Shan Herald Agency for News |
- Myanmar’s Myths of Ethnic Unity
- UN envoy Yanghee Lee told about continued human rights abuses in Shan State
- UNODC's Jeremy Douglas: ‘Myanmar really is the epicentre of the drug trade’
- Immediate Release: Joint Statement - Myanmar Authorities Must Immediately Release and Drop Charges Against three Detained Journalists
| Myanmar’s Myths of Ethnic Unity Posted: 18 Jul 2017 03:23 AM PDT Matthew J Walton muses on the effects of misleading narratives of the independence era. The myths of ethnic unity are alive and well in contemporary Myanmar. While we might expect misleading historical claims from previous military-led governments or even the current NLD government, incorrect and problematic statements about the country's ethnic past even come from those attempting to paint a more complex, even sympathetic picture. A recent op-ed from Myanmar political analyst Sithu Aung Myint is a good example of this. Considering the dispute over including a "non-secession" clause as part of the agreements to come from the 21st Century Panglong meetings, Sithu Aung Myint writes in support of the position adopted by most of the non-Bamar ethnic representatives, that the clause is unnecessary and insulting, given their stated commitments to being a part of Myanmar.  However, in making this argument, he also perpetuates one of the most problematic and a-historical perspectives on the independence period, which is that "The Bamar and the other ethnic groups fought together against the British for independence." This simply is not true. While the Bamar-dominated Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) included members from non-Bamar ethnic groups as well as allied groups among the other ethnicities, responses to the end of British colonial rule were much more varied among the wider non-Bamar ethnic communities. First, it wasn't actually the case that anyone "fought…against the British for independence." Independence was a struggle for Burma but didn't involve actual fighting against the British after WWII. And even during that political struggle, opinions were often divided along ethnic lines. Shan saophas (hereditary leaders) were castigated as oppressive feudalists by Bamar nationalists but those supporting the saopha system saw more benefits to the British system of allowing local forms of rule to exist than to the political centralisation proposed by the AFPFL. This included not just those who materially benefited from the system, but also those who believed in its broader cosmological legitimacy. Accounts of the 1947 Panglong Conference also make clear that most non-Bamar ethnic representatives were convinced more by the instrumental arguments in favour of joining with the Bamar, rather than an emergent "nationalist" spirit or even anti-British sentiment. The Karen were perhaps the most sceptical of the Bamar-led independence movement, in part owing to the strong ties between some Karen leaders and British colonial soldiers and administrators, fostered by Christian missionary zeal among the converted Karen. Karen desires for a separate (independent) state at the time were encouraged by sympathetic writings and public statements by prominent British figures. While views among the Karen overall varied widely, some of the most influential Karen leaders of the late 1940s advocated for a hypothetical "Karen Country" to remain under British dominion, as part of the Commonwealth. Many of them justifiably feared a Bamar-dominated independent Burma, given past violence perpetrated against Karen communities by Bamar-led militias. Also left unaddressed in this claim of ethnic unity in the independence struggle is the fact that, because the group of Bamar leaders that would become the core of the AFPFL initially allied themselves with the Japanese in World War II, that conflict in Myanmar played out largely as battles between the Japanese and the Bamar on one side, and the British and most other ethnic groups on the other. Fierce combat during the war meant that Aung San's defectors, once they finally grew disillusioned with Japanese rule, were met with scepticism and suspicion when they declared their willingness to join with the British Allied Forces. Even after the Japanese had been ousted, inter-ethnic conflict persisted across parts of Burma, putting the lie to any overarching claims of ethnic unity, either before or after the historic conference at Panglong. Why is this minor mis-statement important in an article that is ultimately advocating for something on the side of the ethnic armed groups? I would argue that this myth of unity against the British is a damaging and intentional misremembering of the complex dynamics of a key foundational moment in Myanmar's past that continues to have delegitimizing effects on non-Bamar ethnic communities and their political aspirations in the present. There are many reasons to be critical of British colonial policies, whether they were intentionally designed to divide and weaken Burmese groups or simply misguided and based on ignorance of the multifaceted nature of identity in Burma at the time. However, persistently positing the British as the enemy in the independence struggle has the effect of painting any groups that supported or were friendly with the British as insufficiently committed to the Burmese national project, of suspect patriotism and motivated by self-centred interests, rather than collective good. Inaccurate claims of pre-independence ethnic unity also undercut contemporary grievances of ethnic armed groups and representatives of non-Bamar ethnic groups. As I argued in my 2008 article on "The Myths of Panglong," the predominant version of the NLD's narrative of Panglong is that it has been prolonged military rule that has denied the promise of equality that was generated from the 1947 conference. This narrative relies on accepting the myth that the entire Burmese nation was united at the time of independence, but that military aggression through the 1950s and military rule from 1962 undermined this dream. The logical extension of this argument is that, with civilian (NLD-led) rule at least partly established, the country can now return to its independence-era condition of ethnic unity. Any continuation of an ethnic-oriented struggle would then be seen as illegitimate and narrowly focused on the interests of one's own group, rather than the country as a whole. I had this point brought home to me several years ago when I was invited to speak to a multi-ethnic gathering of young people in Yangon, about my work on Panglong and their own perspectives on the event and its mythos. The most consequential part of the discussion wasn't about my own work, but was rather a heartfelt statement to the group from a young Bamar scholar who was assisting me with some research. He spoke openly about how, until he had begun reading independently, what he had been taught from textbooks, teachers and family was that contemporary ethnic struggles were based on selfish material concerns, not on legitimate political grievances. His apology, and recognition of the validity of these struggles, was a powerful moment, but one that suggests that many Bamar people likely still hold at least partially biased and misinformed views on Myanmar's ethnic history, even if they hold some sympathy toward the groups that have borne the brunt of military abuses over the past five decades. The national reconciliation process in Myanmar should not be looking back to some constructed historical moment of fictional ethnic unity but rather recognising Panglong as aspirational. At best, Bamar political leaders in 1947 made promises that were never fully kept, not even in the 1947 Constitution. But the original Panglong conference was even less inclusive than today's elite-dominated discussions and the provisional nature of the agreement made there is an essential part of the narrative that underlies every continuing struggle for ethnic equality in Myanmar today. I am sure that many from non-Bamar ethnic groups appreciated Sithu Aung Myint's support for their position on a "non-secession" clause. However, their broader cause would be better supported by a more concerted effort from Bamar elites to accurately represent Myanmar's complicated ethnic past and in doing so, lay the groundwork for a national dialogue based on honesty, inclusion and recognition. Link Story : goo.gl/ferv9g | ||
| UN envoy Yanghee Lee told about continued human rights abuses in Shan State Posted: 18 Jul 2017 02:22 AM PDT Representatives from a Shan civic group say they briefed Yanghee Lee, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Burma, on Saturday about ongoing human rights violations in Shan State.
Sai Naw Seng, an executive member of the Tai Youth Network (TYN), an umbrella organization comprising youth groups from across Burma, said that he and his colleagues met with Ms Lee at Golden Hill Hotel in northern Shan State's Lashio Township on July 15. "We told her about last year's Mong Yaw murder case," he said. "And about the situation of villagers in Namtu who cannot go home at present because of continued hostilities in their areas." He said he also briefed the UN envoy about land violations concerning the coal mining industry in Nam Ma and Mong Kung, and noted that villagers' lands were confiscated by the Burmese military in Kehsi Township. The Shan activist said: "We also told her about the case in Yangon in December 2006 when fake protesters turned out in ethnic costumes to purportedly show their support for the Burmese military. Also, we mentioned a recent incident in which a famous Burmese actress wore ethnic costume in her play and was depicted as an alcoholic, a stereotype that was damaging to the image of highland peoples in Burma." Speaking to Shan Herald, he added: "We also told her that we believed that native ethnic languages should be taught during school's hour. "With regard to those issues, she [UN envoy Lee] told us that she will talk to the government." Lee is on her sixth visit to Burma, staying from 10 to 21 July, and is slated to visit Rakhine, Shan and Kayin States, as well as Yangon and Naypyidaw. By Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) | ||
| UNODC's Jeremy Douglas: ‘Myanmar really is the epicentre of the drug trade’ Posted: 18 Jul 2017 12:24 AM PDT On June 26, the government commemorated the International Day Against Drug Abuse by burning illicit drugs with a street value of more than US$200 million at a lavish ceremony in Yangon. Despite these publicity stunts, drugs remain a major issue in Myanmar, with the country still the second-largest producer of opium in the world. Frontier's Oliver Slow spoke to UNODC regional representative Mr Jeremy Douglas about the extent of illicit drug use in Myanmar, measures being taken to improve treatment for users and the agency's programmes aimed at combatting transnational crime.  To what extent is Myanmar a hub for the drug trade in Southeast Asia? This really is the epicentre of the drug trade, at least in the Mekong region. If you look at the heroin trade, it is the epicentre; if you look at methamphetamine, it is one of the key players. If you start at the production side of drugs, we're looking at precursor control. Precursors are the chemicals you need to make drugs, and they are coming from China and India primarily. This country does not have the chemical industry needed to make both major drug types, heroin and methamphetamine, which require chemical flows in order to be made. The drugs are being made in high volume, which means there's a high volume of chemicals coming in. We are really putting a push on regional cooperation to stop or slow the chemical trade into the drug producing areas, because they would hopefully make a bit of a dent in production. We really have to emphasise that – it's something that is under-appreciated and needs a lot more attention. We're also looking at production itself in the country, looking at the source of the drugs. So if it's heroin, it will be Shan State – northern Shan and southern Shan – and we're working with the government in southern Shan State. And then if its methamphetamine then it's around some of the ceasefire group areas. So we are talking to [the government] about how we can reduce trafficking flows, and we're also talking about drug use and drug treatment. We're really trying to prioritise how we can improve the delivery of drug treatment through the public health system. Could you elaborate on that? We've been working with the government and surrounding country governments who have agreed on a new modality for drug treatment that will, from our perspective, be much more effective. The tradition here has been something called compulsory drug treatment; basically someone is a drug user, they come into contact with the justice system and get put into treatment, but it's not voluntary, and not necessarily based on scientific evidence. Working with the World Health Organization, we've come up with a programme called community-based treatment, which helps stream people into appropriate treatment. It is voluntary and evidence based. The government here has signed on to this with its neighbours and now we're looking at how we can scale up with the Ministry of Health. Do you have a timeframe for implementation? It's already started. We have started training and we have got more training sessions for medical practitioners in the next couple of months. The reality is that it's going to take funding, and so the government itself has to look at how it's going to be able to deliver it. We're going to be able to assist with some funding, but it's going to be somewhat limited given the size of the drug problem. So we really need the government itself to make an investment. Why is this approach an improvement? At a fundamental level you need things to be voluntary. People who volunteer for medical treatment go because they want results. Which means when they go in, they are doing so on their own volition and want to come out the other side not using drugs. But when people are forced into drug treatment, or they end up in prison, often there is no rehabilitative effect. It doesn't actually reduce drug use or harm type activities. So this will improve the outcome of the treatment. We are training people in how to identify certain signs of drug use, and the type of drug use that a person has, and we stream them appropriately. For example, only about 10 percent of drug users need residential treatment, the other 90 percent need varying forms of counselling and lifestyle choice advice on how to reduce their drug use. You mentioned poppy cultivation earlier. What sort of trends are we seeing in this area? We've seen it level off, but it has levelled off at high amounts. So if you look back a decade ago it was at a low of say 20,000 hectares or so. We're now looking at just under 60,000, but it has levelled off. What do you think is the reason for hitting that plateau? There are a variety of reasons that it would have levelled off. Some of the interventions we've had with the government have been somewhat successful. They've been modest in scale, but have been successful in reducing [cultivation] in certain areas. At the same time there are market indicators at play. Demand for opium is probably at equilibrium point, so that will be another reason. UNODC issued a report earlier this year saying that poppy cultivation is higher in areas with poor security. Could you talk a bit about that? We see this around the world: where the government is able to provide security and good governance, you generally don't see drug cultivation. That happens in South America, in Colombia for example, and it happens here in the Golden Triangle. If you look at the pattern of conflict here, particularly places like northern Shan where there has been an outbreak of conflict with different groups, that actually is the one place in the country where you do see rising opium production. That's not surprising. There's … no government control regarding the social issues and education. These places are cut off, they're isolated, and drug production is one of the ways they can make a living. How much of an issue are methamphetamines in Myanmar today? It's an enormous problem. More so than opium? Yes, I think it's safe to say that. The police have been telling us for a couple of years, but it's really now proving itself to be true. It's highly available in almost every corner of the country. You didn't see that five or six years ago. Then, it was mainly for export, but now it's actually being used inside the country. At the same time, we're seeing diversification of the market. It used to be yaba, which is a low-grade pill form of methamphetamine, but now we see crystal meth, which is high purity. We're seeing large seizures of crystal meth that have emanated from certain parts of the country. Have you identified a reason why there's been such a proliferation of these types of drugs? There's been an attempt to understand the demand. It started to take place a few years back, and so the demand is still there. It was dumped into the market at a very low price. In some parts of the country you can buy it for a dollar a pill. It's cheap in other markets, but not that cheap. So it's cheap and easily available here. Last week a video was posted on social media of yaba pills being hidden in chillies. How sophisticated are these networks becoming and how difficult are they to track? This comes back to the difference between methamphetamine and heroin. Because methamphetamine isn't geographically specific, it can be made basically anywhere, so the fact of the matter is we don't know exactly where it comes from. You can't trace it back to source, which means you have to develop intelligence on the networks, and the networks that make methamphetamine are very different from those that make heroin because they're very small and tight-knit. And they can use different techniques. As you say, they can embed it in things like chillies, they can embed it in any product essentially, so it's really hard to trace and track. UNODC doesn't only focus on drugs. What are some of the other crime-related issues that you're following closely in Myanmar? One of the bigger issues that we're concerned about here right now is timber trafficking. The country is a source country, one of the few in the region with remaining large original forest cover, and there's [a] market nearby where there is a lot of demand for high value timber. We're also looking at other forms of transnational crime: human trafficking, migrant smuggling. We're very proud of our border management programme. We've established borders posts with neighbouring countries, one on either side of the border, to help countries cooperate together. Those border posts can work on multiple types of transnational crime. We've established them with China, Laos and Thailand and now we have a team leaving to go to Maungdaw [in northern Rakhine State] and establish one on the Bangladesh border. Another issue attracting a lot of attention in Myanmar is wildlife trafficking. Are you also involved in combating that? Often there's a connection between wildlife trafficking and timber trafficking, so we have a programme working with the government on both. This country is a source country for wildlife, which might be going to larger markets in neighbouring countries, but it's also potentially a transit country, like Thailand. This place has an active international port, and therefore has the potential to be a transit country. And are there any animals more at threat than others, or is it all of Myanmar's wildlife? I think it's all of it. We've seen a large number of reports recently, and our wildlife experts talk about the trade in elephant skins, which is apparently harvested from elephants here for medicinal purposes. People believe [the skins have] special healing powers. That's very alarming if it's happening on a large scale because there aren't many elephants left. Of course we also know about pangolin and different bird species that are being trafficked. Link Story : goo.gl/ZB6yHp | ||
| Posted: 17 Jul 2017 11:25 PM PDT We, the undersigned civil society organizations, condemn the arrest, detention and prosecution of six people, including three journalists, under the 1908 Unlawful Associations Act in Myanmar. We demand that these charges against them are dropped and that the three journalists are immediately and unconditionally released, as they have been detained solely in connection with their peaceful journalistic activities. The three journalists, Thein Zaw (also known as Lawi Weng) from the Irrawaddy magazine, Aye Nai and Pyae Phone Aung from the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), as well as those with them at the time - Mai Tun Aye, Mai San Nyunt, and Mai Aung Kham - were detained by the military on 26 June, 2017 in northern Shan State. They were detained after attending a ceremony in an area controlled by the ethnic armed organization, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).  On 28 June, all six men were charged with being in contact with an unlawful association under section 17(1) of the Unlawful Associations Act, a law that has been in place since colonial times. Mai San Nyunt and Mai Aung Kham, the drivers of the vehicle transporting the journalists, were additionally charged with Article 8 of the 2012 Export and Import Law for using a vehicle without a licence. They are all currently being held at Hsipaw prison in northern Shan State, and their next court appearance is scheduled for 21 July. If convicted under the Unlawful Associations Act, they each face between two and three years' imprisonment as well as a fine. A lack of independence of the judiciary and arbitrary use of the Unlawful Associations Act makes the situation for the six detained individuals particularly worrisome. The Unlawful Associations Act is often used by the Myanmar Army to arbitrarily imprison people from ethnic minority and conflict affected areas. Myanmar's military has previously launched large scale offensives against the TNLA and fighting between the two continues. In order to undertake their work, journalists need to be able to report from both sides of a conflict. On 27 June, 25 news outlets, organizations and journalist networks published an open letter to the President, State Counsellor and Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Army. The letter described the arrests as "restricting and censoring the press" and argued that all people in Myanmar should be able to receive information from regions controlled by ethnic armed organizations. The arrest of the three journalists signals the alarming decline of press freedom in Myanmar. Despite the election of a civilian-led government, Myanmar remains a hostile place for journalists and human rights defenders to operate. Defamation suits under Section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Act have been increasingly used against journalists. Harassment using the criminal justice system is a tactic frequently used to delegitimize, undermine and punish the work of journalists and human rights defenders. Article 6 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states that "everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to know, seek, obtain, receive and hold information about all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including having access to information." We urge the Myanmar authorities to take immediate action to: Immediately and unconditionally release Thein Zaw, Aye Nai and Pyae Phone Aung, who have been detained solely in connection with their peaceful journalistic activities; Drop all politically-motivated charges against Mai Tun Aye, Mai San Nyunt and Mai Aung Kham; Repeal the 1908 Unlawful Associations Act and Section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Act and immediately review, amend or repeal other existing repressive laws including the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law, relevant sections of the Penal Code, the media laws and others to ensure they comply with international human rights law and standards; Undertake urgent legal and practical measures to ensure the independence, competence, impartiality and accountability of judges, lawyers and prosecutors; Enact specific legislation and other measures to create a safe and enabling environment for journalists and human rights defenders in accordance with international human rights standards. Endorsed by: 1. Action Committee for Democracy Development (ACDD) 2. All India Network of Individuals and NGOs working with National and State Human Rights Institutions (AiNNI) 3. Amnesty International 4. Arakan Observer Group 5. Arakan Watch 6. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) 7. Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) 8. Association Suisse Birmanie (ASB) 9. Banglar Manabadhikar Suraksha Mancha (MASUM) 10. Burma Campaign UK (BCUK) 11. Burma Centre Delhi 12. Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) 13. Burma Link 14. Burma Monitor Group (BMG) 15. Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK 16. Bytes for All 17. Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO) 18. Christian Solidarity Worldwide 19. Civil Rights Defenders (CRD) 20. Community Partners International (CPI) 21. Farmer and Labour Activists Group (FLAG) 22. Fortify Rights 23. Free Burma Campaign (South Africa) (FBC) (SA) 24. Frontier Myanmar 25. Future Light Center (FLC) 26. Genuine People's Servants (GPS) 27. Human Rights Defenders Alert 28. Human Rights Alert Manipur 29. Human Rights Defenders and Promoters (HRDP) 30. Institute for Asian Democracy 31. Info Birmanie 32. International Campaign for the Rohingya 33. INFORM Human Rights Documentation Centre 34. Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID) 35. Interfaith Cooperation Forum 36. Kachin Development Networking Group (KDNG) 37. Kachin Women's Association Thailand (KWAT) 38. Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) 39. Karen Women's Organization (KWO) 40. Kayan National Party (KNP) 41. Korean House for International Solidarity (KHIS) 42. Let's Help Each Other (LHEO) 43. Mae Tao Clinic (MTC) 44. Madaripur Legal Aid Association (MLAA) 45. Network for Social Development and Peace 46. Norwegian Burma Committee (NBC) 47. Odhikar 48. People's Watch (PW) 49. Peoples' Vigilance Committee on Human Rights (PVCHR) 50. Programme Against Custodial Torture & Impunity (PACTI) 51. People Empowerment Foundation (PEF) 52. Progressive Voice (PV) 53. Pusat KOMAS 54. Quarterly Journal of Federalism 55. Ramhkye 56. Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) 57. Rohingya Academy 58. Rohingya Arakanese Refugee Committee (RARC) 59. Rohingya Youth Development Forum (RYDF) 60. Social Harmony and Inclusive Development Organization 61. Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM) 62. Swedish Burma Committee 63. Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) 64. Tavoyan Women's Union (TWU) 65. Think Centre 66. United States Campaign for Burma 67. Yaung Chi Oo Workers' Association (YCOWA) 68. စိမ္းလန္းျပင္ဦးလြင္ For further information, please contact: 1. Sejin Kim, Human Rights Defenders (HRD) Senior Programme Officer, Asia Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA); +66 (0) 2 1 082 64346, hrd@forum-asia.org (English) 2. Aung Khaing Min, Executive Director, Progressive Voice; +66 (0) 97 995 5305, akm@progressive-voice.org (Burmese/English) 3. Kristina Jelmin, Executive Director, Swedish Burma Committee; +46 (0) 70 759 8046, kristina@burmakommitten.org (English/Swedish) Download this Joint Statement HERE. |
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