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| Naypyitaw urges Wa to sign NCA Posted: 14 Aug 2015 05:45 AM PDT Government negotiator U Aung Min recently exhorted representatives from the United Wa State Party/Army (UWSP/UWSA) at a meeting held in Rangoon to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) draft that was finalized at the 9th meeting with the ethnic armed organizations' Senior Delegation (SD) on 6-7 August, according to government sources.  (Photo: Irrawaddy) U Aung Min reiterated the 4 guarantees that came with the NCA:
Also according to Amsterdam based Transnational Institute (TNI), the Wa leaders are unhappy about the draft negotiated by the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), the SD's forerunner. It quoted Shan leader Lt-Gen Hso Ten saying: "The Wa are not satisfied with the NCCT, and think its approach is too soft, and feel it is appeasing too much. The Wa said 'appeasement is defeatism', and they want to unite all the armed groups and make them stronger than the NCCT." It is not clear whether it is pleased with the latest draft. The Wa , since 1993, has also been calling for a separate statehood which should include the same areas as outlined in the 2008 constitution as well as the adjacent Mongpawk and Mongphen, which are currently incorporated in Mongyang township. "If you don't sign it," U Aung Min was reported as saying," there may arise two thorny problems to address:
The UWSP/UWSA is one of the 15 armed organizations that have signed bilateral agreements with Naypyitaw. According to unconfirmed reports, President Thein Sein recently sent out invitations to all the 15 groups to sign the NCA. No date was proposed, but sources say the government would wish to do it well before the elections in November. |
| Ethnic, Civic and Nation Identities in Contemporary Burma Posted: 13 Aug 2015 09:00 AM PDT A common, national identity in a multi-ethnic state is one of the most crucial components in a nation-building process. In this respect, Burma has had unusually intransigent problems that were never successfully resolved during the colonial period and have simply been suppressed by force since then. This protracted divisiveness has stunted the nation's modernization and growth. Many also believed that economically and politically underdevelopment of the country has much to do with an ongoing struggle for national identity. A Burmese writer, Ma Thida, in an article titled "Defining a National Identity Might Bring Peace to Myanmar", touched on this core theme of national identity in nation-building process as follows: "We, Myanmar, ourselves need to answer a question: What is Myanmar society? What is our national identity? This is the key challenge we all in Myanmar now face. The current government lists 135 ethnic groups and these are grouped into 8 major national ethnic races: Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Bamar, Rakhine, and Shan. There are altogether 64 languages spoken in Myanmar and these are grouped into 5 language families, including Sino-Tibetan, Tai-Kadai, and Hmong-Mien. So Myanmar is multi-ethnic community. And it is also multi-religious country. Amongst all this, how do we identify ourselves? This is still very unclear for the people of Myanmar." The government recognizes four religions – Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Islam, although some other religions such as Jewish and Burmese folk religion, which refers to the animistic and polytheistic religious worship of nats (deities). "Myanmar" a collective, national identity? In 1989, the Burmese military changed the name from "Burma" to "Myanmar", that has since then been prescribed as the national identity of the country. However, it is not accepted by the non-Burman ethnic groups or nationalities as a common identity, which they also belong to. In other words, "Myanmar, Bamar, Burman" are labels only identified with the majority "Bamar" and have nothing to do with the non-Burman ethnic groups. In fact, the usage, "Bamar" is informal and "Myanmar" is formal. For example, when referring to the country, it is "Pyi Daung Su Myanmar Naing Gan" and never "Pyi Daung Su Bamar Naing Gan". If one ask a Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, Mon, Arakanese and Chin, what nationality he or she belongs to, one would only get the answer of "I'm Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, Mon, Arakanese or Chin"; but not "I'm a Kachin Myanmar or Shan Myanmar and so on". In the United States for example, it is quite normal to hear "I'm Korean American, Palestinian American, Chinese American, Armenian American" and so forth. There is another example, when you ask an Indian from Singapore, he would likely answer "I'm Singaporean" and not "I'm Indian from Singapore", which means the common national identity "Singaporean" is fully accepted. Still this writer came across an episode, when a Chinese from Hongkong asked another Chinese from Singapore about his national identity, replied without hesitation that he's Singaporean. The Hongkong Chinese, who asked the question was furious for the Singaporean Chinese didn't say that he was Chinese, but Singaporean. Resolving "constitutional crisis" a way out? The problem of forging a common, national identity in Burma is due to the failed nation-building process, which is rooted in the inability to resolve the "constitutional crisis", that have prevailed since Burma gained independence from the British, in 1948. The acceptance of an all-embracing national identity is only possible, if political settlement of equitable power-sharing and resources-sharing could be worked out. In other words, the non-Burman ethnic groups' aspiration of equality, democracy and rights of self-determination, within the mould of a genuine federalism, has to be worked out and also accepted first. The political power monopoly of the Bamar majority ethnic group, by taking over the place of former British colonial master, has to be altered. In short, Bamar or Burman must become an equal partner of all the other ethnic groups, within the federal union setup. The forging of all-inclusive, common, national identity, will only be possible if "constitutional crisis" is first resolved. The point is that the nation-building process of successive civilian and military Bamar-dominated regimes has never seriously taken off the ground since independence from the British, needless to say about instilling a common national identity that all could agree upon and embrace it wholeheartedly. Combination of ethnic and civic nationalism In the face of such difficulties and intransigent problems, many started to think, if the combination of ethnic and civic nationalism would solve the problem. According to Wikipedia and Yahoo Answers: Ethnic nationalism is a form of nationalism wherein the "nation" is defined in terms of ethnicity. The central theme of ethnic nationalists is that "nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic ancestry". Ethnic nationalism specifically seeks to unite all people of a certain ethnicity heritage together. Ethnic nationalism does not seek to include people of other ethnicities. Civic nationalism defines the nation as an association of people with equal and shared political rights, and allegiance to similar political procedures. According to the principles of civic nationalism the nation is not based on common ethnic ancestry, but is a political entity, whose core is not ethnicity. This civic concept of nationalism is exemplified by Ernest Renan in his lecture in 1882 "Where is the nation?", where he defined the nation as a "daily plebiscite dependent on the will of its people to continue living together". If one looks at Burma from the point of above mentioned concepts, it is evident that all ethnic groups have always been adhering to the notion of ethnic nationalism concept, knowingly or unknowingly. For since pre-colonial time up to the present, all ethnic groups have their own traditional, cultural, linguistic, ritualistic, behavioral, and religious traits; and have, more or less, been living independently from each other, until the new political entity the Union of Burma was formed in 1948. The successive governments have also either neglected or muddled through all along regarding the national identity issue, until today. And as such, a sense of urgency for collective "national identity" has never been present. After the British left and the dominant Bamar took over the mantel of the former colonial power, the sense of ethnic nationalism surged, due to the coercive assimilation policy of the Bama ruling class, intentionally or unintentionally. This is not to blame the Bama ruling class, for they might not have a clear idea on how to forge an acceptable collective "national identity", with the consent and participation in decision-making of all ethnic groups concerned, except to forcefully assimilate the non-Bamar ethnic groups into its prescribed "Myanmar" national identity. However, even this term, without the consent of the non-Bamar ethnic groups, is only introduced officially by the then military regime, State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), in 1989. The core problem in forging such a common identity is the failure to instill a sense of belonging to each other. And there is no way around, other than first coming to mutual agreement, in terms of power-sharing and resources-sharing as a fundamental basis, before agreement on a common identity could be worked out. It should be noted that after more than six decades of independence from the British, the country is still nowhere near to forging an acceptable, common national identity The point to note here is that the successive Burmese governments' nation-building process has totally shattered, failing even to take root after all these years, not to mention the forging of common, national identity. Thus, it would be more pragmatic to accept the existing diversified "ethnic identities" of all ethnic groups as a fact and work for a new common, "national identity" in the future federal union, with the consent and participation of all ethnic groups, Bamar included. Since the ethnic upsurge or ethnic nationalism is a rising global trend and de-ethnicization is impossible, at least within the foreseeable future, the combination of both the civic and ethnic national identity should be the way out, in the case of Burma or Myanmar. But this is only possible, if people involved would earnestly embrace the motto of "unity in diversity" and "diverse actions, common goal". In other words, accepting the vision of an inclusive working social theory that unites the country's ethnic groups into a manageable entity moving in the same collective direction should be the way to go. A multi-ethnic society that allows diversity and not coercive assimilation program has been the order of the day for more than six decades and this need to be corrected. To sum up, forging a common national identity is only possible if the power and resources-sharing is adequately worked out beforehand, apart from disregarding the coercive assimilation dogma, coupled with moving towards a truly inclusive national identity and adhering to the notion of "unity in diversity". Choosing a collective, common name or label would be relatively easy part of the process, for all the ethnic groups residing within the country could make an informed, collective decision, according to their liking. (Note: Myanmar and Burma is interchangeably used in this article for lack of clarity and consensus in the "national identity" debate, which is still ongoing. This is in no way an academic research, but rather a teaser to widen the controversial nature of the issue for more inputs and discussions.) The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democracy Union (SDU) - Editor |
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