Wednesday, August 30, 2017

The Irrawaddy Magazine

The Irrawaddy Magazine

Over 60 Resign From Mon National Party

Posted: 30 Aug 2017 07:24 AM PDT

MAWLAMYINE, Mon State — A total of 63 Mon National Party (MNP) members from the Kyaikmayaw Township chapter in Mon State resigned on Wednesday over their disappointment with what they said was indecisive leadership on a planned merger with the All Mon Region Democracy (AMDP).

"We've watched the actions of our party leaders since the 2015 election. We anticipated the merger, but it didn't happen. We've long been disappointed with this, and finally submitted our resignation today," said Mi Jun Del Non, an MNP central executive committee (CEC) member.

She will work toward the merger as an independent politician, she said. The vice-chairperson, general secretary and executives of the township's chapter were among those who also resigned.

MNP boasts a membership of more than 70,000 in nine townships in Mon State, four townships in Karen State and three townships in Tanintharyi Region. The Kyaikmayaw chapter has more than 1,000 members.

On July 13-15, the MNP held a CEC meeting which saw the expulsion of two CEC members and four central committee members including Dr. Min Soe Lin, who won the seat for Ye Township in the 2015 general election. The dismissals were reportedly because of the six members' strong support for the merger.

The idea of a merger was presented in 2012. In April the following year, representatives of two parties signed an agreement on the merger in front of Mon people, but it has been continuously stalled by struggles to find common ground on the terms of a coalition.

In the 2015 election, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won the majority of votes in the state, which many Mon blamed on votes being split between the two Mon parties.

"If there was only one ethnic Mon Party, it would win the election. This has been shown clearly in the 2015 general election. I would like to ask why we can't merge, but don't know who to ask," said Min Nyan Linn, general secretary of MNP's Kyaikmayaw branch.

In August last year, the Mon National Conference called for unity among Mon parties. Then under the guidance of the New Mon State Party (NMSP), a committee to build unity among Mon parties was formed in October the same year.

But after the resignation of the NMSP from the committee in May this year, work on coordination between the two parties has stalled.

In January, about 300 Mon youth in Lamine sub-township in Ye Township protested against the leaders of the AMDP and MNP after they refused to combine their parties. Growing calls to form a new Mon political party followed the protest.

Dr. Aung Naing Oo, the deputy speaker of Mon State parliament, resigned from AMDP in July also because of the lack of progress in the coalition.

MNP was formed in 1988 as Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF), and then registered in 2012 as Mon National party (MDP), and in 2014 changed its name to current one MNP.

Translated from Burmese by Thet Ko Ko.

The post Over 60 Resign From Mon National Party appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Parliament Votes Down Ethnic DNA Proposal

Posted: 30 Aug 2017 07:15 AM PDT

Naypyitaw — The Lower House on Tuesday voted down a proposal to develop DNA profiles of each ethnic group in Myanmar.

The motion was put forward by Mandalay Region's Meiktila Township lawmaker Dr. Maung Thin who argued that keeping such a DNA profile would contribute to medical research and citizenship verification processes.

A total of 382 lawmakers voted on the proposal—150 voted in favor, 222 against and six abstained.

Military representative Maj. Win Min Tun said: "Keeping DNA profiles will contribute a great deal to the anthropological study of the origins of Myanmar people today as well as genetic characteristics and related fields."

The proposal comes at a time of a stalled citizenship verification process for the stateless Rohingya population in Rakhine State who many—including the government—refer to as Bengali to infer they are interlopers from Bangladesh.

Maj. Win Min Tun said the military is ready to cooperate with civilian technicians in developing genetic profiles of Myanmar's eight major ethnic groups—Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Chin, Mon, Arakanese, Shan, and Bamar.

Asian countries such as China, India, Vietnam and the Philippines keep DNA records of some of its ethnic groups.

The Myanmar government has formed a DNA supervisory board which has made little progress in developing genetic profiles of ethnicities living in the country, said lawmaker U Hla Htun Kyaw of Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State.

"Neighboring countries have started to systematically record their races. This is a very important issue, and necessary. Myanmar has a high risk of problems connected with citizenship and ethnic identity," said U Hla Tun Kyaw, who is also member of the Lower House Ethnic Affairs and Internal Peace Implementation Committee.

Shan State's Pyin Oo Lwin Township lawmaker Dr Aung Khin said much needs to be done to develop DNA profiles at a national level such as hiring technicians, building hi-tech labs, and developing a law in place in case of controversy.

Union health minister U Myint Htwe also called for consultations with technicians first to discuss the viability of the plan as it has legal and human rights implications, as well as being costly.

The post Parliament Votes Down Ethnic DNA Proposal appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Mob Kills Four Arakanese Amid Ongoing Rakhine Violence

Posted: 30 Aug 2017 06:44 AM PDT

MAUNGDAW, Rakhine State — Four Arakanese men were killed and another seriously injured by a mob of Rohingya Muslims in Maungdaw Township in conflict-torn northern Rakhine State on Wednesday morning, according to the district administrator.

The five men were attacked with swords near the Muslim-majority village of Zula, said Maungdaw District Administrator U Ye Htut.

"Four were dead and the other man is seriously wounded," he told The Irrawaddy.

The region has been reeling from the August 25 attacks of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on 30 police stations and an army base, which left 12 security personnel and at least 59 militants dead.

About 18,000 Rohingya are estimated to have crossed into Bangladesh in the last week in order to flee the violence, the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Security forces reportedly shot some Rohingya as they tried to cross the border.

Meanwhile, thousands of Buddhists and Hindus have been evacuated to shelters dotted around the region.

According to witnesses from nearby Thazi village, the five men were approaching Zula after seeing fire come from the village.

"When they were approaching the village, about 10 Bengalis hiding in the field attacked them," said Maung Thein Aung from the Arakanese majority-Thazi village, using a term for the stateless Rohingya that implies they are interlopers from Bangladesh. "It happened right between the road and Zula."

Thazi resident Ko Hla Thein Aung told The Irrawaddy in his village on Wednesday afternoon that there were 10 security members nearby at the time of the attack.

"But they were a bit far so all they could do was fire four warning shots," he said. "The Bengalis ignored it."

The troops would have been outnumbered and attacked if they chased the culprits into Zula village, he added.

Dozens of deaths have been reported over the past five days—some civilian, including the killing of six members of a Hindu family in southern Maungdaw on Saturday that the government said was at the hands of militants.

The Myanmar government declared ARSA a terrorist organization the following day. ARSA has been carrying out arson attacks on local homes and planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs), according to the government.

More than 2,300 buildings in Maungdaw and surrounding villages were razed during ARSA attacks, the government announced on Monday.

However, ARSA has accused the military of burning homes, a claim supported by the accounts of some Rohingya villagers. Satellite data shows widespread fires burning in at least 10 areas of northern Rakhine, according to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) statement on Tuesday.

Burnings were seen across 100 kilometers in length, roughly five times larger than the area where burnings by the Myanmar Army occurred from October to November 2016, said HRW. Over those months, data from HRW suggested about 1,500 buildings were destroyed.

ARSA has stated in a series of statements and videos that it is committed to securing citizenship and basic civil rights within Myanmar for the Rohingya and has maintained that it does not target civilians.

The post Mob Kills Four Arakanese Amid Ongoing Rakhine Violence appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Rights Commission Submits Report on Jailed Journalists  

Posted: 30 Aug 2017 04:36 AM PDT

YANGON — The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC) has submitted its findings and suggestions on the case of three detained journalists in northern Shan State to the defense ministry after its members visited the reporters in Hsipaw Prison.

Commission members met The Irrawaddy's Lawi Weng, also known as U Thein Zaw, and U Aye Naing and U Pyae Phone Aung from the Democratic Voice of Burma, and checked the conditions of the inmates on August 9.

The MNHRC inspected jail cells in police stations and courts in Lashio and Hsipaw as part of countrywide prison reforms. It presented its wider findings to the home affairs ministry and made recommendations on the case of the three journalists to the defense ministry.

"We presented to the defense ministry that the journalists should not have been arrested for going to a public place and doing their jobs," said commission member U Yu Lwin Aung.

The Myanmar Army detained the three reporters along with three other men on June 26 as they returned from covering a drug-burning ceremony hosted by the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to mark the United Nations' International Day against Drug Abuse.

Later, the journalists were charged under Article 17(1) of the colonial-era Unlawful Associations Act after Tatmadaw Adjutant Thet Naing Oo from Light Infantry Battalion No. 503 filed the lawsuit case.

Violators of Article 17(1) face two to three years in prison and a possible fine for being a member of an "unlawful association," making contributions to such an association or assisting in its operations.

U Yu Lwin Aung said no action should be taken against the journalists for covering the drug-burning event, which was also attended by local people including civil servants.

If the military has evidence the reporters are connected to the TNLA, an outlawed organization, he said, the commission cannot object to the arrest and would instead await the court's decision.

"Reporters will cover stories in areas of the military's opponents. It is their job. But we don't know what evidence is included in the confiscated cameras, phones and laptops of the three journalists. If there is evidence that could damage national security, action could be taken against them," U Yu Lwin Aung said.

Press advocacy groups and rights groups have urged authorities to drop the charges against the journalists immediately and denounced the move as an attempt to intimidate journalists for doing their jobs.

U Yu Lwin Aung previously told the media right after the visit to Hsipaw that the journalists did not break the law.

The plaintiff submitted a compact disk with data allegedly copied from the journalists' cameras and phones to be examined as evidence by Hsipaw Township Court.

The journalists' lawyers objected, stating that the evidence was inadmissible and questioning its authenticity as Maj Myat Maw Aung, a military witness, testified at the trial that they had deleted the original data from the reporters' confiscated cameras and phones.

The court will rule whether to accept the evidence on Friday.

The post Rights Commission Submits Report on Jailed Journalists   appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Upper House Approves Rakhine State Proposal

Posted: 30 Aug 2017 04:26 AM PDT

NAYPYITAW — The Upper House has approved a proposal to improve security in Rakhine State despite other similar proposals regarding responses to attacks in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships failing in the Lower House.

On Aug. 9, Arakan National party (ANP) lawmaker U Khin Maung Latt of Rakhine State (3) urged the government take action against suspected militants in northern Rakhine State under the 2014 Counter-Terrorism Law and help locals who have fled their homes because of killings in the area.

The proposal followed the killing of seven ethnic Mro, a sub-ethnic group of Arakanese, of Kai Gyee village near the Mayu mountain range in southern Maungdaw Township.

U Khin Maung Latt said approval of his proposal meant a greater power for security forces, and increased budgets for fencing along the Bangladesh border and police outposts for border security as well as regional rehabilitation.

U Khin Maung Latt, however, was unhappy about the length of time the proposal was debated.

"The proposal should have been discussed earlier, violence erupted while it was being debated," he said, referring to attacks claimed by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), which broke out on Friday.

Of the lawmakers who voted, 187 voted in favor, one against and three abstained.

Just a day before the outbreak of attacks in northern Rakhine, the Lower House voted down a proposal to intensify security in northern Rakhine State, which was tabled by ANP lawmaker Daw Khin Saw Wai of Rathedaung Township.

"Though the two proposals appear to concern the same issue, the points of the proposals were different. This proposal matches the ongoing actions of the government, and that's why I supported the proposal," Deputy Home Affairs Minister Maj-Gen Aung Soe told reporters.

After ARSA launched coordinated attacks on 30 police outposts and a military base in the early hours of Friday in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships—resulting in the death of 12 security personnel—the government branded ARSA a terrorist organization and said it would take action against anyone who is involved in or abets terrorist acts.

On Friday last week and again on Monday, ex-general lawmakers for the opposition Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) made unsuccessful attempts to slam the attacks and beef up security in Maungdaw.

"We have to root out the terrorist group before it can establish a stronghold," lawmaker U Kyaw Kyaw of Rakhine State (4) urged the Upper House.

Translated from Burmese by Thet Ko Ko.

The post Upper House Approves Rakhine State Proposal appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

ARSA Mobilizes Rohingya in Northern Rakhine: Army

Posted: 30 Aug 2017 03:27 AM PDT

NAYPYITAW — The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) has rallied Rohingya in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships to establish a "Rohingya-only area" in Maungdaw District, northern Rakhine State, claimed Myanmar Army spokesperson Maj-Gen Aung Ye Win.

"Their [ARSA] main objective is to rally through fear, build strongholds, and declare the whole region as their liberated area," Maj-Gen Aung Ye Win said at a Myanmar Army press briefing in Naypyitaw on Tuesday for military attaches of foreign countries and the media on attacks in northern Rakhine State.

"They managed to rally some 50 percent of Bengalis in Buthidaung and Maungdaw. They mobilized in different places for each household to send a person to participate in the attacks," he added, referring to the stateless Rohingya population, which the Myanmar government and many in the country refer to as Bengali to infer that they are interlopers from Bangladesh.

According to the briefing, ARSA, which claimed responsibility for attacks last week on 30 police outposts and an army base in Rakhine State, sent a letter to the government on March 29 listing 20 demands. Recently declared a terrorist organization by the government, ARSA had been plotting jihad for some time, according to military leaders.

On Tuesday, home affairs minister Lt-Gen Kyaw Swe claimed that the recent attacks were a move on the part of ARSA to establish an "Islamic State" in Rakhine.

"Bengalis want their own territory. So, they drove Arakanese people out of the country and this resulted in conflict. They made political and military movements to demand their own territory," said Maj-Gen Aung Ye Win, who is also the vice-chairman of the Myanmar Army True News Information Team.

Muslims account for 34 percent of the total population in Rakhine State, and there are 1,272 mosques in Buthidaung and Maungdaw, and no restriction of religion, he said.

He claimed that the attacks were not religiously motivated, but due to the Rohingya being unwilling to undergo the citizenship verification process and wanting to gain territorial control.

The treatment of the region's 1.1 million stateless Rohingya has been one of State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's biggest challenges. For years, they have been denied citizenship, endured apartheid-like conditions and faced severe travel restrictions.

Tensions had been running high recently between the ethnic Arakanese and Rohingya Muslim populations, who remained largely separated since inter-communal violence in 2012 and 2013 displaced around 140,000 people, the vast majority of them Rohingya.

The worst violence that the area has seen in years has sent thousands to flee the area once again.

Deputy Chief of Military Affairs Security Maj-Gen Than Htut Thein said Parliament had rejected Myanmar Army proposals calling for necessary responses. The administration in Maungdaw had collapsed and hatred between the two communities had reached its peak, he added.

He said the Myanmar Army would ensure that a National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) meeting was summoned if necessary, adding that the army was striving for stability but that continued attacks could threaten national security.

Maj-Gen Aung Ye Win said the Myanmar Army was fully cooperating with the government and had offered suggestions, but the decision to summon an NDSC meeting was ultimately in the hands of President U Htin Kyaw.

On Monday, the President's Office sent a letter to the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, instructing the Myanmar Army to continue cooperating with the Myanmar Police Force in operations in Rakhine State.

Maj-Gen Than Htut Thein said the Myanmar Army had to join the operations as the situation was beyond the capacity of the police force.

The president, state counselor and Myanmar Army deputy commander-in-chief had discussions over the phone, in which they agreed to deploy additional military troops to the area and employ helicopters in the operations.

Additional reporting by Htun Htun. Translated from Burmese by Thet Ko Ko.

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Don’t Demonize India Over Rohingya Deportation, Minister Says

Posted: 30 Aug 2017 12:10 AM PDT

DATELINE — NEW DELHI — Rights groups should stop lecturing and demonizing India over its plan to deport some 40,000 stateless Rohingya and recognize that the country has treated millions of refugees from across the world humanely, a senior official said.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's right-wing government says the Rohingya Muslims who have fled to India because of persecution in Buddhist-majority Myanmar are illegal immigrants and should deported as they pose a potential security threat.

"India is the most humane nation in the world," said junior interior minister Kiren Rijiju, defending an order to states to identify and deport the Rohingya—including 16,500 registered with the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR).

"There is no other country in the world which hosts so many refugees so don't demonize us, don't give us lecture."

The Rohingya are denied citizenship in Myanmar and classified as illegal immigrants, despite claiming centuries-old roots.

Hundreds of thousands have fled Myanmar, where they are marginalized and sometimes subjected to communal violence, with many taking refuge in Bangladesh—and some then crossing a porous border into Hindu-majority India.

On Monday, Myanmar security forces intensified operations against Rohingya insurgents, following three days of clashes with militants in the worst violence involving the Muslim minority in five years.

Indian minister Rijiju said registration with the UNHCR was irrelevant.

India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which spells out states' responsibilities towards refugees. Nor does it have a domestic law to protect refugees.

The Rohingya will be sent back from India in a humane way, following due legal processes, Rijiju added.

"We are not going to shoot them, nor are we planning to throw them in the ocean," he said on Monday.

Rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have slammed India's deportation plan as "outrageous."

Asia's third largest economy is bound by customary international law—the principle of non-refoulement—where it cannot forcibly return refugees to a place where they face danger, they say.

The post Don't Demonize India Over Rohingya Deportation, Minister Says appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Myanmar’s Post-Panglong Problems (Part 2) 

Posted: 29 Aug 2017 07:25 PM PDT

Disarmament

The government of Myanmar possesses the capacity to undertake disarmament and demobilization processes. But what it is still theoretically building with EAOs is the trust necessary to engage in such a process. Despite this, the government is unlikely to go down the well-trod path many other states have travelled via the subcontracting of Disarmament and Demobilization processes to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other UN agencies that have expertise in such work. China's acquiescence, however, matters here: elements of One Belt, One Road require the stability in Myanmar's border with Yunnan, and this has been amply demonstrated by the involvement of special envoy Sun Guoxiang in the latest Panglong meeting. It is unlikely that China would involve itself in disarmament and demobilization directly; a process under the auspices, not of the EU or DPKO, but of ASEAN, may be more palatable for them.

The disarmament aspect of DDR is a technically easy, time-bound process that only requires the will of each entity to engage with the other, under third party facilitation. This may involve insurgent entry into cantonments and dual-key weapons storage after a given peace process reaches a certain pre-defined milestone. The weapons initially handed over will likely be constituted in large part by "museum pieces," while better functioning weaponry is held back in case Panglong 21 breaks down, or for sale. Implicit in such a process is the building up of state police forces in insurgent areas—often made up of ex-insurgents under state command—in a structure resembling BGFs, but more lightly armed.

Demobilization and Insurgent Economics

Demobilization of insurgent forces is both a discharging of soldiers and dissolution of the insurgent command structure. In most DDR processes, within the time-bound framework that also encompasses disarmament, it is almost purely symbolic: soldiers in formation hand over their weapons on a parade ground in front of press and dignitaries, and are then "dismissed," one last time, by a commanding officer. The pageantry implies they all go home after. This is disingenuous. Despite claims of demobilization or conversion, the structures nearly always remain, down to the grassroots level.

In less-organized EAOs, these structures are most apparent in financial flows generated by legal and illegal economic activities. Ex-All Burma Students Democratic Front rebel and former MPC director Aung Naing Oo estimated the size of the conflict economy in Myanmar's borderlands at between US$20 billion and $30 billion—and while conflict will stop, the raising of funds often does not. Many EAOs, namely those with longstanding ceasefires with the Tatmadaw, have built up lucrative portfolios constituting of real estate in Yangon and Mandalay, hotels, bus companies, and so on. These are generally in the hands of individual insurgents rather than a group as a whole. Extralegal taxation is the norm, with trade taxed at checkpoints, and businesses and even households taxed in many areas. Sometimes these taxes are used for legitimate ends within complex EAO structures providing services; other times, they are simply protection fees. Often, insurgents exploit natural resources to fund rebellion and charge others for the license to do so: in Myanmar, jadeite, rubies and timber are especially lucrative. Taxes on jadeite, for example, provided up to half of the KIA's operating budget.

In border areas, the smuggling of untaxed goods also constitutes a norm, as does insurgent taxes on such goods. Vice is also a popular business, as is gambling, in Kokang and Mongla especially. This also doesn't stop with a peace agreement, and military businesses also remain deeply involved in natural resource extraction in contested areas, which casts a shadow across Panglong 21. On the furthest end of the spectrum of illegality, select EAO and militia economies are constituted by drug cultivation and processing, namely heroin and methamphetamine. Indeed, some EAOs and militias operate as particularly well-armed criminal syndicates with a thin veneer of ideology masking economic rationales.

As mentioned elsewhere, some crime will be tolerated by the authorities, written off as the "price of peace." A particularly negative example can be found in the experience of neighboring northeastern India, where Naga insurgents who rose up against the Indian state in the 1950s developed comprehensive extortion and protection rackets, and engaged in fratricidal wars—more so than they either fought the state or provided services. They and other insurgent groups in Assam, Manipur, and other areas of northeast India, espouse ideologies to mask the economic rationales of their current activities, and they act as shadow security forces, "descending, despite high-sounding ideals and rhetoric, into a criminalized oligarchy." The Indian state tolerates these behaviors in the insurgents it has treaties with and the groups it is still trying to negotiate with. Yet another example of tolerated criminality can be found in Indonesian Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra. There, the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) fought the Government of Indonesia from 1976 until 2005, when a mediated peace process culminated in the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, followed by the 2006 Law on the Governing of Aceh. GAM disarmed and theoretically demobilized; the structure remained in place, with GAM veterans continuing to collect extra legal taxes from individuals and businesses across the province, as well as other organized criminal activities. This is implicitly allowed by the provincial government, with only GAM dissenters from the main GAM corpus declared "outlaws" and killed.

In Myanmar, peace will also offer lucrative protection opportunities for insurgent structures, especially regarding construction contracts in EAO areas. Improved roads and new businesses will mean more goods and services to tax. These structures will prove durable long after the peace process ends.

The government will initially lack both the capacity and the will to police ex-insurgents and militias, and the Tatmadaw will not do so either. On the contrary, rogue elements of the Tatmadaw within its regional command structure may engage in the same activities, forming new partnerships with EAOs and militias and continuing existing ones.

Ultimately this will be important for a future when the Tatmadaw itself contracts, firstly through its Border Guard Forces. Its affiliated militias, which the Tatmadaw does not finance, will present more immediate law and order problems.

Drug Eradication and Alternative Livelihoods

As in Afghanistan, chaos and statelessness in Shan and other areas of Myanmar engenders drug production. A key element of DDR is the halting of principal insurgent funding streams, and in select (but not all, the KNU, for example, historically executes drug traffickers) EAO and militia areas, this means opium poppy cultivation and heroin/methamphetamine production. The primary way in which this should be undertaken is the ramped-up targeting of grassroots opium poppy cultivators through alternative livelihoods programs, which UNODC and partners have implemented for years through introduction of alternative crops and agricultural extension services. If the alternative livelihood process occurs in a cautious manner, then a period of crop introduction and extension services will occur prior to opium poppy field eradication and law enforcement. Drug treatment programs will follow this process: many poppy cultivators are also addicts.

This can result in much economic distress to poppy-cultivators: In "The United Wa State Party: Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist Party?" Tom Kramer notes that, when the UWSP leadership were indicted by the US Department of Justice for drug production in 2005, they launched eradication efforts on their own accord, and this resulted in widespread declines in household incomes, as well as small-scale famine. As opium was the only cash crop in the area, and hardly any other edible crop was grown, farmers didn't have the ability to purchase rice and other staples. However, a future alternative livelihood process may be less economically painful for these poor households. If it were a seller's market, no alternate crop would equal the value a farmer can earn from opium, but this may not be the case in Myanmar: the last UNODC Southeast Asia Opium Report indicates a fall in the opium purchase price which may result from market consolidation. Initial successes in alternative livelihoods might result in buyers offering higher prices, which could eliminate licit gains made in a non-coercive manner. Other administrations have also taken crop substitution initiatives, in Kokang especially, with sugarcane supplanting poppy grown there.

A better-funded—and for communities, less beneficial—"alternative livelihoods" model has been pursued by private businesses which are opening rubber and other plantations, and paying local laborers pittances. This exploitative capitalism, disguised as beneficial to former opium cultivators, can lead to exactly the type of instability that more traditional alternative livelihoods programs seek to avoid.

Individual Combatant Reintegration

The reintegration element of DDR is likely to be seen by Myanmar and China as less politically sensitive. It is also the aspect of the triage that disarmament and demobilization practitioners avoid, as it is often sub-contracted to the UN sister agency or at the NGO level. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are key reintegration implementers, but this does not mean they have been uniformly successful in past endeavors. Reintegration of ex-combatants from insurgent groups into civilian life is not time-bound, and is fraught with difficulty, if not failure. When insurgencies end, there often isn't enough work for civilians, much less fighters, as insurgent areas are distinguished by a lack of infrastructure and undeveloped licit markets. The majority of the economy is illicit, with significant organized criminal activity, as EAOs are regularly excluded from licit markets unless, in the example of the UWSP and others, they control a large enough territory. Most civilians in such areas are engaged in subsistence agriculture or, to a lesser extent, petty trading. There is often also a lack of health and education services, although this was not the case historically in KIA, KNU, and then-Communist Party of Burma (CPB) territories.

When it comes to the type of work available to ex-combatants, there is also the issue of pride. Having a weapon taken away, as a soldier, can be a traumatic experience. The work one can do in civilian life when one fought previously cannot just be any work. It has to have meaning. We cannot expect people who have killed and suffered for a cause to become subsistence farmers on their own land, much less land that is not their own, or bicycle-riding vegetable sellers— especially when previously, in addition to fighting, they acted in a tax-collecting capacity (or what in peacetime is referred to as conducting a protection racket) and when the old insurgent structure still exists for them to return to. This is why the recidivism rate amongst select ex-combatants to violence and crime is high, and why after millions of dollars in reintegration programming in other contexts, only a minority of ex-combatants identified as problematic by their own structure are engaged in licit work (as a direct result of a program, be it a job training or grant) after five years.

Reintegration of individual combatants will consist of job training, apprenticeships, support to small businesses, and remedial/vocational and technical education. It will be proven that the rural economies of EAO areas do not have the capacity to absorb large numbers of fighters into roles other than subsistence ones. The leadership class of insurgents, on the other hand, will become local politicians and construction contractors for the myriad projects that the union and the Tatmadaw will launch, and non-competitive contracts will likely be awarded to them by the government in order for them to feel that peace is profitable. Such leaders will be able to provide for much less of their rank and file than they would have before the peace. One-time reinsertion payments for demobilized soldiers will be spent quickly, and demands for pensions may follow. A particularly expensive example can be found in Timor-Leste, where disgruntled insurgents from the 1975-1999 conflict acted as the foot soldiers for a 2006 insurrection; since then the government has prioritized veteran's pensions in order to maintain stability, and has committed to paying off select veterans and their descendants through 2122.

The Union of Myanmar cannot afford this. And so a certain amount of illegal activity will continue to be committed by the non- integrated rank and file. Extortion and other crimes are often tolerated by the state and the EAO authorities as the price of peace. And so the future peace, for select EAO host populations, might be a cold one, with some insurgents shorn of their ideological justification continuing to feed on communities, whilst other ex-combatants face the disappointment of local economies that cannot accommodate their peacetime ambitions.

Reintegration, crop substitution, extension services, and other livelihood programs are not only for ex-combatants and opium poppy cultivators. The morass of internally displaced within Myanmar and refugees from Myanmar in Thailand will require not just resettlement but an economic role and livelihood source. The UNHCR and other agencies estimate nearly 100,000 internally displaced in Kachin and northern Shan, and roughly 400,000 in the Karen and Mon areas of the southeast. The government will likely prioritize formerly armed populations for reintegration and livelihoods programming, and will neglect returnees, because in the cynical but pragmatic calculus of authorities, they pose less of a threat.

Part three of the series will discuss other aspects of state building in insurgent areas, service delivery and migration in particular, followed by a comparative discussion of state building in formerly insurgent areas of northwest Thailand in previous decades.

Bobby Anderson (rubashov@yahoo.com) is a Myanmar-based Research Associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own.

This article originally appeared in Tea Circle, a forum hosted at Oxford University for emerging research and perspectives on Burma/Myanmar.

The post Myanmar's Post-Panglong Problems (Part 2)  appeared first on The Irrawaddy.
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