Shan Herald Agency for News |
- PERSPECTIVE: Constitutional Amendments, Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and November Election
- Making it hard what’s easy
- Framework draft awaits nationwide ceasefire signing
PERSPECTIVE: Constitutional Amendments, Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and November Election Posted: 13 Jul 2015 04:20 AM PDT With the announcement of November 8 nationwide election, the linkage of the constitutional amendment debacle and on going problematic Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) issues intensifies, in determining the country's future, especially where democratization and reconciliation process are concerned. Constitutional Amendments By now, it is becoming evident that the recent constitutional amendment debacle has already shown the military's unwillingness to compromise over it's veto power or political edge and make way for easier, future amendments, to the chagrin of most ethnic and opposition parties. The constitutional amendment of Sections 59(f) and 436 were voted down, on June 25, by the military members of parliament, under direct command of Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hliang, where the military has total veto power over the amendments. In the same vein, amendment of Section 261 that had been pushed by non-Burman ethnic lawmakers, to allow state and divisional legislatures to elect their own chief minister, which is currently the responsibility of the president to appoint an individual to the post, was also rejected by the military veto votes. Section 436 amendment proposal is aimed at doing away with the military's veto voting power by lowing the voting threshold from 75% to 70%, while Section 59(f) is to remove the prohibition designed to prevent Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National Legue for Democracy (NLD), from ever becoming president, due to her two sons' British citizenship. The military is allotted with 25% appointed MP seats, which in turn gives the military bloc the veto power that could vote against any constitutional amendment, for more than 75% votes is needed, to sail through the first parliamentary motion. Thus, it becomes clear that no changes could ever happen, without the consent and willingness of the military. Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Parallel to this constitutional amendment debacle, the ongoing NCA between the regime's Union Peace-making Work Committee (UPWC) and the Ethnic Armed Organizations' (EAOs) Senior Delegation (SD) still cannot be finalized. According to Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center (ENAC) Briefing, No. 11, 9 July 2015: On 3-4 July 2015, the Senior Delegation ("SD"), formed by the Law Khee Lar Leadership Summit and led by Naw Zipporah Sein, met with Union Minister U Aung Min, Vice Chairman of the Union Peace-making Work Committee ("UPWC"), Union Minister U Khin Yi and Myanmar Peace Center officials in Chiang Mai, Thailand. During this preliminary negotiation, the SD delivered a clear message to the UPWC that the SD is committed to addressing remaining issues in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement ("NCA") draft and signing it before the end of President Thein Sein's term. Two core issues remain to complete the NCA draft: a) inclusiveness, and b) domestic and international witnesses. During the recent preliminary negotiations of July 3-4, the SD and UPWC acknowledged that the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team ("NCCT") and the UPWC had not finalized these issues on March 30, 2015. They remain to be negotiated. The government and the SD are scheduled to meet during the third week of this month. Consequently, according to the SD-UPWC Meeting Note (3-4 July 2015), the UPWC tabled four points. The first is to stick to the 31 March NCA draft without amendments and Law Khee Lah resolution should be kept as meeting decision between SD and UPWC. Second, in the signing of NCA, 14 organizations that have already signed ceasefire agreement and KIO will be involved; but the remaining groups will be allowed to participate in political dialogues, only after signing bilateral ceasefire agreement. Third, the regime would consider "all-inclusiveness" only at political dialogue stage. Fourth, witness to NCA signing will include only UN, ASEAN and China. And as such, the ongoing NCA failure or success will depend on military's accommodation of the SD proposal and how much more the EAOs could compromise on regime's position. The general assumption is that if the military is unwilling even to reduce the vote-ceiling of 75% to a mere 70%, as shown in its Sections 436 and 59 (f) voting pattern, the SD's 12 points, amendment proposal also won't be easy to make the military agree. And if there couldn't be agreement on NCA, the much anticipated signing of it won't also materialize. November Election One affirmative development is the announcement of nationwide election in November 8. It is positive in a sense that the regime has kept its promises and the influential political parties like NLD and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) have confirmed to participate, unlike the 2010 election, where both parties refused to take part, due to the rejection of military drafted 2008 Constitution. In 1990 nationwide election NLD win with a landslide and SNLD came out the second winning party, but were refused to form government by the the ruling military government. According to DVB report of 13 July, NLD has announced that it intends to run in as many constituencies as it can in this year's general election, but that it is willing to abstain from competing for certain seats to avoid clashing with its allies. The Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP) was formed in 1998 by the NLD alongside other parties that won seats in the 1990 general election, results that were not recognized by the then-ruling military junta. The other parties who were signatories to the 1998 alliance were: Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, led by Hkun Htun Oo; the Arakan League for Democracy, led by Aye Thar Aung; the Mon National League for Democracy, led by Nai Tun Thein; Kyaw Min's National Democratic Party for Human Rights; the National Democracy Party, led by Soe Win; the Zomi National Congress, led by Cin Sian Thang; and Htaung Ko Thang's United Nationalities League for Democracy. SHAN report of 11 July also confirmed that NLD resolved to form coalition with ethnic parties and refraining to run in their constituencies, which are positive moves that have the potential to change the Burma's political landscape and equation. The report quoted Hkun Htoon Oo as saying: " Aung San Suu Kyi's decision to participate in the election and to form coalition with ethnic parties are welcome. We're old friends that have come through – thick and thin – rain and wind, hand-in-hand." It looks like NLD is resolved to further pin it's hope of constitutional amendments within the parliament with the help of other opposition, ethnic parties and protest votes from the government Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Apart from that, it also said that the naming of presidential candidate, other than Aung San Suu Kyi – for constitutionally she is not qualified – will be from within the NLD, narrowing it down to U Tin Oo and U Win Htain, both with military background. According to The Irrawaddy report of 11 July, when asked who would be presidential candidate, one NLD MP said: " Although U Tin U is 88 years old, his health is excellent and could still carry on his duty. But U Win Htain, though only 74, is not so healthy. So, if I say this much you should understand." To sum up, the much anticipated constitutional amendments couldn't be materialized, at least during this legislative period; NCA amendment proposal is still in the limbo and couldn't be sure how much the regime is prepared to compromise; and the November election outcome is still a speculation, although NLD could pocket more votes than the regime's party and push the country into a new era by amending the constitution. But still frustration might linger on, even if the NLD and ethnic parties could form a coalition government, provided that they garnered enough votes, for the constitution still allows the military to simply suspend the government and take over whenever they like. Given such a backdrop, the status quo scenario that is now the order of the day, would be hard to maintain and change is going to be inevitable, after the November election. Only, for now, it will be hard to predict, how Burma's political course will look like and pushed into. |
Posted: 13 Jul 2015 04:12 AM PDT Making it hard what's easy That's the way of the world This passage from acclaimed songwriter Sai Kham Lake's Thake Chit Ya De Nwe Tin (Most beloved Nwe Tin) is a favorite with U Aung Min, President Thein Sein's front man in the negotiations with the non- Burman ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Following the completion of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) draft on 31 March, he said he hope it would be signed soon by the EAOs, because despite its imperfections, it has made 4 solemn pledges namely:
According to sources from both sides, the Senior Delegation (SD) appointed by Law Khee Lar, has a 5 point proposition:
According to government sources, the NCA signing, drafting and ratification of the Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) and the first launching of the Political Dialogue (PD) should be done before the end of August, as the whole country's focus will be shifting to the election campaigns in September and October. Among those campaigners would be several Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) members, including U Aung Min and the military's representatives who are expected to retire and register themselves as civilian candidates. The period for registration is 20 July-8 August. "If they retire before the registration, they will no longer be eligible as UPWC members," one Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) official explained. "But if the NCA negotiations don't conclude during the period, then they will no longer be able apply as candidates." Another problem, according to the MPC, is that the military has been upgrading its security levels in the run-up to the elections. "Now it's level 3, and the army has placed more restrictions along the border areas," said one. "It is expected to be elevated to level 4, where Section 17/1 will be reactivated, in the coming months." Yet, despite the delay and the resultant concern, both sides appear to have built up sufficient mutual trust during their informal meeting in Chiangmai on 3-4 July. One reason, according to Hkun Okker, one of the SD members, is that the new EAO negotiation team has adopted a 4 point strategy:
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Framework draft awaits nationwide ceasefire signing Posted: 13 Jul 2015 04:04 AM PDT The draft framework for political dialogue (FPD) is now almost completed to await for the much anticipated Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signing which is expected to take place next month, according to reports coming out from the FPD consultations in Rangoon which ended Friday, 10 July. "But unlike the NCA draft, it is not an instrument for agreement," said academic Hannes Siebert, who has advised all stakeholding parties creating their own FPD drafts. "On the contrary, it (the finished product) is an instrument for further negotiations." The draft produced by the consultation, which had been held since 16 May, has two columns: one, identified areas for agreement and, two, suggestions made by participants to resolve contentious issues like the number of different dialogue partners in the political dialogue (PD) and decision-making. Some participants saw that the number of different PD partners is less important than how decisions are to be made: "Just suppose we have chosen a simple majority formula to decide on issues. Then large dialogue groupings will have a clear edge over smaller groupings," said a participant. "But if we are to choose the consensus formula, it doesn't matter which grouping is larger or smaller." The almost two-month long consultation was participated by technical teams from the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), National League for Democracy (NLD) and the 56- party alliance, and representatives from the Karen National Union (KNU), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Karen Peace Council (KPC), Myanmar Peace Center (MPC), Euro Burma Office (EBO) and Pyidaungsu Institute for Peace and Dialogue (PI). The polished draft is expected to be ready for consideration by participating parties sometime this week. "As the NCA signing is expected during the first week of August, while the election campaigns are expected to begin on 8 September, we may have about three weeks to debate and approve on the FPD draft," said another participant. The topics discussed by the FPD consultation are as follows: 1. Preamble 2. Aims and Objectives 3. Principles 4. Agenda and Issues 5. Steps and Roadmap 6. Mandate and Managing Process 7. Consensual Decision Making Formula and Mechanisms 8. Composition and criteria for Participation and Inclusivity 9. Structures, mechanisms and procedures 10. Support structures: Shared knowledge, technical background papers, research, deadlock breaking, facilitating and technical 11. Sequencing of agenda and process 12. People's participation and regional dialogues and consultations 13. Communications: Internal, external and public 14. Implementation process |
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