Democratic Voice of Burma |
- Another wrong turn in Mong La
- BUSINESS WEEKLY – 24 August 2014
- Growth at any cost: Strategic direction or tunnel vision?
| Posted: 24 Aug 2014 06:04 AM PDT Let's raise a glass to celebrate that the BBC has discovered Mong La and brought us the news that it is "Myanmar's lawless region where anything goes" (See Jonah Fisher's 18 August installment). Now let’s have another glass to help dull the pain that the BBC's reportage not only produces Orientalist narratives but also takes an unsophisticated pro-statist view which ignores that "anything" also goes in Burmese government-controlled areas. Instead, it attempts to elicit shock from viewers with a visual postcard of "un-Burmeseness" in an area beyond the clutches of the state. Burma's recent reforms have created an atmosphere of journalistic possibilities, but many foreign journalists have failed to capitalise on the opportunities presented by access to areas previously restricted to engage in more extensive coverage of ethnic politics. Many Burma-based correspondents remain unfamiliar with the historical context of their subjects, their editors also share this ignorance and limited budgets often restrict reporting to the confines of the capital and the former capital, preventing them from developing a keener understanding through on-the-ground contacts. The recent BBC story on Mong La is emblematic of a larger malaise that tarnishes reporting of events beyond Rangoon and for this reason the following article critically examines the report. The Mong La story is not new. The Trouser People by Andrew Marshall includes one of the early journalistic accounts of the area and its publication in 2002 inspired countless other journalists to head up to Mong La. Covering this topic and others, such as a comedy troupe in Mandalay, has become a rite of passage for those trying to draw attention to their journalistic prowess by reporting on events taking place beyond Rangoon. But, their stories are essentially an unwitting repackaging of older ones, as these writers often appear unaware that theirs is a well-trodden path. Related StoriesThe attempts in the recent BBC report to ascertain the political conditions that allowed for the emergence of Mong La are amateurish. The author employs descriptive exoticism, referring to the "weird wild world of Mong La”. There's nothing weird or wild about Mong La when one considers how it came into existence and that many of its illicit features are also present elsewhere in Burma. It is useful to point out that the Burmese government did not give the territory of Mong La to its present leaders, but recognised their authority to administer it. In fact, central government leaders have exercised only limited control over the area. In the early independence period, the Chinese Kuomintang remnants exercised control over this area. In the early 1970s, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) extended their control over the region and established the "815 War Zone". After a mutiny triggered an internal revolt within the CPB, four separate self-administered regions emerged in its place as the result of ceasefire negotiations with the military. The 815 War Zone became known as Special Region Four, which is now known as Mong La – its administrative center. The three other special regions that emerged were administered by ethnic Wa, Kokang and Kachin organisations. The so-called "secretive leadership" of Mong La is headed by Lin Ming Xian, one of several Chinese volunteers from the adjacent area of Yunnan, who joined the CPB in the late 1960s. He is Sino-Shan and also has a Shan name, Sai Leun, and became one of the CPB's most effective military commanders. After the mutiny he established control over this area and formed the organisation now known as the National Democratic Alliance Army. Fisher's covert nighttime foray into the jungles of eastern Burma to find a "hidden, illegal" gambling complex conjures memories of The Secret Life of Walter Mitty. When one leaves Rangoon for reporting upcountry, the likelihood of discovering illegal gambling halls increases dramatically. And gambling by proxy – the gist of the "headset scoop" – has been commonplace in the border casinos of Laos, Burma and Cambodia for almost a decade. “When foreign journalists resemble travel writers in their coverage of ethnic areas, one of the few potential sources of independent analysis on the situation in ethnic areas is lost.”One of the most disturbing aspects of this Mong La report is its lack of context. The story leans on a crutch common to bad travel writing – the superlative. The implicit treatment of Mong La is that it is the "unique-est" in terms of lawlessness. But are drugs, gambling, Chinese-ness and the illicit trade of endangered wildlife unique to Mong La? To argue so would be on par with the tomfoolery of suggesting that ngapi is bland. Moreover, the suggestion that we should be shocked that the lingua franca, the currency, the electricity and cell phone system are Chinese belies an innocence of how borders operate and ignorance that such dynamics are commonplace across Burma's border with China in both government and non-government controlled areas. Like many others, the author has gone for the low hanging fruit – the Mong La story – and revels in revealing the outrage of its Sino-centrism to us. Such is a tired tale oft repeated over the last twenty-odd years. What is at stake is that when foreign journalists resemble travel writers in their coverage of ethnic areas, one of the few potential sources of independent analysis on the situation in ethnic areas is lost. Part of the problem is that journalists often know little about ethnic issues and, instead, may sometimes construct stories framed in terms of the exotic. In doing so, they fail take into account that many of the dynamics they report on are commonplace in other parts of Burma and operate under the awareness of officials. In contrast to Mong La, there are many places where the Burmese government and other complicit parties do not tolerate nosing around by journalists. This is evidenced by the jail sentences recently issued to journalists from the Unity Weekly journal for their reporting on an alleged secret weapons factory in central Burma. But myopic perspectives, such as that of the BBC, fail to acknowledge that these dynamics are symptoms of a larger crisis of governance, rather than their cause. Instead, they imply that government rule is more desirable than that of non-state actors. In the case of Mong La, the leadership's efforts at creating a multi-cultural community — in part through the use of multiple ethnic languages and support for the cultural rights of its non-majority ethnic groups — is unusually open for Burma. But more to the point, important issues regarding ethnic politics critical to the future of Burma remain insufficiently addressed by the media. But let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater. The report draws attention to the trade of endangered wildlife in Mong La. Although, again, the trade in endangered wildlife is pervasive, and most journalists do not report on it unless it is right under their nose. One need not go to the lawless land of Mong La to find the trade, but look to the high-end aquariums and zoos across Southeast Asia. Bottoms up.
Danny Deck frequently travels to Burma and has visited Mong La. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect DVB's editorial policy.
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| BUSINESS WEEKLY – 24 August 2014 Posted: 23 Aug 2014 11:40 PM PDT
Ups and downs Burma's currency was stable again this week; the buying rate for Burmese kyat on Friday was still 971 to the US dollar, while also selling at 971. The price of gold fell from 676, 500 kyat per tical to 669,000 kyat. Fuel remains the same as last week: petrol 820 kyat; diesel 950 kyat; and octane 950 kyat per litre. High-quality Pawsanhmwe rice remains at 1,300-1,700 kyat per basket, while low-quality Manawthukha rice is still set at 900 kyat per basket at most Rangoon markets.
China aims to legalise Burmese rice imports Chinese officials will enter discussions geared towards allowing the legal import of Burmese rice, according to Yu Ding Cheng, chairman of the Chamber of Commerce in Yunnan, China. Seizures of illegal rice have led to a steep decline in value. Yu Ding Cheng said that he met with Burma's Federation of Chambers of Commerce in efforts to boost cross-border trade on 14 August. The Myanmar Rice Federation said that they do not expect to meet this year's target of exporting two million tons of rice, as value and demand have both dropped.
UK to supply Rangoon airport with refueling vehicles Flightline Support Ltd, a UK-based manufacturer, has secured export contracts worth over UK£600,000 in Burma and Morocco, the British government announced on Thursday. "Flightline Support are among the first UK companies to clinch orders in [Burma] since the trade sanctions were lifted 12 months ago", the government website said, noting that the British firm will supply Rangoon airport with two 20,000-litre aircraft refuelling vehicles. Ray Harris, Managing Director of Flightline support, recently visited the re-opened British embassy in Rangoon to meet UK Trade & Investment staff. According to the government website, they discussed "forging stronger ties with Myanma Petroleum Products Enterprise and the Myanmar Ministry of Energy".
Muse economic zone to be complete by 2017
Malaysian firm to supply bulldozers to Hpakant Malaysia's UMW Group has reportedly secured contracts worth US$63 million to supply more than 60 units of Komatsu equipment to jade mining firms in conflict-ridden Hpakant in Kachin State. According to Malaysia's The Star on Friday, UMW Engineering Services Ltd secured contracts to deliver Komatsu equipment – presumably excavators, caterpillars and bulldozers. Jade-mining activities were suspended in May 2012 in Hpakant due to security reasons, but Burma announced recently that the suspension will be lifted on 1 September.
Telenor expects to follow Ooredoo roll-out within a month Following the official launch of Qatar-based telecoms giant Ooredoo in Burma last week, Norwegian rival Telenor, the only other international player in the country's lucrative telecoms market, announced that it will roll-out next month. Speaking exclusively to DVB, Myanmar CEO Petter Furberg said Telenor would be operational in Rangoon, Mandalay and Naypyidaw "sometime in September" and would cover every region in the country within the first year. He said the firm was launching both 2-G and 3-G networks to cater for Burma's geography and social conditions. See full interview: https://www.dvb.no/news/dvb-talks-to-petter-furberg-ceo-of-telenor-in-burma-2/43435
Korean firm to provide electrical components South Korean electrical firm LSIS, part of the LS Group conglomerate, has signed a contract to supply high voltage distribution panel boards to Burma's Asia General Electric (AGE) over the next five years, the Korea Times reported on Friday. Under the agreement, LSIS will also provide more than 3,000 vacuum circuit breakers (VCBs), the report said. AGE, which supplies key electrical parts to Burmese state-run forms and other companies, will reportedly manufacture complete switchgears using VCBs at its Burmese plant.
Burmese SMEs in line for bank loans Thailand-based Small and Medium Enterprises Development Bank has pledged for provide 20 billion kyat (US$20 million) this year in loans for small and medium businesses in Burma starting from 27 August. According to an announcement by the bank last week, a business can apply for a loan of 20 million to 50 million kyat at an interest rate of 8.5 percent. More than 120,000 SMEs are registered in Burma making up over 99 percent of the country's enterprises. Read more: https://www.dvb.no/news/smes-to-receive-loans-after-eligibility-survey-burma-myanmar/42786 https://www.dvb.no/analysis/burma-must-boost-smes-myanmar/43353 |
| Growth at any cost: Strategic direction or tunnel vision? Posted: 23 Aug 2014 10:46 PM PDT A lot has changed in Burma since the country's transition began in 2011. This remains an indisputable – albeit somewhat overplayed – fact. Keen to participate in the country's uneven process of opening up, uncomfortable compromises have had to be made on all sides – something which seemed unthinkable only a few years ago. In the realm of macro-level policies shaping the future of Burma, though, the power players dominate. There is a marked asymmetry between the traction given to voices propounding a tried-and-tested model of 'development', and those pushing for a more heedful and cautious approach. Despite the coverage afforded to Burma in recent years, few people seem to be asking either why this is, or what the consequences might be. For more than 50 years, the world largely looked away as torture, ethnic cleansing and acute poverty stalked Burma. Compulsion to leave the bloody past behind by engaging with Burma's oligarchs is, perhaps, understandable in the world of realpolitik. Alongside this, though, account must be taken of the coterie of actors keen to pursue a model of development that prescribes quick fixes to economic and social problems, ensuring the demand for their expertise and safeguarding their role in Burma's future at a stroke. Slow and steady no longer wins the race. Put simply, the quicker these issues can be rendered in language comprehensible to policy makers, the quicker solutions can be identified. The national census undertaken earlier this year was the clearest evidence yet of the international community's resolve to "understand" the country – and the subsequent violence a stark reminder of the cost of subsuming wider social cleavages to it. What we do understand, though, is that Burma's natural resource-reliant economy is pressed by the twin needs of economic diversification, and rationalisation of its regulatory environment. Far less clear is the causal relationship between a resolute focus on these economic fundamentals and dramatic improvements to social welfare. Moreover, there is a very real risk that giving primacy to rapid economic growth over social welfare fans the flames that make the reform process so unstable. More haste, less speed The potential for natural resource exploitation to fuel further conflict is clear, not least in border regions where the brutalisation of civilian populations has continued unabated since President Thein Sein took office in 2011. With a number of important issues unresolved – including how the distribution of resource dividends might take place on an equitable basis – the auctioning off of some of Burma's most valuable assets is proceeding apace. Despite Burma's welcome application to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the ongoing reluctance of companies involved to disclose information relating to their ownership structures does not bode well for those championing accountability as attendant of foreign capital investment. Related StoriesOf course, this investment will be central to the diversification of Burma's economy in the future – itself vital if the cadre of well-connected oligarchs are to have their virtual monopolies challenged. Without this, the provision of public services cannot be improved, and the country's gaping income and wealth inequality cannot be bridged. Recognition of the singularity of recent Burmese experience should, then, be evident in the policies proposed to address these issues. Yet such thinking is not forthcoming. Instead, the proposed direction going forward centres on tourism and garment manufacturing. The rise in foreign visitors to Burma in recent years has been dramatic, straining the country's tourist infrastructure. Increasing the capacity to cater for this deluge seems like a quick win – it will create jobs, bring welcome tourist dollars into the economy, and let potential investors get to know the lay of the land. Policies capitalising on these facts are almost incontrovertible, and can be implemented rapidly. This, in part, explains the ease with which institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), have been able to fund luxury hotels and urban renewal projects. But apprehension remains that the jobs created by these programmes will be reserved for a tiny minority of well-educated Burmese, with promises exaggerated to legitimise the building of what the World Bank's private sector investment arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), calls "critical business infrastructure". Concerns have also been raised about the potential of such projects to serve the interests of oligarchs and strongmen, rather than creating opportunities for the country's largely unskilled labour force. Yet it is the creation of these jobs that must underscore a more sustainable and equitable recalibration of Burma's economy in the future. President Thein Sein's agricultural reform strategy is sharpening this need even further. In essence, the government is prioritising modernisation through market liberalisation and mass land confiscation, aimed at driving vast numbers of the population towards other forms of work. The government is keen to show that internal economic migrants will find work through the development of labour intensive industry. Neighbouring Cambodia and Bangladesh are examples of how this can create jobs, and form the backbone of an export-oriented strategy designed to engage with the global economy. They are also vivid examples of how the pursuit of rapid economic growth in a weak regulatory environment can threaten the rights, lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable. Scrutiny of this growth model has thus far been limited, despite the clear risks associated with genuflection to it. The possibility that Burma's transition is nurturing an authoritarian plutocracy in the guise of a market democracy is very real. A slew of questions remain unaddressed. Should we be confident that global retailers like Gap will be at the vanguard of standard setting, given its response to last year's Rana Plaza tragedy? What is the likelihood that companies relying on scale and volume will work with local small-and-medium enterprises to build the domestic economy, adhere to international standards in their supply chain management, and consult communities adversely affected by their investment? Consultation of recent history is not encouraging here. Given the close association of the majority of Burma's most influential businessmen with the military, these concerns have a strong foundation. Ongoing forced relocation of communities affected by the flagship Thilawa Special Economic Zone, and the government's draconian response to their protests have been well documented. The administration's backsliding on its amnesty for political prisoners,complicity in crimes against humanity in Arakan State, and crimes committed by the military all evidence the international community's willingness to prioritise fast-tracked economic reforms, hoping improvements to social welfare will be a positive externality. This is an enormous risk. To mitigate against this, the pace of engagement with Burma's ruling elite must be tempered, and be made conditional on road-maps that redefine and subsequently reward concrete progress over time. Quid pro quo? Perhaps the most pressing issue to be resolved is the country's ongoing civil war. The difficulties standing in the way of realising a comprehensive, nation-wide peace settlement should focus the efforts of all stakeholders to making a settlement workable, not provide a basis for kicking the can down the road. Rather than finding ways to circumvent security issues, human rights abuses, and regulatory loopholes, the leverage of the international business and aid communities must be put to use here. Withholding investment from areas of ongoing conflict as long as military spending remains high and reports of human rights abuse surface, would be a good start. “The pursuit of rapid economic growth in a weak regulatory environment can threaten the rights, lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable”The experience of other governments who have faced the "resource curse" should also be drawn upon and considered independently, rather than refracted through the ideology of international financial institutions and recast to fit their prescriptions. A resource-sharing agreement between national and sub-national governments will be the cornerstone upon which Burma's future is built. Reaching an agreement will require consultation, debate and compromise. Currently, there is little pressure on stakeholders to reach this type of agreement from investors or international governments. Without establishing such an agreement, though, the likelihood is that the spoils of Burma's resource endowment will be appropriated by a tiny elite, and that capital investment and the provision of public services will remain impoverished. Furthermore, evidence of an improved regulatory environment must be demonstrable. Putting in place the mechanisms for local governments to tax effectively, remain accountable for their practices, and more generally build trust between citizens and the state machinery are long-term projects. The argument that foreign investment drives up standards has its merits – at least in some sectors – and the same could be said of infrastructure projects of bodies like the ADB. But this is no substitute for the maturation of local level institutions, and the skill development of indigenous personnel to staff them. The advanced industrial economies of the world took generations to build this institutional infrastructure; can we seriously contend that this revolution will take place in Burma over the course of a few years? Whether our focus is on institution building, economic diversification, or improving the climate of human rights, meaningful consultation with stakeholders at every level is crucial. Building bridges with Naypyidaw at the expense of civil society organisations and grassroots activists will result – indeed, is resulting – in a parochial understanding of the fundamental issues facing the country. Governments, businesses and aid organisations retort that the immediate focus must be establishing trust at the highest levels of government to effect any change. The grain of truth in this should not obscure the fact that without actively building relationships with grassroots organisations we risk both legitimating and building a more efficient, authoritarian regime whose record speaks for itself. In a climate in which haste trumps prudence, the responsibility to tread with care often gets muted. Up to now, the nature of international engagement with Burma has been geared towards formulating quick fixes to deeply complex issues. An absence of forethought as to how these policies will affect the welfare of Burma's diverse peoples risks both upsetting the country's already fractious social balance, and entrenching the role of the military as a result. How will our willingness to reward rapid economic reform while ignoring egregious human rights abuses play out? Only time will tell.
David Baulk holds an MSc in Development Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, and is a former researcher for Burma Campaign UK. He now works for a Burmese women’s rights organisation in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect DVB's editorial policy. |
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