Tuesday, March 18, 2014

The Irrawaddy Magazine

The Irrawaddy Magazine


Crackdown Under Way on Illicit Thai Passport Trade

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 06:03 AM PDT

passport, identity theft, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia Airlines, China, crime, terrorism, tourism

A policeman holds up photos of the two men whom they believe were travelling onboard the missing Malaysia Airlines MH370 on stolen passports at a news conference in Kuala Lumpur on March 11. (Photo: Reuters)

The disappearance of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 on March 8 cast a spotlight on Thailand's reputation as a center for the trade in stolen and forged passports, after two of the passengers on board booked tickets with passports that were taken in Phuket.

Burmese immigrants in Thailand told The Irrawaddy this week that some of their countrymen are involved in the illegal passport trade, an underground businesses that is now the target of a large Thai crackdown.

"I have heard that some people in the passport market have been under questioning by Thai police, while some others have escaped," said a Burmese man in Bangkok with knowledge of the passport trade.

The man, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said some Burmese immigrants are involved in the passport business in Thailand, adding that Thai immigration officials and police have now begun to target the illicit trade.

Meanwhile, a Burmese passport dealer, who asked to remain anonymous, said he had fled Bangkok in the wake of the tragic disappearance of the Malaysian plane in order to escape the crackdown.

The man explained that there are three types of passports available in the illegal market—stolen, sold by owners for different reasons, and forgeries. Dealing in passports, he added, is a lucrative business.

"On the black market, a Burmese passport was worth between 40,000 baht [US$1,300] to 60,000 baht [$2,000] while a passport from the United States cost 100,000 baht [$3,300] and over," said the Burmese man. "Passports from European countries could be sold for at least 80,000 baht [$2,600]."

An estimated 2 million Burmese immigrants live in Thailand, where they often work in low-paid jobs, such as in restaurants, the Thai fishing industry or in the construction sector. Many crossed into Thailand illegally and lack official identity papers, making them vulnerable to abuse by employers. Some resort to obtaining illegally-sourced passports and forgeries.

The Burmese man said many passport dealers in Bangkok have now gone into hiding after Interpol announced last week that two Iranians on board MH370, from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing, had obtained Austrian and Italian passports that were stolen in the Thai beach resort of Phuket. The Iranians were reportedly illegal immigrants trying to reach Europe.

Their tickets were booked under Austrian and Italian names on March 6, 2014, and issued in Pattaya, a popular beach city located south of the Thai capital Bangkok.

"We want to know whether their passports were lost or stolen, and if there was a gang taking their passports out of Thailand," Pol-Lt-Gen Panya Mamen, Thailand's provincial police Region 8 Commissioner, told The Bangkok Post last week.

Tens of millions of tourists visit Thailand every year and many spend their holidays in the southern beach resorts, where their passports are vulnerable to theft, not in the least because of the country's reputation for lax law enforcement and corruption.

The Associated Press quoted a senior Thai intelligence official as saying that authorities are investigating about 10 passport-trading syndicates in Thailand, adding that most were run by nationals from Pakistan, India, Iran or Central Asia for clients that are mostly illegal migrants.

Some of the forged passports are also sold to human traffickers, or occasionally, terrorists. Airport and customs controls to detect forged passport are reportedly poorly enforced in many cases.

According to Interpol, as of March 2014, its Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database, created in 2002, contains information on more than 40 million travel documents, such as passports, identity document and visas, reported lost or stolen by 167 countries.

The post Crackdown Under Way on Illicit Thai Passport Trade appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Burma Parliament Likely to Approve Electricity Price Rise

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 05:47 AM PDT

Myanmar, power, electricity, Burma, Rangoon, yangon, price, parliament

Protestors against a previous plan to raise the price of electricity light candles outside the office of the Yangon City Electricity Supply Board. (Photo: Sai Zaw / The Irrawaddy)

A Burma government proposal to increase how much people pay for electricity is likely to be approved by Parliament following discussion Monday, lawmakers said.

Limited power infrastructure and generation mean that less than 30 percent of the country's households have access to electricity. The government argues that consumers must pay more for power as the country attempts to extend access and meet fast-rising demand.

According to the government-owned New Light of Myanmar newspaper, Minister of Electric Power Khin Maung Soe told Parliament that increases were necessary to fund more investment in the power sector, since consumption across the country is going up by about 15 percent a year.

Parliamentarians agreed in principle to a planned price hike, drafted by President Thein Sein's office, which it is claimed would have little impact on most families and small- and medium-sized businesses. The plan would reportedly save 272 billion kyat, or about US$272 million, from the government's annual spending on supplying power.

According to lawmakers, the proposed changes presented to Parliament would mean larger users of power pay more, while the rates for low-level consumers stay the same.

For households using under 100 kilowatt hours, or units, per month, the price would remain at 35 kyat (less than US$0.04) per unit. The price would rise to 40 kyat per unit for those using between 101 and 200 units in a month, and to 50 kyat for those using more than 200 units.

For businesses, the basic charge for those using less than 500 units per month would remain at the current level of 75 kyat. But large consumers using over 500 kyat would pay 150 kyat per unit.

According to figures from the Ministry of Electric Power, 56.6 percent of households do not use more than 100 units per month, and 55.6 percent of businesses use less than 500 units.

"The minister said that therefore it would not much impact on those parts of populations, because of a slight price hike," added Khin Saw Wai, an Arakanese lawmaker representing Rathaetaung constituency.

Rising the price of power in Burma is hugely unpopular, and despite the government's reassurances, Rangoon residents have expressed concerns that the energy price hike will impact them through rises in the cost of goods. Previous attempts to raise the price of electricity met with protests, and in November Parliament rejected a proposed price rise from the Ministry of Electric Power.

Power from the national grid is heavily subsidized, but does not reach many residents and businesses, and supply is often intermittent, forcing the widespread use of private power generation. Generators, usually fueled by diesel, can be up to 10 times more expensive than using power from the grid.

The minister said the new plan would cut government spending on power from 284 billion kyat (about $284 million) to just 12 billion kyat, according to Lower House lawmaker Khaing Maung Yi, who represents Rangoon's Ahlone constituency.

Khiang Maung Yi, a long-term critic of the government's management of the power sector, called for more transparency on how international aid to the power sector is spent. The Asian Development Bank, Japan and the World Bank, among other international donors, have pledged large amounts to help to extend access to electricity.

The post Burma Parliament Likely to Approve Electricity Price Rise appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Burma Will Allow MH370 Search to Continue in Its Territory: Official

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:36 AM PDT

Myanmar, Burma, Malaysia, MH370, Malaysia Airlines, plane, Boeing 777, missing

Indian Navy ship INS Kesari, involved in search operations for the missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370, arrives at the naval base in Port Blair, the capital of India's Andaman and Nicobar islands, March 17, 2014. (Photo: Reuters)

RANGOON — Burma's Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) will allow Malaysian authorities to continue searching for the missing flight MH370 in Burmese airspace, an official said Tuesday.

Burma had initially allowed the search to be extended into its territory for a week from March 11 as an international search for the Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 aircraft widened. The flight, which was heading from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing, last made contact with air traffic control from the Gulf of Thailand on Saturday, but is now thought to have been deliberately turned westward and may have continued flying for hundreds of miles.

Tin Naing Tun, DCA director general, told The Irrawaddy that Burma would grant Malaysia permission to continue searching its territory, if it is requested.

"Today is a week since we allowed them to search in Burmese airspace, but nothing has been found here. If the Malaysian authorities want to search again and they make a request, we will allow them as extension period," Tin Naing Tun said.

"But up to today, they haven't asked us if they can search it again."

Burma has said it is working with Malaysian authorities to coordinate the search, and three Burma Navy ships are reportedly part of the efforts. But officials have admitted that Burma's radar technology is poor and therefore the country's contribution to the search has been limited.

Tin Naing Tun said Malaysia had searched Burmese airspace and waters on Saturday and Sunday. The search included Burmese parts of the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Martaban, as well as the area around Coco Island, just north of the Indian-controlled Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

The Indian and United States air forces and navies have been searching other parts of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean for signs of the missing plane, he added.

The post Burma Will Allow MH370 Search to Continue in Its Territory: Official appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Health, Loan Insurance Coming to Burma This Year

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:30 AM PDT

Myanmar, Burma, The Irrawaddy, insurance, life, health, loan, Myanma Insurance

Nuns walk past IKBZ Insurance company's building being built in downtown Rangoon on June 6, 2013. (Photo: Reuters / Minzayar)

RANGOON — Burma's insurance industry will begin providing currently nonexistent health and credit guarantee insurance policies in the 2014-15 fiscal year, according to state-run Myanma Insurance.

"We will operate health insurance and loan insurance services in the coming financial year," said Aye Min Thein, managing director of Myanma Insurance. The fiscal year begins on April 1.

Last year, the government permitted private firms to enter the insurance market for the first time in more than 60 years, allowing for six categories of life and general insurance out of 46 categories recognized by the government. In part as a result of Myanma Insurance's decades-long monopoly, Burma's insurance industry is among the least developed in the region.

"The state-owned Myanma Insurance will start offering the new insurances and after that the private firms, which are still in their infancy, will be allowed to offer it," Aye Min Thein said.

The new offerings will allow for plans that include coverage of medical expenses incurred by a health insurance policyholder, and credit guarantee insurance will be designed to make it easier for small and medium enterprises to obtain loans.

Htay Paing, spokesman for Grand Guardian Insurance Public Company, said that because the government's stranglehold of the local insurance market was only loosened last year, the number of policyholders in Burma remained low.

"The local insurance industry was far from the minds of the public for a long time. Currently, people are getting to know why it is necessary to be insured, but we still need more time," he said.

A supervisor at a private insurance firm, who asked not to be identified, said that since many people in Burma still lacked a solid understanding of insurance products and their benefits, her company was working to persuade potential customers to invest in peace of mind.

"People are more interested to buy health insurance than life insurance," she added.

"If private insurance companies can offer more insurance services like health insurance, for which there is high demand, the number of insured will rise."

Aye Min Thein of Myanma Insurance said the gradual expansion of insurance categories available for purchase would provide the country's people with a greater sense of security.

"As a business or individual, insurance products and services can reduce losses. Insurance is very important to help with unexpected losses—for businesses, families, the whole country," he said.

There are currently 12 private insurance companies, some of which are offshoots of Burma's largest banks, and the government currently allows them to sell six different types of insurance: fire; motor; life; cash in transit; cash in safe; and fidelity.

The post Health, Loan Insurance Coming to Burma This Year appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

After Snubbing Loan, Burma Awaits China’s Response on Road Link

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:00 AM PDT

China, Myanmar, Kyaukphyu, foreign investment, FDI, Arakan, Rakhine, oil, gas, natural resources

A section of the Chinese-owned Shwe Gas pipeline at Kyaukme Town, northern Shan State. (Photo: JPaing / The Irrawaddy)

RANGOON — Burma’s Deputy Construction Minister Win Myint told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday that there has not been a response yet from the China about how to proceed with the proposed highway linking the planned Kyaukphyu industrial zone on Burma’s west coast, with Ruili in southwest China.

Unnamed Construction Ministry officials were quoted in Burmese media in early March as saying that Naypyidaw had turned down a proposed US$2bn Chinese loan to build the proposed roadway—a decision confirmed by Win Myint on Tuesday morning.

"We are not going to take the loan," he told The Irrawaddy, adding that the government prefers that the roadway be developed under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme in which the investors usually recoup their outlay through payments by users, accrued while investors operate the project after it opens.

"If they want to construct this highway they can make a joint venture with a Myanmar company. If they want to build this road from the China side, they are welcome," the deputy minister said. "But there has been no response yet," he added.

The proposed roadway will link Kyaukphyu, site of a proposed 1,000-acre Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and deep-sea port on Burma’s Bay of Bengal coast, to Ruili, a Chinese town just across the border from Muse in Shan State. The Kyaupkphyu SEZ is one of three such zones planned for Burma, along with the Thilawa SEZ outside Rangoon and the less-certain Dawei SEZ on Burma’s south-west coast.

In early March, a Singaporean firm won a government tender to create a development plan for the massive Kyaukphyu SEZ.

Burma’s Railway Ministry is currently also reviewing a Chinese proposal to build an almost-900 kilometer rail link from Kyaukphyu to Kunming, the latest development in a deal inked in 2011, which is likely also to be built and operated under a BOT scheme.

Oil and gas pipelines—the latter drawing from Burma’s Shwe Gas Field in the Bay of Bengal—transit Burma en route to Kunming, the regional capital of Yunnan Province in southwest China, which borders Burma. The gas pipeline has been operating since last year, while the oil counterpart is awaiting completion, possibly pending a review of a proposed oil refinery in Yunnan.

The oil pipeline and proposed road and rail links from Kyaukphyu are regarded as strategically-important to China. The oil conduit will allow Beijing to pipe oil imports from Africa and the Persian Gulf across Burma to China, rather than take the longer maritime route through the Malacca Strait—an additional 5,000 kilometer journey through some of the world’s busiest waters.

The oil and gas pipelines have faced local opposition from residents of Kyaukphyu, while further inland the pipelines have prompted Burmese military reinforcements in ethnic minority areas, in turn sparking skirmishes with ethnic minority militias close to the Burma-China border.

Deputy Minister Win Myint earlier on Tuesday addressed an infrastructure conference in the commercial capital Rangoon and said that Burma’s economic prospects depend on modernizing the country’s decrepit infrastructure.

"Infrastructure development is the backbone," the deputy minister reminded delegates at the Myanmar Infrastructure Summit, run by Malaysia’s Confexhub and hosted by the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI). Win Myint added that the government hoped that Burma's economy would grow at 9.1 per cent in 2014, well-ahead of international growth forecasts.

Foreign investment would be key to this growth, if it is to come about, Win Myint said, adding that investment in infrastructure is necessary if Burma is to improve its road system.

"As of November 2013 there were 28 local companies managing 5,665 kilometers of roads, or 14 per cent of total road in Myanmar, under the BOT system," he said, adding that the government hopes to increase that percentage in the future.

The post After Snubbing Loan, Burma Awaits China’s Response on Road Link appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Peace Brokers Lack a Mandate: Burma Expert

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 03:55 AM PDT

Myanmar, Burma, peace, ethnic, Myanmar peace center, MPC, kachin, Karen, ceasefire

Journalist Bertil Lintner speaks at the Royal Rose restaurant in Rangoon. (Photo: Sai Zaw / The Irrawaddy)

RANGOON — Those attempting to negotiate an end to decades of armed conflict in Burma lack a mandate to effectively broker peace between the Burmese government and the country's ethnic armed groups, according to Burma expert Bertil Lintner.

Speaking at a conference on "The Peace Process, Constitutional Reform and the Role of Ethnics" in Rangoon on Monday, Lintner said that peace advocates like President's Office Minister Aung Min, who heads the government's peace negotiation team, and members of the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC), a government-affiliated nonprofit organization involved in peace talks, lack authority to make decisions on the ethnic conflicts.

"He [Aung Min] doesn’t have any mandate to discuss anything accept the ceasefire agreement. And he promises for dialogue sometime in the future. He has no political mandate," said Lintner.

The veteran Swedish journalist, who has written numerous books on Burma, said the peace process has become an industry where international peace experts and nongovernmental organizations are lavishing money on peace advocacy and development projects. However, due to limited knowledge or understanding of the historical and political background of armed non-state ethnic minorities, the foreign experts do more harm than good, he argued.

He cited the MPC as an example. The center receives significant financial support from international donors such as the European Union (EU), but lacks capacity in promoting the peace process, he said.

"The MPC is like an organization which is being paid for doing nothing," said Lintner.

According to a monitoring report by Burma News International, the EU granted start-up funding to the MPC in 2012 of 700,000 euro, almost US$1 million, followed by a sizable funding package later in 2012. The EU gave a total of 30 million euro, about $38 million, to Burma's peace process in 2013.

Many observers say trust between the government and the armed ethnic minorities is still poor and existing ceasefire agreements are still fragile. Mechanisms to consolidate the ceasefires, such as codes of conduct for ethnic areas are not in place.

Economic development has been prioritized in the peace process, but observers say armed struggle is unlikely to end until ethnic groups' political demands, like the demand for autonomy, are addressed.

Lintner said existing ceasefire agreements were just pieces of paper, and they can break down anytime.

Several ethnic armed groups saw ceasefire's break down and fighting with the Burma Army resume in 2010 and 2011.

Lintner said that even though there is no exchange of fire in Karen State, eastern Burma, government troops are still deployed in Karen National Union-controlled regions—despite a ceasefire agreement with the rebel group—and military supplies to the region are increasing.

In an interview earlier, MPC member Kyaw Yin Hlaing admitted that Burma's peace process has a long way to go.

"The situation remains fragile. The ceasefires can break down at any moment. But, of course, everybody is working really hard," said Kyaw Yin Hlaing.

The post Peace Brokers Lack a Mandate: Burma Expert appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Dolphins Imperiled as Irrawaddy River’s Fisheries Decline

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 03:46 AM PDT

Myanmar, Burma, The Irrawaddy, Irrawaddy River, Irrawaddy dolphin, conservation, endangered, fish stocks, fisheries, environmental degradation, gillnets

Fishermen prepare to cast their nets near an Irrawaddy dolphin. (Photo: Wildlife Conservation Society)

MANDALAY — Researchers say the depletion of fish stocks in Burma's largest river is threatening a vital source of food for the Irrawaddy dolphin, an endangered species whose population is estimated to number less than 100.

Environmental degradation along the Irrawaddy River is to blame for declining fisheries, as are fishermen who use electrical shockers to boost their catches, affecting the river's small Irrawaddy dolphin population in ways both direct and indirect.

"Fishermen nowadays use high-voltage electrical shockers to get more fish, and this is how some dolphins get directly shocked and die. For some, they are only slightly shocked, but later die [as a result]," said Kyaw Hla Thein from the Wildlife Conservation Society's Burma program, who is involved in Irrawaddy dolphin conservation efforts on the river.

According to the New York-based Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), which is working jointly with Burma's Department of Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development for the preservation of Irrawaddy dolphins, the population of a designated protection zone in the upper region of the Irrawaddy River is in decline.

In early 2012, WCS said the total population stood at around 86 dolphins, but by January of this year it had fallen to an estimated 63.

The area, between the riverside towns of Kyauk Myaung and Mingun in Sagaing Division, spans about 230 miles (370 km) of freshwater in which Irrawaddy dolphins can be found, and was established as a protection zone in 2005.

Measures to protect Irrawaddy dolphins include the prohibition of mercury use in gold mining operations, and a ban on catching or killing of the dolphins, or trading in their meat. Electro-fishing is also forbidden, as is the use of gillnets more than 300 feet (91 meters) long, or spaced less than 600 feet (180 meters) apart. The release of dolphins entangled in fishing nets is mandatory.

Despite these efforts, environmental destruction, deforestation and a growing number of mining operations continue to negatively impact on the river's ecosystem. Mercury contamination from gold mining is said to be a leading cause of the waterway's declining fish stocks.

"In 2012, fishermen using normal methods caught more than 25 kilograms of fish, which provided enough for a day's earnings. But nowadays they can catch only 2 to 5 kilograms of fish, so they are forced to use electricity and gillnets," Kyaw Hla Thein explained.

"Even though the Department of Fisheries, in collaboration with us, has caught and fined the fishermen, use of prohibited methods to fish is still happening. We can't blame them alone, as we've witness the scarcity of fish stocks. If we can't control the environmental destruction, the situation will worsen," he added.

Dwindling fisheries are not only affecting the livelihoods of Irrawaddy dolphins and fishermen. A centuries-old tradition of man-porpoise cooperation is also under threat. Conservationists say the number of locals who practice a form of symbiotic fishing with the dolphins is falling.

"Fishing with the Irrawaddy dolphins is now just for show to foreigners, and you will sadly witness only a few fish caught this way," said Su Hlaing Myint, an independent researcher on Irrawaddy dolphins, who works in collaboration with the Mandalay-based NGO Green Activities.

"This lovely tradition is dramatically fading away and we fear for its extinction, together with the Irrawaddy dolphins. … To save the Irrawaddy River and Irrawaddy dolphins, urgent attention is needed," she added.

The post Dolphins Imperiled as Irrawaddy River's Fisheries Decline appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

‘If Things Are Difficult Now, It’s Maybe Because We’re Getting to the End”

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 03:36 AM PDT

Myanmar, Burma, European union, EU, peace process, ethnic, conflict, Kachin, Karen, Shan

Talks between ethnic armed groups in Laiza, Kachin State, in October 2013. (Photo: JPaing / The Irrawaddy)

RANGOON — The European Union (EU) lifted most sanctions against Burma in April 2013, has granted preferential trade terms for Burmese products and is promising large sums of aid to the government of President Thein Sein. The regional bloc has been a major financial backer of Burma's peace process, especially with its support of the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC).

Belgian national Roland Kobia started work as the EU's first ambassador to Burma in September 2013. Kobia has spent 15 years working in countries in transition, including in Eastern Europe, the Great Lakes region of Africa, Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea.

With six months in the country now under his belt, the ambassador spoke to The Irrawaddy's Simon Lewis last week about concerns that government efforts to sign a nationwide ceasefire agreement with Burma's many rebel armed groups are faltering.

Question: The next round of talks between ethnic armed groups and government negotiators—scheduled for Hpa-an, Karen State—have been repeatedly delayed. Are you concerned that Burma's peace process may be stalling?

Answer: I served in many countries in transition. The transition is always difficult. It's always a bumpy road. So it is normal that sometimes it goes well, and you have these periods of euphoria and optimism, and a little bit later you are a bit less enthusiastic about how things go. This is entirely normal, and a smooth and quick process would be really a strange case.

It really depends how you look at things: whether you look at them in macro terms or micro terms. If you look at the peace process in macro terms, I would say that the trend is still positive and there's a lot of effort, commitment from the government, the MPC and from the ethnic groups. Minister U Aung Min [the government's chief negotiator] is on top of things and doing excellent work.

In a way, if things are difficult now, it's maybe because we're getting to the end. As in all negotiations, people tend to raise the stakes at the end. You know, trying a last ditch strategy to get a little bit more. It's normal. Now, if you look at things in a micro way, if you take a magnifying lens and you look at these big positive trends, then, yes, instead of having a big macro curve [going up], it's probably always [generally] going up, but sometimes with down periods.

So now, maybe it's difficult because everyone expected Hpa-an to happen earlier and to have a final nationwide ceasefire agreement, but I remain very optimistic about the whole process. When you look at things objectively, everyone has an interest in trying to get this agreement, both the government and the ethnic groups, they have to understand that the door is open now, that there is always a right moment for things. I believe now is the right moment.

Q: Will the EU continue to fund the MPC?

A: For the EU, peace is the foundation of the development of Myanmar. Without peace and security, reconciliation and development are not possible. This is why the EU is the main financial donor to the peace process and to MPC. And the EU has also been amongst the strongest supporters politically, with other partners.

There was a request from the different parties to see whether the international community would be supporting the political dialogue phase, and we have answered positively. We need to look at the details. We're not just going to finance anything, but certainly if it's something that we believe is useful, we will continue financing it.

The amount we've given [to the peace process] so far is about 20 million euros (US$28 million). Now we are working at the next phase, at the political dialogue phase, and that will be about the same magnitude, maybe a bit more. It's still not finally decided.

That will be for what's going to be after the national ceasefire agreement, i.e., the political dialogue phase. Now we're entering a new phase and Myanmar will have to decide how this is going to be organized, how to have an inclusive and participatory process. That's for them to decide.

Myanmar, Burma, European union, EU, peace process, ethnic, conflict, Kachin, Karen, Shan

The European Union's ambassador to Burma, Roland Kobia. (Photo: Office of the European Union in Myanmar)

Q: What scrutiny is there from the EU on how the money given to the MPC is spent?

A: Of course, we always control what we are spending. That's a duty we have. And I can tell you that everybody that receives EU money finds that the EU is very demanding in terms of controlling the way the funds are being spent.

The European Parliament is attentive of everything. If there is a minimum of smoke, you will get some members of the European Parliament asking questions. We haven't seen anything so far.

Q:Ethnic armed groups in Kachin and Shan states have reported incursions by the Burma Army this year. Does that indicate a lack of willingness from the army, if not necessarily the government, to play along with the ceasefire process?

A: This is explanation 1. Yes, it's possible.

Explanation 2 can also be—and I've seen that in all conflict countries, in transition countries I have worked in—that very often this renewed fighting is the sign that we are getting close to an agreement. Because when you get close to an agreement, you get close to a game changer. And some people do not always like that you change the game.

You've got people who are more committed to change and in this case a ceasefire. And others don't like it, and they try to create a bit of tension and instability.

Also it's a way to raise a little bit the tension, and the stakes. 'This is the last moment and this is what we want, and if it doesn't happen we can take up arms again.' So, it's of course to be deplored, but it's quite normal when you look at other scenarios of this type of situation. There's always an increased tension when we get to the final stage.

It's not good, but sometimes it's a good sign. It means that people take it seriously. When people get nervous, it's because something is there, something is changing. If people don't care, it means that it's worse, because it means there's no change. There's no change looming there on the horizon. If people get nervous, it means that they know that we're getting close to something, and that this thing will be changing. All this in a way is the sign that they believe that what is going on is serious.

The post 'If Things Are Difficult Now, It's Maybe Because We're Getting to the End" appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

EU to Start Investment Pact Talks With Burma This Week

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 03:06 AM PDT

Burma, Myanmar, EU, European Union, trade pact, Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht

European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, right, welcomes Burma's President Thein Sein at the European Union Council in Brussels on March 5, 2013. (Photo: Reuter / Eric Vidal)

HANOI — The European Union will launch negotiations this week for an investment pact with Burma, the EU's top trade representative said on Monday, a deal aimed at giving European firms preferential access to one of Asia's final frontier markets.

Burma, an underdeveloped country closed off until 2012 to Western firms due to trade sanctions, is on the radar of many European companies seeking access to restricted sectors and guarantees against risks in an uncertain climate.

"We'll negotiate preferential agreements and special deals, mostly because we have quite a lot to offer them. We are big investors and for a country like Myanmar, it's of the utmost importance to have investors," EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht said in an interview in Hanoi.

Located between the booming economies of India and China and offering low wages, big agriculture and tourism potential and natural resources like oil, gas, teak, copper and gemstones, Burma's opening after 49 years of military rule has seen a rush of Western investor interest.

The country is looking to review investment legislation more than a year after passing a foreign investment law that caused rumbles among local tycoons and small firms worried about competition.

Many foreign firms have yet to commit fully to Burma, however, concerned about red tape and poor power and transport infrastructure. They are also looking for safeguards in an environment where cronyism exists among a political and economic elite with ties to the still-powerful army.

"Our investors must be protected and it's important to Myanmar because if the investments aren't protected, they simply won't happen," De Gucht said.

"If you don't have that, it's very difficult to take the risk of putting in money from abroad."

De Gucht was in Hanoi to try to advance talks on a free trade agreement with Vietnam, which he said both sides were keen to finalize by October after six rounds of negotiations.

Such an agreement has been reached with Singapore and talks on a similar pact were ongoing with Thailand and Malaysia.

The push to finalize the bilateral deals, he said, did not mean the EU had scrapped its initial plan of a trade deal with the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean), the 10-member bloc that covers a region of more than 500 million people, with a combined GDP of over US$2 trillion.

"It didn't work out and we switched to a one-on-one solution," he said. "The idea is …once we have agreement with majority of Asean members, we can then turn it into a regional agreement and that has been repeatedly discussed.

"We haven't put this aside, we've approached this the other way around. A region-to-region agreement is the ultimate goal."

De Gucht was due to visit Cambodia on Tuesday, where he said he would relay concerns from EU lawmakers about the rate of land grabs and forced evictions in the country, some of which implicate companies that have benefited from EU trade concessions offered to poorer nations.

"The European parliament has explicitly asked me to discuss this with the Cambodian government," he said.

The post EU to Start Investment Pact Talks With Burma This Week appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Missing Plane Throws Spotlight on Passport Theft

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 03:00 AM PDT

Thailand, Malaysia, MH370, passport, tourism, theft, terrorism

Two people suspected of using fake passports to board Malaysia Airlines flight 370 attempted to buy tickets at Six Stars Travel in Pattaya, Thailand. (Photo: Reuters)

PHUKET, Thailand — When a German tourist refused to surrender his passport as collateral at a car rental stand along a popular beach in the Thai resort city of Phuket, the woman behind the counter pulled out a bag full of passport books to prove he could trust her.

But the tourist, Falko Tillwich, was insistent. "I said absolutely not … no way," he recalled, and later handed over his driver's license instead.

Tillwich's concern: losing vital travel documents, or worse—having them stolen by criminal syndicates that are exploiting lax law enforcement and corrupt police here to support a global network of human smugglers, fugitives and sometimes, terrorists.

Those worries were heightened this week after investigations into Malaysian jetliner that went missing March 8 with 239 people aboard revealed two Iranian citizens had boarded the flight with passports stolen from tourists in Thailand.

Investigators say it was unlikely the two men had links to terrorism and appeared to be illegal migrants trying to get to Europe. However, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak said Saturday authorities were re-examining the list of crew and passengers after deciding the plane had deliberately changed course after taking off from Kuala Lumpur on the way to Beijing.

Passport theft is "a very big and critical problem in Thailand," said police Maj. Gen. Apichart Suribunya, who serves as Thailand's Interpol director. "It is a problem that Interpol, the United Nations and the international community have been trying to solve for years."

So far, with limited success.

Thailand's sapphire blue waters, wildlife parks, delicious cuisine and raunchy red light districts have attracted tourists for decades. Last year alone, 22 million foreign visitors made the trip. That means "there are more passports to steal in Thailand than other countries in the region," said Clive Williams, a counterterrorism expert at Australia's Macquarie University.

Phuket is one of Thailand's tourism honeypots. Tourists flock here in droves each year for its sun, sand and laid back ambience. And some, like Italian Luigi Maraldi, lose their passports along the way.

Maraldi hired a hired a motorbike on Phuket last year. When he returned to the shop to retrieve his passport, he was told it had been given away to someone who looked like him.

His passport, along with another stolen in Phuket two years earlier, was used to board the ill-fated flight undetected, revealing startling shortcomings in the security of international travel.

Interpol says it maintains a global database of 40 million lost or stolen travel documents, but only a handful of countries actually check it before allowing passengers aboard flights. Malaysia and Thailand are not among them.

Apichart said accessing the database is not complicated, but Thai authorities use it only when travelers are deemed suspicious. It can also be time-consuming, he said, and the government has been keen to facilitate the lucrative tourism industry and ensure immigration lines aren't clogged.

"This is something we have to rethink," Apichart said.

The global intelligence company Stratfor said that passport fraud is common among human traffickers, drug smugglers, arms merchants, money launderers, fugitives and pedophiles—many of whom end up in Thailand. "Only a very small percentage," of those involved in the underground trade have terror links, Stratfor said.

Nevertheless, the threat remains a concern. After the Sept. 11 attacks, Thailand—under pressure from Western governments—vowed to crack down.

In 2004, police arrested a Bangladeshi who allegedly supplied forged passports to al-Qaida-linked terrorists, including the mastermind of the 2002 Bali attacks. In 2010, authorities nabbed Pakistani Muhammad Butt, who police believe provided false passports to suspects in the Madrid train bombings.

Two years later, Thai officers arrested Parknejed Seyed Ramin for alleged involvement in a passport racket that was thought to have aided suspects in a bomb plot discovered in Bangkok on Valentine's Day the same year. Police said Ramin's gang had been running a lucrative, 5-year-old forgery business worth millions of dollars.

Governments like the United States have fought back by embedding digital chips inside passports that contain a photo of the passport holder and information about the owner. Stratfor said that has made it tougher to alter photos, but chips can still be hacked.

In Thailand, passport forgers now use advanced technology, and their clients can evade capture by selling them to lookalikes who resemble the owners.

A senior Thai intelligence official, who has spent years hunting down passport theft rings, said investigators are currently tracking about 10 major syndicates in Thailand.

Most were run by nationals from Pakistan, India, Iran or Central Asia he said, for clients that are mostly illegal migrants. The fact that travel documents are often stolen or forged in one country and used in another, though, "makes it hard for the governments to follow and arrest them," he said.

In Phuket this week, police called meetings with dozens of owners of motorbike rental shops and told them to take copies of passports instead of the originals. It was unclear, though, how or whether they would enforce it.

The post Missing Plane Throws Spotlight on Passport Theft appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Despite Scandal, Indonesia Election Could Entrench Political Dynasties

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 01:26 AM PDT

Indonesia, elections, political dynasties, South Sulawesi, Banten, Syahrul Yasin Limpo, Ratu Atut Chosiyah, politics

A man rides a motorcycle near a campaign poster for Governor Syahrul Yasin Limpo's daughter, Indira Chunda Thita, in Makassar on April 9, 2014. (Photo: Reuters)

MAKASSAR, Indonesia — Makassar is a scrappy, traffic-choked port city in South Sulawesi where everybody knows your name. If, that is, your name is Limpo.

The family of Syahrul Yasin Limpo, the second-term governor of this resource-rich Indonesian province, has dominated local politics for three generations, and a fourth waits in the wings. Eight of Limpo's close relatives will run in the country's parliamentary elections on April 9: two sisters, one brother, two brothers-in-law, two nephews and a daughter.

It all adds up to a formidable dynasty in a country where political families are both increasingly common and dogged by allegations of corruption, neglect and misrule.

In December, Indonesia's anti-graft agency, known by its Indonesian initials KPK, arrested Ratu Atut Chosiyah, 51, the matriarch of a wealthy clan with a stranglehold over politics and business in Banten, an impoverished province west of the capital Jakarta.

Chosiyah is now in detention awaiting trial accused by the KPK of bribing a judge to favor her candidate in an election dispute last year. Her lawyer denies the charge. The KPK seized her family's fleet of luxury cars, while local media reported on overseas shopping sprees and a US$500,000 renovation of Chosiyah's private mansion.

Her arrest has not dimmed the ambitions of other political families, who—as the lengthy list of Limpo candidates suggests—could become more deeply rooted than ever in the post-election landscape.

Paradoxically, these dynasties are byproducts of Indonesia's democratic rebirth. After the 1998 overthrow of former dictator Suharto, Indonesia embarked upon an ambitious program of decentralization that, through direct elections, turned many local leaders into influential politicians.

Following these politicians into public office are spouses, children, siblings and in-laws, spawning family fiefdoms in every corner of this vast archipelago. Some have shored up power by misusing central government funds intended for regional development, analysts said.

"Indonesia right now is flooded with money and there are many so-called little kingdoms around the country where nobody's checking how local officials spend their budgets," said an official at an international development agency who asked not to be named because he works closely with the Indonesian government.

In the Philippines, political dynasties have held sway for 70 years or more and are "prevalent in areas with more severe poverty," said a July 2013 study by the Asian Institute of Management in Manila.

Poverty entrenched those dynasties, said the study, although there was "less evidence" that dynasties caused poverty.

In Indonesia, dynasties are a relatively new phenomenon and it's too soon to conclude that they impede development, said Michael Buehler, an assistant professor at Northern Illinois University who has studied Indonesian elites in depth.

"But the Philippines basically shows us that dynasties are bad news. Overall, the economic development of places where dynasties have been for decades has been worse than places where there is more competition."

'I'm Yellow'

The Limpo homeland of South Sulawesi, about 1,400 km (870 miles) east of Jakarta, is no economic backwater.

With a population of about 8 million people—the same as Switzerland—the province is rich in nickel ore and a major producer of rice, cocoa and maize. Its capital Makassar is a trade and transport hub between east and west Indonesia.

Sitting in an office guarded by a tiger which has been stuffed in mid-snarl, Limpo cites his achievements as governor: a growing middle class, falling poverty levels and a higher than national economic growth rate.

However, South Sulawesi ranks low among Indonesian provinces for spending on health and education, according to a 2012 study by the Australian government and the Indonesian policy group Partnership for Governance Reform.

Limpo began his career as a low-level bureaucrat in Gowa, a district adjoining Makassar's eastern suburbs and run since 2005 by his younger brother Ichsan.

There are eight Limpo candidates standing for election or re-election to district, provincial and national assemblies on April 9, mostly—but not always—on a ticket for the Golkar Party, which was Suharto's political vehicle for decades.

Limpo's younger sister Dewi is running for the People's Conscience Party (Hanura) and his daughter Thita for the National Mandate Party (PAN).

Limpo doesn't view his family as a dynasty. Voters have a choice, he argued, and if they happen to choose a Limpo—that's because his relatives are hard-working, experienced and honest. "My family members have dedicated their lives to the people, and so far our track record is very good," he said. "Until now none of the family has shown signs of corruption."

At 28, Limpo's nephew Adnan is already a political veteran. He was first elected to the provincial assembly a decade ago while still at high school.

Now a Golkar candidate—his campaign slogan ("I'm Yellow") derives from the party's color—Adnan is running for his third term in office.

"Look at John F. Kennedy," he told Reuters after a recent strategy meeting in one of Makassar's smoke-filled coffee shops. "All his relatives were fit to be leaders during that time."

Thita, 33, one of three Limpos running at the national level, compares her family to the Gandhi-Nehru dynasty of India.

Clan Versus Clan

Understandably, the Limpos are less keen on comparisons with Chosiyah's disgraced clan in Banten. "We have different origins," said Limpo.

Chosiyah's dynasty is rooted in business: construction projects her father won during Suharto's rule were the foundation of its current wealth and power.

Her husband Hikmat Tomet, who died in November, headed Golkar's Banten branch, which allowed him to place family candidates at the top of the party's list, said Buehler. Three of the four Chosiyah relatives running in the April election are Golkar candidates.

"I'm not even sure her arrest will undermine her family's power," he said. "All her underlings are still in place."

Chosiyah's spokesman Fitron Nur Ikhsan has repeatedly defended the family in the Indonesian media, describing it as "democratic" and ruled by consensus.

By contrast, the Limpo family is rooted in the bureaucracy—the governor's father was a former soldier and five-time district head—and boasts neither the same wealth nor control over party politics. Limpo is head of Golkar in South Sulawesi, but choosing election candidates is the task of another party member belonging to a rival family.

This could make it more vulnerable than Chosiyah's family, said Buehler.

The growth of Indonesia's clans is not inevitable—just look at the results of last year's mayoral election in Makassar. Irman Yasin Limpo, the governor's younger brother, ran against a local architect and lost.

So did Nani Rosada, who ran in June 2013 to succeed her husband Dede as mayor of Bandung, the capital of West Java province.

In most areas, however, the member of a clan loses not to a reform-minded candidate, but to a member of a rival clan, said Buehler. "The dynasty building of families is mainly constrained by the influence of other families," he said.

The KPK's investigation of Banten's first family could further entrench some dynasties, as incumbents seek to be replaced or joined by children and other relatives who might help shield them from unwanted scrutiny.

After an interview at the governor's official residence, Limpo's daughter Thita presents a 15-year-old schoolgirl who had recently returned from summer school in England with a burning desire to enter politics.

She is Andi Tenri Bilang Radisya Melati—the governor's granddaughter.

Additional reporting by Kanupriya Kapoor in Jakarta.

The post Despite Scandal, Indonesia Election Could Entrench Political Dynasties appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Planning Could Hold Key to Disappearance of Flight MH370

Posted: 17 Mar 2014 11:50 PM PDT

Malayia Airlines, Flight MH370, hijacking, pilot, co-pilot, transponder

Malaysia's acting Transport Minister Hishammuddin Hussein shows two maps with corridors of the last known possible location of the missing Malaysia Airlines MH370 plane as he addresses reporters at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport on March 17, 2014. (Photo: Reuters / Damir Sagolj)

KUALA LUMPUR — Whoever reached across the dimly lit cockpit of a Malaysia Airlines jet and clicked off a transponder to make Flight MH370 vanish from controllers' radars flew the plane into a navigational and technical black hole.

By choosing that exact place and time to vanish into radar darkness with 238 others on board, the person—presumed to be a pilot or a passenger with advanced knowledge—appears to have acted only after meticulous planning, according to aviation experts.

Understanding the sequence that led to the unprecedented plane hunt widening across two vast tracts of territory north and south of the Equator is key to grasping the motives of what Malaysian authorities suspect was hijacking or sabotage.

By signing off from Malaysian airspace at 1:19am on March 8 with a casual "all right, good night," rather than the crisp radio drill advocated in pilot training, a person now believed to be the co-pilot gave no hint of anything unusual.

Two minutes later, at 1:21am local time, the transponder—a device identifying jets to ground controllers—was turned off in a move that experts say could reveal a careful sequence.

"Every action taken by the person who was piloting the aircraft appears to be a deliberate one. It is almost like a pilot's checklist," said one senior captain from an Asian carrier with experience of jets, including the Boeing 777.

The radio call does not prove it was the co-pilot who turned off the transponder. Pilots say the usual practice is that the pilot not in control of the plane talks on the radio.

Police have searched the premises of both the captain and co-pilot and are checking the backgrounds of all passengers.

But whoever turned the transponder to "off," did so at a vulnerable point between two airspace sectors when Malaysian and Vietnamese controllers could easily assume the airplane was each others' responsibility.

"The predictable effect was to delay the raising of the alarm by either party," David Learmount, operations and safety editor at Flight International, wrote in an industry blog.

That mirrors delays in noticing something was wrong when an Air France jet disappeared over the Atlantic in 2009 with 228 people on board, a gap blamed on confusion between controllers.

Yet whereas the Rio-Paris disaster was later traced to pilot error, the suspected kidnapping of MH370's passengers and crew was carried out with either skill or bizarre coincidences.

Whether or not pilots knew it, the jet was just then in a technically obscure sweet spot, according to a top radar expert.

Air traffic controllers use secondary radar which works by talking to the transponder. Some air traffic control systems also blend in some primary radar, which uses a simple echo.

But primary radar signals fade faster than secondary ones, meaning even a residual blip would have vanished for controllers and even military radar may have found it difficult to identify the 777 from other ghostly blips, said radar expert Hans Weber.

"Turning off the transponder indicates this person was highly trained," said Weber, of consultancy TECOP International.

Not in the Manual

The overnight flight to Beijing from Kuala Lumpur is packed year-round with business people, Chinese tourists and students, attracted in part by code-sharing deals, regular travelers say.

The lockdown of MH370 may have begun as early as 40 minutes into the flight at a point when meals are being hurriedly served in time to get trays cleared and lights dimmed for the night.

"It was a red-eye flight. Most people—the passengers and the crew—just want to rest," a Malaysia Airlines stewardess said. "Unless there was a reason to panic, if someone had taken control of the aircraft, they would not have noticed anything."

At some point between 1:07am and 1:37am, investigators believe someone switched off another system called ACARS designed to transmit maintenance data back to the ground.

The explanation of the timing has shifted after Malaysian officials initially said it was turned off before the pilot last spoke at 1:19am. But it could have been done later as well, although before 1:37am, when the system was to make another transmission, which it did not.

By itself, switching off ACARS was unusual but would not necessarily have raised alarms at the airline and the passengers would not have known something was amiss, said some of the six pilots contacted by Reuters, none of whom agreed to be named.

"Occasionally, there are gaps in the communications systems and the guys in ground operations may not think much of it initially. It would be a while before they try to find out what was wrong," said one captain with an Asian carrier.

Cutting the datalink would not have been easy. Instructions are not in the Flight Crew Operating Manual, one pilot said.

Circuit-breakers used to disable the system are in a bay reached through a hatch in the floor next to the lefthand front exit, close to a galley used to prepare meals.

Most pilots said it would be impossible to turn off ACARS from inside the cockpit, although two people did not rule it out.

Hiding in Full View?

After the transponder was turned off, the northeast-bound jet took a northwestern route from the sea off Kota Bahru in eastern Malaysia to Penang Island. It was last detected on military radar around 200 miles northwest of Penang.

Even that act of going off course may not have caused alarm at first if it was handled gradually, pilots said.

"Nobody pays attention to these things unless they are aware of the direction that the aircraft was heading in," said one first officer who has flown with Malaysia Airlines.

The airline said it had reconstructed the event in a simulator to try to figure out how the jet vanished and kept flying for what may have been more than seven hours.

Pilots say whoever was then in control may have kept the radio on in silent mode to hear what was going on around him, but would have avoided restarting the transponder at all costs.

"That would immediately make the aircraft visible … like a bright light. Your registration, height, altitude and speed would all become visible," said an airline captain.

After casting off its identity, the aircraft set investigators a puzzle that has yet to be solved. It veered either northwards or southwards, within an hour's flying time of arcs stretching from the Caspian to the southern Indian Ocean.

The best way to avoid the attention of military radars would have been to fly at a fixed altitude, on a recognized flight path and at cruising speed without changing course, pilots say.

Malaysian officials dismissed as speculation reports that the jet may have flown at low altitude to avoid detection.

But pilots said the best chance of feeling its way through the well-defended northern route would have been to hide in full view of military radar inside commercial lanes—raising awkward questions over security in several parts of the Asia-Pacific.

"The military radar controllers would have seen him moving on a fixed line, figured that it was a commercial aircraft at a high altitude, and not really a danger especially if he was on a recognized flight path," said one pilot.

"Some countries would ask you to identify yourself, but you are flying through the night and that is the time when the least attention is being paid to unidentified aircraft. As long as the aircraft is not flying toward a military target or point, they may not bother with you."

Although investigators refused on Monday to be drawn into theories, few in the industry believe a 250-ton passenger jet could run amok without expert skills or preparation.

"Whoever did this must have had lots of aircraft knowledge, would have deliberately planned this, had nerves of steel to be confident enough to get through primary radar without being detected and been confident enough to control an aircraft full of people," a veteran airline captain told Reuters.

The post Planning Could Hold Key to Disappearance of Flight MH370 appeared first on The Irrawaddy Magazine.

Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News


BURMA'S CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT: One text procedure, trustworthiness, area cleansing & control policy

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:43 AM PDT

By: Sai Wansai
Tuesday, 18 March 2014

Sai Wansai
The latest development that the Armed Resistance Movements' Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) and the government's Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) have resolved to jointly draft a single text document for the nationwide cease-fire proposal ahead of Hpa-an peace talks in Kayin State is a welcome news, after months of delayed progress, which have hindered the overall peace process in general.

In a recent statement, reported by Xinhua/Global Times, on 10 March 2014, issued at the end of the preliminary meeting between UPWC led by Vice Chairman U Aung Min and NCCT at the Myanmar Peace Centre, both sides agreed to form a team including nine members each from the government and NCCT to draft single text document that includes seven sections.

Accordingly, Eleven Media Group's published news on  11 March 2014, a team will be formed with three representatives from the government, three representatives from the parliament, three representatives from the military, and nine members from the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) on behalf of ethnic armed groups, to draft the ceasefire agreement together.

"The government and ourselves have different ceasefire drafts. We submitted the Law Khee Lar draft. The government also has its own draft, so both sides were holding onto their own drafts. As it was difficult to negotiate like this, we have agreed to draft a new agreement by forming a new group with people from both sides," said Naing Han Tha aka Nai Hong Sar, leader of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT).

DVB report of 10 March also said that Ministers Khin Yi (Immigration), Thet Naing Win (Border Affairs) and Lt-Gen Myint Soe of the Ministry of Defence were present at the meeting, alongside NCCT leaders Nai Hong Sar of the New Mon State Party the Karen National Union's (KNU) Kwe Htoo Win and Lian H. Sakhong of the Chin National Front.

Trustworthiness
The crux of the problem is trustworthiness and so far it has not been forthcoming, according to Karen National Union (KNU) Major Saw Kler Doh when he said, "The government thinks we should trust each other; but they should prove that they deserve our trust," in an interview, published in Mizzima Daily on March 10. "So far, they have never complied with the demands we made during our peace talks," he said.

Major Saw KlerDoh said the Tatmadaw had more than 80 positions in the 5th Brigade area.
"We demanded that they withdraw seven of them, but they never did," he said.
"They even expanded their presence. If they act like this, how can we trust them?" the commander said, acknowledging that he doubted the Tatmadaw trusted the KNU.

Area cleansing and control
Another obstacle is the Burma Army policy of "area cleansing and control" of resistance movements within the areas sized in ethnic homelands. No wonder, despite of ceasefire agreements, armed clashes occurred hundreds of times with the SSA -South and SSA -North in Shan State that have already signed union-level ceasefire agreement with the government, needless to say about the ongoing armed clashes with the KIA and TNLA, which have still not inked the ceasefire agreement.

The agreement to de-escalate the armed conflict between the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and Burma Army signed months ago have also proved to be ineffective, for armed confrontation continue to occur in Kachin and Shan states.

And so the immediate pressing two issues to tackle prior to the joint-ceasefire agreement draft is the lack of "trustworthiness" and the Burma Army policy of implementing "area cleansing and control" in ethnic homelands. In other words, from the Armed Resistance Movements' (ARMs) point of view, the government and Burma Army should show that they mean business by physical withdrawal of their troops from immediate contested areas and stop military operations altogether to give up their area cleansing and control policy. The ARMs' see the ongoing conduct of Burma Army as an intruder and occupation force waging wars within their territories, while the Burma Army would argue that it is protecting the national sovereignty. This two different line of thinking or concept needs to be ironed out beforehand, if the drafting of a  single text document for the nationwide cease-fire proposal should materialize and pave way for further political settlement that lies ahead. The best way might be to accept the notion of "shared-sovereignty" between the ethnic nationalities and the Burman-dominated center, no matter if it is headed by military-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) or the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD).

Time and again, the ARMs have pointed out that the military needs to show some good will by withdrawing from contested areas for a few kilometers and stop the offensives altogether, to pave way for a further consolidation of ceasefire agreement. And as the KNU commander Major Saw Kler Doh rightly put it, the military still needs to show its trustworthiness, if real ceasefire agreement is to be implemented in words and deeds.

At the end of the day, it is like what Khon Ja from the Kachin Peace Network told the panelists, during the recent DVB Debate,  on 12 March, regarding internal conflict in Burma, that there should be less discussion about the peace talks and more focus on ending the conflict in reality.

"Whether they sign the ceasefire or not is not important. What is important is to actually stop the fighting," she said.

One text procedure
The hope that one text negotiation procedure could break the ice seems to be quite high, given the remarkable success of Camp David Accord signed between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat on 17 September 1978. It would do us good to look at a little more at the principles surrounding the approach.

Fisher and Ury explain that a good agreement is one which is wise and efficient, and which improves the parties' relationship. Wise agreements satisfy the parties' interests and are fair and lasting. The authors' goal is to develop a method for reaching good agreements. 

Negotiations often take the form of positional bargaining. In positional bargaining each part opens with their position on an issue. The parties then bargain from their separate opening positions to agree on one position. Haggling over a price is a typical example of positional bargaining. Fisher and Ury argue that positional bargaining does not tend to produce good agreements. It is an inefficient means of reaching agreements, and the agreements tend to neglect the parties' interests. It encourages stubbornness and so tends to harm the parties' relationship. Principled negotiation provides a better way of reaching good agreements. 

Fisher and Ury develop four principles of negotiation. Their process of principled negotiation can be used effectively on almost any type of dispute. Their four principles are 1) separate the people from the problem; 2) focus on interests rather than positions; 3) generate a variety of options before settling on an agreement; and 4) insist that the agreement be based on objective criteria. 

The one-text procedure is a systematic process for shifting negotiators away from thinking about concessions, by using a neutral, third party facilitator to elicit underlying interests and to simplify the process of jointly inventing many options and deciding on one. (Source: Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In - by Roger Fisher and William Ury)
 
This procedure was used at Camp David in the negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat. President Carter and Secretary of State Vance created 23 drafts in 13 days before they had a proposal to which both sides could say yes.( Source: The Negotiator Magazine - 2003)

Meanwhile, the NCCT  optimistic mood for the participation of the Burma Army in the process of one text procedure might be short-lived, for the Burma Army recent statement contradict with at least two of the four principles spelled out in the negotiation approach.

RFA reported on 16 March, speaking on behalf of Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, Northern Regional Commander Tun Tun Naung, when asked about nationwide ceasefire in Myitkyina, Kachin state, said: "The military's part is after signing the ceasefire, to discuss the deployment of troops".

He further explained the position of the military regarding the peace process as follows.
"Not to take advantage of the peace agreement and be a burden to the concerned ethnic population; to follow the existing laws; to follow the three duties - non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of National Solidarity, non-disintegration of Sovereignty - and essence of democracy by adhering to the 2008 Constitution in the process of democratization together. These are the military policies laid down regarding the peace process."
 
The 2008 Constitution, Chapter VII, Defence Services, writes:
"The main armed force for the Defence of the Union is the Defence Services."
"All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services."

This, in effect, means that all the ethnic armed resistance groups must either surrender or incorporated into Burma Army without question, which is a far cry from their aspiration of a "Federal Army" of the ARMs or ethnic armed groups, having a collective say in the formation and decision-making of the national army. The non-Burman ethnic sees the present Burma Army wholly dominated by the Burmans and that they are not adequately presented in any way, except for the role of cannon fodder with no say in decision-making process.

One couldn't imagine, with this rigid positioning of the Burma Army,  whether the much publicized drafting of one text negotiation procedure could successfully be drawn, leading to the resolution of the conflict.

Concluding note
Actually, to break the ice on this stalemate, there has to be a political will and real desire to compromise.  In practical terms, it would mean the shelving of Burma Army's "area cleansing and control" under the pretext of protecting or upholding sovereignty and started withdrawing from immediate, contested areas and stop all offensives altogether, to give this one text procedure on ceasefire agreement draft a chance. If progress could be made on one text procedure and nationwide ceasefire could be inked, we could go on to the next step of political dialogue in the same manner.

Apart from this, another sticking point, however, would be on how to determine the role of mediator or facilitator. So far, no one has heard of the third party mediator participation.

And if government run Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) or any of its affiliated groups would enter the fray is also anybody's guess. Besides, if these groups could even be considered as neutral body is also a big question.

And again, in the end all these deliberation will boils down to constitutional amendment or rewriting it, with special emphasizes on the form of political system -  unitary or federal - and the formation of national army - federal or Burman-dominated army - to encompass and address the ongoing political woes in Burma, so that durable solution could be found.

But one thing is clear that digging-in in one's pre-conceived, entrenched position won't do us any good and will only be a hindrance to the reconciliation process.

The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor

Opium, Logging and Gas: the Burma Army’s predatory rule over the people of Burma

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:41 AM PDT

17 March 2014
Kachin State, Burma

Dear friends,

We have just returned from a series of relief missions to the Kachin and Shan States. There the Burma Army continues its attacks on ethnic minorities. Please see our reports and video of these attacks at www.freeburmarangers.org . The Burma Army also over-watches opium production and logging, and protects a gas pipeline that profits them but few others. This report will be the first in a three-part series that documents the Burma Army's predatory rule of this part of Burma. Part one is "Opium, Burma Army-controlled narcotic militias and real people," part two is "Attacks on the people and logging" and part three is "The Shwe Pipeline and the oppression of the people."

opium-fields-under-militia-and-ba-control
Opium fields in Northern Shan State, Burma 20 February 2014

Part 1: Opium, Burma Army-controlled narcotic militias and farmers

After conducting medical and Good Life Club (GLC) programs and documenting the Burma Army attacks in southern Kachin State, we moved to northern Shan State to work with the Ta'ang, Shan, and Kachin people there. On this mission Arakan, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Shan and Ta'ang FBR team members served the IDPs and villagers we met.

After conducting more programs with the Ta'ang people in northern Shan State, we moved to an area of opium production. We were accompanied by elements of the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Shan State Army North (SSA-N). These groups are united in their struggle for freedom in Shan State and all of Burma. They also have a policy to eradicate all narcotics. We went to the Pang Say area of Nam Kham Township, northern Shan State. Here there were opium fields around every village that we encountered. The Chinese families producing the opium are uniformly poor and some wretchedly so. Most are living in dilapidated shacks of wood, thatch, stone and tattered plastic sheeting. They are all under the control of the Burma Army-supported People Militia Force (Bi Thu Sit or Ta Ka Sa Pha in Burmese). The militia is led by an ethnic Chinese man named Kyaw Myint, who is also  a member of Parliament representing  Namkham No.2 constituency for the Burma government-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).  Namkham is situated on the China-Burma border close to the Muse-Riuli crossing.
Opium Harvest 21 February 2014, Northern Shan State, Burma.

Personal Experience with Opium families
The Ta'ang resistance has an anti-narcotics education program and every Ta'ang village we visited had a large vinyl poster educating people on the evils of narcotics and the policy of the Ta'ang against it. They have a program to educate, provide subsidies and crop substitutions and to conduct enforcement. As we prepared to go, the local leaders told us that the Ta'ang Army was planning to start destroying all the opium fields in the area later this month. We planned to document that too, if it happened while we were there.

We started the movement into the opium area and by the second day began to see opium fields. We stopped at the first large field and began to take photographs. We had only been there 20-30 minutes before we were told that the Burma Army in a camp to the north had word we were there and were coming to attack us. We finished our documentation and moved on deeper into the opium growing area with a rear guard watching for the Burma Army.
Opium fields below Opium Militia camp 21 February 2014 Pansay area, Northern Shan State, Burma.

We climbed up to over 5,000 feet and entered into a high valley with opium fields and houses scattered on the hillsides.  On top of a small hill in the center of the valley was a village of about 10 houses, and in the middle of the village stood a larger stone-and wood house.  Opium fields came right up to the house.  The combined Kachin (KIA), Ta'ang (TNLA) and Shan (SSA-N) troops set up a security perimeter around the village and we began to document the opium fields. As we approached the stone house on the hill, the Chinese family there looked at us fearfully.  I looked back at them and smiled as I took photos of the opium all around their house, the house itself and the 4-wheel drive jeep parked in front. This was the only vehicle we had seen at any farm and signified that this family had connections and more resources than most.  Still, to me they looked very poor. I felt pity, mixed with dislike of their chosen profession.  I took photos, investigated the property and made notes.

After about an hour of taking photos and gathering information, the leader of this part of the mission said we would stay here one night and the next day go to do a reconnaissance of the nearby militia camp. To our surprise we were told we would be sleeping in the house of the family with the jeep – the same family I had spent time documenting and had looked down on.  "We have control right now, and unless the militia or Burma Army comes we will sleep here," our local Ta'ang leader told us. "We have told the people here to stop growing opium and we are trying to help them find other ways. Still they do not listen and keep growing the opium. At some point if they do not stop, our Ta'ang troops will destroy it. But for now we just document it."

I felt awkward as we entered the house of the opium growers but we smiled and in limited Chinese thanked them for their hospitality. My wife led the way in establishing friendship and was soon sitting around the fire with the women of the house.  As she shared with smiles and hand signals and then later through one of our team who could speak Chinese, the family began to warm up and became very friendly towards us. On my part, I began to like them and by that night felt warm and close. Opium farmers are still people and I was finding that out. It was not a simple, "good guy-bad guy" situation. We told them we were here to find out about the situation and they did not need to be afraid of us. Our local Ta'ang leader told them the same. We all knew the Ta'ang had a plan announced to destroy the fields but did not know when that would happen. For now we were becoming friends.
The next morning we took some of the teams and climbed up toward the Militia camp. The camp squatted on a mountaintop that over-watched all the land below it. It can be seen from miles in each direction and it reminded me of a feudal fortress dominating all below.

"It looks like Mordor," said one of our team members. It did.  A bare, tree-stripped, scared, fortified mountaintop stronghold, ruled with bad purpose, subjugating the people below it.

Opium fields were arrayed below the camp coming up the mountain to within a few hundred yards of the outside fence.

We approached the camp carefully and spent most of the day filming and photographing the camp and the soldiers in it. The new flag of Burma, yellow, green and red with a white star, was on the flag pole. The militia troops were in dark green uniform similar to Burma Army uniforms.  After gathering all the documentation we could, we started the walk back to the village we had come from.

When we arrived we were greeted with smiles by the family we stayed with. They, my family and the teams that had stayed back had become closer. This good feeling was interrupted when a new column of Ta'ang troops came into the village. They were from headquarters and were on orders to begin the destruction of the poppies today.  We were all surprised and I said, "Yes, it is good to destroy the fields but please not now. We have been taken into these people's homes, and they have shared their food with us. We told them they did not need to be afraid of us. They knew they needed to do something different but please give them more time. If the destruction starts now, with no other kind of help, they will feel like we betrayed them."
Ta'ang National Liberation Army destroying Opium fields 21 February 2014, Northern Shan State, Burma.

Our kids ran up to me and said, "No, no they should not destroy these fields. These people are our friends!" The situation of us defending opium growers was new to me and seemed ludicrous. But in a flash it showed me how complicated this all was. Here were people trying to survive. They had chosen a bad way to do it, and we were against it and had told them that.  At the same time they had been kind to us and we had enjoyed each other's company. We had told them they did not need to fear us, that, yes, we were all against narcotics production but the FBR was here to gather information. These were poor people and not evil drug lords. In over 20 years of our work in Burma I have never seen a rich opium farmer – they are poor and desperate people scratching a living out of bare, deforested mountains. Here the militia, the Burma Army and the drug cartels can get rich but not these farmers. They were not innocent but they were also not evil.  And they were now our friends. I thought back to last night when my wife sat with the family and shared the gospel story of how much God loved all of us and sent Jesus to help us. We had prayed with this family and we loved them.

As I was thinking these things, the Ta'ang army was advancing through the fields and knocking the poppies off the stalks with sticks.  I prayed about what I should do. We agreed with the Ta'ang anti-drug policy, they are our friends and teammates and earlier we had hoped to document the destruction of poppies. At the same time, here were people in trouble. What can we do? "Comfort them and give them love," was the answer I felt. I looked up and saw the woman of the house burst into tears and run away. Her daughter followed her sobbing. "Why why, why now, we are not ready, I have lost everything, how will we eat, how will we feed our family?" she cried. I went up to her and held her hand, telling her I was sorry and that we would help some way. Her brother looked at me stone-faced and walked away. We gathered around the mother and daughter and tried to comfort them.

My children had tears running down their faces and said, "We know opium is wrong but why now, why didn't they have more time, these are our friends, what can we do?"
I prayed with the mother and through one of our Kachin team members told her that God had a way for her. She could ask God what to do, and God would show a new way. She wept as she answered me, "How will we eat and most of all how will we get my son out of prison? He is being held by the Burma Army and they have demanded $100 to get him released."  I asked our team if this was a true story and they said it was. "How can we save him, now all our way to make money is gone?" she cried.

I told the woman. "I will give you money for what you lost. Not because I think opium growing is right. I do not. It is wrong and our Ta'ang friends are right to destroy it. But we said that you did not need to fear us and we became friends with you and now this has happened. I am giving this money to help you set your son free, for food for your family and to encourage you to find another way. God will help you do that if you call on Him."  I gave her $230 which is about what she could have got with her crop. I explained why I did this to the Ta'ang leaders and soldiers and they all agreed it was okay.

The mother stopped crying and thanked us, saying, "I have nothing to give you but I will never forget this, thank you so much for this help."  My wife sat with her a long time encouraging her that this was an opportunity to make a new start and praying with her.

As we left to go to the next area I thought about this incident and it came to me that if you want to stop people from growing opium, loving them is the most important thing.  For me, I see a five-part policy is needed:
  1. Education
  2. Crop substitution
  3. Food subsidies until the crops substitutes take effect
  4. Enforcement and punishment
  5. Love.  To treat all people with love through each of the parts of a counter-narcotics policy will take longer but it is the moral way and will have the best, most long-term effect.
Interviews with Opium Farmers
While in this village we interviewed some of the opium farmers. Most of the people here were too afraid to answer questions about opium. A few, however, were willing to talk and here is what we learned.
Family harvesting Opium 21 February 2014 Shan State, Burma.

Q. Why do you grow opium?
A. Opium is the main thing in this area. Here rice does not grow well and so opium is the way we know to grow for money. We buy rice from other villages. Note: Some here said they have been growing opium for 5-6 years while others said over 16 years.

Q. Who owns this land and where do you sell the opium you farm here?
A. This is our land, we own it. Nearby villagers come and buy the opium but we don't know who they are. They are Chinese, Ta'ang and Lisu people. But most the people here are Chinese and are all considered to be Kyaw Myint's people.

Q. How much do you produce here?
A. The crop depends on the weather, but we average about 3 viss (7.5kg) a season.  The price is usually 600,000-700,000 kyat (or about $600-$700USD) per viss (about $2800 a year).  Last year we made 800,000 or 900,000 kyat ($800-900USD).

Q. How is production?
A. Opium production is up and down depending on the rains. We try to harvest during February and March before the rains. During the rainy season we can't harvest because it washes away the opium residue on the bulbs. During harvest time they we do 4-5 harvests a month.

Q. Who is the authority in this area?
A. The Burma Army's militia has control here. They are a Chinese militia under Kyaw Myint, who work under the Burma Army and they control the opium.

Q. Are there taxes on the opium?
A. Yes, the Peoples Militia Force (Kyaw Myint group) collects taxes once a year – they collect 10,000kyat per family. The militia who collect the taxes are stationed at Wa Ya Bum camp on Wa Ya Bum mountain.  There are more than 10 militia troops fulltime at Wa Ya Bum camp and over 60 who patrol the area. The militia are Chinese, but they are a different clan than we are. They all belong to the militia group headquartered in Pang Say led by Kyaw Myint.

Q. What is the role of the Burma Army?
A. The Burma Army has overall control. The militia works under them. The Burma Army doesn't usually come to the village, but five months ago they came on a patrol. Nothing happened.  Those Burma Army soldiers were from Kutkai. Other times the Burma Army comes and takes and destroys things.

One family described the opium harvesting process:
The opium plant flowers, then the petals fall away and the bulb ripens. Opium is then harvested from the bulb. A multi-bladed scoring tool is used to score the bulb, usually twice on one side, making six scores. The raw opium oozes from the bulb scores and is then twice-scraped from the bulb with a short, wide, curve-bladed knife. The opium oozes out white, and is gathered on the wide knife where it turns brown.  One bulb can be harvested from four to five times a month for about two months a year. It is sold by the viss for 600,000 -700,000 kyat per viss ($600-$700). One viss is about 2.5kg.

Burma Army controlled narcotic militias
The Burma army controls and supports the People Militia Force (Bi Thu Sit or Ta Ka Sa Pha in Burmese). The militia is led by Kyaw Myint who is a ethnic Chinese but who is a Burma citizen and a member of parliament.  Second-in-command of the militia is his younger brother, Kyaw Htwe. Two other brothers, Jang Kwey Ching and Jang Lu, are next in the chain of command of the militia and they also have the duty of overseeing the illegal logging in this area. The militia is headquartered in Pang Say town, Nam Kham Township, and has camps in three other locations south of Pang Say along mountain range that rises over 6000 feet high. The militia is also co-located with Burma Army troops in Mong Wi Village in the Mong Wi valley southeast of Pang Say. The Shwey gas pipeline runs through this town and valley on its way from offshore Arakan State in southwest Burma to China.
Opium Militia Army Camp on hill above opium fields Burma flag wrapped on pole Pan Say Area Shan State, Burma.

Opium production in the past few years has increased in the Namkham area of northern Shan State and this is directly related to Kyaw Myint and his Burma Army-supported militia.

(From "Still Poisoned ," a report by the Palaung Women's Organization (PWO).  According to this report, in the 2010-11 season, 1,109 hectares (about 4 ½  square miles) of land in 15 villages were now being used for opium cultivation, as opposed to 617 hectares two years ago in the same 15 villages. On this mission we saw eight of these villages and there were opium fields around each of them right up to the houses. According to another report by the Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) documented that Shan State accounts for over 90% of the opium production in Burma and that in 2010 the total area under opium poppy cultivation across Shan State increased by 20% from the year before. Also in this report, the UNODC reported that Burma's share of world opium production had increased from five percent in 2007 to 12 % in 2011. Opium farmers pay taxes of up to 8,000 kyat (US $10) per day to the militia. Some say they pay only a once a year tax of 10,000 kyat or more. The militia also controls methamphetamine trafficking and in this area a pill costs between 2,500 kyat- 3,000 kyat ($3.00- $4.00). The most common is the WY brand.
Opium Militia oversee Opium fields in Pan Say area Northern Shan State Burma 21 Feb 2014.

Conclusion
"Let my people go," has been on my mind and heart for Burma.  Whether the issue is opium, gas pipelines, logging or outright attacks, there is a way through this. For me it means listening to God and repenting of my own sins.  It means asking God how to stand with the oppressed and against oppression of all kinds. It means praying for our enemies and trying to be friends.  Everyone counts and together we can find a way forward – the Burmans and ethnic groups, the Burma Army and the pro-democracy movement, business and the welfare of all people.  Burma is big enough for everyone. Love should be the center of any solution and is the way to find the balance between freedom and responsibility, conservation and progress, justice and mercy. Our prayer is that God will lead us to better understand and help each other work towards reconciliation for all people in Burma.  Thank you for helping us do that.

God bless you and love,
Free Burma Rangers

BURMA: SURRENDER TIMING

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:36 AM PDT

By Roland Watson
March 16, 2014

There is now a desperate push by Burma's military dictatorship, including one of its public faces, the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC), and also ethnic traitors, to complete a nationwide ceasefire by early April. All sorts of announcements have been made saying that this timetable will be achieved. Of course, there have been months of such announcements regarding earlier deadlines, all of which were nothing less than regime propaganda, and which due to the insistence by the ethnic nationalities for achieving a fair deal for their people and for all of Burma, were not realized. The question should now be asked: Why does the regime view April as being so important?

The first thing to understand is that Burma's generals are demanding a unilateral or one-sided ceasefire, in other words, a complete surrender. The push for April therefore is nothing less than a negotiation over the surrender's timing. The regime is yielding nothing! It will not stop Burma Army attacks against the ethnic forces and peoples. Indeed, it has publicly stated, even in the face of unassailable evidence, that it is doing no such thing. Similarly, it will not stop its never-ending commission of gross human rights crimes, including murder, rape, arrest and torture, destruction of villages, extortion of and theft from villagers, etc. Nor will it agree to remove its forces from the ethnic areas, or even genuinely discuss the establishment of codes of conduct, which codes it has already agreed to negotiate and implement in its separate ceasefire agreements with the different ethnic armies. Ultimately, it is demanding that the ethnic forces disperse, give up their arms, and "join the legal fold."

Moreover, the regime refuses to discuss, much less agree to, the different ethnic demands including not only the cessation of attacks and abuses, and creation of codes of conduct, but also the drafting of a completely new Constitution to consign the military to its appropriate role in a democracy, and to establish a truly federal state and federal army.
In view of its continuing if not perpetual obstinacy, there is no reason for the ethnic groups to agree to anything, and given that the rightful representatives of the ethnic peoples can hold off the traitors, they won't.

The ethnic nationalities have now agreed to establish a joint committee with the regime to continue the discussions. From the regime's perspective, not to mention MPC and the traitors, the function of this committee is to prepare the specific terms of the surrender. It is therefore essential that sincere, uncorrupted representatives of the ethnic peoples are appointed to the ethnic side of the committee, not the corrupt traitors, so that ethnic and real Burma-wide interests are served.

This still leaves the question, though, why is the regime pushing for April? The answer to this is simple. The dictatorship knows that the upcoming census will be fraudulent. Its plans for this are already set. It further understands that much of the fraud will be uncovered, and that this will precipitate a popular reaction. In such an environment, an ethnic surrender will be precluded.

The regime has seen that its separate ceasefire agreements effectively defanged the resistance groups. Even in the face of the Burma Army repeatedly breaking and otherwise failing to fulfill the agreements, the ethnic forces, other than in Kachin and Northern Shan States, have done nothing. The dictatorship is confident that with a nationwide ceasefire/surrender in place, the ethnic forces, under the command of traitorous leaders, will also not react to the census fraud.

The ethnic groups should not agree to anything until after the census is completed and the results have been publicized, and further not until after any proposed deal has been presented for comment to the ethnic publics and civil society organizations.

Indeed, for the census, Kachin groups have already said that they will not recognize the results, and Karen groups have called for it to be postponed. Shan and Mon groups are planning their own count, to counter regime lies. Even worse, the regime has announced that Burma's most oppressed group, the Rohingya, will not even be counted.

Burma is still a military dictatorship, with a civilian facade. The recent announcement that the rights of the military to veto any constitutional amendments, will not be changed, not to mention its constitutional ability to act with impunity and with no legal consequences, is proof of this.

This leaves us once again with elementary arithmetic. For Burma to be freed, there must be a new popular uprising, and/or renewed armed resistance. Nothing less will suffice.
For an uprising, a trigger is required. The people of the country, from all ethnic groups, both ethnic nationality and Burman, are very angry, but something is needed to take them over the edge into large-scale action. While it is impossible to predict what will set a subjugated population off - witness Tunisia - a number of potential flash points in Burma are clear:

- If the constitution is not amended to permit Suu Kyi to become President (or for that matter if it is not redrafted to reflect fundamental democratic principles).
- If Suu Kyi realizes the folly of her ways, returns to her real pro-democracy advocacy of 1989, and calls for protests.
- In response to the census fraud.
- In response to fraud in the upcoming election (which personally I give only a 50/50 chance of even being held - at least under the dictatorship's control).

It would be best if the people of Burma became proactive and started demonstrating now, rather than wait for such a flashpoint. They must reject the dictatorship's propaganda, that any peace, including even a unilateral ethnic surrender, is good for the country.
In other words, they should once again protest for freedom and democracy, not only against land thefts and other types of abuse.

To kick all of this off, one can only ask: Where are Burma's revolutionary graffiti artists?

SSA building homes across the border

Posted: 18 Mar 2014 04:34 AM PDT

More than one and a half years after agreement was reached in Kengtung, between the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) and Naypyitaw's Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC), construction of the planned 200 homes for displaced families in Monghta sub-township, opposite Chiangmai's Wiang Haeng district has begun, according to a SHAN reporter that visited the area last month.
001
Signboard at the entrance: Monghta Town, 14 January 2011 (Day of Establishment), 1400ft above sea level

Supervisor for the RCSS/SSA is Maj Sai Lek, who had moved there several months ahead of the implementation of the planned project.

The 200 homes on completion would add to the 40 homes already established there since early 2011, a few months after Monghta and its surrounding area were designated as a second sub-township of Mongton township. The other sub-township is Pongpakhem, opposite Chiangdao district, east of Wiang Haeng.
Today's Monghta

"It used to have hundreds of homes before the Kuomintang incursion in 1950," a Shan who is now a naturalized citizen after fleeing into Thailand since. "It, together with Mongton and Pangpakhem, used to be part of the Mongpan princely state."

It still had about 100 homes in 1994 during the late Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army period. Armed conflict in the area had begun following declaration of Independence by Khun Sa, who used to be a militia leader under the control of the Burma Army.

"It was then that Sao Yawd Serk (then a major in the MTA and now the leader of the RCSS/SSA) became famous after his daring capture of the Burmese army stronghold at Loi Hin Kawng, near Mong Kyawd (some 25 miles east of Monghta)," the reporter remembered. "The Burma Army had to use bombers to dislodge him."

The said battle and another one in 2002, following the MTA's surrender, had devastated the area and by the end of 2010 when it became a sub-township there were less than 10 houses. "The Burma Army managed to bring in Lahus from Nakawngmu and Pongpakhem, with assurances that they would be allowed to grow poppies," a local source told SHAN.
Mongton township, except for parts under the control of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), is known as a major opium producer in Shan State.

Monghta, about 25 miles north of the former border checkpoint of Lak Taeng, is also connected to Mongpan in the north, Nakawngmu in the east, Thailand's Wiang Haeng in the south and Homong (former MTA headquarters) in the west.

"The Burmese officials told us a new bridge across the Salween at Ta Hsop Pard crossing would be constructed and completed within 3 years," another visitor reported.
The road from Monghta to the Salween Crossing going to Mongpan

In the meantime, Chiangmai provincial officials have been pushing for the reopening of BP-1 (Boundary Pillar # 1) at Nawng Ook, connecting Chiangdao with Pongpakhem, and BP-2 (Boundary Pillar # 2, also known as Lak Taeng), connecting Monghta with Wiang Haeng.

The 12 point agreement signed between Naypyitaw and the RCSS/SSA on 19 May 2012 includes Point # 10- to establish an industrial zone in the Monghta area.
The new road: From Monghta to Mongpan