Monday, August 28, 2017

Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News

Myanmar’s Peace Process: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Borderland Economies, Service Delivery, and other Post-Panglong Concerns (Part I)

Posted: 27 Aug 2017 11:18 PM PDT

Editor's Note: The following is the first part of a three part series to be featured on Tea Circle this week. Check in tomorrow for Myanmar's Peace Process: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Borderland Economies, Service Delivery, and other Post-Panglong Concerns (Part II). 
Myanmar's history is defined by violence between a relatively stable lowland Bamar core and a fragile non-Bamar highland periphery. The country hosts numerous ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) including the world's longest-running separatist insurgency. Since independence in 1948, Myanmar has never met Weber's minimalist definition of a state as the holder of the monopoly of the use of physical force within a given territory. Beginning from a low point in 1948, when Karen separatists were assembled on the outskirts of Rangoon, Myanmar's army or Tatmadaw grew over the years into a formidable military force as it asserted central control over all lowland areas, pushing insurgents year-by-year into more inhospitable and state-resistant terrain.
The country's "Panglong 21" Peace Process, which seeks to end 70 years of insurgency in the country's borderlands, has been subjected to significant criticism, not least from the participants themselves. Of the 17 EAOs who have signed the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), in July 2017, eight formed a "Peace Process Steering Team" to evaluate the current NCA, referring to it as a "deviation from the path they had envisioned." Other EAOs excluded from signing by the Tatmadaw, and still others who declined to participate, have come together under a bloc, the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), led by the most powerful EAO in the country, the United Wa State Party, but the government refuses to negotiate with them collectively. A previous bloc, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), has, for all intents and purposes, fallen apart. Apparent from the process is the disconnect between the EAOs and the Tatmadaw in regard to sequencing: for example, EAOs want a political dialogue about the parameters of a federal state followed by security sector and constitutional reform, after which disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) shall occur. Conversely, the Tatmadaw want DDR immediately, pressing for a disarmament prior to political negotiations. Each side has its own understanding of federalism that is, so far, incompatible with the other.
Let's assume, however, that the Panglong 21 process continues: that the Tatmadaw and the EAOs eventually demonstrate realism and flexibility, and that an agreement on federalism leads to security sector and constitutional reforms that will serve as guarantors of future peace between the lowland Bamar state and its borderlands.
Far from being the closing of a chapter, such a success signifies the beginning of a more arduous and insecure process that will likely stretch across generations. It is only after federalism is agreed upon and peace agreements are signed that the process of DDR will likely begin amongst EAOs and other militias. This process is codified by the United Nations in the Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, based on an accumulation of complex and not-always-successful DDR experiences across the 1990s and early 2000s. DDR now stands as a fundamental part of modern peace processes it seeks to address "the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development". Combatants are disarmed, demobilized from armed structures, and are supported in their transition to roles in a licit peacetime economy through grants, job training, education, and so on. This process is important so that insurgents, stripped of their ideological justification for existence but still with their illicit funding streams, don't simply become another organized criminal gang for lack of alternatives. Many— and in some contexts, the majority— of ex-combatants reintegrate spontaneously: the concern is those who do not.
In Myanmar, this reintegration process will involve: the disarming of people across economically and infrastructurally undeveloped and geographically remote areas of the state whose livelihood is fighting; the dismantling (or more likely, conversion) of numerous insurgent command structures and the ending of revenues generated by extra-legal taxation and other means; and, the absorption of inappropriately-skilled combatants into local economies, much of them subsistence, which are also making the transition from illicit to licit. Overall, this is the altering of structures of non-state actor government and governance across areas of the Union of Myanmar, and the imposition of the state, where the Union government has held no sway for generations, if at all.
Numbers:
An unknown number of insurgents exist in Myanmar. According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor, the largest EAO, the United Wa State Party, has around 30,000 fighters and an additional 30,000 reservists; the Kachin Independence organization has between 10,000 and 12,000, with other estimates as high as 20,000. The Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army South has 8,000 fighters; the Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army North, 8,000; the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, 6,000; the Karen National Liberation Army/ KNU, between 5,000 and 7,000; the National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla), 3,000; the Arakan Army, 3,000; the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang), 3,000, and so on. Numerous smaller insurgents, Karenni, Lahu, Mon, and Naga, exist. And then there are the Border Guard Forces (BGFs)- EAOs folded into the Tatmadaw command, of which the Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army, with 5,000 fighters, may be the largest. Other former EAOs that have converted to BGFs include the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, which broke away from the above mentioned MNDAA to become a BGF. John Buchanan, in Militias in Myanmar, characterizes BGFs as a category of militia, of which there are hundreds—maybe thousands— of such groups, most allied with the Tatmadaw, although a few are allied to the KNU and KIA. That publication notes that Major General Maung Maung Ohn, then head of the Directorate of People's Militias and Territorial Forces, reportedly estimated that the total strength of the militias, as of 2010, was over 80,000. The highest estimate thus far, from Min Zaw Oo, claims 180,000 militia members in 5,023 groups.
Combining the conservative estimates from Myanmar Peace Monitor which total roughly 85,000 fighters in the largest 20 or so groups, with the conservative figure of 80,000 militia members, gives us a minimum of 165,000 persons who make their living with guns and through such practices as extra legal taxation. This, of course, is an oversimplification; many will be part-time fighters, and may trade or farm, and many have family providing remittances from Thailand and further abroad. Many may also work within operations/logistics and administration in the more complex EAOs, UWSP in particular. But even such applied nuance will still leave a significant number of fighters with inapplicable skills to earn acceptable incomes, and engage in meaningful livelihoods, in peacetime.
Continued absorption of EAOs into BGFs / Tatmadaw:
We can anticipate that a minority of these fighters will continue to be relatively "demobilized" from their existing command structure and absorbed into Tatmadaw-affiliated border guard forces— groups that the Tatmadaw actually pays and equips (unlike Tatmadaw-affiliated militias who are allowed to raise their own funds, and who will become a law and order issue in any future peace). The BGF initiative is very much found within the tenets of DDR: the primary reason it doesn't emerge in many other contexts, however, is that the military cannot afford the cost of maintaining such forces.
The Tatmadaw, however, is able to maintain its border guard forces as part of its "deep state" structure, and the further conversion of EAOs into BGFs will, to both it and the civilian government, be viewed as another pillar of support to the consolidated peace that may emerge from Panglong 21. But the KNU, KIA and UWSP will likely object, and given their sizes and territories, special accommodations may be reached for some type of "national guard" formation in their respective areas. A second, less plausible option would be to absorb these forces within new "Karen Rifles" and "Kachin Rifles" divisions of the Tatmadaw: something politically untenable for both  the EAOs and the Tatmadaw. At present, it is unlikely that the Tatmadaw would accept any large number of insurgent fighters into the mainstream military, much less the officer class. They cannot do so and retain what to its leadership must be its defining Theravada Buddhist and Bamar characteristics, which many a Karen or Kachin or Wa likely refusing to accept a thoroughly Bamar officer class. With these challenges in mind, the most likely outcome  is that a significant number of EAO fighters will need to undergo DDR processes if the promise of Panglong 21 is to be met.

Part Two of the series will explore the manner in which Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration strategies will unfold, especially within the context of Myanmar's under-developed and illicit borderland economies.

Myanmar’s Peace Process: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Borderland Economies, Service Delivery, and other Post-Panglong Concerns (Part II)

Posted: 27 Aug 2017 11:16 PM PDT

Editor's Note: The following is the second part of a three part series to be featured on Tea Circle this week. You can find the first part of Myanmar's Peace Process: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Borderland Economies, Service Delivery, and other Post-Panglong Concerns here. 
Disarmament:
The government of Myanmar possesses the capacity to undertake disarmament and demobilization processes. But what it is still theoretically building with EAOs is the trust necessary to engage in such a process. Despite this, the government is unlikely to go down the well-trod path many other states have travelled via the subcontracting of Disarmament and Demobilization processes to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other UN agencies that have expertise in such work. China's acquiescence, however, matters here: elements of One Belt, One Road require the stability in Myanmar's border with Yunnan, and this has been amply demonstrated by the involvement of special envoy Sun Guoxiang in the latest Panglong Meeting. It is unlikely that China would involve itself in disarmament and demobilization directly; a process under the auspices, not of the EU or DPKO, but of ASEAN, may be more palatable for them.
The disarmament aspect of DDR is a technically easy, time-bound process that only requires the will of each entity to engage with the other, under third party facilitation. This may involve insurgent entry into cantonments and dual-key weapons storage after a given peace process reaches a certain pre-defined milestone. The weapons initially handed over will likely be constituted in large part by "museum pieces", while better functioning weaponry is held back in case Panglong 21 breaks down, or for sale. Implicit in such a process is the building up of state police forces in insurgent areas— often made up of ex-insurgents under state command— in a structure resembling BGFs, but more lightly armed.
Demobilization and Insurgent Economics:
Demobilization of insurgent forces is both a discharging of soldiers and dissolution of the insurgent command structure. In most DDR processes, within the time-bound framework that also encompasses disarmament, it is almost purely symbolic: soldiers in formation hand over their weapons on a parade ground in front of press and dignitaries, and are then "dismissed", one last time, by a commanding officer. The pageantry implies they all go home after. This is disingenuous. Despite claims of demobilization or conversion, the structures nearly always remain, down to the grassroots level.
In less-organized EAOs, these structures are most apparent in financial flows generated by legal and illegal economic activities. Ex- All Burma Students Democratic Front rebel and former MPC director Aung Naing Oo estimated the size of the conflict economy in Myanmar's borderlands at between US$20 billion and US$30 billion— and while conflict will stop, the raising of funds often does not. Many EAOs, namely those with longstanding ceasefires with the Tatmadaw, have built up lucrative portfolios constituting of real estate in Yangon and Mandalay, hotels, bus companies, and so on. These are generally in the hands of individual insurgents rather than a group as a whole. Extralegal taxation is the norm, with trade taxed at checkpoints, and businesses and even households taxed in many areas. Sometimes these taxes are used for legitimate ends within complex EAO structures providing services; other times, they are simply protection fees. Often, insurgents exploit natural resources to fund rebellion and charge others for the license to do so: in Myanmar, jadeite, rubies and timber are especially lucrative. Taxes on jadeite, for example, provided up to half of the KIA's operating budget.
In border areas, the smuggling of untaxed goods also constitutes a norm, as does insurgent taxes on such goods. Vice is also a popular business, as is gambling, in Kokang and Mongla especially. This also doesn't stop with a peace agreement, and military businesses also remain deeply involved in natural resource extraction in contested areas, which casts a shadow across Panglong 21. On the furthest end of the spectrum of illegality, select EAO and militia economies are constituted by drug cultivation and processing, namely heroin and methamphetamine. Indeed, some EAOs and militias operate as particularly well-armed criminal syndicates with a thin veneer of ideology masking economic rationales.
As mentioned elsewhere, some crime will be tolerated by the authorities, written off as the "price of peace". A particularly negative example can be found in the experience of neighbouring Northeastern India, where Naga insurgents who rose up against the Indian state in the 1950s developed comprehensive extortion and protection rackets, and engaged in fratricidal wars—more so than they either fought the state or provided services. They and other insurgent groups in Assam, Manipur, and other areas of Northeast India, espouse ideologies to mask the economic rationales of their current activities, and they act as shadow security forces, "descending, despite high-sounding ideals and rhetoric, into a criminalized oligarchy." The Indian state tolerates these behaviours in the insurgents it has treaties with and the groups it is still trying to negotiate with. Yet another example of tolerated criminality can be found in Indonesian Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra. There, the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) fought the Government of Indonesia from 1976 until 2005, when a mediated peace process culminated in the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, followed by the 2006 Law on the Governing of Aceh. GAM disarmed and theoreticallydemobilized; the structure remained in place, with GAM veterans continuing to collect extra legal taxes from individuals and businesses across the province, as well as other organized criminal activities. This is implicitly allowed by the provincial government, with only GAM dissenters from the main GAM corpus declared "outlaws" and killed.
In Myanmar, peace will also offer lucrative protection opportunities for insurgent structures, especially regarding construction contracts in EAO areas. Improved roads and new businesses will mean more goods and services to tax. These structures will prove durable long after the peace process ends.
The government will initially lack both the capacity and the will to police ex-insurgents and militias, and the Tatmadaw will not do so either. On the contrary, rogue elements of the Tatmadaw within its regional command structure may engage in the same activities, forming new partnerships with EAOs and militias and continuing existing ones.
Ultimately this will be important for a future when the Tatmadaw itself contracts, firstly through its Border Guard Forces. Its affiliated militias, which the Tatmadaw does not finance, will present more immediate law and order problems.
Drug Eradication and Alternative Livelihoods:
As in Afghanistan, chaos and statelessness in Shan and other areas of Myanmar engenders drug production. A key element of DDR is the halting of principal insurgent funding streams, and in select (but not all, the KNU, for example, historically executes drug traffickers) EAO and militia areas, this means opium poppy cultivation and heroin/methamphetamine production. The primary way in which this should be undertaken is the ramped-up targeting of grassroots opium poppy cultivators through alternative livelihoods programs, which UNODC and partners have implemented for years through introduction of alternative crops and agricultural extension services. If the alternative livelihood process occurs in a cautious manner, then a period of crop introduction and extension services will occur prior to opium poppy field eradication and law enforcement. Drug treatment programs will follow this process: many poppy cultivators are also addicts.
This can result in much economic distress to poppy-cultivators: In "The United Wa State Party: Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist Party?", Tom Kramer notes that, when the UWSP leadership were indicted by the US Department of Justice for drug production in 2005, they launched eradication efforts on their own accord, and this resulted in widespread declines in household incomes, as well as small-scale famine. As opium was the only cash crop in the area, and hardly any other edible crop was grown, farmers didn't have the ability to purchase rice and other staples. However, a future alternative livelihood process may be less economically painful for these poor households. If it were a seller's market, no alternate crop would equal the value a farmer can earn from opium, but this may not be the case in Myanmar: the last UNODC Southeast Asia Opium Report indicates a fall in the opium purchase price which may result from market consolidation. Initial successes in alternative livelihoods might result in buyers offering higher prices, which could eliminate licit gains made in a non-coercive manner. Other administrations have also taken crop substitution initiatives, in Kokang especially, with sugarcane supplanting poppy grown there.
A better-funded—and for communities, less beneficial—"alternative livelihoods" model has been pursued by private businesses which are opening rubber and other plantations, and paying local labourers pittances. This exploitative capitalism, disguised as beneficial to former opium cultivators, can lead to exactly the type of instability that more traditional alternative livelihoods programs seek to avoid.
Individual Combatant Reintegration:
The reintegration element of DDR is likely to be seen by Myanmar and China as less politically sensitive. It is also the aspect of the triage that disarmament and demobilization practitioners avoid, as it is often sub-contracted to the UN sister agency or at the NGO level. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are key reintegration implementers, but this does not mean they have been uniformly successful in past endeavors. Reintegration of ex-combatants from insurgent groups into civilian life is not time-bound, and is fraught with difficulty, if not failure. When insurgencies end, there often isn't enough work for civilians, much less fighters, as insurgent areas are distinguished by a lack of infrastructure and undeveloped licit markets. The majority of the economy is illicit, with significant organized criminal activity, as EAOs are regularly excluded from licit markets unless, in the example of the UWSP and others, they control a large enough territory. Most civilians in such areas are engaged in subsistence agriculture or, to a lesser extent, petty trading. There is often also a lack of health and education services, although this was not the case historically in KIA, KNU, and then-Communist Party of Burma (CPB) territories.
When it comes to the type of work available to ex-combatants, there is also the issue of pride. Having a weapon taken away, as a soldier, can be a traumatic experience. The work one can do in civilian life when one fought previously cannot just be any work. It has to have meaning. We cannot expect people who have killed and suffered for a cause to become subsistence farmers on their own land, much less land that is not their own, or bicycle-riding vegetable sellers— especially when previously, in addition to fighting, they acted in a tax-collecting capacity (or what in peacetime is referred to as conducting a protection racket) and when the old insurgent structure still exists for them to return to. This is why the recidivism rate amongst select ex-combatants to violence and crime is high, and why after millions of dollars in reintegration programming in other contexts, only a minority of ex-combatants identified as problematic by their own structure are engaged in licit work (as a direct result of a program, be it a job training or grant) after five years.
Reintegration of individual combatants will consist of job training, apprenticeships, support to small businesses, and remedial/vocational and technical education. It will be proven that the rural economies of EAO areas do not have the capacity to absorb large numbers of fighters into roles other than subsistence ones. The leadership class of insurgents, on the other hand, will become local politicians and construction contractors for the myriad projects that the union and the Tatmadaw will launch, and non-competitive contracts will likely be awarded to them by the government in order for them to feel that peace is profitable. Such leaders will be able to provide for much less of their rank and file than they would have before the peace. One-time reinsertion payments for demobilized soldiers will be spent quickly, and demands for pensions may follow. A particularly expensive example can be found in Timor-Leste, where disgruntled insurgents from the 1975-1999 conflict acted as the foot soldiers for a 2006 insurrection; since then the government has prioritized veteran's pensions in order to maintain stability, and has committed to paying off select veterans and their descendants through 2122.
The Union of Myanmar cannot afford this. And so a certain amount of illegal activity will continue to be committed by the non- integrated rank and file. Extortion and other crimes are often tolerated by the state and the EAO authorities as the price of peace. And so the future peace, for select EAO host populations, might be a cold one, with some insurgents shorn of their ideological justification continuing to feed on communities, whilst other ex-combatants face the disappointment of local economies that cannot accommodate their peacetime ambitions.
Reintegration, crop substitution, extension services, and other livelihood programs are not only for ex-combatants and opium poppy cultivators. The morass of internally displaced within Myanmar and refugees from Myanmar in Thailand will require not just resettlement but an economic role and livelihood source. The UNHCR and other agencies estimate nearly 100,000 internally displaced in Kachin and northern Shan, and roughly 400,000 in the Karen and Mon areas of the southeast. The government will likely prioritize formerly armed populations for reintegration and livelihoods programming, and will neglect returnees, because in the cynical but pragmatic calculus of authorities, they pose less of a threat.

Part Three of the series will discuss other aspects of state building in insurgent areas, service delivery and migration in particular, followed by a comparative discussion of state building in formerly insurgent areas of Northwest Thailand in previous decades.

Myanmar’s Peace Process: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Borderland Economies, Service Delivery, and other Post-Panglong Concerns (Part III)

Posted: 27 Aug 2017 11:12 PM PDT

Editor's Note: Today's post if the third and final of a series on Tea Circle. You can find the first and second parts of Myanmar's Peace Process: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Borderland Economies, Service Delivery, and other Post-Panglong Concerns here. 
DDR processes are only one aspect of the state building process that will need to occur in EAO areas; durable peace will only arrive when communities in EAO areas discern value in citizenship, and so a distrusted state must deliver health, education, and other services, and offer impartial protections, including the provision of land tenure. Education is particularly important: successful reintegration and enhanced livelihood security in EAO areas are fundamentally a question of human resources, the foundation of which is public schools. Across Myanmar, the educational system is in need of repair, and this is doubly so in many EAO areas. Education is supposed to create citizens as well as workers literate in a common language. A lack of vocational and technical training centers, not only in areas accessible to EAO populations, but in Myanmar as a whole, is also an urgent issue. These matters warrant much greater exploration— exploration that is beyond the scope of this analysis, however.  Afghanistan amply demonstrates how both DDR and alternative livelihood programs fail when they are standalone programs occurring in areas lacking the administrative, service-oriented, and coercive presence of the state. 
The process of state building in insurgent areas will occur through an inflow of Bamar civil servants into these areas to deliver services, and this will also lead to resentment. As a rule of thumb, many EAO host populations will not possess the requisite human resource capacity to completely staff education, health, and general administrative posts. Business and capital, some of it exploitative, will follow. Migrants historically dominate local markets in newly colonized areas; Chinese already play this role in Kachin, while Naga markets in Northeast India are dominated by Marwaris and Biharis, and Han Chinese in Tibet. This can also cynically play into conflict resolution efforts, if it gives struggling ex-EAOs entities to levy extra legal taxes on.
Myanmar's ethnic minorities—and for that matter, China's Tibetans, Indonesia's highland Papuans, Thailand's hill tribes, and others—know that uncontrolled in-migration will reduce them to minorities, with their cultures and lands subsumed by newcomers. James C Scott's engulfment— defined as the settlement of loyal (read: docile) populations with an existing "national" identity in areas where such identity was lacking among indigenous peoples— may occur as a part of an unstated but overarching government strategy to dilute the concentration of peoples with separatist tendencies in sensitive areas. Rich historical precedents exist, such as Manchu/ Qing settlement of Han Chinese colonists and soldiers in Southwest China:
Han settlement into areas where they are not a majority has been a Chinese government policy that transcends types of rule, and its continuity from empire to republic to communist dictatorship to the present appears unbroken. Significantly, however, the greater the disruption of the previous demographic status quo, the greater the volatility, as is demonstrated by contemporary anti-state violence in Xinjiang and unrest in Tibet. Controls on migration will likely be sticking points in future negotiations, between the Union and the KIA, KNU, MNDAA, NDAA, and UWSP in particular.
Lessons from Thailand:
The future settlement of conflicts in Myanmar's EAO borderlands, either through Panglong or another forum, cannot be predicted, but the contours of a long path can be inferred from the recent experience of Northwestern Thailand, which only became integrated into the modern Thai state beginning in the 1960s. While Afghanistan's experience demonstrates how reintegration and alternative livelihoods standalone programs not synchronized within a larger state-building and service delivery exercise can often prove futile, Northwestern Thailand's integration into the Thai state confirms this. The region's hill tribe regions were developmentally and administratively ignored until the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) based itself there: hill tribe members served as CPT foot soldiers, and the exponential increase in poppy cultivation in hill tribe areas made many Thais perceive them as threats to the state. The government's defeat of the CPT involved coaxing CPT members to surrender, but unlike Myanmar, the Thai state's relatively strong position made the process a simpler one than the current context of EAO areas. In Thailand's opium-growing strongholds, much of them in then-CPT areas, poppy cultivation dropped from 12,112 hectares in 1961 to 281 hectares in 2015, and the opium trade shifted almost entirely to Laos and Myanmar.
The historical success of Northwestern Thailand's incorporation into the state through both counterinsurgency and alternative development in formerly insurgent areas is not attributed to any one factor, but to a combination of many. Opium poppy cultivation there was not halted because substitute crops earned the same income as opium. In the Thai case, nothing equaled the price of opium to smallholder farmers, especially those without land tenure and the consequent inability to invest in longer-term crops: in 1984, 15 years after alternative crops and extension services were introduced, cultivation was again peaking, and the Thai authorities introduced forcible eradication and arrests in response. But alternate crops did provide income, especially through Arabica coffee. Despite the interference of middlemen and exploitative contract farming— problems for farmers across Thailand and Myanmar, not simply in opium cultivation areas— farmers did earn a living. But the end of illegality was aided by much more than new crops and price guarantees, and the presence of state security actors. The means by which this once remote area of Thailand was truly integrated into the state was through the provision of health and education services, the extension of roads, the provision of land tenure, and the assignment of civil servants to administer areas they were previously absent from— both the presence of the state, and people's perceptions that its presence was worthwhile.
This success took generations. Myanmar's will as well: if Panglong 21 is a success, then it will only be because it serves as the foundation upon which services and protections for EAO communities are built. If Panglong 21 is the end of a process, rather than a beginning, then it will fail.
Conclusion:
The negotiated assertion of the power of the lowland state into state-resistant areas continues with the Panglong 21 peace process. Myanmar's borderland insurgents have replicated lowland state coercive power in order to fight the state. The egalitarianism discussed by Scott and others mainly exists in those armed communities which continue to resist the state, as they form and fracture over time. Many of these insurgents historically protected their communities from Tatmadaw incursions distinguished by violence, flight and impunity. Like states, they also tax and control the communities they protect. Many have resorted to criminal activities to survive, and also, profit.
EAO communities have been caught between a rock and a hard place. Panglong 21 offers them a chance to be relieved of the pervasive insecurity and occasional violence they have been subject to for generations. It offers many of those who represent them less: what we witness in the insurgent offensives that began in Shan in November 2016 may be the last gasp of certain smaller groups and the beginning of serious negotiations between larger entities and the government. That process will see EAOs surrender some powers while retaining others: outlaws will legitimize, and a certain amount of post-conflict criminality from former militia and EAO structures will be tolerated as the price of peace. The peace process, if it works, will not be the end of an era of instability, but rather, the beginning of a different type of insecurity, and expectations must be managed. Transitional justice and other demands will prove to be illusory.
No one should underestimate the long task ahead of both the government and the insurgents; it will take a generation, at least, before insurgent populations will find a place in licit economies, and before adequate services are provided. No particular program or step serves as a "magic bullet". The same infrastructure that will allow troops to travel quickly to quell unrest will also serve to reduce costs for farmers to get their produce to market and reduce times for people to access emergency care. That access, to name one example of many, gives people a vested interest in the state. And in many an EAO territory, that interest is lacking. It is exactly this type of social capital that the state needs to invest in EAO areas that will guarantee peace after Panglong. The state's presence will be measured not in terms of soldiers but by health, education, markets and opportunities.
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Sunday, August 27, 2017

The Irrawaddy Magazine

The Irrawaddy Magazine

Muslim Militants Targeted Civilians in Rakhine: Govt

Posted: 27 Aug 2017 04:13 AM PDT

YANGON – In what the State Counselor's Office has labeled terrorist attacks, militants in northern Rakhine are allegedly targeting civilians including six members of a Hindu family—three of them children—who were shot dead in northern Rakhine on Saturday.

The 12-member family, who live in No. 4 Quarter of downtown Maungdaw, were returning home from working as casual laborers in Myin Hlut village in southern Maungdaw at 11 p.m. on Saturday when they were caught in clashes between Rohingya militants and the Myanmar Army, according to a statement released on the Facebook page of the State Counselor Office Information Committee on Sunday.

The family sought refuge in a construction site between Myo Thu Gyi village and downtown Maungdaw on the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road when they were discovered by Muslim militants who allegedly shot dead two men, one woman, and three children, the statement read.

Two women were severely injured and four children managed to escape to a neighboring village where security personnel were deployed.

On Sunday, the six bodies were taken to Maungdaw General Hospital and the surviving family members traveled to Buthidaung. The Irrawaddy was unable to independently verify the account.

In a separate attack, 20 ethnic Daignet—a sub-ethnicity of Rakhine—were besieged by around 100 Muslim militants with knives as they evacuated to Aung Zan village in Maungdaw on Saturday afternoon, according to a statement from the Office of the Commander-in-Chief's Facebook page on Sunday.

One man evaded the violence but the fate of the rest of the villagers is unknown, according to the statement.

Since Rohingya militants launched attacks on 30 police targets and one army base on Friday, leaving 12 members of security forces dead, the route between Buthidaung and Maungdaw has been blocked as a precaution against landmines.

Police Col. Maung Maung Soe of No. 1 Border Police Headquarters in Kyee Kan Pyin, Maungdaw Township said seven police outposts in Maungdaw Township were attacked by home-made bombs on Sunday.

According to Reuters, the Myanmar government has evacuated at least 4,000 non-Muslim villagers in the area as clashes continue, while around 2,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled across the border to Bangladesh.
Reuters reporters at the border could hear gunfire from the Myanmar side on Sunday, which triggered a rush of Rohingya toward the no man's land between the countries.

Saturday's attack on the Hindu family was strongly condemned by a legal advisor for the All Myanmar Gurkha Hindu Dhama Assocation U Gannes Basnet, who spoke to The Irrawaddy by phone from Kachin State.

He urged the government to protect civilian lives in Maungdaw.

"This is not just attacks on Buddhists and Hindus, it's threatening the security of the nation," said U Gannes Basnet.

There are about 2,000 Hindus living in Maungdaw, according to a member of Myanmar's Hindu Association U Bagale who lives in Mogok Township of Shan State.

U Bagale said he had heard from relatives in the area that Maungdaw's Hindu Temple had been burnt down, although The Irrawaddy was unable to verify this.

"They were innocent children who have no idea about politics, why did they brutally murder them?" he asked of Saturday's incident.

Chairman of the Arakan National Party's Maungdaw chapter  U Khin Maung Than told The Irrawaddy that the entire Hindu community from No.5 Quarter of Maungdaw Township had been driven out by Muslim residents, and one was killed.

Some 400 Hindu families were sheltering in schools, monasteries, and government compounds, he said.

He described the situation in Maungdaw as "critical," and said 4,000 people had sought refuge at the three-mile border check point, near the Mayu mountains on the road between Maungdaw and Buthitaung, and five Rakhine villages had been burnt down in northern Maungdaw.

The Irrawaddy was unable to independently verify his accounts.

A Twitter account claimed by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) claimed responsibility for attacks on Friday morning, calling them "defensive actions" against security forces.

In Friday's statement, the group vowed that they would "continue [their] struggle." In previous statements dating back to May, statements from the ARSA Twitter account maintain that the group was committed to avoiding civilian targets.

Tension had been running high recently between ethnic Rakhine and the stateless Rohingya Muslim population, who remain largely separated since inter-communal violence in 2012 and 2013 displaced around 140,000 people, the vast majority of them Muslim Rohingya.

Myanmar Army-led security operations, in response to attacks on border guard posts that killed nine police, drove 75,000 Rohingya across the border to Bangladesh and "very likely" amounted to crimes against humanity, according to the UN.

The post Muslim Militants Targeted Civilians in Rakhine: Govt appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Thousands of Buddhist Rakhine, Hindus Evacuated from Northwest Myanmar

Posted: 27 Aug 2017 12:52 AM PDT

YANGON and COX'S BAZAR, Bangladesh – Myanmar government has evacuated at least 4,000 non-Muslim villagers amid ongoing clashes in northwestern Rakhine state, the government said, while thousands of Rohingya Muslims fled across the border to Bangladesh.

The death toll from the violence that erupted on Friday with coordinated attacks by Rohingya insurgents has climbed to 98, including some 80 insurgents and 12 members of the security forces, the government said. The clashes, the worst since at least October, have prompted the government to evacuate staff and thousands of non-Muslim villagers from the area.

Fighting involving the military and hundreds of Rohingya across northwestern Rakhine continued on Saturday with the fiercest clashes taking place on the outskirts of the major town of Maungdaw, according to residents and the government.

The attacks marked a dramatic escalation of a conflict that has simmered in the region since last October, when a similar but much smaller Rohingya attack prompted a brutal military operation beset by allegations of serious human rights abuses.

The treatment of approximately 1.1 million Muslim Rohingya in mainly Buddhist Myanmar has emerged as the biggest challenge for national leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on Friday condemned the raids in which insurgents wielding guns, sticks and homemade bombs assaulted 30 police stations and an army base.

The Nobel Peace Prize laureate has been accused by some Western critics of not speaking out for the long-persecuted Muslim minority, and of defending the army's counteroffensive after the October attacks.

Win Myat Aye, Myanmar's minister for social welfare, relief and resettlement, told Reuters late on Saturday that 4,000 "ethnic villagers" who had fled their villages had been evacuated, referring to non-Muslim residents of the area.

The ministry is arranging facilities for non-Muslims in places including Buddhist monasteries, government offices and local police stations in major cities.

"We are providing food to the people cooperating with the state government and local authorities," said Win Myat Aye.

He was unable to describe the government's plans to help Rohingya civilians.

"It is very difficult to say—this is a conflict situation so it is very difficult to say who is right or wrong," he said.

Panic-stricken Rakhine residents in ethnically mixed or non-Muslim towns have readied knives and sticks to defend themselves. Many were stranded in their villages located in Muslim-majority areas as clashes continued and some roads had been mined, residents said.

"The clashes continued all day yesterday on the main road, there are a lot of landmines. I don't think local authorities have enough food for all the people. The price of commodities is rising day by day," a local journalist from Maungdaw town said on Sunday.

Bracing for more violence, thousands of Rohingya—mostly women and children—were trying to forge the Naf river separating Myanmar and Bangladesh and the land border as gunfire could be heard from the Myanmar side, Bangladesh border guards said.

Around 2,000 people have been able to cross into Bangladesh since Friday, according to estimates by Rohingya refugees living in the makeshift camps on the Bangladeshi side of the border.

Bangladesh's foreign ministry said it was concerned that thousands of "unarmed Myanmar nationals" had assembled near the border to enter the country.

Rohingya have been fleeing Myanmar to Bangladesh since the early 1990s and there are now around 400,000 in the country, where they are a source of tension between the two nations who both regard them as the other country's citizens.

The post Thousands of Buddhist Rakhine, Hindus Evacuated from Northwest Myanmar appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

 Northern Rakhine Cut Off As Violence Continues

Posted: 26 Aug 2017 11:30 PM PDT

SITTWE, Rakhine State — Access to Buthidaung, Maungdaw and Rathedaung townships of northern Rakhine State was cut on Saturday as boat services were suspended from the state capital Sittwe as attacks by Rohingya militants continued in the area since early Friday morning.

Boat service providers in Sittwe told The Irrawaddy requests to the Rakhine State government for security assistance had not been answered.

The three townships are only accessible via boat from Sittwe to Maungdaw.

"We suspended our service as we don't dare to venture out without any security assistance," said a saleswoman from the Shwe Nadi Boat Service's ticket counter, adding that she didn't know when the service would be resumed.

U Aung Kyaw Zan, state minister for industry and transportation, told The Irrawaddy he had informed boat services to operate based on the situation in Maungdaw.

"Everyone knows what is happening there, we can only take action based on the situation there," he said.

Since Friday morning, attacks on around 30 police and army targets in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships caused the deaths of 10 policemen, one soldier, one immigration officer. At least 59 suspected militants were also killed.

The Myanmar government on Friday evening denounced those involved in the attacks as terrorists.

The post  Northern Rakhine Cut Off As Violence Continues appeared first on The Irrawaddy.
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Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News

Commentary on “Security forces 'fire on fleeing Rohingya' as violence scorches Rakhine”

Posted: 27 Aug 2017 07:48 AM PDT

Looking at the human toll and causality figures of a hundred or more and is said to be increasing with every passing hours, the immediate need of the seemingly out of control conflict situation in Arakan as a whole is on how to first limit the damage.

All parties concerned in this conflict would be well advised to make use of the political dialogue and reconciliation attitude to defuse the situation, rather than just banking on total elimination of "win-lose" or zero-sum game.


At this confusing hours and attitude haof hatred from both sides of the conflict spectrum, just declaring Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) as a terrorist organization and total annihilation won't end the conflict, as human rights violations and defending the country's sovereignty through area cleansing and combing of the Rohingya settlement, couldn't be delineated clearly. In other words, the line is blurred between the two issues.

Thus, "limiting the damage and political solution" are the only way to get out of this mess, even though it would be hard to swallow this reality at this emotionally charged moment that both conflict parties have the tendency to think that one side is wrong and the other side right, so to speak.

As in all conflict situation, the middle ground is always the place where solution could be found, as all Rohingya could not claim blanket citizenship for all, including illegal immigrants that have entered the country after the country's independence from the British – as a timeline for example to draw a line between legal and illegal, the powers that be cannot also throw the whole Rohingya population into the sea.

As Kofi Annan's Commission suggested reviewing the controversial 1982 citizenship law and verification of the legal resident from illegal ones would have to be carried out in an internationally accepted democratic norms, if this simmering conflict is to come to an end.

Link to the story: Security forces 'fire on fleeing Rohingya' as violence scorches Rakhine

BURMA: A NEW ETHNIC NATIONALITY PRO-DEMOCRACY RESISTANCE

Posted: 27 Aug 2017 07:38 AM PDT

Bigotry, the conviction that a group bears collective guilt for a perceived offense, can have many foundations. These include differences in skin color, ethnicity, and religious belief. For the last, the nature of the actual belief system is irrelevant. That others think differently is enough to justify persecution against them.

Presently, there is widespread bias against Muslims. While it is true that certain fanatical cults such as ISIS and al Qaeda self-identify as Muslim (and which self-identification is false, even though they - supposedly - follow the Koran), this in no way implicates all Muslims.


With a population over 1.5 billion, one out of five people on earth practice the faith. To think that all of them are fanatics is not only ludicrous, it is the most pervasive form of bigotry in the world today - other than on the basis of skin color.

There are many types of terrorism. There is the terrorism of cults such as ISIS, and on the opposite end of the spectrum the terrorism of right-wing extremists, who typically act as "lone-wolves," including followers of neo-Nazism, the Klu Klux Klan, and more generally who identify as white supremacists and anti-Semites.

The worst terrorists of all, though, who generate the most fear, and who perpetrate crimes against humanity against the largest number of victims, are state actors. In this group would go the dictators of such countries as North Korea, Syria, China and Burma, who terrorize their populations every day and who have been doing so for many decades. Anyone who opposes in self-defense such state terrorism, and who limits their actions to armed rebellion against state agents, but not civilians - innocent targets, is a pro-democracy rebel, not a terrorist.

For Islam, the United States clearly does not consider every Muslim to be a terrorist. Many are in fact allies. U.S. soldiers from Special Forces up to larger units from the Army and Marines and also the Navy and Air Force are presently fighting side-by-side with anti-terror/pro-democracy Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Yemen and likely other countries as well. The U.S. also has bases in additional Muslim countries, including Kuwait, Djibouti, Qatar and Turkey.

The situation at the moment in Burma is very unusual. The regime's military and police are State perpetrators of terrorism. This has gone on for over fifty years, notably in the East and North of the country. Since 2012, there has been a State campaign of terror in the West, against the  small Muslim group, the Rohingya. The Rohingya have been terrorized so severely that they are experiencing nothing less than genocide.

Historically a peaceful people, now - one might say finally - they are beginning to stand up for themselves. They have established a self-defense unit, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). This group is essentially the same as the KIA, KNLA, TNLA, and Burma's myriad other ethnic armed organizations (and should likewise be invited to participate in the nationwide peace negotiations).

The military dictatorship is dominated by Buddhists from the ethnic group, the Burmans. (By no means are all Burmans racist.) The dictatorship hates Muslims, and has been slaughtering the Rohingya. It calls the ARSA "terrorists" (and also the EAOs that are active in Shan and Kachin
 States). The generals have been helped greatly in this propaganda through the words and actions of Aung San Suu Kyi, also a Burman Buddhist, who while formerly a democracy campaigner herself has now abandoned fundamental political change and indeed the idea of having any moral foundation at all, in her quest for personal power and self-gratification.

The United States has been put in a difficult position. It has opposed the Burma dictatorship since its bloody massacre of students and other activists in 1988, and supported Suu Kyi who came on the scene at that time. Now, both are bad, partners in crime. What will the U.S. do? Will it actually begin to cooperate with the military regime, and assist the genocide, out of loyalty to Suu Kyi; or, will it condemn the terror against the Rohingya and even potentially begin to help its, and the country's other, ethnic nationality pro-democracy armed groups?

If it is doing this in Syria and Iraq, why not Burma?
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Saturday, August 26, 2017

The Irrawaddy Magazine

The Irrawaddy Magazine

This Week in Parliament (August 21 – 25)

Posted: 25 Aug 2017 09:55 PM PDT

Monday (August 21)

In response to question from Nganzun Township MP U Min Thein about the usage of farmlands rented by citizens to non-citizens, Deputy Minister for Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation U Hla Kyaw said that owners may report to nearby agricultural departments if non-citizen tenants exploit the land and cause soil degradation. He added that the agricultural departments may also take legal action against the breach of fertilizer and pesticide laws.

In the Upper House, in response to a question by MP U Kin Shein of Tanintharyi Region (9) about the provision of loans for township municipalities to carry out development work, Deputy Finance Minister U Hset Aung said that there is no current plan to take on foreign loans. The government's priority, he said, is to focus on the economic development of the country.

Tuesday (August 22)

In response to Kawlin Township MP U Myo Zaw Aung's question about the government's plan to disseminate digital and information literacy on a wide scale among communities and students, Deputy Minister for Transport and Communications said that the information ministry operates a website, Facebook page, Twitter account and blog. Meanwhile, the Myanmar Book Aid and Preservation Foundation has provided a digital information literacy master training to library staff of the information and public relations department who are tasked with disseminating information and promoting this type of literacy.

Lawmakers discussed the proposal of Arakanese lawmaker U Khin Maung Latt of the Arakan National Party, urging the Union government to take action against insurgents in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships in line with the 2014 Counter-Terrorism Law. Military representative Maj-Gen Than Soe raise objections to the discussion points raised by Daw Ei Ei Pyone of the National League for Democracy as she described the problems in Rakhine State as part of a "legacy of dictatorship" and criticized the military for not doing enough to protect local people despite its huge defense budget.

Wednesday (August 23)

MP U Aung Win of Hmawbi Township questioned asked about the prosecution of original farmland owners by those who confiscated their land while review committees continue to investigate the cases. Deputy Minister for Home Affairs Maj-Gen Aung Soe replied that land confiscation review committees are only responsible for reviewing the cases if lands are confiscated in line with the law, but not for solving land disputes and conflicts over inheritance. The committees cannot intervene in lawsuits filed by individuals and associations.

Lower House speaker U Win Myint criticized the deputy minister's answer, saying it is ridiculous that poor farmers whose farmlands are grabbed illegally could be sued by those who grab their lands. "We should have sympathy for them," he said.

U Khin Myo Win of Tanintharyi Region (12) asked about the government's plans to prevent illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Deputy Minister for Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation U Hla Kyaw replied that his ministry has installed a vessel monitoring system for foreign fishing trawlers, and is also conducting a feasibility study in cooperation with the French Development Agency to install the system for local fishing trawlers.

Thursday (August 24)

The Lower House voted down Rathedaung Township MP Daw Khin Saw Wai's proposal urging the Union government to intensify administrative and security efforts in northern Rakhine State.

In the Upper House, lawmakers discussed in favor of the proposal of Dr. Win Myint of Bago Region (11), which urged the government to establish a university solely focused on the sustainable development of the country's fishery industry.

The Upper House passed a bill amending the 2013 Telecommunications Law, as per the amendments sent back from the Lower House.

Friday (August 25)

MP U Thaung Aye of the Union Solidarity and Development Party made an abortive attempt to submit an urgent proposal to the Union Parliament following attacks by Muslim militants on police and military targets in Rakhine State Thursday night and Friday morning.

The Union Parliament passed the bill amending the 2013 Telecommunications Law.

The post This Week in Parliament (August 21 – 25) appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

With Rakhine Under Siege, Will Govt Call a Security Council Meeting?

Posted: 25 Aug 2017 09:37 PM PDT

Friday's midnight attacks on police and military targets by militants could be a game-changing event for Myanmar.

If the National League for Democracy (NLD) government cannot act swiftly to quell the unrest, the military is likely to step in to ensure that its presence is at the forefront, and will take control of the situation.

The coordinated attacks, which left a dozen members of security forces and 59 suspected militants dead, coincided with the release of the final report on Thursday published by the Rakhine State Advisory Commission, led by former UN chief Kofi Annan. The commission detailed recommendations for addressing longstanding tension and injustices in the region.

"As Chair of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, I am gravely concerned by, and strongly condemn, the recent attacks in Rakhine State. I am saddened to hear of the loss of life of members of the security forces," Kofi Annan said in a statement.

In a statement from the State Counselor's Office on Friday, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said she also "strongly condemn[ed]" what she described as "brutal attacks by terrorists on security forces in Rakhine State."

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi held an urgent meeting on Friday with Union ministers of defense, home affairs and border affairs, as well as her national security adviser. The State Counselor's Office also said that the government had been aware of a risk of attacks coinciding with the release of the commission's final report, and that the current administration remains committed to "finding meaningful and lasting solutions for conflict-torn Rakhine."

These latest attacks will undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences for residents of the region, as well as for Myanmar and beyond, testing the government's ability to control the troubled state.

Questions have inevitably been raised. Will the NLD administration be able to bring law and order, ensure the safety of fleeing locals, and protect the nation's sovereignty? Perhaps more importantly, how will counter-terrorism measures be implemented? Are Myanmar's security forces sufficiently prepared to secure the area?

Arakanese politicians who feel that the country's western border has been compromised in northern Rakhine State are among those urging for the convening of the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). Many seasoned political observers feel the same.

According to the 2008 Constitution, the rapidly changing situation in Rakhine State demands that the President exercise executive power to call an NDSC meeting; will U Htin Kyaw do just this?

Meetings of the NDSC have been put on hold since the NLD government took office in 2016. Instead, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has relied on ad hoc security briefings, and her working relations with army leaders are at odds. President U Htin Kyaw, a close confident of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, will likely to wait for a cue from the State Counselor regarding any action with the NDSC.

Mandated by the 2008 Constitution, the 11-member security council was formed under former President U Thein Sein's administration, during which it held regular meetings to discuss security issues in the country, including the right to petition the President to declare a nationwide state of emergency. The military commands a 6-5 majority in the council, but it is understood that there is no voting exercise. Some political observers feel it is the best platform to discuss the developing situation in the country, as the council is comprised of civilian and military leaders.

The council members include the President, two vice presidents, two parliamentary speakers, the foreign minister, and the military-appointed ministers for home affairs, border affairs, and defense, as well as the military's commander-in-chief. As foreign minister, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would be present at NDSC meetings.

The developing situation in Rakhine State was also discussed in Parliament, when military MPs and Arakanese politicians proposed that administrative and security measures be intensified in northern Rakhine State.

Maj Aung Kyaw Hnin, an army representative, was among those who debated alongside members of the Arakan National Party in favor of the proposal.

"In dealing with the affairs of Rakhine State, security matters should be prioritized for protecting national sovereignty and the depredation towards local Rakhine nationals from the danger of terrorists, instead of feeling fear of international pressure," he said in the legislature.

The NLD-dominated Lower House voted down the proposal on Thursday.

However, demands to convene the NDSC are growing as the security situation in northern Rakhine State requires more attention from the top command. Calling such a meeting should be of no harm to the country or its people.

The post With Rakhine Under Siege, Will Govt Call a Security Council Meeting? appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Who Can Bring Stability to Rakhine State?

Posted: 25 Aug 2017 09:26 PM PDT

Kyaw Zwa Moe: Welcome to Dateline Irrawaddy! On Aug. 8, The Arakan National Party (ANP) called for tightened security measures in Rakhine State. Promptly, the military dispatched troops to Rakhine. There are criticisms that the government and the parliament have not been responsive enough to the ANP's request. We will discuss if there are political tricks behind the military's move and the state of stability and rule of law in Rakhine State. Ethnic affairs analyst U Maung Maung Soe, who recently visited Rakhine State's Mayu mountain range, and journalist Ko Thiha will join me to discuss this issue. I'm Irrawaddy English editor Kyaw Zwa Moe.

Dateline Irrawaddy : ရခိုုင္ပဋိပကၡအေရး ဘယ္လိုုကိုုင္တြယ္ေျဖရွင္းမလဲ ရခိုုင္ျပည္နယ္ဘက္မွာ အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ေရးအေျခအေနေတြက ဘယ္ေလာက္ထိ ဆိုးေနၿပီလဲ ဒီကိစၥေတြရဲ႕ ေနာက္ကြယ္မွာ ဘယ္လိုႏိုင္ငံေရး လွည့္ကြက္ေတြမ်ားရွိေနမလဲ ဆိုတာနဲ႔ ပတ္သက္ၿပီးေတာ့ ဧရာဝတီသတင္းဌာန အဂၤလိပ္ပိုင္း အယ္ဒီတာ ေက်ာ္စြာမိုး၊ႏိုင္ငံေရးေလ့လာသုံးသပ္သူ ဦးေမာင္ေမာင္စိုးနဲ႔ ႏိုင္ငံျခားသတင္းေထာက္ ကိုသီဟေသြးတို႔က ေဆြးေႏြးထားၾကတာပါ။ ယခုေဆြးေႏြးပြဲဟာ ၾသဂုတ္လ (25) ရက္ေန႔အၾကမ္းဖက္တုိက္ခုိက္မႈမျဖစ္ပြားခင္ ေဆြးေႏြးသုံးသပ္ထားတာျဖစ္ပါတယ္။

Posted by The Irrawaddy – Burmese Edition on Friday, August 25, 2017

The ANP called for heightened security measures in Rakhine State on Aug. 8, and the Tatmadaw [Myanmar Army] sent troops on Aug 9. That same day, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi summoned a cabinet meeting on the issue. The Tatmadaw took immediate action and dispatched troops. U Maung Maung Soe, you recently visited the area. How is the administration operating on the ground and did you see weaknesses in security?

U Maung Maung Soe: The [Rakhine State] problem originated in 2012. Many [Rohingya Muslims] were placed into internally displaced persons [IDP] camps after renewed conflict between Rakhine people and Bengalis.

[Editor's Note: The Rohingya Muslim community in Rakhine is referred to by many, including the government, as "Bengali" to suggest they are interlopers from Bangladesh.]

Then, Bengalis had their white cards [temporary identity documents] seized and their movement was restricted. This situation has continued for five years. U Thein Sein's government had about four years to solve the issue, but could not find an answer. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is still trying to solve the problem more than one year after she took office. The situation has actually got worse. In Maungdaw Township, there are around 500,000 Bengalis while the population of indigenous people [ethnic Rakhine Buddhists] is only around 30,000.

KZM: Indigenous ethnic Rakhine people?

MMS: Yes, indigenous people belonging to the Rakhine ethnic group. In Buthidaung Township, the Bengali population is around 250,000, and the population of indigenous peoples is around 45,000. There are only these two townships in Maungdaw District. While the total Bengali population is 750,000 there, the population of indigenous people is just around 75,000—only one in ten.

As the Rakhine problem continued unsolved, a militant attack occurred in 2016. There were attacks on police border posts. Since early 2017, the authority of the General Administration Department [GAD] and the police force over Bengali villages has gradually declined. Bengali village administrators who worked under the township GAD were killed, and ethnic Rakhine villagers, who went into forests to collect firewood, hunt and fish, were also killed. This problem has intensified.

Before the killing of eight ethnic Mro villagers in Kai Gyee village [earlier this month], a villager from Zedipyin went missing, and was not recovered. About three suspected militant hideouts were discovered on Mayu Mountain. On Aug. 3, eight ethnic Mro villagers from Kai Gyee were killed. On Aug. 4, villagers surrounded around 40 policemen who came and arrested six suspects in Outt Nan Yar village. Around 400 to 500 villagers grabbed the suspects and two suspects got away. Police had to fire warning shots and flee. This shows that [government] administration collapsed in those villages. The following day, ethnic Rakhine in small nearby villages fled to villages, which had police stations. Around 600 ethnic Rakhine villagers fled. ANP lawmakers raised this issue in the Lower House but the debate is pending. It is only recently that the Upper House has started discussing this issue. One month ago, Buthidaung Township lawmakers raised this issue at the Rakhine State Parliament, but the Rakhine State government said security was good and there was nothing to worry about. In the meantime, these killings happened.

KZM: The situation has become worse.

MMS: Yes, it has. The ANP requested a meeting with the army commander-in-chief on Aug. 8. They met on Aug. 9 and military troops were dispatched on August 10. The main cause of the problem is that we were not able to solve the Bengali issue—which originated in 2012—correctly in line with the law over the past five years. The second is an outbreak of militant attacks, and the third one is the collapse of administrative mechanisms in Bengali villages in Maungdaw Township.

KZM: Politically, the ANP has raised this issue in parliament, but the National League for Democracy (NLD)-dominated parliament only paid scant attention and didn't treat it seriously. The ANP took steps to directly meet the army commander-in-chief, and they did meet him. Ko Thiha, why do you think the NLD-dominated parliament is less responsive? Daw Aung San Suu Kyi did hold a cabinet meeting on this issue on Aug. 9, but there are criticisms that the government is slow in its response. Some say that the military has got political gain by making an immediate response. What is your assessment?

Thiha: The government needs to frankly admit that it is not doing enough. The reason is because it is still in the process of implementing the recommendations of Kofi Annan's Advisory Commission on Rakhine State [from its interim report]. Kofi Annan has given a lot of recommendations to ease tensions in the area.

As the government is working on the idea of easing tensions, it seems it has underestimated the possibility of conflict and militant attacks. Their approach is not to attack, but to ease the tensions in the area. In fact, we should treat the militancy with extra attention so as to make a prompt response. But their approach solely focuses on easing tensions, and therefore did not put some factors into consideration. Maybe it is because of the lack of cooperation with the military or that they have no information about the situation on the ground. This coincides with parliament's negligence and the Rakhine State government's failure to cooperate with locals and strong parties in the state. As a result, things have developed into today's situation, I think.

KZM: We can conclude that the ANP had to approach to the military because it could not approach the government and the NLD-dominated parliament. U Maung Muang Soe, according to what you have discussed, do you think a dispatch of military troops was necessary?

MMS: While an armed insurgency of Bengali militants has risen in the area, and while locals are in a state of panic, and while there are reports about Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army's operations with around 400 to 500 troops, military [intervention] is required, I think, because the Mayu mountains are important for security in this region. To the north, the Mayu mountain range stretches hundreds of miles from mile post No. 50 on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border to Agnumaw. There are dense forests and herds of elephants in its north. The Mayu mountains end in Angumaw and the Mayu River drains into the Bay of Bengal. Maungdaw lies in the west of Mayu River, and Buthidaung lies in the east. Rathedaung lies downstream of Mayu River. So, the mountain range is important for security of those three townships. Besides this, on the opposite bank of the Mayu River to Agnumaw is Yay Chan Byin Jetty—just a 40-minute boat ride to Sittwe Island. Access to the Mayu mountains is a military threat to Sittwe Island, and Sittwe Township. So, it is important that there is military control of Mayu to avoid militancy.

Taking a look at the activities of the military, troops entered Maungdaw on Aug. 10, but there was no [apparent] clashes or clearance operations. I think the military is preparing to build military outposts in the Mayu mountain range rather than conducting clearance operations in villages. Between 1950 and 1960 under the government of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, there was the Mujahideen insurgency. They were also based in the Mayu mountain range.

There is a big Bengali village called Maung Hnama upstream of Kyee Kan Pyin village where the border police force is headquartered. There is a mountain to the east of the village. Locals call it 'Kasim' after a Mujahideen leader. Locals know that there are caves on Mt. Kasim because it has been the hideout of Mujahideen insurgents in the past. So, I think the military will establish outposts and build roads on the Mayu mountains to keep the area under surveillance.

KZM: Rakhine State has witnessed troubles since 2012, but, at the same time, there are clashes in Kachin State and other places. There were also clashes in Karen and Mon states. In the case of Rakhine State, if local parties or organizations approach directly to the army commander-in-chief out of concerns for security of their region… they can also approach the government such as the defense minister and home affairs minister. So, Ko Thiha, this procedure is…?

Thiha: I'd set aside the other things, the only thing I'd like to point out is that the Tatmadaw is allowed to take actions freely to operate its troops and take security measures under the constitution. It only needs to report to the president in real time. Will the military go there only when it is called? I mean, Maungdaw is a territory of our country.

It is the 24-hour duty of the Tatmadaw to protect the borders of the entire country and monitor and take actions as necessary without delay. There is the risk of troops of other countries trespassing into our territory. There are lots of problems. The Tatmadaw is fundamentally responsible for all of these, not only when it is requested to take responsibility. If the Tatmadaw thinks it is necessary… the government is a civilian government and it is just one year and a half in office. If it is not good at handling such an issue, the military has to give advice to them, and urge them to take their advice. This is something they have to do internally.

The ANP is a political party based in the city. Yes, it has members in the villages. Their information may be good. But there is the professional force of the Tatmadaw, and the government, which has power and responsibility. They can coordinate internally. I think [the ANP's request to meet the commander-in-chief] was politically motivated.

KZM: What do you think, U Maung Maung Soe?

MMS: I think the ANP did what it could do because ethnic Rakhine people had already fled out of fear while there was no progress in parliament. But, the ANP met the army commander-in-chief on Aug. 9, and he sent the troops immediately the following day. So, I think the military had already prepared for [operations in Maungdaw], not only after the ANP requested it. The military conducted clearance operations last year, but has almost ceased operations because of allegations of human rights abuses. So, the ANP—which has a mandate from the majority of local people—gave the military reason to continue operations for the time being. The military sent troops under these circumstances.

KZM: The State Counselor's Office has released a statement about the issue, saying it has plans for the security and development of the region. Plans include easing of tensions with the help of Kofi Annan's commission. This is more like a long-term plan. What do you think are the [government's] short-term plans, Ko Thiha?

Thiha: I'm particularly concerned about the collapse of civil administration. I've been watching this with deep anxiety. In the attacks on police outposts and in some small clashes, civilian villagers attacked with sticks and knives. This is a bad sign. I don't like it because it could be developing into a public movement. If an attack is conspired by a militant group, it is not a problem. But it is very difficult to solve problems when the local people are involved, and it also paves the way for intervention from the international community. I don't want these things to happen.

It is a matter of life and death for the ANP, the government, and the military to join hands to ensure civil administration. If it collapsed and every person and household killed others nearby with any weapon available such as sticks and knives, the state would be plunged into chaos. Even if the military could take control of it, we will find it hard to claim it as our territory if there is no civil administration. It is a real cause for concern.

KZM: These problems originated a long time ago, most recently in 2012. But these issues existed before that. One of the causes of these problems is that the State Peace and Development Council government issued a lot of white cards [temporary identity documents] to Rohingya. Those cards served as a living permit, but also allowed voting. This contradicted international norms. The military issued white cards to around 500,000 people. Under such circumstances, will it be easy to retrieve civil administration or rule of law?

MMS: In fact, the NLD government and the military have to cooperate with ethnic Rakhine people. For the time being, the ANP has the mandate of the majority of ethnic Rakhine people, and we have to cooperate with the ANP. Whether individual [party members] of the ANP have weakness or not, we have to cooperate with the ANP because the majority of ethnic Rakhine people have given it a mandate. And at the same time, Bengali representatives must be involved. The problem now is that we don't know who their representatives are. We have to work together with those representatives. This is a basic problem that calls for cooperation.

The second problem is about citizenship—how we can solve the citizenship problem in line with existing laws and retrieve the administration. Without administrative mechanisms, the military approach can only alleviate the problem in the short-term, but will not solve the problem. To solve the problem in the long-term, I think it is important that representatives from all sides cooperate, and implement civil administration and solve citizenship problem in line with law.

Kofi Annan's Commission focused on granting [Rohingya] free movement and providing access to health and education. But it doesn't provide input for the citizenship problem [in its interim report]. In any country, you need ID to show you are a citizen. For example, if I go to the United States and I have no document, they won't give me citizenship. Likewise, you need citizenship documents in European countries no matter how much they pay heed to human rights. In Myanmar, whether Bamar or Kachin or Shan you need documents to apply for citizenship. Only when there is a definite answer for this, will this problem be solved, I think.

KZM: This problem is still burning. As you two have said, this problem calls for cooperation among the central and state governments, as well as elected parties and representatives of both communities in Rakhine State and security forces. We should, however, look forward with optimism. Thank you for your contribution.

The post Who Can Bring Stability to Rakhine State? appeared first on The Irrawaddy.
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