Shan Herald Agency for News |
- Shallow graves uncovered in Namtu Township
- Learning to share: About low hanging fruits
- Aung San Suu Kyi’s Visit to Beijing: Recalibrating Myanmar’s China Policy
- BOYCOTT THE BURMA "PEACE" CONFERENCE
| Shallow graves uncovered in Namtu Township Posted: 17 Aug 2016 02:00 AM PDT The bodies of three local men have been discovered in shallow graves in Namtu Township. The cause of death is as yet unknown.
According to one of the victims' family members, the three have been identified as: Loong Por Kham, 56; Sai Ai Parng, 31; and Sai Ai Htwe, 24. All three were from the village of Kong Hong and had disappeared while out foraging for forest foods on August 1 in Mongmu village tract, Namtu Township. Their bodies were uncovered on August 4 between the villages of Wan Mai and Sarm Kar, the family member told Shan Herald. Sai Lek, a spokesperson for the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, or SNLD, said this is not the first time that this kind of incident had happened. In fact, he said, it all too common. Sai Lek blamed the frequency of such murders on a lack of rule of law in the region. "I have urged the Shan State and Union governments to put some serious attention into this issue and try to solve the problem immediately," he said. "The armed groups also have to understand and respect the law. They should respect human rights and behave according to military ethics." According to Tai Freedom News Agency, the news and information department of the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) reported on August 13 that two of the victims were soldiers of its rivals, the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA). Reached for comment, an SSPP/SSA official, who wished to remain anonymous, told Shan Herald that the militia will form a committee to investigate the case. He said that they will proceed with the investigation according to the law, and bring the culprit or culprits to justice. Loong Maung, who found the graves, said that he has no idea which armed group, if any, committed the crime. He said that he and other residents reported the case to local authorities and local political parties. "The bodies were found near one of the ethnic armed groups' camps," Loong Maung told Shan Herald without elaborating or providing any further details. Armed groups active in the area include Burmese government forces, the Kachin Independence Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, the RCSS/SSA, and the SSPP/SSA. According to a resident in Namtu who did not wish to be identified, another villager had been found murdered recently in Nyaungmong village. In the most high-profile recent case, on June 25, seven civilians were killed by government troops in Mong Yaw, Lashio Township. A trial for the suspected soldiers and officers involved is currently under way at a military court in Lashio. By Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) | ||
| Learning to share: About low hanging fruits Posted: 17 Aug 2016 01:55 AM PDT  Afterword A lot of problems in this world would disappear, if we talk to each other instead of about each other. Workshop quotes I wasn't planning to write this. I thought I had already written enough. But something happened following my Day Four journal. Which, if the truth were not made known in time, could be disastrous —in the long term, if not immediately. On Day Three and Day Four, we went through the usual motions of a workshop: Conducting scenarios and options exercises. The subject was how to deal with the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Panglong) The Lady had just announce would take place on 31 August. How the EAOs, both signatories and non signatories, should respond to it. The resultant options: · To boycott the conference. Write to her "we" would not be coming. · To write to her that it should only be a "grand opening", no more · To write to her that "we" will attend, but for future cooperation, the muddled up process should be renegotiated The reader doesn't need me to say what the outcome was: Option #1. The workshop did not spend much time on it. Here are some of the responses: "I'll go, even if not one else goes." "The signatory EAOs will become divided" "Criticisms both at home and abroad" "This is not the time for confrontation" "Refusal to participate will be too risky." Option #2. Demanding that it be just a "grand opening" is not enough. "We" still need to be prepared for any eventuality Option #3. This is the workshop's choice. To write to her that "we" will attend, but we will also need to discuss how we could move further ahead when we play by the NCA rules A letter was accordingly written, as reported by SHAN yesterday (16 August 2016) and delivered on 12 August. The State Counselor's reply, appreciated by all concerned, is that she will be meeting the PPST (Peace Process Steering Team) on 24 August morning. The JICM (Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting) will be held in the afternoon on the same day. That seemed to have cleared up all the hiccups in the peace process that arose, after the new government took over on 30 March. Except for on unanticipated development: That leading members of the government's UPC-21CPC Preparatory Committee are unhappy with "suggestions" by a certain workshop participant to "boycott" the Conference. Is this misunderstanding? Or mis(dis) information? The situation calls for a clarification. However, the fact is that the Preparatory Committee, though in direct contact channel with the said participant, has yet to demand an explanation. And the unresolved situation, though seemingly insignificant at present, can explode into an uncontrollable one, as unexplained misreadings accumulate. I end this journal with a counsel from my Chinese teacher, Lao Zi (some regard him as Tai-Shan): Everything easy means great difficulty So, to the sage, everything is difficult Thus, in the end, nothing is difficult | ||
| Aung San Suu Kyi’s Visit to Beijing: Recalibrating Myanmar’s China Policy Posted: 16 Aug 2016 07:52 PM PDT Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government faced a tough situation with China at the time of their inauguration in March. But, as she visits Beijing this week, hopes are high again in China that a redirection of Myanmar's foreign policy could be underway and the pendulum of Myanmar's balancing diplomacy is swinging back to the east. But many challenges lie ahead. These include resolution of the Myitsone dam impasse, repositioning political relations between the two countries, and peaceful settlement of ethnic conflicts in the Myanmar borderlands. The stakes are very high. The outcome of Aung San Suu Kyi's meetings could well come to define Myanmar-China relations for many years to come.
Different from the U Thein Sein government, which was seen as turning "pro-West" in Beijing, Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government are believed to be more "neutral" in their foreign policy. The destination of her first official foreign visit since assuming office was none of the great powers, but Laos, a neighboring country chairing the ASEAN this year. While China might have been disappointed that she did not visit China first, the fact that she did not pick a Western country, especially the United States, for her first foreign visit is nevertheless regarded as comforting. The sense of reassurance for Beijing is strengthened by the perception that Suu Kyi's relationship with the United States may not be as smooth and trouble-free as people had previously perceived. The combination of these factors reignites the hope in China that Suu Kyi's ascension to power could actually bring opportunities to rebuild the damaged bilateral relations and re-strengthen China's waning influence in the country. Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government faced a tough situation on China at the time of their inauguration in March. The deterioration of Sino-Myanmar relations since 2011 is widely acknowledged. Former President Thein Sein suspended the Chinese-invested Myitsone mega-dam in September 2011. While the project has never been popular in Myanmar, the Chinese nevertheless saw themselves as the victim of a pseudo-democratic government's attempt to gain legitimacy, popularity and support by both the Myanmar people and the West. China's antagonism was exacerbated by Thein Sein government's lukewarm attitude toward Chinese economic ambition in the country, as manifested by the suspension of the Letpadaung copper mine, the abandonment of the Sino-Myanmar railway and the difficulties it encountered in the bidding for the Kyaukpyu special economic zone. The sense of agony peaked in 2015, when officials in Myanmar appeared to accuse China of supporting ethnic armed organizations in northern Myanmar and undermining the government's peace process by blocking the participation of several groups in the October Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), an accusation that China vehemently denies. Such a difficult context puts Aung San Suu Kyi's China policy at a critical juncture in history. The NLD government could continue to cater to anti-China sentiment inside Myanmar and run the risk of losing China's support for the peace process and for Myanmar's domestic economic agenda. Or, it could try to improve relations with China and enlist Beijing's help for Myanmar's national priorities on ethnic reconciliation and economic development. The record of the past four months seems to suggest that Aung San Suu Kyi identifies with the second option and has recalibrated the country's policy toward its large neighbor in the north. Ample evidence on key fronts suggests that she has strived to improve relations with China, with her upcoming China visit being the latest one. On the state-to-state level, ministerial level visits by key government officials have increased. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was the first foreign guest Suu Kyi invited and received in April after the inauguration of the NLD government. They met again in Vientiane three months later during the ASEAN Foreign Minister meetings. At that meeting, very much to China's satisfaction, Myanmar maintained its traditional detached position on the controversial South China Sea disputes. Also in July, China's Minister of State Security, Geng Huichang paid a highly unusual visit to Myanmar, where he met with Suu Kyi. Given the Ministry of State Security's unique status and special mandate, the meeting is widely interpreted as having focused on the issue of northern Myanmar, including Sino-Myanmar cooperation on the peace process. Last but not least, the Chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Song Tao, visited Myanmar one week before Suu Kyi's scheduled visit to Beijing. He held meetings with a wide range of political leaders in Myanmar besides Suu Kyi, including the Commander-in-Chief Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, ex-President Thein Sein, former head of the military government Than Shwe and former speaker of the Lower House Shwe Mann. Having learned the importance of building diverse relations with different political forces in the country, China is keen on tying any loose ends and preempting any sour feelings with the military and former ruling party that might arise from a rapprochement between Suu Kyi and China. To China's great pleasure, Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government finally took an apparent step toward the resolution of the Myitsone dam project. The announcement of the establishment of a new commission to examine the hydropower projects on the Irrawaddy river has come days before her trip to China. The decision will greatly mitigate the pressure on Suu Kyi to provide a definitive answer on the fate of the problem during her visit. Former President Thein Sein's decision to suspend the Myitsone dam during his term of office has effectively been dissolved by the inauguration of the NLD government, and China has been eagerly pushing for a resolution of the suspended project. Indeed, China has been so eager to move on that its bottom line has been lowered from the project's resumption to an agreement over the disbursed investment under its cancellation. The newly-established commission may or may not resume the Myitsone dam project. On the one hand, Myanmar's power shortage has become so critical that it not only affects the nation's economic functioning, but it also raises questions about the future effectiveness of the NLD government. Earlier in August, Htein Lwin, permanent secretary at the Ministry of Electric Power, openly acknowledged the necessity of hydropower projects, citing an increase in power demand. In fact, given Myanmar's rich natural endowment in water resources, many analysts believe that well-regulated hydropower projects could indeed be the most realistic way to solve the country's energy problem. While such hydropower projects do not have to include the Myitsone dam, the general attitude toward hydropower is changing, and Myitsone's specific strengths and weaknesses are up for investigation and debate. A transparent and thorough examination of the project by the commission is indeed the best way to answer questions and dispel criticisms on both sides. Foreseeably, given the emotional baggage and public sentiment associated with the Myitsone dam in Myanmar society, if the NLD government decides to resume the project based on perceived merits, it would encounter major political and public objections. While sufficient scientific evidence and thorough policy deliberations should form the foundation for any such decision, Aung San Suu Kyi will be the only one in the country with the authority to pull this through. Such a political maneuver, however, will be costly, as attested by the criticisms against her after she chaired a commission that decided to resume the Letpadaung copper mine in 2013. And people should bear in mind that the Myitsone dam and the Letpadaung copper mine are not on the same level in terms of their scale, complexity and public objections. The peace process will also be a key issue for Aung San Suu Kyi during her China trip. It remains unknown to what extent, and on what issues, she and her team have specifically requested China's support for the peace process. Nevertheless, according to private sources, such solicitation has been conveyed and well responded to. In order to build good will with Suu Kyi and the NLD government early on, China has demonstrated an unprecedented level of support and cooperative attitude toward the nationwide peace process and the 21st Century Panglong Conference to be held on the last day of August. Chinese financial contributions to, and political support for, the Myanmar peace process have increased substantially since March. Earlier this year, China donated three million USD to the peace process, a scenario that was not considered possible during the former Thein Sein government. The Chinese special envoy for Asian Affairs, Sun Guoxiang, attended the Maijayang summit among ethnic nationality groups hosted by the Kachin Independence Organization in late July and publicly committed China's continued support to the peace process administered by the NLD government. He and other Chinese officials have also lobbied non-signatory groups to the NCA, including the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army in the eastern Shan state, to join the 21st Century Panglong Conference. They have been so enthusiastic and persistent that some ethnic leaders complained that the Chinese were lobbying for them to surrender to serve China's bigger cause. Besides politics, one other issue that will be high on Aung San Suu Kyi's agenda in China is economic cooperation. There is indeed much common ground, such as on power supply. China's Yunnan province suffers major overcapacity in power generation and could potentially turn into a supplier of electricity to Myanmar. Technical difficulties, such as Myanmar's lack of power grid, will be good issues to discuss since the Chinese are more than willing to invest in such infrastructure to boost political affinity and economic interdependence. The Chinese have conveyed their willingness to be flexible on the price of such electric power and infrastructure as long as Myanmar remains friendly and cooperative. Anything that can pull Myanmar closer to China and enmesh it in China's national/regional economic network will be seen as good political investment with profound payoffs in the future. For her part, Aung San Suu Kyi is apparently recalibrating Myanmar's policy toward China. Does this signify a redirection of Myanmar's neutralism and non-alignment foreign policy? So far the answer is negative, although her decision to improve relations with China is increasingly clear. Many people are waiting to see how Suu Kyi navigates the great power politics and balances Myanmar's relations with all countries, China included. Yet the task might be more difficult than it appears. China has a lot to offer to boost Suu Kyi's domestic agenda, especially in its peace process and economic development. It is practical for her and her government to seek China's support and contribution. However, they should also understand that China's support always comes at a price. Issues such as the Myitsone dam project and Myanmar's embrace of China's strategic agenda will be at the back of the mind of Chinese officials when they sit at the negotiation table. Aung San Suu Kyi will have much work to do, and much caution to take, to anticipate the potential consequences of China's demands on both her domestic constituencies and her foreign partners in order to best promote and protect Myanmar's long-term national interests. Written by Yun Sun, a Senior Associate with the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center. Her expertise is in Chinese foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, Sino-Myanmar relations and China's relations with neighboring countries and authoritarian regimes. These commentaries are part of a TNI project funded by Sweden. | ||
| BOYCOTT THE BURMA "PEACE" CONFERENCE Posted: 16 Aug 2016 07:43 PM PDT Aung San Suu Kyi has announced that Burma will have a national peace conference, starting at the end of the month. Many people have commented that this leaves very little time for planning, and that it should be postponed. What is the point of having a conference if the lack of suitable preparations means that it will fail? This in turn raises the question of what the conference is actually supposed to achieve. A peace conference is simply a meeting between two or more sides in a war. Its goal, obviously, is to end the conflict: to achieve peace. In theory, such a meeting could be limited to two people, one representative each for conflicts which have two clear sides. They would then bargain hard and compromise where necessary. Such negotiations could involve a whole series of meetings, as the representatives communicate with their compatriots, and everyone gets comfortable with and finally approves the appropriate compromises. Peace conferences may also have facilitators or mediators - independent individuals who help and if necessary prod the different warring parties to compromise. As a general principle, the lower the number of people who are involved, the more likely the negotiation will succeed. Adding more participants raises the prospect not only of additional disputes between the two sides, but also within them. Suu Kyi's planned conference, therefore, which is to have close to one thousand participants, clearly has poor prospects, at least if the meeting goal is real peace for Burma. Successful peace negotiations also have a couple of other characteristics: Sincerity - The negotiations cannot achieve a favorable conclusion if the sides to the conflict are insincere. For Burma, this too raises the question of whether the conference should even be held. Burma's military dictatorship, under the continuing ultimate rule of Senior General Than Shwe, although he now has his orders carried out in secret by factotums, starting with Min Aung Hlaing, and which enforces its rule through the Burma Army, is not sincere. Were it sincere, the dictatorship would immediately end its offensives in the ethnic nationality areas, and pull back its troops. Not only will the dictatorship not do this, it has in fact made no concessions whatsoever, including on the issues of inclusion, the demand for ethnic army disarmament, and their need to sign the so-called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. Therefore, any negotiations will - they necessarily must - fail. Role of mediator - If the negotiation involves a facilitator, this party must be objective and impartial. For Burma, the facilitator is Suu Kyi. However, she is not impartial. Through both her words and actions she has taken sides - with the dictatorship. Suu Kyi has met with dictatorship officers and agents many, many times (going back to Thein Sein). Conversely, she has met the ethnic armed organization non-signatories only once (the "other side" in the war), and in a staged meeting where they felt compelled not to be forthright about what they and their peoples are experiencing (e.g., by not describing dictatorship offensives and war crimes). She has never publicly condemned the Burma Army for its decades of atrocities. Instead, she has announced her warm feelings towards it. Also, she has followed the dictatorship blueprint to the letter. She has installed former military personnel in key positions in the peace process institutions, and in the government posts which she appoints (country representative to the U.N., Attorney General, Minister of Population and Immigration). She has further insisted that the peace negotiation be based on the NCA. In effect, she is trying to corner the non-signatory EAOs and force them to accept something with which they disagree. Why is she doing this? Is it Burman racism? She is after all Burman, as is the dictatorship. Do the ethnic nationality interests, including as formalized in the Panglong Agreement, have no significance to her? Or, as her apologists argue, is she merely stuck in a difficult situation, and has decided to capitulate to the dictatorship at every turn, to minimize the risk of having the generals re-seize overt power, even if this means the ethnic nationalities must accept never-ending oppression? Frankly, the underlying reason for her behavior does not matter. The "peace" conference won't lead to peace. It will be a spectacle, and the ethnic nationality participants merely actors on a stage. The one thing we can be certain of is that Suu Kyi has unlimited vanity (and also arrogance - she believes that she and she alone knows what is right for the country), and while the peace conference won't end Burma's Civil War, it will indulge her. She will be on the grand international stage once again. How lovely! The non-signatory EAOs have one responsibility - to do what is best for their people. Since the peace conference will have no result, or, even worse, a fake result - Burma is at peace!, while the war continues without end - they should boycott the conference. They should not attend without inclusiveness, and also unless there is a concrete plan to achieve something tangible about the war, starting with a ceasefire announcement by the Burma Army. They should not allow themselves to be puppets in Suu Kyi's show. http://www.dictatorwatch.org/prpeaceconference.html |
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