negotiations. However, groups like the Karen National Union have developed something of a special relationship with top Myanmar Army leaders over the past two years, which should be mobilized in order to attempt a breakthrough. The Myanmar Army will continue to dominate the security sector for years to come; there will be no (or only limited) civilian control of the military in Myanmar after 2015. Together with ethnic armed groups, the Myanmar Army is among the actors which will continue to be key players after the elections. However, the influence of ethnic armed groups will gradually diminish, as just one among a range of stakeholders—rather than as the government’s key interlocutors, as at present. Ethnic armed group leaders should therefore secure what advantages they can in the peace process, in the hope of being able to make further progress post-election. To hold out for a better deal in 2016 may not be wise. Ashley South is a Research Fellow at Chiang Mai University's Center for Ethnic Studies and Development and a Senior Adviser to the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative. The views expressed here are not to be attributed to either of these institutions. The post Where Next in Burma's Peace Process? appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Myanmar Officer Jailed for Backing Smaller Army Role in Politics Posted: 08 Dec 2014 01:48 AM PST An image of Maj. Kyaw Swar Win, in which he appears to be signing a pro-constitutional amendment petition in Pyin Oo Lwin, went viral online. RANGOON—Burma's military has jailed an officer for two years for signing a petition supporting a constitutional amendment to reduce the army's role in politics, the officer's wife said Monday. The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, spearheaded a campaign earlier this year to rescind Section 436 of the constitution, which gives unelected military parliamentarians veto power over further amendments to sections, including one that bars Suu Kyi from the presidency. Over the past year, Suu Kyi, whom the former junta kept under house arrest for years, has been critical of the government, accusing it of stalling on reforms. A military tribunal on Friday convicted Major Kyaw Zwar Win after arresting him in April, said his wife who asked not to be identified by name. "He wasn't granted the right of defense through lawyers during the trial in accordance with the practice of court martial," she told Reuters. "He was sentenced to two years in jail for disobedience." The military has no spokesman and does not speak to journalists. The office of government spokesman Ye Htut did not answer calls requesting comment. Burma's former ruling junta, which repeatedly cracked down on pro-democracy protests, stepped aside in March 2011. A semi-civilian government has since introduced reforms, including the release of political prisoners. While the military ceded nominal political power to civilians, including former officers who retired to join the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), it cemented its role in government through the constitution it drafted in 2008. Major changes must be supported by more than 75 percent of Parliament, which allows military seat holders and their USDP allies to veto any proposed amendments. During the NLD's petition drive, the military issued orders that no officers should add their signatures, according to Nay Myo Zin, a former military officer who is now a political activist. Under the constitution, 25 percent of the seats in parliament are set aside for the military. And more than half of the rest are held by the USDP, made up mainly of former officers. The NLD and political activists collected about five million signatures on their petition for constitutional change, which they presented to Parliament in August. Aung Thein, a legal adviser to the NLD, said his team would provide assistance should Kyaw Zwar Win wish to appeal the verdict, but his wife said he had no plans to appeal. The post Myanmar Officer Jailed for Backing Smaller Army Role in Politics appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Burmese Rock and German Punk Hits Rangoon’s Kandawgyi Park Posted: 08 Dec 2014 01:37 AM PST Die Toten Hosen lead singer Campino. (Photo: Hein Htet / The Irrawaddy) RANGOON — Hundreds of Burmese youths and a sizeable contingent of foreigners gathered at Rangoon's Kandawgyi Park on Saturday night to enjoy a night of rock and punk performed by local bands Side Effect, No U Turn and Burmese alternative singer Kai Zar Tin Moong. The main act was German punk band Die Toten Hosen, which was invited to the event organized by the German Embassy to celebrate the 60th year anniversary of German-Burmese diplomatic relations. Die Toten Hosen—meaning The Dead Pants or The Dead Beats in German—were formed in the early 1980s, the height of the punk-era, and have been a well-known for decades. The post Burmese Rock and German Punk Hits Rangoon's Kandawgyi Park appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Govt Should Investigate Girl’s Killing by Army, Say Rights Groups Posted: 07 Dec 2014 09:39 PM PST The 14-year-old,Ja Seng Ing, was shot by soldiers in September 2012 in her village in Kachin State. (Photo: Ja Seng Ing Truth Finding Committee) RANGOON — Burma's government should investigate the military’s alleged killing of a 14-year-old girl whose father is being prosecuted for making "false charges" after filing a complaint about the attack, rights groups said Saturday. The girl, Ja Seng Ing, was shot by soldiers in September 2012 in her village in Kachin State, according to a 42-page report based on witness testimonies collected by a coalition of rights groups. Myanmar’s military has been battling the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), an ethnic guerrilla group in the northern state bordering China, since a ceasefire agreement broke down in 2011. "Eyewitnesses allege that Burma army soldiers shot her at close range during a period of indiscriminate gunfire," said a report by the Ja Seng Ing Truth Finding Committee, which also conducted a "physical investigation of the alleged crime scene". The military has no spokesman and does not talk to journalists. Burma government spokesman Ye Htut did not respond to emailed questions and his office did not answer phone calls requesting comment. The army said Ja Seng Ing was killed by a mine detonated by the KIA, contradicting villagers who said soldiers opened fire on her and her friends at close range, the report said. Her father, Brang Shawng, wrote to President Thein Sein and the Human Rights Commission requesting an investigation. Subsequently, the military took him to court for making "false charges", which carries a sentence of up to two years in prison. Bangkok-based Fortify Rights has documented abuses perpetrated by the military against civilians including killings and torture, said the rights group’s executive director Matthew Smith, who urged the military to drop the charges against Brang Shawng and end impunity for soldiers. The KIA’s second-in-command, General Gun Maw, accused the military of lying about the case of Ja Seng Ing. "That’s why the Kachin community doesn’t trust the Burmese military," he told Reuters. The latest round of peace talks between guerrilla groups and the semi-civilian government that took over in 2011 after nearly 50 years of military rule ended on Sept. 27 without agreement. Most of the rebel groups have been battling for greater autonomy under a federal system but the military has long stressed the need for a strong, centralized government, as set down in a 2008 military-drafted Constitution. The post Govt Should Investigate Girl’s Killing by Army, Say Rights Groups appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Ex-Czar’s Arrest Makes China’s Xi Stronger Posted: 07 Dec 2014 09:34 PM PST China's former Politburo Standing Committee Member Zhou Yongkang attends the closing ceremony of the National People's Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 14, 2012. (Photo: Reuters) BEIJING — The criminal case against China's ex-security chief not only plays to public demands to curb corruption but spells the downfall of one of President Xi Jinping's biggest rivals, puts other challengers on their toes and leaves Xi more solidly in control than ever. The fate of the once-feared Zhou Yongkang, 72, appeared to be sealed by the just-after-midnight announcements Saturday that he was expelled from China's ruling Communist Party and arrested in a criminal investigation into allegations ranging from bribe-taking to leaking state secrets. "Many of Xi's enemies have been scared, and he's been successful in intimidating his enemies," said Willy Lam, an observer of China's elite politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. "All of them have become obedient—at least superficially—to Xi Jinping." Zhou, with a face that looks like it is made of stone, was a former member of the party's all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee and was once in charge of the country's police, security forces and judiciary, a vast apparatus that spends more on domestic security than what China spent on the People's Liberation Army, the world's biggest military. Zhou's status as security czar would have meant he had access to private phone conversations and secret information about national leaders. The state secrets allegations against him likely stem from his attempts to use leaks about colleagues to jockey for position ahead of China's handover of power in late 2012 to a new generation of leaders at the retirement of President Hu Jintao, Lam said. If he ends up formally charged on that count, it also may give the court a reason to keep trial proceedings closed and thus limit any politically damaging public disclosures. Lam said Zhou and his associates also may have been part of the biggest corruption ring since the Communist Party took over power in 1949. His vast network of protégés involved hundreds of officials and billions of dollars, Lam said. Whispers that Zhou was in trouble began to circulate months before he was set to retire in November 2012. They grew louder when his favored protégé, a deputy party chief in Zhou's old stomping ground of Sichuan province, became the first major official to fall in the anti-corruption campaign that Xi has made hallmark of his tenure. That happened a mere 18 days after the conclusion of the power-transfer ceremony. One by one, Zhou's associates—in the oil industry, in police and in Sichuan province, where he had built strong power bases—were placed under investigation, making Saturday's announcement marking Zhou's fall all but expected. "When the arrow leaves the bow, there is no turning around," Beijing-based independent scholar Zhang Lifan said. Zhou has not been formally charged and the case has been referred by party investigators to criminal prosecutors. The investigators also cited his keeping mistresses as a reason for his expulsion from the party. Adultery is not technically illegal in China, but it is deemed by the Communist Party to be a serious violation of party rules because mistresses are considered to inevitably open a politician up to financial demands that lead to corruption. Any trial would be expected to have a foregone conclusion with Zhou's conviction, because the outcomes of such high-profile trials are widely believed to be negotiated among top leaders ahead of time. The prosecution of Zhou also will serve to "shock and awe" opponents to Xi's two-year anti-corruption drive, Zhang said. "The campaign has moved many people's cheese, and it has been met with great resistance, especially from the mid- and lower-level officials," Zhang said. "It is entering into a logjam, and the announcement against Zhou can help break that stalemate." Differing from the view that the prosecution of Zhou is primarily about factional rivalry, Li Cheng, director of the John L. Thorton China Center at Washington-based think-tank Brookings Institution, said the main objective is to tamp down pervasive corruption that has crippled public confidence in party rule. "It's about the life and death for the party," Li said, calling the retired Zhou a "dead tiger" with little political relevance left. "The urgency is to change the public view of the Communist Party and to raise its prestige." China's political system at the highest levels is opaque, but in recent decades has been seen to embrace a rule-by-consensus approach among topmost leaders that eschews the personality cult and turmoil of the Mao Zedong era. Xi Jinping has reversed some of that trend with a higher-profile public persona and with his moves to swiftly consolidate power, including placing himself at the helm of panels that control the military, domestic security and reform efforts. He is now seen by many observers to be the strongest leader since the time of Deng Xiaoping that lasted into the 1990s. The fall of Zhou and his associates has helped score further points for Xi, portraying him as a heroic, resolute figure against corruption, said Perry Link, a sinologist at the University of California at Riverside. Stata media have celebrated the prosecution of Zhou as strong evidence of the party's determination and its ability to root out corruption, and, as expected, members of the public have cheered. "That's a success for Xi Jinping. It increases his popularity," Link said. However, cynicism remains among many members of the public who believe that corruption extends beyond just Zhou and his circle. Corruption charges, when used selectively, are the time-honored ploy to purge political opponents, Link said. "Why Zhou Yongkang, but not other members of the Standing Committee? That difference is political," he said. Any suggestion that the crackdown can cure China's epidemic corruption is naive, because corruption cannot be effectively curbed without independent checks on the party's power, which China so far lacks, Link said. "As long as you have the one-party rule, it won't change the basic problem." The post Ex-Czar's Arrest Makes China's Xi Stronger appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Japan PM Abe on Track for Landslide in Weekend Poll Posted: 07 Dec 2014 09:31 PM PST Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (center), who is also leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, campaigning in Tokyo on Sunday. (Photo: Yuya Shino / Reuters) TOKYO —Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ruling party is on track for a landslide victory in a Dec. 14 election and could take a two-thirds majority in the lower house of parliament even without its coalition partner, a media projection showed. The result of the survey by the Mainichi newspaper was similar to previous forecasts, suggesting the prospect of a landslide has not caused voters to change their minds. Abe has dubbed the election a referendum on his reflationary policies. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is set to take 303-320 seats of the powerful chamber’s 475 seats, the forecast showed, indicating the LDP may grab the 317 seats on its own to hold a "super majority" needed to override votes in the upper house. The expected win would make it easier for Abe to push ahead with his "Abenomics" recipe, despite the fact that many voters say they have yet to feel the positive impact and data shows the economy slipped into recession in the third quarter through September. When Abe dissolved the lower house, the LDP held 295 seats, and together with its junior partner, the Komeito party held 326 seats. Reforms cut the number of seats in the chamber by five. News on Monday that the economy had contracted more than thought in the third quarter after an April sales tax rise was unlikely to affect the election, with many voters opting for the LDP because of dissatisfaction with the opposition rather than a positive groundswell for the ruling party, some analysts said. "This is an election without choice," said Tomoaki Iwai, political science professor at Nihon University, adding that voter turnout may be even lower than than the record low hit in the 2012 election that brought Abe and the LDP back to power. The opposition Democratic Party is expected to win between 65 and 81 seats, more than the 62 it had before the election but far below the 100 it has targeted, the Mainichi survey showed. The post Japan PM Abe on Track for Landslide in Weekend Poll appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

No Major Damage in Philippine Typhoon, at Least 3 Dead Posted: 07 Dec 2014 08:35 PM PST People take shelter inside an evacuation center after evacuating from their homes due to super-typhoon Hagupit in Surigao city, southern Philippines Dec. 5, 2014. (Photo: Reuters) LEGAZPI, Philippines — Typhoon Hagupit weakened on Monday, a day after it left at least three people dead and sent more than a million others into shelters, sparing the central Philippines the massive devastation that a monster storm brought to the region last year. Shallow floods, damaged shanties and ripped off tin roofs were a common sight across the region, but there was no major destruction after Hagupit slammed into Eastern Samar and other island provinces. It was packing maximum sustained winds of 120 kilometers (75 miles) per hour and gusts of 150 kph (93 mph) on Monday, considerably weaker than its peak power but still a potentially deadly storm, according to forecasters. The typhoon, which made landfall in Eastern Samar late Saturday, was moving slowly, dumping heavy rain that could possibly trigger landslides and flash floods. Traumatized by the death and destruction from Typhoon Haiyan last year, more than 1 million people fled to more than 1,000 emergency shelters and safer grounds. Hagupit (pronounced HA'-goo-pit) was moving across a string of island provinces and would be near the bustling capital, Manila by early Tuesday, according to government forecasters. Manila Mayor Joseph Estrada said more than 3,000 residents of a shantytown on the edge of Manila Bay have been evacuated due to possible storm surges. "We've prepared and trained for this," Estrada told The Associated Press, adding his greatest fear was widespread flooding. Like villagers in the central Philippines, Estrada said Manila residents were readily moving to safety because they're still haunted by troublesome memories of Haiyan's devastation last year. "That's still very fresh in their minds," he said of Haiyan's tsunami-like storm surges and killer winds left thousands of people dead and leveled entire villages, most of them in and around Tacloban. Metropolitan Manila has a population of more than 12 million people. Two people, including a baby girl, died of hypothermia in central Iloilo province Saturday at the height of the typhoon, disaster-response agency chief Alexander Pama told a news conference. Another person died after being hit by a falling tree in the eastern town of Dolores, where the typhoon first made landfall, according to Interior Secretary Mar Roxas. Displaced villagers were asked to return home from emergency shelters in provinces where the danger posed by the typhoon had waned, including Albay, where more than half a million people were advised to leave evacuation sites. Nearly 12,000 villagers, however, will remain in government shelters in Albay because their homes lie near a restive volcano. While officials expressed relief that the typhoon had not caused major damage, they were quick to warn that Hagupit—Filipino for "smash" or "lash"—was still on course to cross three major central Philippine islands before starting to blow away Tuesday into the South China Sea. Several typhoon-lashed eastern villages isolated by downed telephone and power lines were out of contact, Welfare Secretary Dinky Soliman said. Army troops deployed to supermarkets and major roads in provinces in the typhoon's path to prevent looting and chaos and clear debris, all of which slowed the government's response to Haiyan last year. The post No Major Damage in Philippine Typhoon, at Least 3 Dead appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

State of Anarchy Posted: 07 Dec 2014 08:21 PM PST A procession of cars drove to the funeral of Lo Hsing Han in Yangon in July, 2013. (Photo: The Irrawaddy) No traveler to Shan State could fail to notice the presence of an abundance of local militia forces that are especially active in the northeast and near the Thai border in the south. They carry guns, bear their own insignias and run businesses—from petrol stations and plantations for commercial crops to the trade in methamphetamine and other drugs. These militia forces are, at least officially, under the control of the Myanmar Army, and more than 1,000 of their troops are now being used to fight the Shan State Army-South and the Shan State Army-North, ethnic armed groups that actually have ceasefire agreements with the government. It is hard to imagine that these often unruly militia forces could contribute anything to Myanmar's future other than chaos and destruction—as the decades-long civil war in Shan State clearly shows. In the mid-1950s, Shan State was a battleground where government forces fought the invading Chinese-nationalist Kuomintang that had set up bases in remote areas in the northeast. Called Pyu Saw Htee after a legendary hero of the Bagan era, these fighting forces soon developed into local warlord-led factions that the government proved unable to control. Consequently, they were disbanded when Gen. Ne Win established his caretaker government in 1958. But the relatively weak and poorly equipped Pyu Saw Htee were to be followed by the much more powerful—and far more notorious—Ka Kwe Ye home guards. This group was established in 1963, the year after the military coup that deposed the government elected in 1960. Ka Kwe Ye literally means "defense" and the group became part of a new counter-insurgency strategy that the government was about to launch. Shan State has always been Myanmar's most troublesome region, partly because of its ethnic diversity—not only Shan but also Kachin, Pa-O, Palaung, Padaung, Wa, Kokang Chinese and many others live there—but also because of the separate status and rights that it enjoyed before and after independence. During the British colonial period, the 40 or so Shan principalities were collectively a protectorate and not part of Myanmar proper. Each state was ruled by a Shan saopha (sawbwa in Myanmar) who had his own administration and even his own police force. The Shan, who call themselves Tai, are closely related to their Thai and Lao neighbors. Contact with the Myanmar kings of the pre-colonial era was limited to paying tribute to the various courts that ruled the western lowlands. But that never amounted to recognition of Myanmar sovereignty over their principalities. Britain's interest in the Shan states, as they were called, was limited to keeping the French in Indochina at bay and preventing the emergence of an uncontrollable region between the two colonial empires. Sir Charles Crosthwaite, the British Chief Commissioner in Myanmar in 1887-90, described the situation in this manner: Looking at the character of the country lying between the Salween and the Mekong, it was certain to be the refuge of all the discontent and outlawry of Burma [Myanmar]. Unless it was ruled by a government not only loyal and friendly to us […] this region could become a base for the operations of every brigand leader or pretender where they might muster their followers and hatch their plots […] To those responsible for the peace in Burma, such a prospect was not pleasant. Crosthwaite's words were to become prophetic—in the 1960s. The Shan princes had agreed to join the proposed Union of Burma [Myanmar] at a conference in the Shan market town of Panglong in 1947. The agreement that was signed there on Feb. 12 stipulated that the Shan states would retain their autonomy, thus laying the groundwork for the federal system that was introduced after independence in 1948. The Shan princes had also asked for, and been granted, the right to secede from the Union after a ten-year period of independence, should they be dissatisfied with the arrangement. Only the Shan and Karenni (now Kayah) states had this right, which was enshrined in Chapter Ten of the new constitution. When the ten-year "trial period" was up in 1958, voices were raised for separation from Myanmar. A rebellion broke out that year which attracted radical Shan students in Yangon and elsewhere as well as figures such as Bo Maung, an ethnic Wa former officer in the Union Military Police. In 1959, he led an attack on the garrison town of Tangyan with a force including some Shan students. The civil war was in full swing, and intensified after the 1962 coup, when the federal constitution was abolished and Myanmar's first president, the Shan prince Sao Shwe Thaike, was arrested and killed in custody. In 1964, his widow, Sao Nang Hearn Kham, became the head of a coalition of resistance forces that amalgamated to form the Shan State Army (SSA). In the 1960s, Crosthwaite's nightmare vision of chaos in the area was coming true. The main reason was the growth of the Ka Kwe Ye home guard forces. The idea behind the program was to create units to fight insurgents in areas which government forces had difficulty reaching. This became even more important for the government when the Communist Party of Burma, with massive assistance from China, in the late 1960s and early 1970s took over the remote eastern border mountains, including Kokang and the wild Wa Hills. The Ka Kwe Ye home guards were encouraged to strengthen their forces, but there were not enough funds in the central coffer to support such a sustained counter-insurgency effort. The answer was to allow them to use all government-controlled towns and roads in Shan State for opium trafficking. In that way, the home guards would become self-sufficient and not dependent on the government for funds. Many local warlords and brigands accepted the offer and turned their forces into home guard units. The most powerful of them was Lo Hsing Han, an ethnic Chinese from Myanmar who was the commander of a home guard unit made up of men from his native Kokang. Lo Hsing Han's forces assisted the Myanmar Army during the crucial battle for the Kunlong bridge in December 1971 to January 1972. The government's forces were led by a very able commander, Lt-Col Tun Yi, a short, rotund and baldheaded man who was nick-named "Napoleon" by his fellow officers. Later in life, he rose to become the chairman of the National Unity Party and passed away in Yangon earlier this year. In exchange for Lo Hsing Han's services to the nation, the Myanmar Army even helped protect his opium convoys from ambushes by rival gangs. But the Ka Kwe Ye home guards became too powerful even for Gen. Ne Win and were abolished in 1973. However, rather than surrendering his arms to the government, Lo Hsing Han went underground and formed an alliance with the SSA. Lo Hsing Han was arrested later that year in northern Thailand, where he had slipped across the border to avoid an attack by the Myanmar Army. He was extradited to Myanmar where he was sentenced to death, not for trading in narcotics—which he had had the unofficial permission to do anyway—but for "rebellion against the state," a reference to his brief alliance with the SSA. Lo was, as we know, never executed but was released from jail during a general amnesty in 1980. He returned to his old base in Lashio where he set up a new militia force under the Pyi Thu Sit ("people's militia") program. He was still a useful tool for the government and later also became a prominent businessman. He passed away in July last year. Another prominent home guard commander was Zhang Qifu, the half-Chinese leader of the local Ka Kwe Ye unit on Loi Maw mountain in northern Shan State. He became an equally powerful warlord. His forces attacked the Shan rebels and, in return, he was allowed to trade in opium and heroin. He was arrested in 1969 after an attempt to reach out to his enemies, the Shan rebels, to negotiate safe passage for his convoys through the areas they controlled. Such an agreement would have defeated the entire purpose of the Ka Kwe Ye program, so Zhang Qifu ended up in jail. He was released in 1974 after his men, who had gone underground and also linked up with the SSA, kidnapped two Russian doctors from a hospital in Taunggyi. Zhang Qifu then built up a new army, remodeled it into a Shan resistance force and assumed a new, Shan name: Khun Sa. His Mong Tai Army (MTA) became one of the strongest and best equipped in Shan State, armed mostly with weapons acquired in Thailand. But the MTA, much to the chagrin of his new Shan followers, never used its weapons against the government's forces. It seemed this was the old Ka Kwe Ye deal in a new shape and form. Khun Sa eventually surrendered to the government in January 1996, disbanded his army and moved, with his money, to Yangon. He died there in 2007. Against this background, is it plausible to assume that the emergence of yet another set of militia forces would lead to a situation that would be any different from the past? Hardly, most observers would say, as the recent rapid increase in the production of opium and synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines indicates. Shan State is bound to remain a cockpit of anarchy where drugs, guns and money rule supreme. The post State of Anarchy appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

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