Monday, February 29, 2016

Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News


Casualties reported after clashes between TNLA and RCSS/SSA

Posted: 29 Feb 2016 05:29 AM PST

At least seven soldiers from the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) are reported to have been killed in fighting in northern Shan State's Kyaukme Township on Sunday.


Sai Hseng Murng, the spokesperson for the RCSS/SSA, told SHAN on Monday that five TNLA soldiers were killed and another nine were injured during the clashes.

The clashes, which began at about 8.45 am, took place in Kankaw and KinKhai village tracts, in Kyaukme Township.  The clashes lasted for about four hours.  

Sai Hseng Murng alleged that the TNLA troops had first attacked the RCSS/SSA forces.

"They knew that our soldiers were in the area and they attacked us," he said. "Even though we asked to discuss this issue, they never replied. They kept attacking us."

The TNLA Information Department's Facebook page featured an update on Sunday which claimed that two RCSS soldiers had been killed.  The TNLA update also stated that another two RCSS soldiers were injured during the fighting.

In an interview with DVB that aired earlier today, a spokesperson for the TNLA, Mai Aik Kyaw, repeated the group's claim that two RCSS soldiers had been killed during the clashes.

Sai Hseng Maung, the RCSS spokesperson denied that this had happened. He said that his side did not in fact suffer any casualties. 


Fighting between the two armed groups first broke out on November 27 last year.  More than 4,000 civilians from Kyaukme, Namhsan and Namkham townships have fled their homes since the clashes began.

The RCSS/SSA was among eight ethnic armed groups that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government on October 15 last year.  The TNLA did not sign the agreement.

BY SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)


Next year’s Thai studies conference expects participation by Shan scholars

Posted: 25 Feb 2016 11:49 PM PST

Add captionDr Chayan Vatanabhuti
The 13th Thai Studies International Conference to be held in Chiangmai, 15-18 July 2017, aims to encourage international academics, including Shan, as participants, said Dr Chayan Vatanabhuti, a key organizer for the event, yesterday.
"Many are already familiar with veteran scholars like Dr Sai Aung Tun (who has written several research papers, including The History of Shan State: From its origins to 1962)," he said, during a meeting in Chiangmai. "We hope there will be younger scholars this time."
Chiangmai International Convention and 
Exhibition Center (Photo: http://pinkanakorn.or.th)
The conference, which will be held at the Chiangmai International Convention and Exhibition Center, near the Chiangmai 700 Years Stadium, to commemorate His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej's 7 Cycle Birthday Anniversary, will focus on Thai society, politics, economics, culture, and environment in the context of globalization that concerns relationships between Thai and other Tai-speaking groups residing in and outside of Thailand.
Chiangmai International Convention and 
Exhibition Center Maps
The Tai-speaking groups include Lao (in Laos), Tai (in Vietnam), Leu (in Xixuangbanna, Yunnan), Zhuang (in Guangxi) Ahom (in India) and Shan (in Burma). Tais, apart from the Chinese, are regarded by scholars as the most widely spread race in Asia.
The call for papers and abstracts submission has already begun in 15 January, the deadline for which is on 30 November.
Registration for participation, on the other hand, will open on 1 July (2016).
For more information, please visit http://www.icts13.chiangmai.cmu.ac.th

SNLD call for assistance for displaced in Kyaukme

Posted: 25 Feb 2016 05:42 AM PST

Speaking before the Shan State Hluttaw (parliament) on Thursday MPs from the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) called  for assistance to be given to displaced civilians in northern Shan State's Kyaukme Township.




Reached for comment, Sai Tun Ngan, an SNLD MP representing Kyaukme Township Constituency No 2, told SHAN that thousands of villagers were forced to flee their homes due to the ongoing fighting in his township.

"Over 4,000 IDPs from 50 villages including Taw Sang, Mong Kong, Ngaung Mong and Parng Jarm, are now staying in 19 shelters in Kyaukme Township," he said.

Clashes between the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) first broke out in Namkham and Namsan townships on November 27 last year. The conflict intensified again on February 7.

Sai Tun Ngan accused government forces, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) of being involved in the dispute in northern Shan State.

"It's unacceptable that they (the military) burned down villagers' houses, took over their properties and barricaded themselves using civilians as a shield against other armies," he said. "This kind of action is against international law and contravenes the military code of conduct."

The proposal was also supported by Nang San San Aye, an SNLD MP from Hsipaw Township Constituency No 1. The Shan State Hluttaw will review the proposal on February 26 at which time the proposal will be approved or denied.

BY SAI AW/ Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)


New States issue

Posted: 23 Feb 2016 11:33 PM PST

During the Union Peace Conference #1, a number of non-Shans had submitted proposals for separate statehoods: Palaung (Ta-ang), PaO and Wa. (A branch of the Shans, Shanni aka Red Shans, had also demanded a state of their own, combining areas from Kachin and Sagaing, where they are the dominant majority.)



This isn't the first time non-Shans have tried to secede from the Shan State (formerly known as the Federated Shan States, with a pronounced "s" a postfix).

Just after World War II, Kokang sub-state demanded secession from Hsenwi, citing failure of the ruling prince to go to its aid when it was being attacked by the Japanese forces, despite the fact that it had paid annual tributes to the state.

On 25 August 1947, the two sides met in Rangoon, where it reached a mutually happy agreement to part ways, but the latter (Kokang) would still remain in the federation.

Another was the proposal by the Mongpai/Moebye state, where the Kayans are dominant, to merge with the Karenni/Kayah state.

The 1947 constitution had recognized the fact by inserting Article 182:

(1)    The territory heretofore known as Mongpai State in the Federated Shan States shall be acceded to the Kayah State if the majority of the people of the territory so desire.

(2)    The procedure for ascertaining the desire of the majority shall be such as may be prescribed by law.

Only somehow, the "procedure for ascertaining the(ir) desire" so far has eluded them.

Here it must be remembered that the 34 states of the Federated Shan States that was formed in 1922 comprised the following number of principalities:

Shan      21 states
Danu     7 states
PaO        2 states
(Wa, Palaung/Ta-ang, Kokang and Kayan) 1 state each

Until 1947, it was headed by the British Commissioner. But that year, the princes and their people rose up to form their own federal council headed by the popular Palaung prince Sao Hkun Pan Sing. The new council also took the historic (some say fateful) decision to join hands with Burma, Chin and Kachin for joint independence from the British.

The country has come a long way since. The Shan State, once considered a major power to contend with, is a "dying nation", even according to some Shans. "That's why the wolves are coming," wrote one. "They know there are no more tigers for them to fear. They think it's time for them to take whatever it's worth."

Right or wrong, the founding of new states at the expense of old ones, is not a new question. One finds it even in the 1947 constitution, the 2008 constitution, and also in the draft federal constitution endorsed up by 90 dissident organizations in 2008.


1947 constitution
2008 constitution (military)
2008 draft constitution (FCDCC)
Article 199. The Parliament may by an Act admit to the Union a new State upon such terms and conditions including the extent of representation of the State in the Parliament as may be specified in the Act.

Article 200. The Parliament may by an Act, with the consent of the Council of every State whose boundaries are affected thereby –

(a)    establish a new unit;
(b)   increase the area of any unit;
(c)    diminish the area of any unit;
(d)   alter the boundaries of any unit;

And may, with the like consent, make such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions as Parliament may deem necessary or proper.
Article 53.
(a)    If there arises a cause to re-delineate the territorial boundary of a Region or a State, the prior consent of the electorate residing within the township concerned shall be obtained.
(b)   In obtaining consent, re-delineation of the territorial boundary shall not be executed at all in the absence of assenting votes of more than half of the total number of the electorate residing within the township concerned.
(c)    If more than half of the total number of eligible voters residing within the township concerned cast assenting vote for re-delineation of the territorial boundary, the consent of the Hluttaw representatives of the Region or State involved in the territorial boundary concerned shall be obtained.
(d)   The President shall re-delineate the territorial boundary of the Region or State concerned with the consent of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, after obtaining the assenting votes of three-fourths and above of the total number of representatives from the Region or the State concerned.
(e)   The resolution of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw shall be obtained if a Region Hluttaw or a State Hluttaw concerned decided against re-delineation of the territorial boundary.
(f)     The President shall, as necessary, re-delineate the territorial boundary of a Region or a State if three-fourths and above of the total number of representative in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw assent to the re-delineation of the territorial boundary.
Article 55. Right to From New State
New State of the Federal Union may be formed from a continuous land area within an existing State or by the combination of continuous regions of two or more adjacent States.

Article 56. Provisions for Formation of New States
Formation of new Member States of the Federal Union shall be in accordance with the following provisions.

(A). With the support of 30 percent of the population of an area desiring to form a new Member State of the Federal Union, on the basis of having their own distinct geographical area and history, the proposal for forming a new state shall be submitted to the legislatures of the respective State or States.
(B). The proposal to form a new state shall be submitted to the Federal Chamber of Nationalities with the approval of over half the members of the respective State Assembly or Assemblies.
(C). The Federal Chamber of Nationalities, in accordance with Article (56) (B) shall form an Inquiry Commission for New State Formation composed of representatives from The Federal Chamber of Nationalities and representatives from The Federal Chamber of Nationalities and representatives from State Assembly or Assemblies.
(D). In accordance with the recommendation of the Inquiry Commission for New State Formation, a referendum shall be held in the area which has submitted a proposal to form a new state.
(E).  If in the referendum, 60 percent of the people living in the area vote in favor, the formation of a new state becomes valid under this Constitution.
(F).  If in accordance with the Article 56 (E), approval has been obtained for the establishment of a new State, the Chamber of Nationalities shall further forward the bill to the Assembly of the Federal Union, and the Assembly of the Federal Union shall pass the bill into a law.
(G).The Federal President must sign and promulgate it.
(H). The law must next be sent to the respective State Assemblies for further necessary action.

Article 57. Legislation Concerning New States

The Assembly of the Federal Union shall enact laws relating to above-mentioned Article 55 and Article 56, for the new State or States.

For Shans and Burmans alike, it may be a bitter pill to swallow (right now there are leaders, both Shan and Burman alike, who are trying to pass the buck to each other). But it is a question one cannot avoid when one is out to restore peace to this country.


Other countries have dealt with it amiably either by allowing systematic, internal secession or creating systemic local governments. It is time not to fret, but to coolly explore solutions. After all, where there's a will there's a way.

RCSS will not be ‘in the way of the Tamadaw operations’

Posted: 23 Feb 2016 10:56 PM PST

Meeting with retired general Khin Zaw Oo yesterday at Chiangmai's Sheik Istana Hotel, Lt-Gen Yawd Serk, the leader of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), whose armed wing the Shan State Army (SSA) is fighting against the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta-ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) in northern Shan State, has agreed that his units would not in anyway pose as an inconvenience to the Burma Army's operations up there.

Delegation led by U Aung Min and Lt-Gen (retired) Khin Zaw Oo meeting the delegation led by Sao Yawd Serk, RCSS/SSA, on 22 February 2016. (Photo: Hla Maung Shwe's Facebook)
On 16 February, the parliament had approved proposal by MP from Kyaukme township calling for an end to the fighting.

The general, under instructions from Naypyitaw, had reportedly requested the withdrawal of the SSA South, as it is known, to the South. The SSA South leader then negotiated for his troops to remain in the north until the issue with the TNLA is "peacefully resolved."

In the meanwhile, they would not be in the way of the Burma Army's movements, he said. "We will then withdraw all our troops except for the 200 from the Task Force 701 (based along the Chinese border in Namkham township)," he added.

Some 2,000 strong SSA south troops have been in northern Shan State since the fighting broke out last November. "We just want to know two things from the TNLA:

·         We used to be close allies. Why did they attack us?
·         "How soon they would release the villagers they had detained?" he said.
"Then we hope to work out an agreement allowing both of our movements to live side by side together. Afterward we will have no reason to place the bulk of our troops up there."

The RCSS/SSA's main base is on the Thai-Burmese border in Mongpan township, opposite Thailand's Maehongson province.

The two generals spoke for about 40 minutes, then parted. Both sides deny they had any agreement on joint operations against the TNLA.


A report from the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) that has offered to mediate between the two meanwhile says the TNLA would propose to meet the RCSS in Yunnan's Ruili, known as Mong Mao in Shan, opposite Shan State's Muse, or Mongla, the main base of the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), opposite Yunnan's Xixuangbanna. The RCSS/SSA, on the other hand, wants to hold the negotiations at its headquarters in Loi Taileng. 

Suspension of 59 (f) may set “dangerous precedent for future presidents”

Posted: 23 Feb 2016 10:19 PM PST

According to a government peace broker, speaking to SHAN during a break in the meeting in Chiangmai with the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) on Monday, 22 February, amendment, or even suspension, of Article 59 (f) is out of the question.

Aung San Suu Kyi (Photo: www.businessinsider.com
"It is not her (Aung Sun Suu Kyi) but who will come after her that's the problem," said the source. "It will set a dangerous precedent for future presidents." 

According to the article, a President or a Vice President "himself, one of the parents, the spouse, one of the legitimate children or their spouses (shall) not owe allegiance to a foreign power, not be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country. They shall not be persons entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges of a subject of a foreign government or citizen of a foreign country." 

He conceded though as a president, "The Lady", as she is known, would be easier to handle, the reason being:
·         Article 62 prohibits the President or Vice President from being a representative of any legislative house
·         Article 63 requires them to resign from their seats in the legislature as well as any civil services offices
·         Article 64 also rules them out from taking part in party activities throughout their term of office

"But we have no objection if she chooses to become a foreign minister," he added. A foreign minister is a member of the country's most powerful organ, the 11 person National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). Other member are: The President, 2 Vice Presidents, Speaker of Lower House, Speaker of Upper House, Commander-in-Chief, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Defense Minister, Home Minister and Border Affairs Minister. The last three ministers are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief.

Meanwhile, according to other sources, Ms Suu has yet to give up her aspiration to become President. An ethnic leader, in response to the news, expressed his concern in this way: "If the reports are true, then it will mean she is prepared to make considerable compromises to the military. Which in turn will mean she won't be able to accommodate the calls for ethnic and democratic rights."

The result is that the election of the new president will be on 17 March, unlike the first time when the incumbent President was elected on 4 February in 2011.


The peace delegation led by President Office minister U Aung Min arrived in Chiangmai on Monday. His visit has two-fold purpose, he said: To meet the non-signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement  (NCA) which was signed on last 15 October, and to meet the RCSS/SSA over the fighting in northern Shan State against the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta-ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA). He will be returning on Thursday, 25 February. 

Common vision for Burma’s federalism

Posted: 23 Feb 2016 02:08 AM PST

According to the organizers of the Union Peace Conference (UPC), it has been agreed that there will be 3 conferences per year, each 4 months apart from the other. However, the UPC#2 is not expected to be held in May as scheduled, due to the fact that the transfer of power to the new government will take place only in April. "It might therefore even be moved to October or November," a source from the peacemaking circle in Rangoon said recently.


 All the same, it doesn't mean that the participants of the UPC#1 in January should stay idle. What will mostly likely come after the new government takes over will most certainly be the revision of the current framework for political dialogue (FPD) which may allow, among others, for inclusion of youth and women.

Some of the new government members might also want to make federalism an exclusive subject for the union legislature, according to some sources, instead of being a two pronged (both inside and outside parliament) effort. However, that might call for the amendment of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) that was already ratified by the parliament on 8 December. It is therefore certain to face stiff opposition especially from the EAOs quarter.

Nevertheless, what all parties have agreed, judging by the presentations at UPC#1, is that "the way to peace is through federalism."

So what kind of federalism are we talking about? To be able to make informed judgment on it, it is necessary to look into the basic principles of at least 2 constitutions and 1 draft constitution:

·         1947 constitution (drafted and approved before Independence)
·         2008 constitution (drafted by the military leaders and approved in a controversial referendum after 14 years)
·         2008 draft constitution by the Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordinating Committee (FCDCC) and endorsed by 90 organizations

The readers, I'm sure, may like to decide for themselves: In what principles the three are similar, in what they are different, and what they may want to suggest to resolve the differences:

1947 constitution (The 7 directives of Gen Aung San)
2008 constitution (Basic Principles, Article 6.)
2008 draft constitution (FCDCC)
1.       An independent, sovereign republic
2.       Autonomy for constituent states
3.       Sovereign power derives from the people
4.       Equality and freedom of expression, of faith, of livelihood, of organization
5.       Adequate safeguards for minorities
6.       Territorial integrity
7.       Peace and friendly cooperation with international community
6. The Union's consistent objective are:
(a)     Non-disintegration of the Union;
(b)     Non-disintegration of National solidarity;
(c)     Perpetuation of sovereignty;
(d)     Flourishing of a genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system;
(e)     Enhancing the eternal principles of Justice, Liberty and Equality in the Union and;
(f)      Enabling the Defence Services to be able to participate in the National political leadership role of the State.
1.       Sovereignty of the people
2.       Equality
3.       Self Determination
4.       Federal Union
5.       Minority rights
6.       Democracy, Human Rights and Gender equality
7.       Secular State
8.       Multiparty democratic system

Here the "Panglong Agreement" and the "Panglong promises" through which the present union came into being should also be taken into account:

Panglong Agreement

The gist of the agreement:

Point 1-4.         Shan, Chin and Kachin representatives will be appointed as minister and deputy ministers respectively responsible for matters relating to Frontier Areas affairs (now  known as Border Affairs)

Point 5.                 Full autonomy in internal affairs

Point 6.                 A status of state for the Kachins in the future independent Union. (The Chins then did not request the same status)

Point 7.                 Rights and privileges fundamental in democratic countries (which is interpreted by the author as Human Rights and Democracy)

Point 8-9.             Financial autonomy as in the Federated Shan States for Chin and Kachin

It is quite significant that the UPWC had refused to adopt the term.

Panglong Promises

During the 4-day negotiations in Panglong, 8-11 February 1947, the following demands were made by the Joint Chin-Kachin-Shan Committee, officially dubbed Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples (SCOUHP), which was formed on 7 February:

·         Equal status
·         Joint responsibility for common subjects such as foreign affairs, defense and coinage and currency
·         The right to secede if and when we choose

Gen Aung San reportedly had accepted all in principle but requested that they be included in the Union constitution to be a drafted by the upcoming Constituent Assembly instead. His solemn word of honor thus became known as the promises of Panglong.

It is significant that the UPWC has also refused to employ this term.

One thing seems to be clear: Without common basic principles (or Vision if we may use it), the upcoming UPCs will merely be a waste of time and resources. Worse, the return of war is inevitable.

The author is President and Co-founder of the Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN). He is also serving as Managing Director for the Pyidaungsu Institute (PI) for Peace and Dialogue, which has offices both in Chiangmai and Yangon/Rangoon.


RCSS-TNLA Conflict: Proxy or mini-Cold War in display?

Posted: 22 Feb 2016 10:26 PM PST

As 4000 plus refugees count hits the headline due to the armed engagement between the Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) and Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), coupled with seven Shan villagers being killed, reportedly by the Palaung troops, the conflict dimension changed drastically and dramatically.

First, the parliament in Naypyitaw approved the motion to stop the inter-ethnic armed conflict, prompting the Burma Army (Tatmadaw) to take action, asking the RCSS to stand down, stop the offensive and issuing ultimatum to the TNLA that it would be clearing the areas of conflict. Since then the armed clashes was said to have died down, starting from 11 February. But the Tatmadaw, which was tasked to stop the clashes in the said areas delivered fire-fights in the vicinity of Kutkhai and Namhsan areas with the TNLA on 19 and 22 February respectively , according to the Palaung sources.

Again on 19 February, the US Embassy  released a statement stating that it is worried of the human rights situation in northern Shan State and that the warring parties, RCSS and TNLA, including the Tatmadaw, to stop the armed engagement against each other. The statement writes:

"The U.S. Embassy is deeply concerned about ongoing clashes in Shan State involving the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), and the military. We are particularly concerned by alleged human rights violations targeting ethnic Shan and Palaung communities. Civilian protection as well as unhindered access for all humanitarian organizations to those affected by the fighting is a fundamental international principle. Offensive military actions undermine the trust necessary to build lasting peace. We urge all sides to exercise restraint and recommit to dialogue so that the peace process may remain on track, and those displaced are able to return to their homes and resume their lives."

On 21 February, after the emergency United Nationalities Federal Council's (UNFC) four days meeting, a statement was made public. It confirmed the formation of Delegation for Political Negotiation (DPN) to lead the peace process with the government and strongly condemned the present government and the Tatmadaw for sowing racial hatred among ethnic nationalities.

The fourth and final paragraph of the statement stressed: "We see that the current government and Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) are using the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) as a military and political weapon. We strongly condemn the current government and Tatmadaw's acts of causing racial hatred among the ethnic nationalities, with the military-political strategy of divide-and-conquer."

In addition, the RCSS-TNLA conflict becomes more complicated and the UNFC secretary general Khu Oo Reh condemned the Tatmadaw for preparing to launch an offensive against the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA),    according to the recent Mizzima report.

He elaborated: "We cannot see this happening as a simple conflict any more. It is becoming wider and between the Shan and Palaung population, racial (animosity) views are being aired and we are worried this will go on (to escalate)."

He further stressed: "In addition, for one or two days, the Tatmadaw is gearing to start the attack on Kokang (MNDAA) and has even already begun. We consider that (the Tatmadaw) is using the NCA to pressure us in a variety of ways, especially talking peace, while creating problems."

Parallel to the happening, rumours were making the rounds that the RCSS boss Sao Yawd Serk have been meeting the US and Chinese diplomats, during the third week of February, in Bangkok either to brief them or making a deal, but unclear of what  issues might have been in discussion.

Generally it would seem that this inter-ethnic conflict is only to do with competing for area of influence and control. But careful study shows there are a lot more involved in this trajectory.

Now let us delve into it a bit more and do some critical thinking. But first, we need to look at this particular contested area to make a picture, why this has propelled to such a derogatory situation.

Contested areas are where Chinese gas and oil pipelines run through

If one carefully looks at the map, the fighting between the two warring groups, RCSS and TNLA were happening mostly along the Chinese gas and oil pipelines, within northern Shan State.

The TNLA expansion form its original Namhsan, Mantong Townships of Palaung Self Administrative Zone included 8 Townships of Namkham, Namtu , Muse, Kutkhai, Lashio, Nawng Khio, Kyaukme and Man Piang, (Mabein) which are overwhelmingly populated by the Shan, who called themselves as Tai.

The Palaung Self-Administered Zone was created by the 2008 Constitution and is headquartered in the town of Namhsan.

The RCSS, which has its troops presence since 2005 in the mode of roving guerilla units began setting up base camps with increased deployment in contested areas, after the signing of NCA in October last year. However, it is not clear whether such deployment were with the approval of the Burma army or on its own decision. But nevertheless, the clashes between the RCSS and TNLA started, with the ambush of the latter in Namkham area, in November last year. The armed conflict has escalated ever since, sending thousands of refugees fleeing their homestead.

Roughly there are five major interest groups having to do with the recent inter-ethnic conflict. They are RCSS, TNLA, Union Solidarity and Development Party-Military (USDP-Military), the United States, China and the UNFC.

Conflict of interest

The RCSS, which has its base in Loi Tai Leng, across the Thai border of Pang Mapha district, Mae Hong Son Province, has been active also in northern Shan State since 2005. There had been no clashes prior to the signing of NCA October last year, but the armed confrontation only started as of November, when the TNLA attacked its column that was coming back to its base in Namkham.

While the TNLA accused the RCSS for expansion of its operational areas with the help of the Burma army, the RCSS insisted that the areas have been its areas of operation since a decade. But the motive of RCSS for such moves could be more than just this given reason.

First, the TNLA has expanded its reach into mostly Shan or Tai inhabited areas and have been riding roughshod on the population from demanding recruitment for its army to taxation, to the dissatisfaction of the people in the area.

Second, the RCSS and even some of senior member of the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), known as the northern Shan State Army, and many lower ranking Shan soldiers detested the TNLA's heavy handedness of the Shan population and have been itching to counter it. But since the SSPP is allied to the TNLA through the UNFC, the official policy line is to keep mum on TNLA mistreating the Shan population. It was said that many of the rank and file of the SSPP were quietly and gleefully approving the RCSS undertaking to "teach the TNLA a lesson," for trying to insert its influence over the Shan population, needless to say of its riding roughshod on the people.

Thus, the actions of the RCSS could have been to protect the Shan villagers on one hand and also expanding its reach on the other, while other benefits deriving from it could also be the real motive behind such undertakings.

The TNLA, which was trained and supported by the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and allied to MNDAA and Arakan Army (AA) have been openly siding and fighting along side its allies, has lately received material support from United Wa State Army (UWSA) and as well from China to protect its interest: the gas and oil pipelines, according to Shan sources.

If this is true, it explains the fact why the TNLA has strayed and branched out so widely beyond its traditional stomping ground, into 8 Townships of mostly Shan populated areas with force and vigour.

For the USDP-Military regime, the classic "divide and rule" could be the motive. Pitting RCSS against the hated TNLA, for its alliance with the MNDAA and unspoken collaboration with the UWSA, is an advantage and could even swoop down on both the warring parties, when both are tired and exhausted, according to a senior officer of the SSPP.

The Tatmadaw sees the MNDAA, UWSA and Mong La, also known as National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS), as China's proxies sitting along the Sino-Burma border.

Apart from that it is also in the interest of the USDP-Military clique to clear all armed factions from the vicinity, while all the while it could curry favour indirectly with the super power for standing up to China's proxy, in its mini-cold-war undertaking, within the mode of expansion containment of the regional power.

While the US comes out with a decent, balanced statement that all the warring groups, the RCSS, TNLA and Burma army should stop the war so that democratization could move ahead and human rights violations curtailed, its real motive could be more than this. Its containment of China policy, in the wake of assertive China's ownership claim of South-China Sea, could also play a role in determining the relationship and consideration. But of course only the policy makers in Washington could answer such a question.

As for China, its policy is to benefit from Burma as a whole and not just part of it, which means not only Wa, Kokang or Palaung regions or even the whole Shan and Kachin States are of importance.

It is interested to protect its already finished pipelines, the pending Myitsone dam project, the Letpadaung copper mine and so on, country wide. And thus, securing the pipelines is just a part of its project to satisfy its energy hunger, from a variety of economic investment and interest.

And as such, it is ready to cooperate with any entity to secure the pipelines and the TNLA might have come into question. But whether this has been a wise choice is completely another question.

It now seems, it is having a second thought for betting the wrong horse otherwise, it won't be opening up the venue to talk to the RCSS, even though this rumour could not be confirmed at the moment.

UNFC on its part is more interested to project its political aim of achieving ethnic rights, anchored in the rights of self-determination, equality and democracy within the mould of a genuine federalism. Thus, the RCSS-TNLA conflict is not desirable for fractured ethnic unity is the last thing it wants, because it would work against the alliance interest and the whole ethnic nationalities' aspirations as a whole. So it could be said that achieving understanding between two warring ethnic armies is its ultimate desire, at this juncture.

The UNFC has formed during the recent emergency meeting, a five-men team to particularly handle this RCSS-TNLA conflict.

59(f) Section and maintaining war-footing

On political transition facet, it is becoming clearer that the Aung San Suu Kyi's push to circumvent the 59(f) clause won't be an easy undertaking, even she has sought to buy time to work out a give-and-take accommodation with the military, so that she could take the top job of the country, the presidency.

Apart from the government's mouthpiece, Myawaddy newspaper commentary that the military-drafted constitution should not be altered for eternity, the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing's rejection posture, U Ye Htut, the information minister and witty orator, in an interview with Voice of America during an ASEAN gathering hosted by President Barack Obama in California, said: "If the two sons want their mother to become president, they and their wives can apply for Myanmar citizenship according to the 1982 Immigration Law. This is in fact their family matter."

Reportedly, it was the first time that a senior government figure had expressly ruled out such a move.

59(f) bars any individual aiming for the top job of the country is ineligible, if his or her immediate family members hold foreign citizenship, including the spouses of the sons or daughters. Suu Kyi's two sons are British citizens.

59(f) is also one component that could be used to turn back the tide of National League for Democracy (NLD) political onslaught, as Tatmadaw considers it is being overwhelmed and might be on the verge of a domino-like scenario, hastening and escalating the military clique's downfall, if Aung San Suu Kyi is allowed to take the presidency.

To fight back on all front and to alleviate this angst the Tatmadaw is keen to create armed conflict or at least to be on war-footing, so that it is seen as an essential saviour of the country from disintegrating and further legitimize its claim to lead the country out of such debacle.

The cases in point here are the Tatmadaw offensive last year in central Shan State against the SSPP that produced thousands of refugees, apart from declaring no-vote areas to the disadvantage of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) for they were its political stronghold; and recent the RCSS-TNLA armed confrontation that has been designed to create an atmosphere of conflict and war-footing, which could be used as an excuse to declare either emergency decree for the particular area or even out right military rule, if and when the Tatmadaw chooses to do so.

Is there a way out?

The catchwords here are "containing racial conflict, peaceful political transition and building genuine federalism" and shouldn't be fuelling a proxy or mini-Cold War of any sort, as outside stakeholders, intentionally or unintentionally, might be suggesting or driving to do so.

The official will of the super power and regional power is known to be the reconciliation and harmony of the people leading to peacefulness and development of the country. If this is the case, the super power should refrain from looking at the Burma's ethnic conflict scenario through the usual containment of China prism and the neighbouring regional power not only just to exploit the country by all means, but also empower it by not taking undue advantage of the conflict parties for its own benefit. It is easily said than done, to put moral ethic ahead of the interest-driven tendency, in realpolitik. But for the sake of the suffering people of Burma, for once the international stakeholders should make altruism and moral principle a priority.

In the same vein, the self-appointed saviour of the nation, the Tatmadaw, should wake up to the reality that it has no right to dictate its "Discipline-Flourishing Democracy" or "Tatmadaw's way to democracy" and thrust down the throat of the people. To put it differently, it should not lay stones on the way to genuine federalism, by blocking Aung San Suu Kyi's path to presidency with 59(f) Section. 

The military should not forget that the people has shown that they wanted her to lead and have given their overwhelming mandate of 80% vote in the nationwide election. It is a clear "no" to the continued military self-appointed leading role of the country and an unmistakable, affirmative "yes" to the Aung San Suu Kyi-led NLD. As such, it would do the Tatmadaw good to make it easier for the smooth transition and look at the big picture of reconciliation and development for the sake of people and the country.

Besides, nobody is buying the Tatmadaw's pretext that gradual reform allowed by it is the safe and only way to go about democratization and that it will be the guiding party to determine, whether the country is ripe for fully fledged democracy or not.

Wasn't it the military that had trampled upon the nascent democracy in 1962 and ruled the country through military dictatorship until 2010, when a quasi-civilian Thein Sein regime was installed? With such track record, the military is hardly an institution to oversee the democratic transition. It is better left to the will of the electorate.

Having said that, the super power and regional power should assist Burma to be on its feet again and the USDP-Military clique should give a helping hand to make the democratic transition smoother and faster, for the country and people that have suffered for too long deserves to live a decent life as citizens of the free world, under the democratically elected government.

The Union Peace Conference #1: Some clouds and some silver linings

Posted: 22 Feb 2016 02:00 AM PST

This review (originally in Burmese) appeared on 23 January, a week after the Union Peace Conference #1 was successfully held in Naypyitaw, 12-15 January. The author is Dr Sai Oo, country representative, of the Pyidaungsu Institute (PI) for Peace and Dialogue, who is based in Rangoon. Comments by participants at the review meeting are added by SHAN.



The conference was opened by key leaders of the country: President Thein Sein, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and the November elections winner Aung San Suu Kyi, and attended by diplomats and observers from the UN, Japan and China, among them, thereby lending the much needed credibility to the controversial Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) that was signed almost 3 months earlier. Their presence had also helped boost legitimacy to the ongoing peace process.

Among the more than 1,000 other participants were young military officers, 15 from each of the 10 military regions in the non-Burman ethnic areas of the country. Listening to their presentation, one can easily surmise they had done their homework on federalism before joining the conference.

Here are some of the selected lines from their discussions:

·         Federalism is not secession
·         Federal countries prosper
·         The Tatmadaw (military) is pro-change
·         Federalism distributes power between the central and states, and there are two legislative houses
·         States have separate powers and the central cannot interfere with state powers
·         States have the right to exercise 3 sovereign powers
·         States have the right of self determination

At the same time, there are other statements made by them that may not be so reassuring:

·         A centralized federalism
·         No separate constitutions for states
·         Interchangeable use of "right of self determination" and "autonomy" as though they were identical
·         Opposition to ethnic-based states, expressing preference to geographical-based states ("Then they should get rid of 'Myanmar' first, which is but a synonym to 'Bamar'," exclaimed a participant)

Other than that, there are three things that will serve as reminders that the federalism issue is not going to be plain sailing:

·         The fact that military officers, in the end, must obey orders even if they don't like them
·         The fact that the military is the real power behind the throne in every ministry and from the top to the bottom in the country's different administrative levels through its General Administration Department (GAD)
·         Insistence by the commander-in-chief and his lieutenants of the "one country, one military" principle in opposition to the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)' equally insistent demand to have state defense forces at least until mutual trust is attained
·         Moreover, although other dialogue topics like 'land and natural resources management' should logically be part and parcel of federalism, military representatives had entered the deliberations as if they had nothing to do with federalism

On the EAOs side, they appeared to be stronger on federalism during the conference. Nothing surprising because they have been at it for decades and some for more than half a century. Unfortunately they seemed to have joined the conference without prior consultation and agreement. The result was precious time being spent on a debate among themselves on establishment of new states, that could only serve in the interests of the government and the military. "Besides, what's the use of having new states, when even old states are states only in name?" one reviewer asked rhetorically. "We also need to consider the possibility of some of our neighbors taking advantage of the matter."

Dr Sai Oo concludes his preliminary analysis with the following suggestions:

·         Intensive public consultations in order to produce a common stand ("The 1960-62 federal movement failed in part because the people in general were ignorant about it," commented a lawyer)
·         Equally intensive capacity-building programs (Federal study trips to countries such as India, Germany, Switzerland and others plus at least 2 seminars and workshops for each dialogue topics)
·         Study trips to other states and regions
·         Encouraging more participation by youth ("And women," said a female participant. "Don't forget women.")

"We still have a maximum of 5 more years, with 3 Union Peace Conferences per year, if the peace process goes according to the resolution on the last day of UPC#1," said a participant. "That should be sufficient time for our people to shape their own destiny."

I do hope he's right.


The author is President and Co-founder of the Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN). He is also serving as Managing Director for the Pyidaungsu Institute (PI) for Peace and Dialogue, which has offices both in Chiangmai and Yangon/Rangoon.

Aftermath of Armed Conflict Leaves 1,000 IDPs In Need of Assistance

Posted: 22 Feb 2016 01:37 AM PST

Over 1,000 displaced civilians in central Shan State's Mong Hsu Township still in need of relief after the resolution agreement between the Burma Army and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) had been reached.


According to Nang Jing, a local relief worker in Mong Hsu Township, IDPs were told to return homes after the head of the Eastern Central Command visited the camp on January 2. Many of them decided to stay at the camp due to security concerns.


"There are over 1,000 villagers still staying at Hai Pa camp," said Nang Jing. "They still need food and housing supplies."


"But now, there is very little aid for them," she added.


Burma Army launched heavy offensives in early October last year against the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), an ethnic armed group that refused to sign the nationwide ceasefire agreement. Fighting caused more than 10,000 civilians from Mong Hsu, Mong Nong and Kesi Townshipsin in Central Shan State to flee their homes.


"We were asked to go back home but we are afraid of landmine so we don't want to go," said a displaced villager who is staying at Hai Pa camp. "Burma soldiers are still stationed in our village."


"We cannot provide them the houses but we can give them some building materials so that they can build their houses," said Sai Hseng Murng, the secretary of local aid group Namkhong Organization.


He said that the IDPs, who stayed in the camp, did not have space to grow their crop. He went on to say the group would try to provide them rice until June this year. 

Aid is being sent to northern Shan State's Kyaukme Township to help over 5,000 displaced people who just fled their homes due to the renewed clashes between the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA). 


BY SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)

A new peace facilitating center set up

Posted: 17 Feb 2016 11:44 PM PST

As if having three independent facilitating centers for peace is not enough, another center has been recently established and registered, according to a reliable source from Rangoon.

This latest setup has been named the Center for Peace and Reconciliation (CPR). "The name was taken from the Deed of Commitment (DoC) for Peace and Reconciliation (which was signed between the President and 4 ethnic armed organizations on 12 February last year that became the accelerator for the completion of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement that was signed on 15 October)," said the source.

The three other existing peace facilitators are Rangoon based Nyein Foundation, Chiangmai based Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center (founded by the United Nationalities Federal Council), and the Pyidaungsu Institute for Peace and Dialogue (PI), which has offices both in Chiangmai and Rangoon.

Most of the members of the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) which was founded by the President Thein Sein in 2012 will be joining the CPR, said the source. Meanwhile, the incoming government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) has reportedly nominated Dr Tin Myo Win, Aung San Suu Kyi's personal physician, to head the office.

"The reason is that trustbuilding between the NLD and the military is still in its preliminary stage," explained the source. "And we don't want any misunderstandings between the two parties because of us."

There are still several issues on which Miss Suu Kyi and the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing do not see eye to eye, especially the suspension of Article 59 (f) which bars her from becoming President. "The C-in-C wants to keep it as it is, at least for the next two years," said the source.

The Myanmar Peace Center on Shweli Road, Rangoon
The military and its surrogate political arm, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), are also reportedly unhappy with the NLD's appointment of its former chairman Gen (ret) Thura Shwe Mann as head of the Commission for the Assessment of Legal Affairs and Special Issues (CALASI) on 5 February. "While the NLD says it has consulted the military chief, military sources denied he has given the go-ahead," said the source.

CPR has long been an acronym for more than 200 definitions including eye catchers like Chopper, Critical Power Ratio, Center for Policy Research, Center for Professional Responsibility, Critical Point Region, and Child Protection Registry.

In the meantime, international funding for the peace process will be on hold until the new government takes over. Questioned by SHAN whether the status of the EAOs, whether being NCA signatories or non-signatories, would be a criterion, the source replied he didn't think so.



SNDP Secretary Resigns After Party Announced Not to Dissolve

Posted: 17 Feb 2016 02:10 AM PST

Secretary of the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) Sai Maung Tin announced his resignation less than a week after the party released a statement saying it will not dissolve the party.



Sai Maung Tin, who was a co-founder of the party and also served as managing director of the Top White Tiger Company Limited - established under the party's name, said that as his role for central executive committee and a member of parliament ended on January 31, he had decided to quit.

 "I was a co-founder of the party. I have been with SNDP for about six years," he said. "During my time in the party, I was a representative for the People's Assembly seat in Laikha Township which I served as an MP in parliament for five years."

"I think that I have done all my responsibilities," he added.

Sai Maung Tin said he submitted the letter of resignation to the SNDP headquarters in Taunggyi and also informed all branch offices on Tuesday.

Sai Ai Pao, the chairman the SNDP and the former of the Shan State Minister of Mining and Forestry, has yet to respond, according to him.

The White Tiger party won a combined 57 seats in Burma's 2010 elections and the bi-elections of 2012. In the general elections on November 8, it won only one State Assembly seat in parliament.

"No one puts pressure on me to resign," Sai Maung Tin said. "As an executive committee, I feel ashamed that we were not able to achieve what we had promised to the people."
Sai Maung Tin said currently he has not decided to join any party yet. However, he would continue to work for the Shan people.

He urged that all Shan leaders work together for the prosperity of Shan State and its people.

Sai Maung Ting, age 56, was born in northern Shan State's Nam Kham Township. He was with the SNDP from April 2010 to January 2016. 

BY SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)

Four dead and seven injured in a car accident while fleeing armed conflict

Posted: 16 Feb 2016 02:21 AM PST

Four people killed and seven were injured in a car accident on Monday while fleeing the conflict between the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) in Kyaukme Township, according to a local source.


Sai Leik, a local aid worker in Kyaukme Township, told SHAN that the accident happened at about 8 p.m. near Ban Korn village while a vehicle carrying more than 20 people heading to Kyaukme Township to seek shelters crashed.

 "A monk died at the scene, he said. "The other three; Nang Seng Aung, Sai Ai Maung and Nang Mo Leng were pronounced dead at the local hospital."


He explained that the accident occurred because the vehicle had no torch light.
Since February 10, over 2,000 villagers from Ban San, Ban Korn, Kang Kan, Taw Sang and Wan Lone village had left their homes.

The fight between TNLA and RCSS/SSA-S troops broke out on November 27 last year, just over one month after the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on October 15 between the government and eight country's armed groups. RCSS/SSA-S was among the signatories, but the TNLA was excluded by the government from signing.


Regarding Why President Waived US Trip to Monitor Sensitive Transition

Posted: 15 Feb 2016 08:22 PM PST

Thein Sein can't relax as the whole military clique is in panic, that losing another chunk of power would start a domino leading to avalanche collapse of its complete control of decision-making power.

The second-last resort to such angst could be the emergency rule by decree, as is allowed by the military-drafted constitution. The last resort is of course the military coup.

The military had created such a situation in central Shan State by launching offensives on SSPP/SSA without reason. Only it had not officially used the emergency decree, but nevertheless had declared non-voting areas to the chagrin of the SNLD for they were its political stronghold and consequently, lost sizeable seats in the election. This and irregularties in Tatmadaw influenced militia areas have given the USDP the most seats in Shan State and not out of popularity and love from the people it has suppressed for decades.

This time, it is pitting nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) signer, the RCSS/SSA and non-signatory TNLA against each other, intentionally or unintentionally, could create an atmosphere ripe for emergency decree rule.

This could become an opportunity or handy reason in time to invite the Tatmadaw to act, postponing even the setting up of an elected NLD government.

While no one could be sure that this will happen, there is a potential that a panic-ridden military clique could do anything, which it thinks will save its skin.

Shan leaders seek solution for ethnic conflict

Posted: 15 Feb 2016 05:36 AM PST

Representatives of the Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU) held a meeting on Sunday to explore solutions to the armed conflict between the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).


Sai Htoo, a representative from the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), a coalition of 11 ethnic armed organizations of which the TNLA is a member, said that various issues were discussed during the meeting.

"We discussed the future development of Shan State and the problem between the RCSS/SSA-S and the TNLA," he said.

The meeting was attended by fifteen representatives including Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk, chairman of the RCSS/SSA-S, Gen. Sao Hso Ten, a representative from the SSPP/SSA-N, Sai Htoo, a UNFC representative and Sai Nyunt Lwin, the general secretary of the SNLD.

Recent clashes between the two groups led to the displacement of more than 2,000 civilians in Kyaukme Township; fighting has been ongoing since late November.

"We will work hand in hand in order to solve the problem," Sai Htoo said.

The CSSU comprises the Shan State Joint Action Committee (SSJAC), which represents the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the Seng Kiao's People Militia, the New Generation Group (Shan State), Shan Youth Association, Shan Nationality Organization-Thailand, the Shan community-based organizations and a team of legal consultants.

By SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N)

Chiangmai Shans observe Shan National Day/Shan State Day

Posted: 14 Feb 2016 07:52 PM PST

Last Sunday, 7 February, Shans in Chiangmai gathered together to remember the Shan National Day, also known as Shan State Day, and the events surrounding it which took place 69 years ago.

Shan National Day/Shan State Day at Loi Tai Leng, the SSA-S headquarters (Photo: Irrawaddy)
The some 50 participants attending the event were made up of both Shan migrants and Thai-born Shans. Many were either too young or uninformed about the day.

It was Hsai Lern Kham, 67, who, as a young student in Rangoon had participated in several annual commemorations of the day, acquainted the audience with its history. "It wasn't easy to hold a ceremony to observe the day under the military government in those days," he recalled. "I remember that one of the students was detained and imprisoned for six years soon after he delivered a fiery speech at an event in 1963 in Taunggyi."

Mai Hawng, also 68, admonished his audience with a warning. "Jews that didn't have a country to call their own founded one. But the Shans who have it appears to be losing it."

A young participant strongly agreed with him. "If you look at the demands for separate statehoods today you will find that only three (out of 55) townships remain with the Shans: Mongyai, Kehsi and Monghsu," he said. "It's time they start to shed their Terng Man La/Zarng Man (Let it be) attitude."

Meanwhile, at the event in Loi Taileng the main base of the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), also known as the SSA South, leader Gen Yawd Serk urged thousands of his admirers who were gathered there not to let go the opportunity offered by the turn of events in the country to negotiate. "Whether there is trust or not is not the point," he said. "The point is we have this opportunity to resolve our political issues by political means and we should seize it."

The Shan National Day, as it was officially termed by the Palaung prince of Tawng Peng Sao Hkun Pan Sing on 11 February 1947, became Shan State Day during the years under military rule.

The event marks the day when Shan leaders set up their own Shan States Council to oppose the British president Federated Shan States Council.



INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICT: Territorial dispute, human rights violations and ethnic aspirations' remedy

Posted: 14 Feb 2016 06:11 PM PST

The outburst of the armed conflict, or better the ambush on the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) by the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) in November last year came about as a surprise, as the RCSS troops have been in the vicinity of Nam Kham, Kyaukme and the likes since more than a decade, although they  have not set up permanent bases, according to its spokesman, Colonel Sai Hla.

But in contrast, the TNLA said that the RCSS's troops have intruded into their areas of operation and have been expanding their reach, when in fact it should be operating only in the South of Shan State as it is popularly known as the SSA-South, with the help of the Burma Army, known as the Tatmadaw within the country.

RCSS has signed the controversial Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with Naypyitaw and been removed from the illegal, terrorist organizations' list, while the TNLA is a non-signatory that has been delivering running battles with the Tatmadaw, since the outbreak of war between the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), known as Kokang, and has entered the scene as an alliance on Kokang's side, together with the Arakan Army (AA), also a non-signatory, apart from not being recognized as armed groups that the regime is ready to negotiate with.

Reportedly, the RCSS/SSA Statement of 11 February described the scenario as follows:

"The current armed conflict started when the troops of TNLA first attacked a column of Task Force 701 of RCSS/SSA, who were returning to their area of operation in Nam Kham township after receiving training about the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) at the Supreme Headquarters, in Mong Wee area in Nam Kham township."

"In that ambush attack by the troops of TNLA on 27 November 2015, Task Force 701 of RCSS/SSA suffered heavy casualties, altogether 11 troops, including those who were killed and injured in the battle and those who were killed after being captured alive. After the battle, 23 villagers of Mong Wee village were arrested and detained by the troops of TNLA. Although 8 of the villagers have since been released, the rest of them have not yet been released up to the present."

Generally speaking, the inter-ethnic conflict in Burma is not a new thing, for the armed conflict among ethnic armed groups had happened, time and again, even if they don't resemble the racial conflict of African continent like Hutu against Tutsi in Rwanda, where nearly a million Tutsi were slaughtered by Hutu-led government militias, in 1994. As such, it could be said that for now the inter-ethnic conflict in Burma is more on the side of armed organizations shooting out at each others and in no way a horizontal conflict, with one race slaughtering another out of sheer hatred. But this may be changing, as beheading of two Shans by TNLA and displaying the heads on the poles at the village entrance was reported quite recently, according to Sai Leik, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy's (SNLD) spokesperson in DVB, and it is worrying.

Along this trend, the inter-ethnic conflict occurred in the past between the Pa-O and Shan (Tai) ruling Saohpas in 1949; the Karen troops under British colonial army oppressing the Bamar nationalist in Saya San rebellion in 1930s; The Karen National Union (KNU) troops against the Mons; the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 4th Brigade against the SSA in 1960 to 1970; the United Wa State Army (UWSA) against the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of Khun Sa; and last but not least, the UWSA attacks on RCSS positions some few years back.

The ethnic armed resistance groups on their side knowing too well that they only stand a chance against the Burma Army if they are united, formed umbrella organizations or united front in the past and as well at the present. The National Democratic Front (NDF) is the forerunner of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), which involves some nine ethnic armed groups.

But even this umbrella organization is unable to control or coup with such armed conflict outbreak against one another, as the RCSS-TNLA recent and ongoing battles suggests.

The RCSS-TNLA conflict might be mainly due to the fear of RCSS intrusion into it sphere or areas of operation. But the real underlining factor is the heightened ethno-nationalism aspiration or awareness, which is trying to express its existence through armed resistance and by demanding the upgrade from the status of sub-ethnic level to a national state-level administration status, short of the imagined identity of a "nation-state".

As secession to form a nation-state is remote, given the unfavourable international and regional political configuration, the Palaung, Wa and Pa-O have openly pushed for a state-level administration under the union government, to the chagrin of the Shan State, from which they seek to secede.

We need to look at this from a broader perspective of how to accommodate or contain such an aspirations. But let us briefly look at the other factors surrounding the problem.

Pre-conflict situation

Palaung State Liberation Organization/Army (PSLO/A) made ceasefire with the government in 1991 and was disarmed in April 2005. Palaung leaders Tar Aik Bong and Tar Bone Kyaw formed the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) to fill the gap of armed struggles and continued to fight against the Tatmadaw. Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) is formed as the armed wing of PSLF. It is said to be supported by the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and has formed a military alliance with the MNDAA and AA.

The TNLA is not recognized by the government as negotiation partner, along with the MNDAA and AA in NCA deliberation.

Reportedly, although it is empowered by the KIO/KIA, of late the UWSA is said to be the main source of support for the TNLA, to the disappointment of its former supporter, according to the insider sources.

The RCSS/SSA, which is headquartered in Loi Tai Leng across the Thai border of Pang Mapha District, Mae Hong Son Province, although it has maintained a presence in the Nam Kham, Kyaukme areas of northern Shan State since years, the build-up of its forces began only after the NCA signing, a few months ago. Reportedly, due to the opportunity to move its troops freely, according to news sources.

The armed clashes started between the RCSS/SSA and TNLA last November, amid accusation that the former intruded into the latter areas of operation that has escalated and still ongoing, causing some 1500 to 2000 inhabitants to flee their homes.

The cost of conflict and civil societies'statements

According to UN figures, the number of IDPs in Myanmar rose by some 10,000 in 2015 to more than 660,000. And no doubt, the recent visible cost of the inter-ethnic conflict and the Tatmadaw offensives against the SSPP/SSA in central Shan State a few months back, would have definitely added up more to the IDP population.

Besides disrupting the livelihood of the people, and not to mention the death of dozens of combatants from both sides, the people's misery exacerbated with human rights violations and extra-judicial killings, not by anyone but by the warring troops.

The civil society organizations   were frustrated with the situation and began issuing statements, which, more or less, reflected their respected communities' opinion.

SHAN reported that the Ta'ang Women's Organization (TWO) and Ta'ang Students and Youth Organization (TSYO) on 10 February accused RCSS/SSA, one of the eight groups that signed the  NCA in October, of abusing against citizens such as rapes, robberies, arrests and many acts of violence.
Colonel Sai La, spokesperson of RCSS/SSA, claimed that the Ta'ang groups are feeding false information to the public. He said such kind of things made their organization look bad.

"We've ignored the allegations that they (TNLA) have said about us in the past, such as the Burma Army transporting our troops by army trucks, and forcibly relocating villagers from their homes," he said. "Now, we feel that it is time for us to clear things up by addressing these allegations and telling our side of the story. "
A seven point statement following decisions agreed upon on 25 - 27 January 2016 by 11 Youth Organizations and 12 CBOs (Community Based Organizations) at the office of Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), Nam Kham Pong Quarter, Nam Kham, pin-points that two Shan armies, RCSS/SSA and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), together with the Shan political parties and various communities should prioritize the welfare of the Shan people.

The Tai Youth of Nam Kham, under which the statement is released also includes, in its 7 February 2016 announcement the following resolution:

·         The Tai Youth believes that any armed groups should not abuse the citizens.

·         The Tai Youth completely disagrees with the request of obtaining their own states by Wa, Palaung and Pa-O at the  Union Peace Conference at Naypyitaw from 12-16 January 2016.

·         The armed conflicts in the Shan State do not differentiate the citizens or ethnicities. On 27 November 2015, the TNLA attacked RCSS/SSA and captured 23 citizens from Mong Khart, Marn Ho Pan, and Mong Wee. Thus, we condemn such actions by the TNLA and demand the release of the captured citizens immediately.

·         After the TNLA capturing of the 23 citizens in Nam Kham township, the KIA also captured the Tai (Shan) citizens on the days of Tai New Year (28/29 December 2015) at Narn Oom, Muse township, thus, we condemn such actions and demand the KIA to release the captured citizens immediately.

Speculation on RCSS alliance with the Tatmadaw

Since the outbreak of violence between the RCSS and TNLA, the RCSS has been accused that it   collaborated with the Tatmadaw in its attacks on the TNLA. Further more, its troops deployment in northern Shan State in November last year with some 200 men and again in mid-January with another 300 were only possible because the Tatmadaw facilitated the necessary transportation, even said to be providing with the military trucks, according to Anthony Davis a security consultant and analyst with IHS-Jane's, in 7 February Bangkok Post.

Sao Yawd Serk, head of the RCSS as expected rejected the accusation and that he is ready for peaceful negotiation to work out an understanding to exist together in the area.

Khuensai Jaiyane, senior advisor of the RCSS, when asked if the collaboration with the Tatmadaw was true, said: "The Tatmadaw is just taking credit, while the RCSS is doing the fighting. The Burmese troops are not involved in skirmishes with the TNLA."

Anthony Davis pointed out the "divide and rule" dictum of the Burma Army, repeating history, with examples of pitting the ethnic armed groups against each others.

A strategy of what he called out-sourcing counter-insurgency involved the Tatmadaw recently setting up and arming a new group called the Shan-Ni (Red Shan) Nationalities Army (SNA) among ethnic Shan communities in southern Kachin state against the dominant KIA; encouraging the  UWSA to go south to the Thai border to fight the Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA) in 1990s; and also when it armed the break-away Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) to fight against the Karen National Union (KNU).

UNFC and SSPP as mediators?

On 15 December last year RCSS/SSA leader Lieutenant General Yawd Serk met with members of the UNFC in Chiang Mai to discuss about the fighting. The UNFC is an umbrella organisation for nine ethnic armed groups, including the TNLA but not the RCSS.

But Mai Aik Kyaw, a TNLA spokesperson, played down the significance of the Chiang Mai talks, saying that his organisation did not send a representative to the meeting.

By mid-February, the tone of TNLA changed and was said to be ready for negotiation.

"We don't want more fighting with them (RCSS) but they invaded our territory. We understand we need to negotiate with them but talks have not started," said TNLA spokesperson Mai Aike Kyaw.

He said the UNFC was mediating between the TNLA and RCSS to arrange direct talks.

UNFC general secretary U Tun Zaw said they were trying to arrange a time and place for the talks, which needed to be held as soon as possible.

Earlier, the TNLA had also asked the SSPP/SSA, together with the UNFC, to intervene and stop the fight. The SSPP is member of the UNFC, in which TNLA is also a member.

On 12 February, SSPP released a four point statement stating its worry of the conflict, which is causing the population unnecessary hardship and also hurting the ethnic nationalities' unity. The statement said that it is also sending mediation teams both to the RCSS and TNLA to help end the conflict.

The UNFC, which is meeting on 18 February to map out on how to go about with the peace process with the new in-coming NLD regime said that it would also discuss the issue of  RCSS-TNLA conflict and find ways to defuse the conflict.

On 12 February, the 69 Anniversary of the Union Day, the seven ethnic political party umbrella organization, the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), condemned the warring parties for gross human rights violations on the villagers, including arbitrary arrest and causing thousands to flee their homes.

It also urged the warring parties to settle their dispute through peaceful means.

Prospect and perspective

As have been stated from the outset, the immediate de-escalation, or better achieving ceasefire, between the ethnic warring parties and a longer run strategy of theoretical underpinnings to resolve or tame the ethno-nationalism aspirations, on a wider scale should be earnestly planned and thought out.

Regarding the first question of conflict resolution and achieving ceasefire between the RCSS and TNLA, it shouldn't be a problem, for both parties are willing to negotiate to end the animosity. There is no doubt on it , given the strong will,  combined with the high cost of the conflict, politically, economically and physically that both parties have to pay.

Furthermore, the already started SSPP shuttle diplomacy mediation between the two sides and UNFC intervention might be able to solve the problem, provided both parties see eye to eye that ethnic armed organizations' (EAOs) unity is crucial in any political bargaining with the Tatmadaw and as well with the government for the ethnic nationalities as a whole.

To immediately stop the armed conflict on the ground,  an agreement would be needed to physically move away the warring troops to a safe distance from each others, followed by a demarcation of operation areas or understanding to exist together like in the past, before the RCSS signed the NCA. In short, a sort of military code of conduct could be agreed upon for troops movement and behaviour on the population.

For the long term harmony between the dominant Shan and sub-ethnic groups like Palaung, Pa-O, Wa and so on, a common identity of a Shan national identity somewhat like Federated Shan States in 1922 should be built, of course minus the feudal Saohpas' system of governance, replacing the decentralized units with popularly elected representatives. This political union, later changed its name into Shan State in 1947, with its own flag, national anthem and government signed by the Palaung Saohpa, Khun Pan Sing, before entering into alliance with the Bamar government, headed by U Aung San, to struggle for joint-independence from the British, should be the model of achieving a common identity for the Shan State.

In fact, the Federated Shan States model is a  decentralization that should and could be applied to all other states, including Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma that have now diversified into seven regions, which could have a better chance to address and satisfy political aspirations of the dominant ethnic groups and as well, the sub-ethnic groups within each and every state.

True that it wouldn't be able to immediately satisfy the ultimate and highest aim of nation-state aspirations, but will at least quench the thirst of state-level administration wishes to a degree. For it will be one step nearer that the sub-ethnic groups like Palaung, Wa, Pa-O and the likes would be able to pursue their aspirations under a genuine federal union government, once it is set up.

To put it differently, the long term political sequence should be, democratization within the mould of genuine federalism will be first to set up a federal union form of government; followed by decentralization vested with proper power-sharing between states and federal government; drawing up criterion on what is needed to become a national state-level administration; and finally, move along the prescribed guideline according to the criterion.

In short, the demand for national state-level administration could only be realized through democratic process, not through the force of arms. Of course, if a particular ethnic group or sub-ethnic group would strive for a total independence from the present, existing union and not just for an upgrade of administration status, it will be a different matter altogether. But the point here is, finding a solution within the existing mode of the country's formation, preferably through asymmetrical federalism.

According to the USLegal definition: "Asymmetrical federalism refers to a federal system of government in which power is unevenly divided between states. In asymmetrical federalism some states have greater responsibilities or more autonomy than others. An asymmetric federation must have a federal constitution and all states in federation have the same formal status as state."


Finally, the ethnic conflict parties know too well that such an out of hand situation is not going to work to their advantage, but just the opposite. Such being the case, looking at the big picture of ethnic harmony and unity that could bring better bargaining power at the negotiation table with the power-that-be and the military should be the collective aim. And most importantly, the welfare of the population that all resistance organizations which said that they are working for, should uphold the said principle accordingly, not making them miserable, having to endure all sorts of human rights abuses including extra-judicial execution.

SNDP decides not to dissolve its party

Posted: 12 Feb 2016 02:37 AM PST

The Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) released a statement Thursday stating that they would not dissolve the party.


The party said that the leadership had taken the decision.


"In order to strengthen the party," read the statement, "the new committee will be taking responsibility."


The SNDP, also known as the White Tiger Party, was established in 2010. The party won 57 seats in the 2010 elections and the bi-elections in 2012. In the 2015 elections, it won only one seat in parliament.


Nang Than Shwe, a new member of the SNDP, said that although the SNDP did not do well during the November polls, they will continue to work for the people outside of parliament.


Sai Leik, the spokesperson for the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), said, "It's the SNDP's right to decide whether to dissolve the party or not. The aim of setting up a political party is to work for the citizens."


In 2013, monks and people from 52 townships submitted a petition that the two major Shan armies be merged into one single Shan State Army (SSA) and the two major Shan parties combine to become one single party.


"The unification of Shan parties will depend on the new committee," Nang Than Shwe said.


Sai Leik responded by stating, "we have discussed at the Committee for Shan State Unity (CSSU) in October 2013. The SNDP said they would discuss it again after the elections. Since then, we have not asked them what their thoughts are on this matter."

"We hope to hold our party conference in March or April." Sai Leik added. "We will address this issue during the meeting. If they (SNDP) have the will to unite, it will be welcomed by the SNLD". 


BY SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)

Panglong Agreement, Panglong Promises and the Panglong Spirit

Posted: 11 Feb 2016 10:47 PM PST

During the 2 year long negotiations for the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) between the government-army's Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) and the Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) s' Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team- Special Delegation (NCCT-SD), one of the major hurdles that the negotiators had to overcome was reportedly the choice of words in connection to Panglong acceptable to both sides for the text. They were:

§  Panglong Agreement

§  Panglong Promises

§  Panglong Spirit

Let us therefore examine each of the terms, briefly but not exhaustively.


The Panglong Agreement, as we all know, is the 9 point treaty signed between Burma, the Federated Shan States (which later became the Shan State), the Chin Hills (which became the Chin State) and the Kachin Hills (which became the Kachin State), a pact between 4 equal partners.


The gist of the agreement:

Point 1-4.         Shan, Chin and Kachin representatives will be appointed as minister and deputy ministers respectively responsible for matters relating to Frontier Areas affairs (now  known as Border Affairs)

Point 5.            Full autonomy in internal affairs

Point  6.           A status of state for the Kachins in the future independent Union. (The Chins then did not request the same status)

Point  7.           Rights and privileges fundamental in democratic countries (which is interpreted by the author as Human Rights and Democracy)

Point 8-9.         Financial autonomy as in the Federated Shan States for Chin and Kachin


It is quite significant that the UPWC had refused to adopt the term.

Panglong Promises

During the 4-day negotiations in Panglong, 8-11 February 1947, the following demands were made by the Joint Chin-Kachin-Shan Committee, officially dubbed Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples (SCOUHP):


§  The right to secede if and when we choose

§  Equal status

§  Joint responsibility for common subjects such as foreign affairs, defense and coinage and currency


Gen Aung San reportedly had accepted all in principle but requested that they be included in the Union constitution to be a drafted by the upcoming Constituent Assembly instead. His solemn word of honor thus became known as the promises of Panglong.

It is significant that the UPWC has also refused to employ this term.


Now the last one.


The Panglong Spirit


The NCA, both in the text and its attachment, which contains 36 resolutions passed in the 9 formal meetings, doesn't have anything to say about what the word means.


However, Judging by what the Burmese leaders have repeatedly said, the much-vaunted Three National Causes (Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of National Solidarity, and the Perpetuation of National Sovereignty) appears to be their interpretation. To the non-Burmans, this summing-up means they have to live under Burmese domination as second class citizens whether they like it or not.


Their own interpretation: Equal status, sense of joint ownership and sense of joint responsibility, has not been sought out, let alone agreed.  



As long as this ambiguity continues, it is a doubtful a genuine union will be realized. It will therefore be the job of the Union Peace Conference which began on 12-16 January and is being planned three times a year for at least 3-5 years to clear up the enigma, if the Union is meant to be everlasting.

By SAI KHUENSAI / Director of Pyidaungsu Institute and Founder of Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N)
All views expressed are the author's own  

Over 2,000 flee homes while 2,000 held captive in Kyaukme Township

Posted: 15 Feb 2016 06:38 PM PST

Over 1,500 civilians fled their homes due to the ongoing clashes between the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA).





Sai  Than  Maung, a representative from the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) in Kyaukme Township, said that more than 800 IDPs came to Kyaukme. They are staying in Kobya Yartha, Thiho Temple, Saya Aung Supan Temple, Namsilin Temple and Honam Temple.

"Today, more than 1,500 IDPs are still arriving at the site," he said. "So far, there's no group providing aid to them yet." The IDPs are only receiving relief from local people in Kyaukme.

"About 2,000 villagers are being held captive in the Chinese temples of Taw sang village," he said. "The villagers said the TNLA troops looted the villagers' houses and took their properties."

Sai  Than  Maung also stated that people in the township are going to offer aid such as food, blankets and clothes.

The conflict between TNLA and RCSS/SSA also known as SSA-South, erupted in late November last year.

The Ta'ang Women's Organization (TWO) and Ta'ang Students and Youth Organization (TSYO) on Wednesday accused RCSS/SSA, one of the eight groups that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October, of abusing against citizens such as robberies, arrests and many acts of violence.

Col. Sai La, spokesperson of RCSS/SSA, claimed that the Ta'ang groups are feeding false information to the public. He said such kind of things made their organization look bad.
"We've ignored the allegations that they (TNLA) have said about us in the past, such as the Burma Army transporting our troops by army trucks, and forcibly relocating villagers from their homes," he said. "Now, we feel that it is time for us to clear things up by addressing these allegations and telling our side of the story. "
The RCSS/SSA spokesperson also said that with regards to the current fighting they had contacted the TNLA for talks.
"But, we have yet to get a response from them," he added.
"Without negotiation, citizens wonder what the future holds for the IDPs," Sai  Than  Maung  said.

 "I strongly recommend that the Ta' ang group regardless if they took part in the ceasefire signing or should pay attention to the IDPs."


The TNLA could not be reached for comment at the time of reporting.

USDP rules Shan State Parliament

Posted: 10 Feb 2016 01:34 AM PST

Representatives from the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) were selected as the speaker and deputy speaker of the Shan State parliament on Monday.


Sai Lone Seng of the USDP, representing constituency one in Keng Tung Township, was chosen as the new speaker. The deputy speaker appointed was Sao Aung Myat, the current Shan State parliament chief minister who represents constituency one in Ywar Ngan Township.  The speaker chairman is Lt. Gen. Aung Than Htut who won the state assembly seat in constituency one in Laokhai Township.


Nang San San Aye, a new Shan State parliamentarian from the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), told SHAN that the party had competed for the seats but lost to the USDP.
"We (SNLD party) competed for all three seats; chairman, speaker and deputy speaker," she said. "We could not win because the votes from NLD (National League for Democracy) and SNLD together are still only half of what USDP has."


She said there are 46 representatives from NLD and SNLD all together, but the representatives from USDP, the military and other parties totalled 88 votes.


U Soe Nyunt of the NLD in Kalaw Township said that even though the vote process was democratic, it was impossible to win the USDP because they dominate the parliament.


"We knew that we could not win, but we just wanted to know what the military representatives were thinking," he said. "We want to know whether there is any change or not."


136 representatives attended Monday's session including 102 newly elected representatives, including 34 from the military. Others came from the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), National League for Democracy (NLD), Ta'ang National Party (TNP), Pa-O National Organization (PNO), Lahu National Development Party (LNDP), Wa Democratic Party (WDP), Lisu National Development Party (LNDP), Kokang Democracy and Unity Party (KDUP), Wa National Unity Party (WNUP), Akha National Development Party (ANDP), and some independent of affiliation.

BY SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)

Aung San Suu Kyi's dilemma of presidential election and national reconciliation

Posted: 09 Feb 2016 10:52 PM PST

These days, the nomination of presidential candidates, especially by the National League for Democracy (NLD), and the election of speakers and formation of the State and Region governments are important issues that have been making headlines.

Hardly have the two Lower and Upper Houses speakers been elected, after the parliamentarians met on 1 and 3 February respectively, the first show down between the military clique and the NLD is brewing, regarding the waiving of paragraph 59(f) that would enable Aung San Suu Kyi to take over the task of presidency personally.

It all comes about as the naming of presidential candidates speculation is constantly pushed to the forefront, with the end Thein Sein era coming to an end by 31 March, and the NLD hard-pressed to do the naming.

The NLD reportedly said, to presumably ward off the pressure of having to name the presidential candidates for the Upper and Lower Houses, that it would fix the date to publicize the names.

On 8 February, convening the Union Parliament for the first time, its Speaker Mahn Win Khaing Than of the NLD said the Lower House, Upper House and bloc of military-appointed lawmakers, which together constitute the country's electoral college, would discuss their respective nominations on March 17.

The Union Parliament will then meet to elect a president from among the three candidates, the remaining two of whom will become the country's vice presidents. With the NLD holding a majority in both houses, the party will be able to select two candidates. 

It seems although the NLD is tight-lipped, neither saying that it is tabling the motion in the parliament, to waive the 59(f) clause that bars Aung San Suu Kyi from being the president, nor rejecting the speculation,  Aung San Suu Kyi, the chairwoman of the party,  might be leaving the opportunity open, hoping that she could change the situation to her favour in time before the   presidential candidates' nomination.

Regarding this, although the military, also known as Tatmadaw, top brass have not taken a clear position, its mouthpiece, Myawaddy newspaper had run an article against the idea of waiving the said 59(f) clause that would allow Aung San Suu Kyi to take over the presidency, saying in effect that the constitution should not be amended "for all eternity", which means "individual influenced by foreign power, one way or the other, should not be president."

Aung San Suu Kyi was married to the late Michael Aris, a British scholar, and have two sons together, who are also British citizens.

Whatever the scenario's outcome regarding the presidential candidates' nomination, Suu Kyi seems to be implementing her own version of national reconciliation scheme.

The mostly procedural process of Lower and Upper Houses Speakers' selection and the two Committees – Bill Committee and Public Accounts Committee - where 13 ethnic MPs are employed, seems to suggest that Suu Kyi's version of national reconciliation is in action, albeit it is just a token to show largesse and in line with her national reconciliation scheme, according to her own confession.

Elected ethnic  leaders' opinion

But quiet a number of ethnic MPs were in an upbeat mood, even though the ethnic parties as a whole won't make much of a difference, given their insignificant number of votes when it comes to parliamentary decision- making or voting in a particular motion, so to speak.

Mahn Win Khaing Than, the new upper House Speaker briefly addressed the lawmakers in a speech saying, "Myanmar is a resource-rich country, unrivalled by any other country in the world in that regard. Ours is a country which should be a developed and rich nation. But in reality, that has not been the case." 

He stressed: "In order to transform our nation into a prosperous and developed federal democratic union, it is exceptionally crucial to first implement internal peace, rule of law and national reconciliation, and to do so, we need the right legislation," and continued that since the upper house is part of a legislative branch which is one of the three branches of government, it should work to enact the legislation necessary for peace, rule of law and national reconciliation.

U Aye Thar Aung, an election winning MP from the Arakan National Party (ANP) was appointed as deputy-speaker of the upper house, who is also a long-time ally of Aung San Suu Kyi, stressed the importance of an eventual federal union for Burma.

"Most importantly I will focus on implementing ANP policy and ethnic issues. I want to see an end to civil war, internal peace and the establishment of a federal union where all national ethnic groups can live harmoniously. These issues I‟ve worked on consistently," Aye Thar Aung said.

The making of state and regional governments

After the task of the Upper and Lower Houses Speakers' election had been made, the task of the election and formation, including speculation, of the state and regional governments have  become  the talk of the whole nation.

In all the 14 States and Regions, NLD won with an absolute majority except for the Arakan State, also known as Rakhine State, and Shan State. And it is at these two states that the bargaining and jockeying have been most visible.

In Shan State, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and appointed military representatives occupy 66 seats, while the NLD , Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and other small ethnic parties combined amount to just 61 seats. But in Arakan State, the ANP with 22 seats is the majority, with NLD 8, USDP 3, independent 1 and appointed military having 12 seats respectively.

While the situation in Shan State is quite clear that the USDP and military combined could formed the majority in the state parliament, giving the coalition to form the government in normal circumstances, it would depend on whether the would be NLD-led President would endorse the State Chief Minister herself/himself or give a green light to USDP and military coalition endorsed MP as the Chief Minister.

On 8 February, as expected the parliament elected Sai Lone Hsaeng from USDP as House Speaker, Sao Aung Myat, USDP,  as Deputy House Speaker and Aung Than Htut, also from USDP as Chairperson.

Sai Lone Hsaeng competed against Sai Kyaw Thein of SNLD and won with 88 to 48 votes; Sao Aung Myat competed against Sai Kyaw Ze Ya of SNLD and won with 88 to 45 votes; and U Aung Than Htut competed against U Soe Nyunt Lwin of NLD and won with 83 to 53 votes receptively.

The SNLD had nominated all the three candidates, two from SNLD and one from NLD, since the NLD has given it the responsibility to do so, according to Sai Nyunt Lwin, the secretary general of the SNLD.

As for the ANP case in Arakan State, the party lack two votes to get the simple majority of 24 seats . There is one independent seat won in the Arakan State.

On the same date of 8 February, Arakan State Parliament elected U Zaw Zaw Myint of USDP as Chairperson, U San Kyaw Hla of ANP as House Speaker and U Pho Min also from ANP as Deputy House Speaker.

Reportedly, the nine MPs from NLD congratulated the ANP for the election of the two House Speakers position.

As the parliamentary House Speaker and Deputy House Speaker are from the ANP, it is not clear what is going to happen with its ultimatum that it would go into opposition, if it is not allowed to form the government and given the executive position of Chief Minister, which appears questionable for the moment. Chief Ministers to the 14 states and regions are to be appointed by the President.

Paragraph 59(f) and presidential election

After the task of parliamentary elections, both at Upper and Lower Houses, followed by the State and Region parliaments, the focus has now shifted to the presidential election, which is to be held on 17 March.

For Suu Kyi, overcoming the barrier of 59(f) is imperative to realize her political conviction, if not a live and death matter. To do this, three options are open, such as to install a proxy president and try to amend the 59(f) clause embedded in 2008 constitution; to table the motion of suspension or waiving the said clause within the parliament; and to file for approval within the parliament, the exceptional status that the clause won't have an effect on her as a sole individual.

The third option is said to be based on the fact that the majority of some 80 percent have given her the mandate to lead the nation in the election and thus the appeal for exceptional status as an individual not to be barred by the said clause, in the interest of the people.

According to Myanmar Times of 8 February, NLD sources said that the party was negotiating with military leaders on the shape of the new government, including the positions of chief ministers.

It is being widely speculated that as part of a broader power-sharing agreement the Tatmadaw could agree to change or suspend section 59(f) of the constitution barring Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency. In return she would give key posts to the military, such as chief ministers of some regions and states, possibly including Yangon, Kachin, Shan and Rakhine.

But aside from the Myawaddy newspaper opinion piece of rejection a week or so earlier, on 9 February, a military representative for the parliament, Colonel Kyaw Kyaw Soe told the media that while the Commander-in-Chief didn't give exact directive regarding the issue, the military would only adhere to the constitutional procedure strictly. Meaning: the military 25 percent veto power will be used in any important amendment of the military-drafted constitution.

Min Aung Hlaing, during the recent four monthly meeting of the military officers had also said that the military will not amend the 59(f) or suspend it.

Shan, Kachin and Arakan States as bargaining chips

Whatever the rumours might say, the lobbying and jockeying to circumvent the 59(f) is still in full swing and nobody knows how it will unfold.

According to The Myanmar Times of 8 February, the NLD sources saidthat the party was negotiating with military leaders on the shape of the new government, including the positions of chief ministers.

It is being widely speculated that as part of a broader power-sharing agreement the Tatmadaw could agree to change or suspend section 59(f) of the constitution barring Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency. In return she would give key posts to the military, such as chief ministers of some regions and states, possibly including Yangon, Kachin, Shan and Arakan.

Regarding thisat least one senior source within the NLD is of the opinion that a military officer could be in line for the post of chief minister of Shan State, where the Tatmadaw and the USDP have a combined majority in the state assembly.

"There will be no argument if a military representative becomes chief minister of Shan State because the ethnic parties in the state have good relations with the army," said the source, adding, "She is making good relations with the military a priority. The incoming Union government and the state and regional governments will have military representation."

This political posture won't go down well with quite a number of stakeholders, especially the armed groups that the NLD wants to draw into the peace process.

Colonel Sai La, spokesperson for the Shan State Progressive Party, which came under heavy Tatmadaw attack late last year, was said to be worried about Shan State being led by a chief minister with a military background.

"We can't do anything to influence the appointment, but I think it is not appropriate to appoint a military officer. Shan State has too many problems, especially armed conflict," he said.

Political commentator U Yan Myo Thein said chief ministers should represent the citizens and reflect the people's will, saying, "National reconciliation should be correctly interpreted. The Tatmadaw should focus more on gaining the trust of the ethnic armed groups and ethnic citizens rather than aiming for chief ministerial posts."

Likewise, yielding to the military's demand, where appointment of chief ministers in Kachin and Arakan states are concerned, won't be to the liking of the ethnic nationalities, especially the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).

Summing up

Given such complication, coupled with sensitivity, the art of lobbying and jockeying to circumvent the 59(f) clause is easily said than done.

Aung San Suu Kyi must tread a fine line not to antagonize the ethnic nationalities, especially the EAOs, and also try to make a deal with the military that it could not refuse, so that her goal of overcoming the 59(f) clause could be fulfilled.

For now it seems, Suu Kyi is left with an only option of filing for an exceptional status that the said clause will have no effect for her as a special case, to circumvent the barrier, while not stepping on the red-line of amending or waiving the clause that the military is so obsessed to keep it in tact, for  whatever reason it might have in store.

The military, while it has so far insisted that it wants no change to the constitution, it would not countenance Suu Kyi's presidency ambition, according to the Reuters report of 6 February.

Speculation have been rife that Min Aung Hlaing might be tempted to yield to Suu Kyi demand, in exchange for the NLD regime leaving the military's economic interest and conglomerate alone, apart from promising no retribution on the military for its decades-long human rights violations. Besides, accordingly he could as well burnish his legacy, for such a move would also put responsibility for fixing an impoverished country riven by decades of ethnic conflict squarely on Suu Kyi, according to the well-informed diplomatic sources.

Paragraph 261 of the constitution gives Suu Kyi the rights to appoint the Chief Ministers in ethnic states and regional governments. If she considers to fulfil the ethnic nationalities desired candidates to head the state governments, harmony with them will be achieved. But if the military insisted to have their men placed, particularly in Shan, Arakan and Kachin states, she will have to calculate the pros and cons on how the outcome of such a decision will affect the ongoing internal armed conflict, not to mention the feeling of the ethnic peoples that are being oppressed by the military for decades.

For now Suu Kyi might be facing the dilemma of whether to compromise with the military's demand to circumvent the 59(f) section, if this is really the term of bargaining basis, or fulfil the ethnic groups' desired candidates for Chief Minister positions, to pave the way out for ending the ethnic conflict.

Still there is another option for Suu Kyi and that is to work out a strategy of "escaping between the horns" from the dilemma she is now facing. In other words, advocating a "win-win" outcome for all stakeholders.

Suu Kyi being an able strategist, as has been shown in her election campaign that won her a landslide victory with the slogan of "don't look at the candidates, just vote for the party, if you want change", will again come up with a brilliant move to overcome this. We only need to wait and see.

The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor

Back to Tell’s Land (Day-8,9,10)

Posted: 05 Feb 2016 12:10 AM PST

Day Eight. Friday, 22 January 2016

Federalism should be a meeting point of all groups
Khil Raj Regmi, former Prime Minister of Nepal

Dr Andreas Ladner
Today, a jolly professor, Dr Andreas Ladner  from the University of Lausanne is our resource person on federalism.

Switzerland may not have so many ethnic races like Burma, but it has 3 other important differences that took centuries for them to overcome: religious denominations, wealth and political disagreements.

At one point, he is asked why Switzerland did not choose to become a union of 3 units based on language (Romansch is spoken by less than 100,000). His reply is forthright: 3 units will make one canton too strong, which in turn will create negative spontaneous reaction from the other units. Having several cantons significantly reduces that kind of risk.

For those in Burma advocating 8 states or 14 states configuration, his answer may well ring a bell.

I think it is also him who tells us why his country doesn't have a popularly elected president as in the United States. "Only Germans will be elected," he says. "And, that is not good for the union in the long run."

He is not one who sings only the praises of federalism. It has its own downside, he reminds us. "Federalism costs money and time," he says. "Sometime it is also very difficult to implement a national policy, as each canton does it differently."

Nevertheless, I think the Swiss know it's the price they have to pay for their union. So I don't think they'll trade federalism for a unitary state, whatever the faults of the former are.

Meanwhile, he doubts China will ever adopt federalism. "Their psychology doesn't work that way," he muses. "In their minds, China is the center and the rest are its peripheries."

In the afternoon, we visit Geneva, 94.7 km away. It is pleasantly sunny, the first sun since our arrival.

I visit a bookstore called Payot which has several English books. After more than an hour, I choose one. To my regret, the store refuses to accept dollars. So I return to our hotel empty handed.

Day Nine. Saturday, 23 January 2016

Today is the day for review of what we have learned and how we can put them to use. Which I will not bother the reader with.

Except for one thing: We have learned some, but not as much as we want. Because time has been a great constraint. Maybe a refresher trip is what we need in the near future.  Remember Alexander Pope's much quoted and misquoted words, that "A little learning (not knowledge) is a dangerous thing"?

Chateau Chillon
Chateau Gruyerse
In the evening, we are out on the bank of the Geneva Lake, just a 100 paces out from the hotel, decked in Shan costumes, for a photo session.

We are sort of like a novelty in town. So naturally many towners take photos with/ of us.

Day Ten. Sunday, 24 January 2016

Today we visit two castles: Chillon and Gruyerse. And then the local hydropower plants.
Our escort  Mr Antonie Dubas whose company works in Burma says: Shan State, like Switzerland, has a lot of streams and lakes. Small hydropower plants should be initiated by the local people. He is critical of the World Bank's mega projects.

Again when I put the question to him about Bern's peace efforts in Burma and his company's involvement in hydropower projects, he is not disturbed. "The politicians do their job there," he smilingly replies. "And we businesspeople do ours."


Two days later, we are back in Chiangmai, our home away from home.

By SAI KHUENSAI / Director of Pyidaungsu Institute and Founder of Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N)
All views expressed are the author's own

Shan to celebrate 69th National Day

Posted: 04 Feb 2016 06:39 AM PST

Shan people around the world will celebrate the 69thanniversary of the Shan National Day, which falls on February 7.


The Shan National Day was proclaimed on February 7, 1947 by the prince of Tawngpeng, Sao Khun Pan Jing, who served as the President of the Federated Council of Shan States.

The main venue of the celebration is traditionally Loi Tai Leng, the Thai-Burma border headquarters of the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S), in which hundreds of people participate every year.

"Shan National Day is unity day," said Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk, the chairman of the RCSS/SSA-S. "It's the day that everyone meets and talks to each other to build unity."
Lt. Gen. Yawd Serk also said that there are three purposes in holding the Shan National Day. The first is to pay respect to "patriots" who have fought for the nation. The second is the unity of Shan people. And the third purpose is to think about the future of the Shan.

"Our new generation has to think critically. We have to learn our mistakes from Panglong Agreement," he continued, referring to the agreement that was signed by Shan, Kachin, Chin and Burman representatives in 1947 in order to demand independence from British as a unified country.

Townships across Shan State such as Muse, Namkham, Mong Pan, Kesi and Taunggyi are also reportedly holding events to mark the 69thanniversary of the day. Shan communities living in the United States, Thailand, and Japan are also organizing commemorations.

By SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N)


Back to Tell’s Land (Day-7)

Posted: 03 Feb 2016 11:06 PM PST

Day 7: Thursday, 21 January 2015

If Germans and French, who used to hate each other so much, can live together, I don't see any reason why you (the nationalities of Burma) cannot.

Georges Martin, Deputy Secretary of State, FDFA, Government of Swiss Confederation

We are to move out today from Murten to Montreux, which is nearer to Geneva, the international capital of Switzerland. So we all are up early to pack our things and get ready to check out from the hotel.

At 09:00, we are at the meeting hall of the Fribourg cantonal parliament, made up of 130 representatives who meet 8 times a year. Fortunately, it isn't in session.

Here we are received by Mr. Lorenzo Brancher, External affairs; and Mr. Thomas Plattner, deputy cantonal physician.

The following are some of the things we learn from them:

·         Fribourg, name for both the canton and its capital (16.9 km from Murten), is 1,671 square kilometers, nearly twice as big as Jura
·         Population is 303,377, out of which 67,708 (22%) are students and apprentices
·         Unlike Jura, which is uni-lingual (French), it is bilingual: French (63%) and German (29%). The cantonal constitution stipulates that partner language is the first foreign language to be taught in school.
Each official language, for administration, is translated in the other partner language. And trials are carried out in courts in the language of the districts concerned
·         The cantonal government is made up of 7 councilors (ministers) who are all elected
·         The canton has 7 districts: 5 French, 1 German and 1 bilingual
·         Every person living in the confederation must enroll in one of the 90 health care insurances. Every insurance must pay for every curative health service prescribed by a physician. For low income families and children, there must be premium reductions

The reader who may take notice of the cantons having districts as an administrative level, as we do, may be confused, as we do. Because so far, we have been hearing only 3 levels of government: federal, cantonal and communal. And the answer is this:

Most cantons, except 8, including Basle and Geneva, used districts as an intermediate level for administration and court organization for convenience. But a number of them have already reduced its number or even considering its abolition. (Maybe we can do the same back home?)

At noon, we are off to Bern again, 34.3 km away, for the last visit. This time we are attending presentations by two experts: Mr. Bruno Rosli and Mr. Albrecht Schnabel, on the role of the military in a federal state and SSR/DDR, the very topics the whole delegation has been gearing up to listen. And we are not going to be disappointed.





Typical Swiss citizen
The following is the gist of what we have learned throughout the four and a half hours with them:

·         Switzerland has no standing armed forces.
Active duty personnel 2,755
Doing annual refresher training                          120,000                 (Age 20-34)
Undergoing basic each year                                 20,000                  (Age 20-34)
Reserve                                                                 80,000                  (Age 20-34)
Total                                                                   222,755

·         The Councilor for the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS) is the acting Commander-in-Chief in peace time. The Commander-in-Chief is appointed only in wartime
·         The Armed Forces is made up of land forces and air force 
·         The land forces comprise the following:
11 brigades (infantry, 2 armed, I log and 1 C2)
4 territorial regions
7 training units (4 for land forces and 3 for air force)

·         The history of its evolution is, I think, something we can all take a leaf from. In 1848, there were only cantonal forces, commanded by a combined federal general staff. In 1872, a popular vote was taken for centralization of military affairs, but it was turned down. It was only recently, in 2004, after 156 years, that the cantonal forces were disbanded. (I'm sure Burma won't take that long, if an SSR that is mutually acceptable has been negotiated)

As for the Security Sector Reform (SSR), the first thing one should know, says Mr. Schnabel, is: who are part of the security sector. Only then we can consider the reform. They are, according to him:




Having a cost effective and transparent security sector, he says, has its advantages:
  • Security institutions will be seen as "assets" by the population
  • Positive reputation
  • Creation of friendly environment
  • Protection of rights, security, stability and rule of law
  • Conflict-prevention
On the other hand, ineffective and in transparent security sector will create suspicions, rumors, abuses, fear and distrust which will in turn give way to, crises and violent conflicts, the very things the SSR is trying to prevent.
As for DDR, Mr. Schnabel interprets them this way:
  • Disarmament is for the non-state actors (NSA) forces
  • Demobilization is for the state forces, as they no longer need to fight anyone
  • Reintegration will be for ex-combatants from both sides
Naturally, our delegation is confused by our resource persons' words that the Swiss Armed Forces adhere to a "militia system": which to them means every citizen become a soldier when called for, but to most of us from Burma means a civilian carrying arms and working for the army. The misunderstanding is of course cleared away soon enough.

Another question from the delegation is: What language do they use in the army, especially when issuing military drill commands? In four languages, as they do in the parliament?

No, only one language is the answer. As units are formed in accordance with the languages the soldiers use, there is no need to give one's command in several languages. "I used to be the commander of an Italian unit," recalls Mr. Rosli, a Swiss German. "The language I used was Italian. In our country, officers speak the language of rank and file, not the other way round."

(Sao Yawd Serk remarks that when the six ethnic armies launched a joint officers training course on the border, more than a decade back, they had solved the problem by using only military commands in English.)

As to my question, how can a country like Switzerland and Burma be allowed to stay neutral by the neighbors who are hostile to one another, Mr. Rosli has this answer:
  • First of all, the neighbors must all agree that our country's neutrality is in their interests
  • On our side, we have to show them, not only by words, but by deeds, that we are not taking sides (For instance, Switzerland is not a member of EU or NATO)
  • Like Switzerland, maybe you can institute one of your cities as an international peace making center
(Another answer was given by someone before we left: For Switzerland to take sides, it has to risk its own breakup. Because some of us are going to take sides too, and it may be the other side.)

At 17:30, we all climb into the bus to the new hotel in Montreux, 91.2 km away, with our heads still full of questions.

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