Shan Herald Agency for News |
- Investment protection treaties endanger democratic reform and peace initiatives in Myanmar
- Oxford-Myanmar Policy Brief Series
- Mentality of the “Tatmadaw” Through the Living History
- IS PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE POSSIBLE? : Mounting offensives against ethnic armies and new violent outburst in Arakan State
- Thousands of Red Shans demand self-rule
| Investment protection treaties endanger democratic reform and peace initiatives in Myanmar Posted: 18 Oct 2016 08:01 AM PDT In the volatile and fragile context of Myanmar's nascent democratic reform, investment protection treaties must not be allowed to negatively affect processes that would make Myanmar more peaceful and democratic.
While the benefits of signing investment protection agreements are highly overstated, the risks are seriously underestimated, and they could have major negative impacts on democratic development and sustainable peace in Myanmar. When signing these treaties, governments give away their sovereign right to regulate in the interest of the people and the environment, and they expose themselves to expensive lawsuits. The incentives offered to foreign investors come at a high price, depriving countries like Myanmar of the necessary policy space to harness investment to serve sustainable development and peace. Under the provisions of the investment protection agreements, foreign investors can challenge almost any government intervention if they consider that it will affect its current or future profits. These interventions by foreign interests could, for example, include challenging new policies or laws introduced by the Myanmar government around more sustainable health or environmental approaches and priorities. They could also undermine agreements that come out of the country's peace process: for instance, around natural resource management and sharing – or better regulations to make natural resource extraction more sustainable. If it signs up to these investment protection treaties, the Myanmar government may have to pay a heavy price to foreign companies or abandon policies and principles that it would like to promote in these vital situations of such importance to the country. The investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses, which form a standard part of investment agreements, enable foreign investors to circumvent national courts and take a complaint straight to an ad hoc international tribunal consisting of three commercial investment lawyers, who will decide on whether government measures are legitimate or proportionate to their objective. These for-profitlawyers can, and do, award compensation that may run into many hundreds of millions, in some cases even billions, of dollars. These awards are enforceable and must be paid out of public budgets, reducing the funds that are available for public policies. Equally detrimental, the independence of lawyers is not guaranteed as they are paid commercial fees on a case-by-case basis in a one-sided system where only foreign investors can bring legal challenges and where there is thus an incentive to rule in their favour. For these reasons, this week Myanmar civil society organisations (CSOs) are rallying all over the country against the RCEP and the proposed European Union-Myanmar IPA. The campaign by Myanmar CSOs is part of a campaign in most of the 16 RCEP countries. Neither details of the EU-Myanmar IPA negotiation dates, nor the negotiation text, are made public. As a result, Myanmar civil society groups have consistently raised serious concerns about the EU-Myanmar IPA and many of them refused to participate in the external EU Sustainability Impact Assessment on the basis that they can not say anything sensible as long as the negotiation texts have not been made public. In a joint statement, the Myanmar CSOs point out: "Myanmar is still in its very early stages of a democratization and peace building process, which will involve negotiations over ownership and revenue sharing of natural resources in the different ethnic areas. Many laws and policies still need to be revised. Signing an investment treaty like the one proposed by the EU would lock-in future policy space in Myanmar and severely endanger the prospects for democracy and sustainable peace. For Myanmar to take this course at this stage in its development appears not only inadvisable, it is also unnecessary.''   There is a long history in such international investment law that Myanmar now has to face up to. Signing international investment treaties (IIAs), in the hope of attracting foreign investment, has been a central strategy for governments looking to improve economic development. IIAs have been around since 1959, when the first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between Germany and Pakistan was signed. By the end of 2015, there were 3,286 investment agreements (2,928 BITs and 358 "other IIAs") globally. "Other IIAs" refer to economic agreements other than BITs that include investment-related provisions, such as investment chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements. The bulk of these investment protection treaties were signed during the 1990s and early 2000s when most governments believed that economic liberalism would bring development. The idea was that signing investment agreements would help countries attract foreign investment. At the time, there was no awareness of the risks involved and what governments were giving up in terms of sovereignty. Today, more than 20 years later, the evidence that international investment agreements actually deliver on their stated purpose is at best inconclusive. Most research studies carried out by the academic community have failed to find a direct correlation between IIAs and attraction for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The experience of countries like South Africa, Ecuador, Hungary and Brazil show that increased foreign investment is not based on having IIAs. Even the European Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström recently admitted that most studies show no "direct and exclusive causal relationship" between international investment agreements and foreign direct investment. Foreign investors, however, have already used the investment dispute settlement system to challenge environmental protections, energy policies, financial regulation, public health, land use and taxation measures. The threat of claims can cause governments to reconsider or shelve public interest regulation. International Investment Agreements also have the effect of severely limiting a host government's ability to design a national investment strategy that involves a tighter and dynamic regulatory framework for foreign investors. In particular, many IIAs prohibit or restrict the introduction of performance requirements for companies. The government cannot impose obligations for technology transfer or demand a percentage of domestic content. This means that the host government is unable to ensure that the supply of goods or services is provided by nationals or that the company employs a certain percentage of local employees in order to promote job creation. The government is also inhibited from introducing tax measures or demanding a minimum investment in research and development (R&D) activities. Such rules combine to severely limit government sovereignty to direct investment flows towards sectors that support national or state level development objectives. The consequences of such IIAs could be especially damaging for Myanmar. At present, the country relies heavily on the exploitation and export of natural resources as a driver of economic development. Investors in the mining and extractives industry are among the most frequent users of the investor-state-dispute settlement (ISDS) system. Any future endeavours by Myanmar to reregulate its natural resources more effectively and equitably for its peoples could be challenged by foreign investors through the ISDS system. Such challenges could halt initiatives to ensure that the management of its extraction contributes to a sustainable peace or that Myanmar's mineral commodities are not exported in raw form but that value is added domestically. There is much international precedent in such warnings. Several mining companies, for example, lodged ISDS claims against Indonesia when it adopted a new mining law which required among other things mining companies to put in place downstream production: in other words, to refine and process minerals (for example by establishing a smelter) in the country prior to export in order to generate jobs and profits for Indonesia. The mining company Newmont used the Netherlands–Indonesia Investment Treaty to file a claim against the Indonesian government. Newmont only withdrew its case against Indonesia after it had reached an agreement with the Indonesian government, giving the mining company special exemptions from the new mining law. This is a clear case of a regulatory chill, which is more and more used by investors to challenge proposed regulations. The impact can be immediate because of the risks to public budgets that may come under enormous financial pressures. The mere threat of a multi-million dollar international arbitration lawsuit can make governments reluctant to implement social or environmental protection measures that could affect the interests of foreign investors. For example, the government of New Zealand decided to postpone their plans to introduce stricter rules on cigarette packaging until they know the results of the investment arbitration lawsuit initiated by Philip Morris against the governments of Uruguay and Australia for their decision to change regulation on warnings in cigarette packaging. The potential risks to governments do not end here. Often investors claim compensation not only for the actual investment made but for loss of future profits as well. In Myanmar's case, this means that a definite cancellation of the Myitsone Dam could potentially cost the Myanmar government hundreds of millions to billions of dollars, which would have to be paid from the public budget. For the moment, the Chinese investor has not threatened to bring a case and has tried to solve the issue through diplomatic means, but this could well change in the case of a final cancellation. Germany, for example, faces a 4.6 billion Euros ISDS claim from the Swedish energy company Vattenfall after the parliament decided to phase out nuclear energy in response to the Fukoshima disaster. This by far extends the actual investments made by Vattenfall. As concerns have risen over such practices, the argument that unregulated foreign direct investment will improve a country's economic development has been widely discredited in recent years. Rather, it is recognised among communities in many countries dependent on natural resource production that the regulation of foreign investment in general, and the extractive industry in particular, is crucial in order to restrict the industry's negative social and environmental impacts and to guarantee some positive contribution to economic development. Greater government influence in the extractive industries is the current trend among resource-rich countries. For example, African countries have developed a regulatory framework for mining, the "Africa Mining Vision" aimed at enhancing development by supporting the industrialisation of natural resources. A growing number of countries are beginning to understand the financial, social and environmental costs of the system of investors' protection — with countries as diverse as Australia, Bolivia, India, Indonesia and South Africa revising their investment treaty policies. They are dissatisfied with transnational investors challenging the legitimacy of their policy decisions and the threat to public budgets. Thus, since Myanmar is only opening up its economy recently, it can learn from experiences elsewhere in the world. As Myanmar is opening up for business, the country is currently developing a very liberal investment law protecting the rights and property of foreign investors in the country, as well as giving very generous tax incentives. On top of this come the RCEP and the EU–Myanmar Investment Agreement, with EU actors interested in such diverse fields as Energy, Logistics, Infrastructure, Construction, Health and Agri-Food Sector. These will extend investors' rights with even more countries, and they are a dangerous step that will prevent effective regulation of foreign investments in the interests of a durable peace. Worse still, unlike the existing Bilateral Investment Treaties that Myanmar has with for example China, India and Japan, it will be much harder for Myanmar to revise its investment policies in the future since regional trade agreements such as the RCEP have no expiry date. Myanmar is a country in transition. For the first time in decades, a democratically elected government is in place. However, the national armed forces still play a significant role in the country's political arena, and democratic reform has only just begun. The country has many outdated laws and policies that need to be reformed. At the same time, a peace process has started to finally seek a solution at the negotiating table to solve ethnic conflict in the country and end the 65-year old civil war. In this context, many new policies and laws need to be introduced. But in such a volatile and fragile landscape, it is essential that investment protection treaties do not have negative impacts on processes to make Myanmar more peaceful and democratic.   These commentaries are part of a TNI project funded by Sweden. | ||
| Oxford-Myanmar Policy Brief Series Posted: 18 Oct 2016 06:08 AM PDT Myanmar's new government faces a variety of challenges on its path to securing democracy, federalism, security, and equality for all of its people. The Oxford-Myanmar Policy Brief Series was created as an effort to contribute to domestic policy-makers' work addressing these many challenges.  This initiative began with a workshop on 15 February, 2016, entitled "Towards Democracy and Reconciliation: Challenges Facing Myanmar's Incoming Government." Co-organised by Dr Ma Khin Mar Mar Kyi and Dr Matthew J Walton, and co-sponsored by the Programme on Modern Burmese Studies at St Antony's College and the International Gender Studies Centre at Lady Margaret Hall, the workshop brought together over a dozen UK experts on Myanmar, drawn from academic, advocacy, and activist communities. Presenters focused on the challenges facing the new NLD-led government, identifying key stakeholders, persistent and emerging impediments, and potential policy responses. Subjects considered included military legacies, governance concerns, social issues, land and resource management, and conflict and displacement. With the success of the event, the co-organisers saw an opportunity to effectively channel the insights of the participants into policy-making conversations in Myanmar's government, civil society, and other political institutions. They also sought to contribute to the developing public discourse on political reform in the country. Participants were asked to transform their presentations into short policy briefs that could be of use to ministries, parliament, and other decision-making bodies in Myanmar, and others who could not attend the workshop were invited to contribute briefs. The collected briefs were edited by the co-organisers and translated into Burmese. They are available to download free here and will be distributed in hard copy to lawmakers, policy-makers, and others in Myanmar's government. With the additional support of the Irrawaddy Policy Exchange, the co-organisers plan to hold events at Oxford focused on different policy areas approximately every 6-8 months, with policy briefs to follow, along with other follow-up events in Myanmar. The second iteration was held at Oxford on 13 October, 2016 and focused on environmental issues. In addition to including several presenters from Myanmar, the workshop organisers were pleased to be able to welcome several representatives from Myanmar's Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation as well as representatives from Myanmar's Parliament. Reports on the discussions at the event will appear in the next week on Tea Circle, the Programme on Modern Burmese Studies' Myanmar blog. | ||
| Mentality of the “Tatmadaw” Through the Living History Posted: 18 Oct 2016 05:59 AM PDT
The ancient history of Burma is a history of war between the rival petty kingdoms. Sometimes the Myanmar monarch won and sometimes the other ethnic nationalities like Shan, Mon and Arakanese won. The warrior kings either Myanmar or non-Myanmar often endeavour to subdue their neighbouring kingdoms, but the peoples of Burma always lived in the same country and no ethnic group Myanmar or non-Myanmar, can solely claim that the country has been under their rule throughout all the time. But Chauvinistic (Mahar) Myanmar who are myopically nationalist and hegemonic claiming that they have ruled the country except in the colonial period believe in the linear progression of Myanmar, and imagine themselves to be a historically cohesive nation, whose organizational integration with the ethnic nationalities in the peripheries only need to be completed either democratically or by force. General Than Shwe's Armed Forces Day speech in Naypyidaw in 2009 said, "Our Tatmadaw should be a worthy heir to the traditions of the capable Tatmadaw established by noble kings Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya," that is why the Tatmadaw set up the three mammoth statues of the warrior kings under whose shadow they marched past every annual Resistance Day (there is no such thing as Army Day in Burma). The name "Naypyidaw" in Burmese means royal capital city of kings. Hence, the history of post-colonial Burma centers on a pathological process of neo-colonization of the non-dominant members of the Union by the dominant Myanmar elite, where the urban elites and males, and soldiers, are more equal than the other ethnic communities, classes and females. They Tatmadaw have resumed this old expansionist mission in the name of post-colonial nation-state building. (2) Tatmadaw is an occupational Army The current Myanmar Tatmadaw have originated from BIA, hence it is only the Myanmar ethnic group and not a Union army. As said the Union army was originated in 1937 when the country was separated from India composed of the ethnic nationalities, known as the Burma Rifles, a sort of a federal army, under the British command. When the Allies retook Burma from Japan, the British Burma Rifles played an important and crucial part, acting as scouts and gathering intelligence and harassing the enemy from behind the line, while the BIA was still aligned to with the Imperial Japanese army. Only when the BIA saw that the allies and the British Burmese army were winning and that Mandalay had fallen to the allies did the BIA decide to join the winning side. When the two groups were amalgamated the two Karen commanders became chief of the armed forces (General Smith Dun) and chief of the air force (Saw Shi Sho); the chief of operations was the Sandhurst-trained Karen, Brigadier Saw Kya Doe. The Quartermaster General, who controlled three-quarters of the military budget, was a Karen, Saw Donny. Brigadier Bo Let Ya, army chief of staff. The Myanmar had considered the ethnic nationalities especially the Karen and Anglo Burman as mercenaries. Within a twelve weeks after Britain give independence on Jan 4th 1948, the Burma Communist Party revolted. This was the first Myanmar ethnic insurrection against the Union of Burma, the Myanmar Communists Parties were the only group among the insurrectionists that did not recognize the Union of Burma, while the ethnic nationalities insurrectionists recognized the Union of Burma and wanted only autonomy within the union, a sort of a Federal Republic. The second rebellion was by the PVO (part of Tatmadaw) and the third was the Red flags communist (Thakin Soe) Hence among the insurrections only the Myanmar ethnics that did not recognize the Union of Burma. The Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) was forced to rebel in 1949, after the Karen quarters in Rangoon city (Kenmendine) and Insein town came under attack by Myanmar troops. So, unlike in Pakistan, where a professional military force became politicized, in Burma the military was politicized from the outset because of its role in the independence struggle. It may or may not accept civilian control up to this day, but at times out of conviction as well as expediency it may accept. But up to this date the people still look at the Tatmadaw as the people's army. However Ne Win and his lieutenants were more ambitious, as they had tasted power in the form of caretaker regime and launched a military coup on March 2nd 1962 and their ugly visage on 7th July by massacring hundreds of, Rangoon University students. Since then Tatmadaw despised both nationally and internationally and came to be much feared by the people and could not rely on the popular vote to stay in power. (3) Attitudes towards non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities Tatmadaw believes that the ethnic nationalities are inherently inferior (culturally/socially) and would split from the country if given a chance. They also believe that the ethnic nationalities are distrustful and have the fear of Myanmar domination, however, they provide lip-service respect for ethnic nationalities' culture through ritualized holidays and propaganda efforts. They believe that if the Myanmar do not oppress other ethnic nationalities then they would find themselves oppressed. For them, national reconciliation means assimilation and preventing disintegration. All the ethnic nationalities and their languages, traditions, culture and values are to be assimilated into those of the Myanmar race hence, if the Tatmadaw falls everything falls. They believe that their mission is to protect the country and that the country would fall apart without them. Essentially, their power is rooted in the deep racism that has permeated Myanmar society since the beginning, the racial supremacy over the non-Myanmar, and the Divide and Rule Policy. Hence, the 3 As method of Annihilation, Absorption and Assimilation were adopted on the ethnic nationalities. The Tatmadaw believes that the country is surrounded by enemies – real and imagined. These threats no longer take the form of territorial aggrandizement, but economic domination and the possibility of encouraging ethnic nationalities for separatism. This fear is based on a reality once extant, but now completely outmoded. These past instances of such foreign support are the American assistance to KMT forces in Burma, Pakistani-Bangladeshis' support for Muslim insurgents, the Thai's tolerance to a variety of insurgent groups (both ethnic and Myanmar), Indian backing of anti-Junta groups, some British humanitarian support for the Karen, Chinese aid to the Burma Communist Party and a general perception that Christian minorities have closer support and contact with foreigners than do the Myanmar Buddhists. (4) Tatmadaw's Philosophy The Tatmadaw, has no real ideology and no constituency within the society under its rule, but for a time it was successful by entrenching fear and hopelessness in the minds of the people. Even its junior and mid-level officers work mainly only for purposes of their own power or wealth. Employment in Tatmadaw is one of the few viable careers in today's Burma. As for the rank and file soldiers, many are conscripted by forced, while others are coerced or misled into believing that the Tatmadaw provides an escape from personal trouble or protection for their families. The current generals of the Tatmadaw lack experience of independence struggle and Cold War politics, and are unable to stand on a nationalistic platform and non-alliance ideology. They are not skilful in playing political theory games. The only lessons they have learnt are some effective ways to hold on to their power. The training and lectures given eventually instill in all soldiers a Tatmadaw mindset, which is comprised of the following features: - We work harder than others for the sake of the country. - We sacrifice our lives to work for the sake of the country. - Our comrades are injured or killed by our enemies. - The enemies, who injure or kill us are supported by a part of the population. -We must follow orders, live under the discipline of the army at all the time. -We are soldiers serving the country 24-hours a day. Hence from the soldier's view, ordinary people and civil servants live more easy-going lives, indiscipline and have many leisure hours and do business just to enrich themselves. The end result is that soldiers believe they have the sole right to hold state power due to their hard work and sacrifices. These basic opinions hinder the relationship between the people and the Tatmadaw. When the Tatmadaw cracks down on peaceful demonstrators, they viewed them as lazy opportunists, who are asking for rights without working hard and sacrificing like they do. The Tatmadaw, in a way, blames the people for failing to develop the country. They appeared to believe that the Tatmadaw as a whole works hard, the people and civil servants do not work hard. Foreigners work and think smarter than do the lazy people of Burma, and these are the reasons why developed countries are ahead of Burma is their rationale. However, when ordinary people go abroad to seek job opportunity, they see them as betraying the country by opting for a foreign one. The soldiers work industriously, because they receive advantages from their work. They are disciplined, because they are simply reaping the advantages from performing well. Clearly, the Generals followed the dictum of Mao Ze Dong: "Crack down on the extreme minority, leave the educated to live in illusion, and label the majority of ordinary people as supporters." (5)Tatmadaw's Perspectives on Economics The Tatmadaw view economic progress, reform, or liberalization as secondary to maintenance of political control. They believe that the primary function of an improved economy is greater military power, general political acquiescence of the population to Tatmadaw control through military delivery of greater economic rewards for loyalty, which improves their political legitimacy, but not the betterment of the human condition. To this end, the Tatmadaw leaders believe they must control the economy and thus they have set up direct and many indirect mechanisms for control e.g. such as UMEHL (Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings) and MEC (Myanmar Economic Corporation), in short they deliberately set up a crony capitalism. The Tatmadaw view any form of pluralism, within the administration at any level, in the dissemination of information and within non-governmental organizations as a threat to the state and their control. (6) Is Myanmar Tatmadaw, the Guardian of the country? " If the hypothesis that the Tatmadaw should take temporary control, when a civilian government strays from its 'national ideal' or obligation, is correct," then it should have already solved the country's problem long ago as any genuine guardian might do. For example, when there was a dilemma in civilian rule in the years from 1950 to 1958 when the ruling party AFPFL split, the pro-West faction wanted to take aid from the West and Japan, but the neutral faction wanted to remain non-aligned, Tatmadaw, joined the winning side of the pro-West faction to wipe out the ethnics and the communist. This is the first proof that Tatmadaw is not a genuine guardian and has no basic loyalty to the country as it claims. The second proof is when Ne Win and Sein Lwin were forced to resign in 1988 the Tatmadaw move against their own civilian government of Dr. Maung Maung. The third is when Tatmadaw's pet party NUP won only 10 seats compared to the pro-democracy party of the NLD 392 the Tatmadaw broke its own promise to hand over power to the winner and changed the rules of the game. The fourth is current 2008 Nargis Constitution of occupying 25 % of seats in all the elected bodies, is the authentic proof that the military was determined to hold on to power, at any cost through its sham democratic-trappings. The fifth was as lately as August 2015 Shwe Mann was ousted from the pro-Tatmadaw party, the USDP, by force, not only because he was too close to the NLD party of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but also he had angered the military by supporting an attempt to amend the 2008 Nargis Constitution. Tatmadaw's continuing presence provides one of the greatest obstacles to the aspirations of those committed to democratization and federalism in Burma. (7) Targeting Education After the 2nd World War, during the Cold War period, democracy, in the newly emerging nations of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries were not strong and naturally there were military coups e.g. Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram, came to power in Thailand, General Ayub Khan in Pakistan, General Suharto in Indonesia and in Burma, General Ne Win. But looking back at these military coups in these neighbouring countries, we find that they always bounced back to democracy within a decade or two, except in Burma. Why? One of the answers is because the Tatmadaw targeted the higher education system, where the young brains are hatched to think, as number one enemy. Starting from 7th July 1962 waves after waves of students were killed and persecuted. The Tatmadaw believes that students and educated class went into politics because of their misconceptions and that universities were, and are the birth place of dissent against autocratic rule, hence the Burmese generals have sought to subvert education for their own purpose, - to keep them in power in perpetuity. The Tatmadaw has kept bonded the rights to education hostage, to be kept in permanent captivity. If the university were not closed, they were isolated and separated from one another and so that they would not be able contact one another. Iron fences were built around universities campuses. The universities were sent to remote places and were closed down at the slightest sign of any trouble. This prolonged closure of schools and universities has affected the future of almost all the young people of Burma and except for those with political influence, such as the children of the generals and those rich enough to send their children abroad, continue to enjoy uninterrupted and quality education. The Tatmadaw controlled education system has resulted in sub-standard education and critical lack of teaching facilities, stymied by unskilled teachers, and lack of job opportunities after graduation, corruption and bribery. (8) Tatmadaw's New Weapon (The Rapist Army) Sexual violence as a weapon of war in ethnic cleansing was implemented, as girls and women have been singled out for rape because women are viewed as repositories of a community's cultural and spiritual values. Due to the well-known impunity for rape, survivors and families are extremely reluctant to complain about rape. In the rare cases where victims do complain, the military often responds with violence. The UNHCR found that refugee families frequently cite rape as a key factor in their decisions to seek refuge. Tatmadaw is overtly targeting civilians; says Benjamin Zawacki, Southeast Asia, researcher for Amnesty International "The violations are widespread and systematic.'' A well-documented phenomenon for at least a decade, "License to Rape" report inspired a level of interest and outrage on the part of the international community. A well-documented rape and murder of the two Kachin missionaries Tangbau Hkawn Nan Zing (21) and Maran Lu Ra, (20), in the Church compound, of Kwang Hka village, Nam Tao Township, by the soldiers of the 503rd Light Infantry Regiment, under Northeast Regional Command, was never admitted nor its DNA results made known. Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has said he also wants the truth to be known, but the case was shut up to this day. This explicitly means that the Generals themselves were involved in this ethnic cleansing policies, which the Tatmadaw has been doing all these years since 1962. Several NGOs and independent organizations have examined the structures, policies, and practices of the Tatmadaw, and concluded that it was designed to target the non-Myanmar ethnic nationalities. Before 1988, a secret order was issued that any Myanmar soldier, who is able to marry an ethnic woman would be rewarded a handsome amount of monetary prize, but this happened to be difficult and slow. Therefore, when the Tatmadaw took over the administration, it encouraged raping the women of the ethnic nationalities. This message was received by the lieutenants, and captains, and hence it was these ranks, who committed most of the rape cases. It was hoped that in the long run if there were only one race 'Myanmar', one religion 'Theravada Buddhism' and one country, 'Burma', they would be able to govern and stand tall in the international community. This was basic idea of Tatmadaw's rape.  (9) Child Soldiers Even animals do not kill their young or bully them instead they shield them up and help them to grow but Tatmadaw, not only torture and kill but also send the children to the front lines. The worst thing is that it has forced the children to become child soldiers. In March 2007 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on Burma, for "the continuing recruitment and use of child soldiers". The report: "My Gun Was as tall as me", estimated that 70,000 or more of the Burma army's estimated 350,000 soldiers are children." Human Rights Watch research has shown that boys, as young as 10, continue to be forcibly enlisted into Tatmadaw by a network of predatory recruiters, often soldiers themselves, who lurk at train stations and outside cinemas and tea shops looking for vulnerable young males to coerce into the Tatmadaw. Once forced into the Tatmadaw they were not permitted to contact their families, their ages were fabricated on enlistment material, and receive harsh training before being deployed to bleak and dangerous outposts throughout Burma's hinterland. Boys are used to fight ethnic insurgents, mete out punishment to civilians, and as porters to support frontline troops. It is hard to imagine the psychological trauma and damage these experiences are inflicting on children. The problem of child soldiers is hidden from the eyes of many international observers and Burmese citizens in towns and cities. Once impressed into the army, child soldiers often eke out a desperate existence fishing and hunting for food and stealing from villagers, surrounded by malarial forests, landmines and ethnic insurgents. Their plight is so desperate that many of their victims of crimes committed by these boys have pity for them. The victims know that these young boys are being brain washed by their commanders. Despite official regulations within the Tatmadaw prohibiting the use of child soldiers and frequent promises to the UN to erase the practice, it did not appear to be at all serious about curbing the practice. It is almost impossible to place a figure on how many children under 18 were in the Tatmadaw, but there are certainly thousands. As the Tatmadaw expanded rapidly; desertions increased and volunteers decrease. A system of incentives and punishments was in place to encourage recruiters to fill their quotas. Some local authorities were reportedly pressured by the Tatmadaw to produce a certain number of recruits per village, some of them children. Nowhere is there a more disturbing, if not horrifying example of the relationship between a culture of cruelty and the politics of irresponsibility than in the resounding silence that surrounds the torture of children under Myanmar Tatmadaw. There is an undeniable pathological outcome when the issue of Tatmadaw becomes more important than the survival of morality itself, resulting in the deaths of thousands of children A 29-page report, "Under the Radar" on ongoing recruitment and use of children by the Tatmadaw, by the UK-based NGO Child Soldiers International, shows that military officers and civilian 'brokers' continue to use deliberate misrepresentation to entice new recruits, including children. Poor and uneducated boys continue to be frequently intimidated and coerced and lured them to the nearest recruitment centre or battalion. Until safeguards within recruitment procedures are implemented in practice across the country at all levels and until effective age verification mechanisms are put in place and properly enforced, the situation will not significantly improve. Epilogue In short, there is no Union of Burma Army (Federal Army) in Burma the current Tatmadaw is held together not by patriotism but by a mixture of patron-client ties, personal power, economic privileges, fear of severe punishment complete and total obedience" of the subordinates in the chain of command. It is a cruel occupationaly army with the highest records of human rights violations, which has never fought an external enemy but used all its resources to surpress the pro democratic and ethnic nationalities. It is the roots of all evil in Burma and need to be replaced by a Federal Army. Democracy is seen as a threat to the existing order because it would deprive the ruling elite of power. The Tatmadaw and their families are "second state" of approximately two million out of a total population of 50 million plus. It will be a great mistake for any country to have military to military relations with Myanmar Tatmadaw because Burma will never be peaceful, democratic or federal if there is an occupational Myanmar Tatmadaw. This paper was read at the 12th International Burma Studies Conference at Northern University of Illinois Dekalb on Oct.8, 2016 attended by several experts (both Burmese and international). Meticulously answering every question and criticism proves its authenticity beyond doubt. By Kanbawza Win Anybody is free to republish this paper prof.unclewin80@gmail,com sd. Dr. Ba Thann Win | ||
| Posted: 18 Oct 2016 05:38 AM PDT  Quite a lot of happening have been unfolding during the last few days. But the most outstanding one is the new conflict in Arakan State, between the militant "Rohingya", that the Burmese government and the Arakan nationalist prefer to dub as "Bengali", and the government's security forces. And thus, the previous headline hitting news of the Tatmadaw's (military) offensives in Kachin, Shan and Karen States, followed by the anti-war demonstrations in Myitkyina and elsewhere were somewhat pushed back to become a back burner. The 14 October meeting of National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), the first of its kind since Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) regime comes into power, followed by the 15 October, first anniversary of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signing occasion has brought back the back burner issues to light, portraying the woes that the country is facing, into a package as a whole, which needs to be resolved earnestly and speedily. The national defense and security affairs meeting of 14 October that was attended by the President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, U Htin Kyaw, the State Counselor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Commander in Chief of Defense Services, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Deputy Commander in Chief Vice Senior General Soe Win, Union Minister for Ministry of Home Affairs Lt-Gen Kyaw Swe, Union Minister for Ministry of Defense Lt-Gen Sein Win, Union Minister for Office of the State Counselor U Kyaw Tint Swe, touched on the following issues, according to the Presidential website. · The situations of the battle occurred in Kachin State and the Northern Shan State · The situations which occurred in "Wa" Special Region (1) and "Mailar"(Mong La) Special Region (4) · The management procedures in order to enhance the capacity and ability of the Myanmar Police Force. Remarkably, the said meeting didn't mention the issue of recent Arakan conflict that has already taken place on 9 October. It is not clear, whether concrete directives or solutions have been made, but seen from the speeches delivered the following 15 October, on the occasion of the first anniversary NCA, the NLD regime and the Tatmadaw don't seem to have a clear understanding of cooperation, on how to go about with the country's woes, in a coordinated manner. Thus, it is necessary to study the speeches delivered at the occasion, as a clue on how each stakeholder is gearing up to go about with overcoming the obstacles. Aung San Suu Kyi In her speech, Suu Kyi reiterated her former position of all-inclusiveness and advocate, or one could even say plead, for the culture of altruism in peace-building. "All inclusiveness is very important to our country. Peace is a treasure which cannot be exchanged for whatsoever thing. Reflecting in the wording NCA, the notion of fire struck my mind," she emphasized explicitly. In trying to instill the culture of altruism, she said: "Should we want peace and ceasefire, we had better start with extinguishing of anger and prejudice which are likened to fire burning inside our heart and soul. So, only when all the individuals and organizations involved can subdue their fire-like anger and prejudice, will we be able to achieve the genuine peace." Her ultimate message was outlined when she stressed: "We have our own opinion, we can't deny. But I'm confident we are all able to overcome these bitter experiences. What we ought to compete is who the most forgiving individuals and / or organizations are. We are not to compete in our firing power. We need to vie with one another for our fire-extinguishing power. The whole country is watching us with great expectation." Buttressing her plea, laced with urging she said. "Instead of competing with one another in firing power, we'd better vie in fire-fighting power." In addition Suu Kyi talked about the seven-point road map to amend the military-drafted constitution, which includes the following: 1. To review the political dialogue framework 2. To amend the political dialogue framework 3. To convene the Union Peace Conference—the 21st century Panglong in accordance with the amended and approved political dialogue framework 4. To sign union agreement— the 21st century Panglong Conference Agreement based on the results of the 21st Century Panglong Conference 5. To amend the constitution in accordance with the union agreement and approve the amended constitution 6. To hold the multi-party democracy general elections in accordance with the amended and approved constitution 7. To build a democratic federal union in accordance with the results of the multi-party democracy general elections (Source: Global New Light of Myanmar – 16 October 2016) Min Aung Hlaing The Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing's speech on the NCA first anniversary occasion centered on the concept of the present union being the continuous legacy of immemorial time; urging the EAOs to sign the NCA, give up the armed struggle and make use of the multi-party democracy platform to address their grievances; and acceptance of the military's six guiding principles to achieve peace. He said: "Our country is a Union which has been formed since yore (immemorial). Any regions and states in the Union are home to all ethnics, not for a single ethnic specifically." To make his point that armed struggle is out of place, he said: "I would like to say the attempts to grasp the opportunities through armed struggle line by turning a blind eye to the actual rights and opportunities is opposition to the people's desire." "Therefore, if we accept democracy, we need to abandon the obsession to the armed struggle line which is the opposition of democracy," he stressed. "Ethnic‐minority areas where armed groups are based are peaceful and have no more fighting since the groups signed the ceasefire. Mutual trust proves that. So I am urging other armed groups to learn from the example," Min Aung Hlaing also said, luring the non-signatories to sign the NCA. The most important message that he put across is the often reiterated military's controversial six guiding principles to achieve peace, which is the actual stumbling block in the peace process, as far as the EAOs are concerned. They are: 1. To have a keen desire to reach eternal peace, 2. To keep promises agreed to in peace deals, 3. To avoid capitalizing on the peace agreement, 4. To avoid placing a heavy burden on local people, 5. To strictly abide by the existing laws, and 6. To march towards a democratic country in accord with the 2008 Constitution. Mutu Say Poe The Karen National Union (KNU) leader Mutu Say Poe is a close confidant of Min Aung Hlaing and is even jokingly depicted by many as a sample pupil of the Tatmadaw's peace process structure. Now even he was forced to protest the Tatmadaw's heavy-handedness on the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), as it begins to directly attack the NCA signatory the RCSS and the KNU indirectly. The Karen Border Guard Force (KBGF), which is jointly commanded by the Tatmadaw conducted offensives against the splinter group of Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), intruding into the KNU controlled area of Hat Gyi, where a dam is scheduled to be built by the government. The KNU and RCSS are two core EAOs, from a total of eight EAO signatories of the NCA, that have thousands of troops, while the others only have token armed forces with only few soldiers, except for the DKBA. Mutu outlined his plea in his recent speech during the NCA anniversary as below. · It is necessary to avoid the use of force in our attempts to adopt and exercise the new political culture of the NCA and in finding political solutions through political means. · For instance, it is necessary to stop the ongoing armed conflicts in northern Myanmar. · Although incidents are understandable, intentional attacks are not acceptable. Leaders from both sides are responsible to reach an agreement on interpretation of the NCA. · Therefore, on behalf of NCA signatories, I would like to call for the government and the Tatmadaw with all seriousness to ease policies and suspend the use of force in order to pave way for non-signatories to sign the NCA. United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) The UNFC, an alliance of seven ethnic armies, that is the non-signatory of the NCA didn't attend the occasion even though it was invited. But immediately after the NCA anniversary occasion, the government's Peace Council (PC), headed by Dr Tin Myo Win, and the UNFC's Delegation for Peace Negotiation (DPN), led by Khu Oo Reh met in the afternoon. After a few hours of meeting the DPN's joint-secretary Tun Zaw was interviewed by the BBC, in which he said that the talks were about accommodation of the UNFC's eight point proposal that was already handed in to the government a few weeks ago. Accordingly, if the said points could be negotiated satisfactorily, another point of signing the NCA would be included, making the eight point proposal to become a nine point agreement. The UNFC proposal centers around all-inclusiveness, unilateral or bilateral ceasefire and a tripartite dialogue proposal to make each level of the peace negotiation to be fair and equitable. However, Tun Zaw said that the important point discussed was said to be on how Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) should be empowered to make it workable. The DPN was said to proposed that the role of international participation in the mechanism of JMC implementation and enforcement, so that positive achievement could be evaluated, as the recent self-employed peace keeping structure, given the inability to end the some seven decades old ethnic conflict and not producing satisfactory result and achievement. The idea was said to be met with cold shoulder from the part of the military and meeting ended without any resolution, with an understanding to meet again to resolve the remaining issues between the two parties in the coming November. Reportedly, four out of eight point proposal was said to be resolved, although both sides did not spell them out. The Rohingya conflict Another issue that has thrust forcefully into the political scene is the Rohingya conflict, equally alarming if not more than the ongoing EAOs and Tatmadaw (Burma Army) conflict. On October 9, around 400 militants in a coordinated action targeted three Burma border posts along the border with Bangladesh and killed around nine soldiers. The President's office has also released an official statement detailing information obtained through interrogation of apprehended suspects, as well as apparent intelligence sources. However, the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), based in London, on 17 October, refuted the statement of Burma President's office described a well organized armed group called Aqa Mul Mujahadeen, whom they said were funded by middle eastern sources and connected to proscribed terrorist groups. The BHRN questioned the validity of this uprising being a well-planned military operation, as its statement said: " If the men in the video are assumed to be responsible it should also be noted that they depict only a few dozen adult men with assault rifles and that the vast majority seen in the videos are children armed with swords, sticks and farming tools. This again draws questions into any accounts describing the group as well organized, well funded or well trained." Whatever the regime likes to portray the situation, the recent violence outburst of the Rohingya is the product of the successive military governments side-lining and oppressing of said ethnic group. There might be some elements that have received training somewhere abroad. But according to available data, it seems to be more of a home-grown rebellion due to the injustice and oppression, rather than a well-planned military operation, involving only rebel combatants. According to the New Delhi based The Wire, "After this major border incident, Bangladesh had moved swiftly and arrested two of the attackers and handed them over to Myanmar." Accordingly on 16 October, Dhaka "unequivocally" condemned the attack and promised to help track down the perpetrators. "Bangladesh follows a 'zero tolerance' policy towards violent extremism and terrorism of any form and manifestation," said a statement issued by Bangladesh foreign ministry. Outlook Taking cues from the events that have been unfolding, assessment on stakeholders' political stance; the government and military policy in dealing with the EAOs; and the government's handling of the Arakan conflict involving the Rohingya's spontaneous rebellion or armed outburst would be in order. First let us look at the issue of the stakeholders political positions in relation to the contemporary political happenings. Suu Kyi could be said to have reiterated her previous commitment of all-inclusiveness and genuine ceasefire achievement, although she is powerless to rein in the military to stop its offensives in Kachin, Shan and Karen States, excluding Arakan State, where the government seems to be working in tandem with the military on the recent Rohingya uprising. While the military is trying to project its image that the offensives in the Kachin, Shan and Karen States are with the blessing of the government, Suu Kyi's recent speech indicated that it might not be the case. Because her clear urging that the conflict and warring parties should compete more in extinguishing the flames of war and not firing power or escalating the conflict showed that she couldn't have agreed to the heightening of armed conflict that the military has decided to implement. And clearly, especially the offensives in Kachin and Shan States are the handiwork of the military and not an accidental armed engagement, while patrolling. Apart from that, the conflict in Karen State between the KBFG and the splinter group of DKBA unfolded as an intentional encroachment of the KNU territory, which is against the NCA. It should also be noted that the RCSS and the KNU are signatories of the NCA. The Commander-in-Chief has clearly indicated that it is not going to abdicate from the military's self-employed national savior role and protector of the multi-party democracy, sovereignty and national unity, even though this image projection of the military is highly debatable and controversial. Its mentioning, as if it is part of the multi-party democratic system is deplorable, as the military occupied twenty-five percent of the MP seats in all parliaments without election; having a bigger say in NDSC that is existing parallel with the government, where no such structure is allowed in a real democratic system of governance; and also the parallel military court together with the country's judicial system. As such, the Commander-in-Chief taking cover and leaning on the elected civilian government to blast at the EAOs has no bearings and moral weight, so to speak. Finally, justifying the military's offensives in the name of protecting the ethnic population is an undue credit accumulation, as all know that how much human rights violations have the military committed on the population during these years of war in ethnic states. One only needs to go through tons of documentation compiled by the UN and reputable rights organizations. Besides, even a child knows that opening war front on the EAOs is not conducive to the peace process and trust-building and could even be seen as sabotaging the deliberation that otherwise might lead to peace. As for KNU leader Mutu Say Poe, it has made a plea that the military allowed all-inclusive participation of all EAOs and to stop the military offensives nationwide. But whether his plea would be heard and implemented is totally another question. The UNFC has not budged from its demand for either unilateral or bilateral ceasefire to be in place first, coupled with an eight point proposal to amend the NCA, if it were to sign it, according to the government and military wishes. But it has made clear that military pressure on the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), with the extension of all the UNFC members, would be counter-productive as a means of pressure to sign the NCA and would be met with only stiff resistance. In sum, the government and the military positions in Kachin, Shan and Karen States seem to differ, as the military is bent on "negotiated surrender" stance, while the NLD is for all-inclusiveness and negotiated settlement. And this seemingly uncoordinated strategy is not leading the country to peaceful settlement and successful political outcome. Still no one is quite sure whether the NLD government and the military are doing things in cooperation or the government just being dragged into a mum or tight-lipped situation and has to act as if it is agreeing to what the military has been doing in ethnic states, with the exception of the Arakan State on Rohingya issue. Regarding the Rohingya rebellion situation, the military and the government seems to be on the same page so far. The violent protest, with no doubt, stems from the building up of the tension all through theses years that has finally exploded. The 1982 citizenship law of General Ne Win era, that have stripped all the Rohingya of their citizenship and eventually lumped all the Muslims with origin from Bangladesh into an illegal immigrant category, might be the main culprit. While Islamophobia and xenophobia definitely might be playing important roles in this racial and ethnic conflict, it is simply not correct not to differentiate those who are entitled to be citizens and those who enter the country illegally, after the independence from the British in 1948. The angst of over foreignization or xenophobia is understandable, especially for the Arakanese. But lumping the whole ethnic group, legal and illegal, into inhumane treatment of illegality might not also be correct and could even become an act of racial discrimination, leading to racism. As such a new set of conceptual thinking which could accommodate the liberal democratic principles and preserving the ethnic identity of the indigenous Arakanese must be found. All know that assuming the policy line of Ne Win's side-lining and oppression would only breed animosity and rebellion, as is evident by the recent violent outburst. It might even be considered as an act of despair and disappointment. In a concrete term, filtering out the illegal immigrants with the cooperation of the neighboring country and reinstating the citizenship rights of those who are entitled is the only way to go. As to how this could be achieve would be entirely up to the government and stakeholders concerned, including those at the receiving end, depending on their creativity, degree of harmony aspirations of peaceful co-existence and innovation. To conclude, the unless the military could make an about turn from its "negotiated surrender" stance and top-dog, preconceived posture, the war with the EAOs won't end and the peace process would remain a pipe-dream. The same goes for the resolution of Rohingya issue, so long as only side-lining and oppression is used and not humane accommodation. | ||
| Thousands of Red Shans demand self-rule Posted: 18 Oct 2016 03:37 AM PDT Thousands of ethnic Red Shan people have marched to demand the creation of a new autonomous state.  According to Naing Naing Kyaw, the leader of the demonstration, marchers came to the town of Moenyin last Thursday from as far afield as northern Sagaing Division to join Kachin-based Red Shans in calling for their own self-administered state. "Throughout history, this area was ruled by the Shan," he said. "Therefore, we want to govern our own territory. "In Kachin, the KIA [Kachin Independence Army] controls the region; in upper Sagaing, the Naga and Kuki ethnic groups control large areas. But the Shan people have been oppressed, particularly in Kachin State. We are gradually dying out," Naing Naing Kyaw said. "That's why we staged this rally." The protest leader added that this was the second time that Red Shan people had taken to the streets demanding self-rule. A previous demonstration took place last month in Homakling Township in Sagaing Division. The Red Shan, also known as the Shan-ni in Burmese and Tai-leng in Shan language, was among a handful of ethnic groups that demanded their own self-administered region during the 21st Century Panglong Conference in Naypyidaw from August 31 to September 4. The other militias that stood up to demand an ethnic state for their nationality are: the United Wa State Army (UWSA), arguably Burma's strongest ethnic armed group; the Ta'ang [Palaung] National Liberation Army (TNLA); and the Pa-Oh. Meanwhile, the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) based in Mong La demanded a self-administered zone for ethnic Akha people. Currently, Burma recognizes self-administered zones within Shan State for the Danu, Kokang, Pa-Oh and Palaung ethnic groups; the Wa group has its self-administered division and a self-administered zone for the Naga in Sagaing Division. In January, Shan Herald reported that the Red Shan had formed their own army to protect the minority's interests and stand up for its claims of autonomy. With a population estimated at 300,000, the Red Shan people have sizeable communities in upper Sagaing Division and Kachin State, particularly in Moenyin (known as Mong Yang in Shan), Moegaung, Myitkyina, Puta-O and Bhamaw. By Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) |
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