Friday, August 19, 2016

Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News

AN ALL-INCLUSIVENESS PROBLEMATIC: Preemptive masterstroke of three EAOs met with Tatmadaw's blunt rejection

Posted: 19 Aug 2016 06:01 AM PDT



As all domestic and international eyes are pinned on Aung San Suu Kyi's ongoing China visit, back at home a preemptive move worthy to be termed as a masterstroke has been undertaken by the three excluded Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), with a joint-statement saying that they are ready to participate in the 21st Century Panglong Conference (21 CPC), as publicized under the motto of all-inclusiveness, without leaving anyone behind, by the government.

The five point joint-statement released by the Kokang or Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA) are outlined as follows:

1.     Welcomes the government's national reconciliation and internal peace efforts;
2.     Welcomes Aung San Suu Kyi headed  Union Peace and Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) meeting decision of 15 August, on all-inclusiveness and ready to participate (in the forthcoming 21 CPC);
3.     Sixty years of armed conflict happened due to the inability to conduct political dialogue;
4.     The people (of Burma) desire for political dialogue;
5.     Readiness to cooperate in the peace process; and declares that through political dialogue, termination of recent ongoing conflict, leading to nationwide ceasefire, regional peace, development and national reconciliation.

Immediately after the statement, Khin Zaw Oo, the former lieutenant  general and peace negotiator of the government's team out-rightly rejected the three EAOs' overtures, stating that he had not yet received the required "formal reply" and it didn't correspond to the criteria demanded by the military, according to The Irrawaddy report of 18 August.

"We don't have a plan to hold further talks with the three groups unless they pledge [to abandon the armed struggle] in their statement," he said, pointing out that the statement released to media did not meet that criteria.
While Suu Kyi has been pushing and advocating all-inclusiveness to level the playing field, it seems the military faction is determined to impose unreasonable demand on the excluded three, so that they are left out, which in effect would amount to be against all-inclusive notion of the government.

It is a puzzle that is hard to explain, as to why the military (Tatmadaw) faction has been so rigidly acting the way it is doing, except for the explanation that it is keen to keep the war flames on by maintaining a war footing on the three EAOs as the state's enemies number one, so as to position itself in an influential political stance, or purely out of animosity and revengeful attitude. After all, all Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) non-signatory EAOs are allowed to participate in the forthcoming 21 CPC, without having to surrender arms and why is it an exception for the excluded three EAOs?

During the last year's February eruption of in Kokang armed conflict, MNDAA, in alliance with the TNLA and AA, attacked Burma army positions in an attempt to wrestle back its lost territory and power from the military installed local administration.

During the numerous encounters, the Burmese military was said to be badly beaten, taking high casualty figures, counting in hundreds, that had supposed to anger and inflict a loss of face for the top brass, which was hard to forgive. Thus it is reasoned, the demand for the three to surrender or something to that effect to satisfy the military's ego and take advantage to revenge, while at the same time showing that it is the establishment that is calling the shots in the ongoing peace process and not the National League for Democracy (NLD) regime or Suu Kyi.

The military knows pretty well that asking the three to denounce armed struggle and repentance of having taken such a wrong course would not be accepted. For them, the armed resistance is a form of political struggle, which they were unable to practice, one way or the other, within the legal fold or being denied.

On top of that, the military's proposal of locking up the three EAOs' armory - within their trusted hands of United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Mong La or National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) - during the peace process negotiations, is unrealistic and only a halfhearted concession, which no one in its right mind would go along with.

Some even speculate so far that the military wants to show that it is bowing to the pressure of the people and also the big neighbour across the border by talking to the three EAOs last month in Mong La, just for the sake of talking, with unrealistic demands imposed on its adversaries.

To conclude, the solution to this debacle of all-inclusiveness lies with the military faction within the government. All the military needs to do is accept the government and Suu Kyi's lead in the peace process, abstain from acting as "a state within the state" and let bygones be bygones, so that the much publicized 21 CPC could be held in a real all-inclusiveness atmosphere, leading to political settlement, peaceful coexistence and lasting peace.


Ethnic groups discuss shape of a future Shan State

Posted: 19 Aug 2016 02:43 AM PDT


Representatives of 13 ethnic groups have concluded a five-day meeting in Shan State capital Taunggyi, where they discussed how a future Shan State would accommodate each minority group.

 
 According to Khun Soe Myint Tun, a member of the Eastern Nationalities Political Center, or ENPC, the forum focused on the State Reorganization Act, a matter that is on the agenda for discussions at the peace talks beginning in Naypyidaw on August 31 – negotiations that have been dubbed the "21stCentury Panglong Conference." 

"The main discussion was to get support from minority groups in Shan State. We want to hear their opinions on this issue," he said. "At the Panglong conference, we will discuss the matter of the various ethnic groups in Shan State. That's why we had this meeting – to prepare for it."

The closed-door meeting, from August 11 to 15, concluded with an agreement on 10 points of national security, 12 points of national defense, and five points on federal principles. 

Fifty-three representatives from ethnic political parties in Shan State attended the meeting, alongside one delegate from Karenni State and another from Chin State.

The 13 indigenous groups said that they will also seek cooperation with the United Nationalities Alliance, led by Khun Tun Oo, and the Nationalities Brotherhood Federation, chaired by Sai Ai Pao of the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party.

Taunggyi farmers face criminal charges over land issue

Posted: 19 Aug 2016 01:41 AM PDT


Some 130 farmers in Shan State capital Taunggyi, who claimed their lands were seized by the Burmese armed forces, are now in turn being sued by the military, according to local sources.

Photo by SHRF: land confiscation for Salween Dam in northern Shan State.

The farmers are all from Yepu village in the Kunlong tract of Taunggyi Township. They were brought to trial on July 25 and charged with criminal trespassing under Article 447 of Burma's Penal Code.
According to Myo Aung, a Yepu villager who claims his land was confiscated, more than 4,000 acres of farmland was confiscated from the local farmers by the Burmese military in 2004.  

"Our farmlands were seized by the military's eastern command in 2004 in order to grow jatropha," he said. "In 2010, they allowed us to cultivate the land again, but we had to pay them 10,000 kyat per acre." 

Myo Aung added that in 2015, the villagers were ordered to stop growing on the land because it belonged to the military. 

"They ordered us to stop cultivation, but then they rented the land to another company," said Maw Maw Oo, a local woman who is among those being charged with criminal trespassing. "Some parts of the land were also sold.

"We are the rightful landowners, but we cannot grow anything on our land," she exclaimed. "And now we are being sued because we dared to grow crops on our own property."

She added: "Almost everyone in the village is being sued."

In May 2015, a Yepu villager named Myint Aung burnt himself to death in frustration at the land grab. 

Yepu residents said that they have endured great difficulties due to the loss of land, and they have collectively called for the Shan State chief minister to intervene in the case. 

During the decades of rule by Burma's military junta, arbitrary land confiscation was a common complaint across the country. By the 2000s, much of the seized land had been rented out to agri-business firms, and a massive government campaign was initiated to encourage investment in the harvesting of jatropha oil. Ultimately, the scheme failed: investors lost great sums of money, while farmers lost land and livelihoods.   

By Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)

“Panglong Spirit” under the 2008 Constitution

Posted: 18 Aug 2016 08:40 PM PDT

Editor's Note: Today's post is a follow-up to a previous post, "'Panglong Spirit' under the 2008 Constitution," which was written by Mael Raynaud as part of our forum on the 21st Century Panglong. Raynaud is an independent political analyst who has been researching Myanmar politics and society since 2002.
In the first part of this article, I explained where I thought the notions associated with the so-called "Panglong Spirit" came from, where different political organizations stood, historically, in relation to it, and why I thought the only realistic way forward, for the next few years at least, was what I dubbed "federalism under the 2008 Constitution."
Before I explain what "federalism under the 2008 Constitution" could mean in further detail, I first need to acknowledge the fact that, to many political activists on the "ethnic" side and certainly for several ethnic armed organisations involved in the peace process as well as in the political process, the idea that federalism is an objective that can be reached without writing a new constitution is an anathema. Many do not accept the 2008 Constitution, and it will be quite a challenge to get them to change their minds.
But what the NLD did in 2012, in accepting to play the game offered by the Tatmadaw after refusing to do so in 2010, ethnic nationalities organisations could do as well. The NLD won the elections and formed a government, so this strategy has already proved it can be successful. As a matter of fact, many ethnic parties did participate in the 2015 elections (and some did in 2010 as well) and it could prove to be only a matter of time (and a significant amount of convincing, on both the NLD's and the Tatmadaw's part) before ethnic armed organisations agree to negotiate regarding their participation in the current political process.
This, as I argued in the first part of this article, does not mean that the notion that a better constitution should be written, at some point in the future, must be abandoned. Rather, it means realizing that Myanmar and its ethnic nationalities cannot wait for that to start working towards a federal system. It is then—when peace, a stronger form of democracy, and some sort of federalism have been achieved—that writing a new constitution will become possible.
What this means is that a two-stage approach needs to be developed. The first stage would be to reach an agreement on how federalism can be realized under the 2008 constitution, which is the topic of this article. The second stage would be the writing of an entirely new federal constitution, at some point in the future.
How long in the future? This question obviously cannot be answered now. But it is safe to assume that new elections will take place in 2020, and that a new government will be formed in 2021, with the 2008 Constitution still standing. It is not impossible that it would take much longer before a new constitution is drafted. If that's the case, then surely it is vital to start by working towards "federalism under the 2008 Constitution."
A two-stage approach means being clear about the objectives of the second and final stage (a new constitution) so that the first stage (federalism under the 2008 constitution) can successfully help with getting there.
There has been talk, in the last few days and weeks of what a new federal constitution could look like. One important issue discussed is whether all States (or whatever the new entities would be called) should be equipped with their own individual constitutions (as is the case with the 50 American States) as well as calls for new State boundaries to be drawn. There is also an argument made that there should be only 8 States in Myanmar, made of the seven existing States and one big "Burman" State made of—essentially—the seven existing Regions. All these points, one must notice, have already been discussed among ethnic armed groups and political organisations associated with them at least two decades ago.
What can be said of these ideas?
First of all, the 8 States concept is deeply flawed, completely impractical, and contrary to the stated objectives. According to the 2014 census, the population of the seven ethnic States amounted to just over 15 million, while the population of what would form the Burman State (i.e., the 7 Regions) amounted to over 36 million. A federation made of 8 States where more than 70% of the population lives in one State alone is highly unlikely to end up serving the interests of the minorities living in the smaller States than the current system. By comparison, the most populated American State, California, only accounts for 12% of the country's population. Also, the Burman State's population would be 127 times that of Kayah State. It is true that California, to continue this comparison with the US, has a population 65 times that of Wyoming. But the current situation, where the Yangon Region only accounts for 25 times the population of Kayah State and 14% of the population of Myanmar, still seems a lot more reasonable. And a lot more likely to give the existing 7 States an equal footing in deciding of the federal laws that would in any case strongly weigh on what States could and could not do, as is the case in any federal system.
In addition to this, it should be noted that, according to article 141 of the 2008 Constitution, each State and Region is provided with the same number of representatives (12) in the House of Nationalities, the Amyotha Hluttaw. This should answer the concern many on the ethnic side have that the Regions would be over-represented against the States, because, as we've seen, they're more populated. An 8 States solution that would provide 7 times as many representatives to ethnic States than it does to the Burman State could in no way be seen as being fair, on the other hand, and would de facto create a two-speed system that could only end-up reinforcing the marginalisation of the ethnic states. The current system, with its 14 local entities (States and Regions), plus the Union Territory of Naypyidaw, seems better suited to allow space for most of the demands associated with federalism.
While equipping all States and Regions with their own constitutions is not a provision of the 2008 Constitution, Articles 433 to 436 do provide details on how it could be amended. Whether the Tatmadaw, the government, and ethnic nationalities can agree on that point or not, only future negotiations will tell, depending on the ability of each side to compromise in one area in order to get their way in another.
Beyond this specific issue, though, it is important to notice that it is indeed possible to amend the 2008 Constitution, and this, I believe, could be done to a point where Myanmar would have a de facto federal system.
Article 53 states that it is possible to re-delineate the boundaries of States and Regions. As history has showed in various places around the world (and which has led to a wide consensus on the matter), trying to redesign controversial boundaries often leads to a lot more trouble than that being faced because of existing boundaries. Opening this Pandora's box, in Myanmar, would take the form of a call for a Wa State separate from Shan State, fighting between the Mon and the Karen over what should constitute each of their two States, potentially a call from the Karen to gain parts of present day Bago Region, calls from the Kachin to gain parts of Sagaing Region and maybe even parts of northern Shan State, and so on. Again, I will argue that the existing 14 States and Regions, with their equal status and reasonable proportions, are one issue that should be better left aside so negotiations can concentrate on more pressing topics.
"Federalism under the 2008 Constitution" can be said to be made up of two main elements: a political/constitutional element, and a cultural element. No constitution will in itself solve the issues of discrimination and second-class citizenship that so many among the ethnic nationalities so rightly complain about. Changes in education, not least in the teaching of history, and improvements in the way Burmans and other ethnic nationalities look at each other and respect each other will have to occur over a very long period of time, in addition to federalism, to reach a point where all citizens of Myanmar feel they and their communities truly enjoy equal status.
What this all comes down to is the fact that associating ethnicity with political representation is not necessarily the best way to promote equality. The call for States to be "ethnic States" beyond their name, meaning that one ethnic group would, as such, control one State it feels belongs to it, could create more problems than it solves. This is why I would now like to suggest an alternative model, based on the four different layers of political administration which I think are necessary to such a federal system
  1. The State and Regional Parliaments
The first and most obvious way to get Myanmar closer to federalism while keeping the 2008 Constitution is to reinforce the powers and the budgets of the 14 local parliaments. Articles 161 to 198 of the 2008 Constitution provide details of how these parliaments work.
Article 188 confirms that local parliaments have the right to enact laws, in a wide range of fields described, towards the end of the Constitution, in Schedule 22, as including finance, planning, the economy, agriculture, land, energy, electricity, mining, forestry, industry, transport, communications, construction, development, housing, and the social sector. This means pretty much every sector, with the exception of education. Including education in the decentralization efforts could be one objective of the negotiations taking place under the banner of the "21stcentury Panglong."
While it is normal, in a federal system, that the local parliaments would be based in their respective States capitals, it would be important for Region and State parliaments MPs to be able to gather and discuss federal issues. Maybe at some point the local parliaments could meet in their States' or Regions' respective capitals when they discuss their own State's or Region's affairs, and use the parliaments in Naypyidaw for special gatherings associated with relations between the States and Regions and the Myanmar government and the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.
Article 170 describes how the commander in chief nominates military representatives in the local parliaments, as he does in the two chambers of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Maybe the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organisations could agree that some of these seats will be reserved for non-Tatmadaw armed groups, as part of any future agreements in the peace process. That the Kachin Independence Army would sit in the Kachin State Parliament as part of a peace agreement would certainly seem like a good way to make a positive use of one of the most controversial provisions in the 2008 Constitution.
  1. Institutions of ethnic nationalities
If identity is to be kept separate from political representation (although there already is a level of representation of specific ethnic nationalities in the various parliaments enshrined in the 2008 Constitution), then certainly there must be institutions dedicated to managing and making decisions on issues associated with ethnic cultures, identities, and languages. Virtually all ethnic nationalities already harbour a number of cultural associations promoting local culture, identity and language. There could be institutions such as a Mon Center, a Shan Institute or a Chin Bureau. If such institutions were public institutions, meaning that they would be independent but funded by the Government (maybe through the Amyotha Hluttaw, the House of Nationalities), they could be the guardians of their respective culture, identity and language, working with the relevant ministries and all relevant political institutions on matters related, for instance, to education (both regarding the teaching of local language and local history).
There would be several advantages to that formula. One is that the Karen in Mon State, or in the Bago, Yangon and Irrawaddy Regions, the Shan in Kachin State or in Magway Region, or the the Ta'ang (Palaung) in Shan State, could all belong to, participate in, and be represented in an institution associated with the community they feel they're a part of, regardless of where they live. At a time when Mother-Tongue Based, Multi-Lingual Education (MTB-MLE) is the topic of so many conversations in Myanmar, who is going to be responsible for producing the textbooks in the Shan language that pupils in Magway Region may need to use? That's only one of many examples that show that language, identity and culture cannot, and must not, be strictly bound to a geographic political entity.
Also, as the third decade of the 21st century is already approaching, culture, identity and language cannot be bound to a single country any longer either. A Shan Institute, while based, for instance, in Taunggyyi, could very well build bridges with universities in Kunming, Yunnan, Luang Prabang, or Chiang Mai. A Mon Center, while based in Moulmein, could build bridges with Mon communities in Thailand and develop research on Mon-Khmer languages with Cambodian scholars, etc.
What I'm describing here is an attempt to open local cultures to the world. If a Chin Bureau could serve as a bridge between Myanmar and India, then the whole region, and certainly the Chin themselves, would greatly benefit from it.
Last but not least, the Burmans themselves would need to create an institution of their own. Federalism means that the Burman culture, identity and language is just as much one of the components of the cultures, identities and languages of Myanmar as all the others.
  1. The GAD and the "prefecture" model
As I wrote in the first part of this article, there are other countries where the Ministry of Interior, or Ministry of Home Affairs, maintains a level of control over Territorial Administration. Here, as in the rest of this analysis, a strong focus is kept on the fact that change in Myanmar has come, and will continue to come, only within the Tatmadaw's comfort zone. The General Administration Department is one institution that the Tatmadaw is very keen on keeping under its control, through the Ministry of Home Affairs, one of the three ministries the elected government does not oversee. The whole process of democratization in Myanmar is a game of using the space made available by the Tatmadaw, and negotiating expanding that space with the Tatmadaw. So far, the country has indeed changed tremendously, so working within that frame is both inevitable and relatively successful.
The GAD could evolve, though. It could make space for elected bodies at the local level, as I will describe below. But it could also make space, within its own hierarchy, for some of the armed groups that the Tatmadaw is negotiating with in the peace process. It is simply a matter of looking at reality as it is: the Tatmadaw does not control a number of parts of the country. Armed groups and militias do.
While ethnic political parties participate in the democratic life of each of the States and Regions, and compete with parties like the NLD and the USDP, maybe the GAD could be turned into an administration where armed groups can maintain the control they already de facto have over some areas while entering what the Tatmadaw calls "the legal fold."
  1. Local democracy
In all "contested areas," armed groups have organised layers of local administration that, for several decades at least, are the only forms of administration hundreds of thousands of citizens of Myanmar have ever known and been confronted with. As local democracy develops in Myanmar, as it very likely will, local forms of democracy implemented by various ethnic nationalities, often based on historical ways they organised politically, could be very useful in smoothing the transition from absolute local control (as a response to war being waged on them by the Burmese State) to being fully part of the Union of Myanmar.
The 74 districts of Myanmar could be an important component of federalism, in that sense. Article 51 of the 2008 Constitution, which describes the relations between the various levels of administration (the Union, the States and Regions, the Districts, the townships and village-tracts, the wards and the villages), seems to be a good basis for a federal system.
These different layers of local administration will need to interact in order to deal with a number of issues, from healthcare to education to security. Here too, federalism will be an answer to many of these issues, in the sense that it will build on existing networks beyond simply the Myanmar State.
Dozens of organisations work in each of these fields, many of them associated with ethnic networks and often even with ethnic armed groups. Giving them the opportunity to continue to exist while providing a level of coordination is the best way the Myanmar State can promote unity and peace.
There are two risks that each side is worried about. The Burman side is concerned that ethnic nationalities will not belong to Myanmar or live within the boundaries of the Myanmar State. The ethnic side is concerned that living under the control of the Myanmar State means living under the control of the Burmans.
Federalism has long been identified as a means of answering both concerns at the same time, and rightfully so. Making Myanmar a truly federal system means compromise on both sides, and being creative about the answers being sought. The ideas described here may not be the best, but the general spirit behind them, the "Spirit of Panglong," is the only way forward.
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