The Irrawaddy Magazine |
- Sofaer, So Good
- Journalists Planning to Sue Police
- Interactive Timeline: Press Freedom Under Attack
- Majority of Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee Complaints are Territorial Disputes
- 60 Bn Kyats Worth of Drugs Seized in Mandalay
- Do Not Punish Migrant Workers, Fix a Broken System
- 34,000 Migrant Workers Return from Thailand
- Myanmar Mulls Change to Defamation Law
- Coal Mining in Hsipaw Township Poisoning Farmland: Report
- Hunger Rife Among Rohingya Children: WFP
- Book Review: Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics and Religion
| Posted: 06 Jul 2017 07:52 AM PDT YANGON — The transformation of a forgotten unit in the Lokanat Building from storage space to chic restaurant with colonial décor and Mekong-inspired fusion menu is the latest sign that Pansodan Street is having its renaissance as a downtown dining neighborhood. Recently-opened Sofaer & Co., co-founded by restaurateur Ma Ingyin Zaw, serves up plates of Vietnamese, Thai, and Myanmar classics with a modern twist to diners perched on rattan and teak furniture surrounded by 100 year-old antique tiles, exposed brickwork and wooden paneling. The restaurant's menu includes modern takes on classics such as Tom Yum Gung and papaya salad with prices not unreasonable for its prime location. (It's a more affordable option than Gekko, just around the corner.) It is the environment, however, that is likely to make the first (and perhaps lasting) impression. "We like to think of the restaurant as a meeting place," Ma Ingyin Zaw told The Irrawaddy. "It's for people at a crossroads; people like you, people like me, people like Isaac Sofaer who built this amazing building.  Then known as the Sofaer Building, it became Yangon's hottest commercial property in the 20th Century after it was constructed in 1906 and received the moniker of the Selfridges of Asia. Reuters Telegram Agency, the Bank of Burma, and Café Vienna all occupied units. "We wanted the restaurant to feel like the building did in its heyday," said Ma Ingyin Zaw. A painstaking renovation of a space that had been neglected for decades took six months to complete. Vintage features including exposed steel girders from Lanarkshire in Scotland, floor tiles, in green, gold, and dull red from Manchester in England and large wooden panels were scrubbed down and now shine. The restaurant is largely double height with only a small private dining area on a mezzanine level at the back above the kitchen—it sits 15 for dinner or double that for drinks. With its own private bar, it's going to prove popular for parties. The choice to keep the ceiling high will please heritage conservationists who derided KBZ bank for splitting the unit two doors down into two stories.  The wooden cladding along one side of the restaurant is Ma Ingyin Zaw's favorite feature—she explained how they were found in a pile covered in a sheet at the back of the unit. She squealed with joy when it became clear all of the sections were still in the building. The restaurant's glassware was sourced from Yangon's Nagar Glass Factory—a sprawling handmade glass factory tragically destroyed in Cyclone Nargis in 2008 but leaving a large number of pieces strewn around the jungle surrounds. Vintage marble and iron tables and handmade bamboo and rattan chairs complete a vintage aesthetic that Yangon Heritage Trust would be proud of. Unfortunately, cutlery and crockery sourced from Ikea somewhat hamper the vibe. Sofaer & Co.'s Mekong menu is rooted in Yangon's bountiful markets—some just a stone's throw from the restaurant itself. Ma Ingyin Zaw expounds the virtues of a seasonal menu to make the most of the country's finest products. Expect avocados from Taungyin in January, strawberries in February, and pineapples in September.  The Irrawaddy visited at peak mango season. Sofaer & Co.'s take on a traditional Burmese Thayat Thee Thoke (spicy green mango salad) uses slightly riper ma chitsu mangoes than the traditional recipe—Ma Ingyin Zaw and her team's trick to add sweetness and cater to more tastebuds. It's served with crispy chicken skin. Another Myanmar dining staple Ohn-No Khao Swe (coconut chicken noodles) has been "innovated" to replace raw onion with cooked and served with grilled chicken. The Burman Scotch egg is one of the more outwardly fusion dishes—pork flavored with lemongrass and chili surrounds a local farm egg before being deep fried. It's served with a homemade teriyaki sauce. The grilled Mandalay tea leaf smoked pork neck is a highlight of the menu. The pork neck is smoked on fresh tea leaves before being lovingly grilled on the barbecue—the subtle tea leaf smokiness and the barbecue punch is a match made in heaven. It's served with sticky rice on a lemongrass skewer—another Sofaer & Co. novelty.  The fusion continues with regionally flavored burgers—pulled pork curry with green mango and soft-shell crab with spicy som tam. There's other regional staples including the mutton and tea leaf curry, bun cha (Vietnamese grilled pork paddies), and, of course, morning glory. The cocktails are delicious—we tried the Sofaer Sour with gin, lime, egg white, and cinnamon bitters. There's plenty of inviting cocktail promotions: the restaurant's already hosted a gin and tonic week and are planning a whisky month. The Irrawaddy plans to hold Ma Ingyin Zaw to her promise of a soon to be introduced happy hour. The post Sofaer, So Good appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Journalists Planning to Sue Police Posted: 06 Jul 2017 06:09 AM PDT YANGON – The Protecting Committee for Myanmar Journalists' (PCMJ) complaint against Cpl Soe Myint Aung of the Yangon military command was rejected by deputy police captain Aye Min Thein of Bahan Township police station on Thursday. At the fifth court hearing of The Voice Daily's chief editor U Kyaw Min Swe, plain-clothed soldier Cpl Soe Myint Aung photographed journalists' individual faces instead of taking wider shots while they were interviewing legal adviser U Khin Maung Myint outside of the court. U Kyaw Min Swe is being sued by Lt-Col Lin Tun of the Yangon military headquarters under the notorious Article 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law, enacted during ex-president U Thein Sein's tenure. The PCMJ reasoned that Soe Myint Aung had violated the Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens Law that was enacted by President U Htin Kyaw earlier this year in order to restrict state surveillance. Such conduct was once a tactic used to suppress activists. The Bahan police station summoned complainant Ye Lin Htoo and other six journalists on Thursday. A policeman gave a response letter to the plaintiff which was signed by police captain Aye Min Thein. The letter stated that the soldier in question did not "breach any prohibitions of section (4)" of the recently enacted law. The law has six chapters and 13 sections in total. Capt Aye Min Thein recommended the plaintiff Ye Lin Htoo and other PCMJ members file a case at the Bahan Township courthouse directly if the journalists felt that the conduct of Cpl Soe Myint Aung had harmed their dignity. Although police summoned seven journalists to the station on Thursday morning, those who attended the meeting said Capt Aye Min Thein did not show up to speak with them, despite a police statement declaring that all seven reporters had met with him. Ma Thuzar of 7 Day TV told The Irrawaddy that PCMJ members are now in talks with lawyers since the police have failed to bring the case to court, and allege that they "prejudged" the reporters as complainants. She said she had "expected the rejection." Tha Lun Zaung Htet, a committee member of PCMJ and a presenter on the Democratic Voice of Burma, said, "the police have no right to override the case. It's gone too far." Tha Lun Zaung Htet said that the PCMJ committee had decided to continue the case directly against both Cpl Soe Myint Aung and Capt Aye Min Thein for interfering in what they say should be the role of the judiciary. "We are now receiving consultations from lawyers to sue the police official for failing his duty and prejudging. Guilty or not must be decided by a judge, not by the police," he said. Former chairman of the Myanmar Lawyer Network U Kyee Myint corroborated the statement from journalists that the police did not have a right to object to the lawsuit and were required to open the case for the plaintiff. They should have taken legal advice from the township law officers, he added, explaining that under the current circumstances, the plaintiffs could take their complaint "to a higher level." The post Journalists Planning to Sue Police appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Interactive Timeline: Press Freedom Under Attack Posted: 06 Jul 2017 06:01 AM PDT YANGON— With the arrest of three journalists by the Myanmar Army on charges of contacting an "unlawful association" last week, The Irrawaddy and the Democratic Voice of Burma joined a number of local media outlets being threatened in court by the country's powerful institutions, including the military. Myanmar's stringent media censorship laws, in place since 1962's military coup, were lifted under former President U Thein Sein in 2012 but broad draconian laws used to throttle the media remain. Colonial-era legislation such as the State Secrets Act and the Unlawful Associations Act continue to be used as weapons of press oppression. In 2014 freelance journalist Ko Par Gyi (also known as Aung Kyaw Naing) was shot dead in military custody. Controversial Article 66(d) of the 2013 Telecommunications Law is a newer law used to silence media on defamation charges concerning online content; there have been 65 cases brought forward since Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) formed a government in 2016 April. In fact, reporters and editors from five media organizations in Myanmar are now facing trial. Among them, three were cases filed by the military. Here, The Irrawaddy has outlined some of significant cases brought against publications through use of the country's restrictive laws. The post Interactive Timeline: Press Freedom Under Attack appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Majority of Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee Complaints are Territorial Disputes Posted: 06 Jul 2017 04:00 AM PDT YANGON — The Union-level joint ceasefire monitoring committee (JMC) said almost 70 percent of the complaints it has received were territorial disputes that would soon be assessed by verification teams. The JMC's role includes monitoring the ceasefire implementation for signatories of the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). The JMC held its 11th regular meeting from July 3-5 in Yangon's National Reconciliation and Peace Center office. The meeting focused on issues related to monitoring the ceasefire implementation, complaint verification, local participation in ceasefire monitoring, and the development of standard operating procedures (SOPs). Since its formation in late 2015 following the signing of the NCA in October of that year, the JMC established state- and regional-level joint ceasefire monitoring sub-committees in five locations in Karen, Mon and Shan states, and Bago and Tanintharyi (Tenasserim) divisions. It is still in the process of forming its state-level complaint verification teams. Dr. Sui Khar, a secretary of the Union-level JMC, told reporters in Yangon at a press conference on Wednesday evening that a JMC verification team would assess two cases in Shan State's Mongping Township in the coming months. One case concerns the death of a militia member and another concerns engagement between Tatmadaw and Restoration Council of Shan State troops in May. A JMC spokesman said it would hold further workshops on territory demarcation, as some ethnic armed groups had clear statements regarding boundary lines in their bilateral ceasefire agreements with the government while others did not. "The groups have different understandings of the territory demarcations. Their complaints center on this so it is important to consider how we handle this," Dr. Sui Khar said. The JMC will also develop a computerized complaints management system, as it receives more verbal complaints than written ones. As for drafting standard operating procedures, Seng Pan, the deputy executive director of the technical secretariat center (TSC) said 12 of 40 SOPs needed for the JMC mechanism have been drafted and approved at this time. But SOPs related to helping internally displaced persons have not yet been approved, as further assessments need to be done on the work of the social welfare ministry, she added. The JMC recently accepted the appointment of U Aung Naing Oo, former Myanmar Peace Center employee, as the new executive director of the TSC, as the current director Dr. Min Zaw Oo will leave the position at the end of July. JMC spokespersons said Dr. Min Zaw Oo had planned to leave the position since November 2016 but was waiting until a replacement was found. Dr. Min Zaw Oo is also an adviser to the government’s Peace Commission and will remain in that post, according to Seng Pan. The post Majority of Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee Complaints are Territorial Disputes appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| 60 Bn Kyats Worth of Drugs Seized in Mandalay Posted: 06 Jul 2017 03:51 AM PDT MANDALAY – More than 60 billion kyats (US$44 million) worth of drugs along with 380 million kyats worth of gold were seized from a home in Mandalay's Pyigyitagon Township on Wednesday, the largest single amount seized in Mandalay this year. The haul was made after the owner of the house Liou Yone Chan, also known as Kyaw Win, was arrested along with his wife and a friend for possession of 70 kilograms of methamphetamine in Nawnghkio Township, Shan State last week, according to police. "The three individuals, along with the couple's housekeeper, are now in police custody and will be charged under Myanmar's narcotics law," U Kyaw Tun, deputy police superintendent of Mandalay regional anti-narcotic unit 1, told The Irrawaddy on Thursday. According to the police, more than one million methamphetamine "yaba" tablets called 88, five cars, gold blocks and gold accessories were seized along with with 36 million kyats in cash. "The tablets were concealed inside the gas tank and hubcaps of cars parked on the grounds of the house, ready to be transported," said U Kyaw Tun. The post 60 Bn Kyats Worth of Drugs Seized in Mandalay appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Do Not Punish Migrant Workers, Fix a Broken System Posted: 06 Jul 2017 02:55 AM PDT What does it take to effectively regulate migrant labor? A tougher law? Thailand's Labor Ministry believes so. So does the military government. Hence the draconian decree on migrant labor management — and the subsequent red faces all around. Effective June 23, the harsh punishment triggered panic among migrant workers and their employers, leading to mass layoffs and an exodus of workers across the borders back to Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. Now it’s the government’s turn to panic. Hence the promise from Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha to evoke Section 44 which gives him absolute power as a military leader to suspend the decree for 180 days. This is policy embarrassment big time. That the Labor Ministry and the country’s top leadership failed to foresee how this big-stick policy would wreak havoc on the economy shows their top-down, ivory tower mentality – and their deep prejudices against migrant workers. That the cabinet gave the decree the green light one day, then suspended it the next, does not give us much confidence in how the military government runs our country, does it? Under the decree, employers will face a hefty fine of 400,000 to 800,000 baht (US$11,700 to 23,500) for each undocumented migrant worker they hire. Even if their workers have work permits, the employers will still be fined 400,000 baht per worker if the job is not the same as registered in the permits. The decree hits small businesses hard. For them, it means bankruptcy. As for migrant workers, the undocumented are subject to a maximum five-year jail term and/or a fine of anywhere from 2,000 to 100,000 baht. If they are registered but not working in the job they are registered for, they are subject to a maximum 100,000 baht fine. Meanwhile, the new decree does not make registration any easier. The employer must pay an exorbitant fee of 20,000 baht for a license. The migrant workers must also pay 20,000 baht for a work permit, and another 20,000 baht to extend it. Can poor migrants afford it? What is the government thinking? In normal time, decrees are reserved for urgent matters. To justify the heavy punishment, the Labor Ministry says the decree is urgently needed to protect the country’s economic security. What? Do the labor authorities really believe Thailand will be economically secure if millions of migrant workers leave? Do we still need the labor bureaucracy which does not understand the significant contribution of migrant workers to the national economy? We cannot deny, however, that the labor authorities'negative attitude reflects the nationwide belief that migrant workers are national security threats. Migrant workers are stereotyped as job thieves, carriers of contagious diseases, and a burden on the country to provide health care and education for their children. Worse, migrants are often seen as cold-blooded criminals. Remember when the junta seized power in 2014? One of the first things then coup leader Gen Prayut did was crack down on illegal migrant workers because it struck a chord with his nationalistic supporters. After a migrant panic, an exodus and employers'fury, the general took a sharp U-turn, urging the migrant workers to quickly come back. After repeating this mistake, it's worrying that the prime minister still misses the crux of the problem – the migrant labor management system itself. It's why he insisted employers and migrant workers should use the 180-day grace period to legalize their status. "No need to fear if you follow the law," said the prime minister. "Migrant workers need to be registered. It's not too much of a problem. If they still don't register [before the grace period is over], I don’t know what to do but implement the new decree." Contrary to what the prime minister said, the registration system is plagued with problems and corruption. For starters, the annual registration period is unreasonably short, leaving migrant workers who cannot register in time vulnerable to police extortion. The dizzying amount of red tape in the nationality verification process and the issuance of work permits forces workers to turn to brokers, which feeds corruption at all levels on both sides of the borders. The high expenses for registration – including the tea money involved – mean workers start off in debt to their employers who pay fees for them in advance. Migrant workers also have to pay for health insurance as part of the registration system. Yet they rarely benefit from public health services because the newcomers cannot speak Thai while hospitals lack translators. Despite their legal status, migrant workers are rarely protected from police extortion. Many employers still confiscate workers' passports and work permits. Without legal papers, migrant workers are routinely subject to arrest and extortion. Stories of sexual harassment of female migrant workers are common. Even if migrant workers go through the complicated system to get work permits, it's not the end of the problem due to the oppressive labor law. Migrant workers are barred from changing jobs and employees – a gross violation of labor rights. The punishment is arrest and deportation. By increasing the punishment with heftier fines and longer jail terms, the new decree fortifies these violations even further. Migrant workers are also restricted to labor-intensive work, which robs them of professional development and deprives the country of skilled human resources. They are also prohibited from traveling outside their work zones, a serious infringement on freedom of movement. With little benefits from their legal status, the majority of migrant workers here prefer to work underground. It's not because they are bad. It’s because our system is. With no measures to fix the flawed registration and oppressive law, the 180-day grace period is of little help in encouraging migrant workers to join the system. And if Gen Prayut lifts the freeze on the decree as promised, the problem of extortion and corruption will worsen. How do we effectively regulate migrant labor then? Easy. Make the registration easy. Make access to welfare and health benefits easy. Then extortion and corruption will be difficult. Start an open, year-round registration system. Get rid of the red tape so workers and employers do not have to pay money under the table. Fix the law to open the job market for migrant workers. And get tough, really tough, on corrupt officials. Accord migrant workers human dignity and lawful rights. See them as they are – contributors to our economy. Give their children an education so they be can be part of society, ready to chip in when the country gets old and needs a young workforce. Respecting migrants'rights is good for the economy. Unless policy makers understand this, harsh laws based on control and punishment are only good for the business of corruption. Or is it just meant to be that way? The post Do Not Punish Migrant Workers, Fix a Broken System appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| 34,000 Migrant Workers Return from Thailand Posted: 06 Jul 2017 01:27 AM PDT More than 34,000 migrant workers have returned to Myanmar since the Thai government launched a crackdown on illegal foreign workers, according to the Union minister for labor, immigration and population U Thein Swe. The minister said the two governments were negotiating to issue work permits to undocumented Myanmar workers in Thailand, at the ministry's press conference on the issue of Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand and Malaysia in Naypyitaw on Wednesday. "It is also important that workers go to Thailand through licensed agencies only when Thai businessmen send job offers, they should not trust brokers," said the minister. The Thai government has promised not to arrest more illegal Myanmar migrant workers this year, he said. It also promised not to detain Myanmar citizens, but hand them over to the Myanmar government, the minister added. The Myanmar government estimates there are nearly 5 million Myanmar migrants in Thailand with around 2.2 million working legally with the correct documents, said the minister. There are around 500,000 Myanmar migrants in Malaysia and around 200,000 are legal, according to the minister. The Thai government declared a 180-day delay in enforcing parts of the new labor law aimed at regulating the foreign workforce after criticism that the crackdown had caused economic chaos. "State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi made a special request to the Thai Ambassador to Myanmar and requested him to ask higher-level authorities to consider," director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs U Myo Tint said at the press conference. "Thai authorities relaxed the policy the same day," he added. Since the Thai government's move to arrest foreign workers, Myanmar migrants have been flocking through various border checkpoints along the Thai-Myanmar border. In Karen State, they were welcomed back by government representatives and private businessmen, with the Myanmar Army assisting in transport back to their hometowns. "The policy of the president and the state counselor regarding migrant workers is that the [Myanmar] government must protect its citizens whether they are working legally or illegally [in foreign countries]. We have informed the concerned embassies of this policy," said minister U Thein Swe. Director general U Myo Tint said his ministry is also helping Myanmar migrant workers in Malaysia after the labor attaché of the Myanmar Embassy in Malaysia reported that Myanmar workers were being arrested. The director general said the Myanmar Embassy in Malaysia could solve 55 of 56 labor cases reported to it; and it was also working to deliver justice for Myanmar migrants who were killed in Malaysia. Myanmar migrant worker U Nyan Naing Ye, who is working in Malaysia's Kuala Lumpur, told The Irrawaddy that migrant workers were being arrested by the Malaysian authorities. "Even legal workers are brought to the police station for interrogation," he said. "We feel unsafe. There are tens of thousands of people who are overstaying and they all are in a state of alarm. It all depends on their bosses to retain their jobs." Additional reporting by Pe Thet Htet Khin. Translated form Burmese by Thet Ko Ko. The post 34,000 Migrant Workers Return from Thailand appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Myanmar Mulls Change to Defamation Law Posted: 06 Jul 2017 01:18 AM PDT NAYPYITAW — Myanmar is considering amendments to a law that human rights monitors say violates free speech and has been used to jail journalists and activists, leader Aung San Suu Kyi said on Thursday. Following a recent spate of arrests of reporters, the United States and the European Union have raised concern that despite Myanmar electing its first civilian government in about half a century, its media face increasing curbs. Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) has a majority in parliament—and many of its lawmakers are former political prisoners—but the party has not until now prioritised repealing laws that previous governments used to quash dissent. "About 66(d), the legislature is considering amendments to that particular law," Suu Kyi told a news conference, referring to a broadly worded clause of the Telecommunications Law that prohibits use of the telecoms network to "extort, threaten, obstruct, defame, disturb, inappropriately influence or intimidate." Suu Kyi did not say what changes were planned, but Myanmar officials have indicated that the law may be changed to enable judges to release on bail those charged under the law, diplomats have told Reuters. Some Senior NLD members oppose changes to the law, which they defend as a tool for curbing hate speech and false news as internet access expands in Myanmar. Suu Kyi's defenders say the Nobel Peace Prize winner—who spent years under house arrest for opposing army rule—is hamstrung by a military-drafted constitution that keeps the generals in politics and free from civilian oversight. Last month, three journalists covering an event organised by an ethnic minority rebel group, that authorities have designated an "illegal organization," were detained by the military and later arrested on suspicion of breaching a colonial-era Unlawful Associations Act. A newspaper editor is also on trial under the telecoms law over a satirical article making fun of the military. The cases have sparked outrage among the boisterous media community that has emerged in the commercial hub Yangon since the government lifted pre-publication censorship in 2012. They have also prompted statements of concern from both the European Union and the United States. When asked about the case of the three arrested reporters, Suu Kyi said it was "not for us to comment on … how the various cases should be tried in the court—that's for the justice sector to take care of." "This should not be seen very narrowly as three journalists against the army or vice versa, but in general, as to whether the existing laws are in line with our desire for justice and democratization," she said, without elaborating on her position. The three journalists are due to appear in court in Shan State in the north of Myanmar on July 11. They face up to three years in prison. The post Myanmar Mulls Change to Defamation Law appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Coal Mining in Hsipaw Township Poisoning Farmland: Report Posted: 05 Jul 2017 11:08 PM PDT Coal mining operations conducted by the Ngwe Yi Pale Company in Shan State's Hsipaw Township have poisoned farmland and severely impacted the lives of more than 3,000 local villagers according to a new report released last week by a group representing local farmers affected by the mines. The company, which began mining in the Nam Ma village tract area in 2004, has so far ignored calls from local residents to halt the mining and has actually expanded considerably in recent years. Strong opposition from the local community was apparent last month when 600 villagers took part in a prayer service held on June 23 at the Ho Na Pa forest area, in which participants blessed the forest and called for an end to coal mining in the area. Ngwe Yi Pale is currently operating two mining sites in the Nam Ma area, using both underground tunnels and open pit practices, with the biggest share of the mining taking place near Na Koon village. A third mine at Pieng Hsai village ceased operations in 2015 and has now filled with water. According to a press release accompanying the publishing of the report by the Nam Ma Shan Farmers group, villagers have in recent weeks noticed large cracks in the ground and sinkholes emerging close to the mining operations. The report notes that water quality in the area has declined since the mining began. Water from the mining operations is being dumped into Nam Ma stream, which is used by local villagers for irrigation; as a result the stream has "become black." A pump system set up by the firm purportedly to provide water for local farmers near the abandoned Pieng Hsai mine is problematic because the water pumped from the site is polluted and "smells like engine oil." The report claims that farmers using the dirty water from Pieng Hsai have seen their yield per field go down by about a third. A new problem also appears to have emerged last month. One day after the prayer service was held, large amounts of smoke began billowing out of one of the mining tunnels in Na Koon. The source appeared to be an underground coal fire, according to photos published alongside the report. Coal mining operations can trigger such fires but once a coal seam fire begins it can last for months or years, with some such fires releasing huge amounts of toxic smoke for decades after a mine's operations have finished. The 36-page report notes that the Ngwe Yi Pale Company received a 10-year permit in August 2010 to dig for coal in the Nam Ma area, in a joint venture with Myanmar's state-owned Mining Enterprise No 3. The Ngwe Yi Pale Company firm owns a 70 percent stake in the project with the state-owned entity holding the remaining 30 percent. The concession area is 11.3 square kilometers in size, but, according to the report, two of the mining sites that the firm operated "appear to be outside the concession area." The Ngwe Yi Pale Company, which also operates sugar cane plantations and sugar cane processing facilities, has also come under fire for accusations of using forced labor. A detailed expose by Myanmar Now released last year showed that the firm was using unpaid prison labor on its 800-acre sugarcane plantation in Shan State's Nawnghkio Township as part of a joint venture agreement Ngwe Ye Pale has with prison authorities. The company's coal mining activities appear to be equally as controversial as their sugar operations. Heavy fighting in May of last year in the Nam Ma area saw the army use airstrikes and shelling to drive out the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), an armed group which has had a presence in the area for many years. The move was, according to the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF), connected with the company's expansion plans and the desire to rid the area of the SSPP. "There is thus no doubt that a main aim of the offensive was to safeguard the mining operations. The Myanmar Army and their militia have now secured control of areas around the mines, including coal transport routes," said SHRF in a report released last year. According to the SHRF, the fighting drove more than 1,000 villagers from the area. The group reported at least two civilians were killed by the army during the clashes, including a villager who SHRF alleges was shot while driving a motorbike and then beaten to death. SHRF also alleges that other villagers were arbitrarily arrested and abused during an army sweep of the area. Following the fighting last year, the army's Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 325 built a base at Kho Nang Pha, which was previously held by the SSPP. According to the SHRF, about 100 army troops together with their allies from the Wan Pang militia, a group that emerged from Shan warlord Khun Sa's Mong Taii Army (MTA), now patrol much of the area that was previously held by the SSPP. The SSPP, who in 1989 signed a ceasefire agreement with the central government, have not signed the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) and have been on the receiving of repeated attacks from military troops in recent years. The group, which is also known as the Shan State Army-North, is a member of the United Nationalities Federal Council and also closely aligned with other northern armed groups and part of the newly emerged Northern Alliance. Earlier this year, Nam Ma village tract secretary Lung Jarm Phe was shot and killed near his home. The February 26 killing remains unexplained but in the words of SHRF has "instilled fear among local villagers." The post Coal Mining in Hsipaw Township Poisoning Farmland: Report appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Hunger Rife Among Rohingya Children: WFP Posted: 05 Jul 2017 10:53 PM PDT YANGON — More than 80,000 young children may need treatment for malnutrition in part of western Myanmar where the army cracked down on stateless Rohingya Muslims last year, the World Food Programme (WFP) said on Wednesday. Myanmar's security forces launched a counter-offensive in the northern part of Rakhine state after attacks by Rohingya insurgents that killed nine border police in October. About 75,000 people fled across the nearby border with Bangladesh in a crisis that marred Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi's first year in power. The United Nations has said the military committed rapes, killings and burned down homes in what amounted to crimes against humanity. In the first detailed on-the-ground assessment of the community affected by the violence since October, the WFP interviewed 450 families in 45 villages in Maungdaw district in March and April. "The survey confirmed a worsening of the food security situation in already highly vulnerable areas [since October]," the UN agency said. About a third of those surveyed reported "extreme …food insecurity" such as going a day and night without eating. Not one of the children covered in the survey was getting a "minimum adequate diet," the report said, adding that an estimated 80,500 children under the age of five would need treatment for acute malnutrition in the next year. Suu Kyi's administration is refusing to grant access to a United Nations-mandated mission tasked with investigating allegations of abuses by security forces in Rakhine and elsewhere. The WFP does not distinguish between different communities, but more than 90 percent of residents in Maungdaw are Rohingya. Many in Myanmar see the group as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Following the attacks, the military declared an operation zone in Maungdaw, restricting aid access and preventing locals from fishing and farming. A WFP map shows that villages where the military was most active were highly vulnerable to hunger. The report also notes that households where the men left due to security operations were more likely to go hungry. Many Rohingya men fled their homes because they believed the military would target them as suspected militants. Suu Kyi's spokesman, Zaw Htay, said he was not familiar with the specific WFP findings, but that after initial security restrictions the government had been allowing aid agencies to operate in northern Rakhine. "The WFP is conducting many, many projects for the people in that region. The Myanmar government is allowing them to deliver food and other assistance," he said. The government continued to restrict some access for foreign aid workers in northern Rakhine, but national staff could move freely, he said, adding the government has delivered aid to people in the area. The post Hunger Rife Among Rohingya Children: WFP appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Book Review: Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics and Religion Posted: 05 Jul 2017 07:45 PM PDT In many deeply divided polities and war-torn societies, conflict is a normal occurrence that challenges state-building, nation-building, and peace-building efforts. The various causes of conflict are influenced by the complexity of majority-minority and center-periphery politics and the long sensitive clashes between strongly antagonistic forces that lead to a culture of violence. Myanmar in its transitional period stands out as an important case reflecting the long-standing civil wars that often co-exist with peace-making activities. Protracted unrest in Myanmar constitutes one of the most brutal conflicts in the contemporary world. Nevertheless, since the country's political reform of 2011, Myanmar has demonstrated some impressive progress in conflict management within an ethnically and culturally fragmented environment. This alone makes the oscillation between conflict and peace in Myanmar worth exploring. Conflict in Myanmar, through presenting several narratives, analyses and evidence-based accounts, provides insights on the specific nature of the conflicts and disputes existing and unfolding. The volume can be considered a genuine attempt to examine the character of conflict transformation in Myanmar and aspects of conflict in country's democratizing process. The book is an admirable product from the Australian National University (ANU) Myanmar Update Conference in 2015. The theme focused on Myanmar’s conflict dynamics and the conference panel discussions were attended mostly by the rising generation of scholars, analysts, and practitioners. The book consists of seventeen chapters structured into five parts. Part one is just one chapter by Nicholas Farrelly and provides a lively introduction to the collection that has been categorized into three key topics: war, politics, and religion (p.7). Part two presents five chapters that examine the conflict through the lens of war and order, while part three, with five chapters, connects the conflict to elections and other political and legislative institutions. The five chapters of part four analyze Myanmar's ethno-religious conflict as well as the internal and international dimensions of communal violence. Part five is a concluding chapter written by Nick Cheesman that seeks to conceptualize the patterns of conflict in Myanmar. Cheesman evaluates the preceding chapters by systematizing them into three terms: politics, the political, and the non-political (p.355). He suggests the term "politics" signifies a set of practices and institutions through which an order is established. The "political" refers to the essence or the condition of political accommodation via fundamentally nonviolent approaches, whereas the "non-political" creates antagonism through generally violent means (p.354). Through incorporation of Cheesman's conceptual categories with Farrelly's empirical categories, Conflict in Myanmar helps to answer, in part, the two meaningful questions of "what explains the decades-long conflict in Myanmar" and "how can we conceptualize conflict in transitional Myanmar." However, the book has some weaknesses. Although the volume provides many in-depth analyses about the dynamics of war, peace, identity, religion, law, institution, development, nationalism, and international politics, it failed to mention the rebel-to-party transformation process, which is significant for Myanmar's security dynamism. Militias and rebel armies have been part of conflict in Myanmar for more than 60 years. Despite their long-term presence, deep analysis about them is insufficient. In the book's part two (on war and order), several authors have paid limited attention to this challenging security process. For a former rebel armed group to become a political party, it will first have to demilitarize its organization by demolishing its military command structure and relinquishing its fighting capabilities. In Myanmar, this might be settled by sending former combatants through a process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Nevertheless, due to the long history of armed conflict and the different political motivations among ethnic armed groups, the reintegration of former rebel fighters into society or their reinsertion into Myanmar's national armed forces (the Tatmadaw) is rather difficult. From this trend, a failure to successfully integrate former ethnic armies or transform a military fighter into a civilian politician under an appropriate time frame can destabilize Myanmar's peace process and this is one of the roots of violent conflict in Myanmar. As such, the inclusion of this issue would have strengthened the volume for a better appreciation of war and order. For a theoretical merit of the book, conflict is an extremely complex phenomenon composed of a variety of different angles and thus it cannot be easily consolidated into any one broad explanatory framework. Consequently, despite this collection's valiant efforts, many necessary tasks for other scholars and researchers to theorize conflict in Myanmar remain, tasks that could be helped along by utilizing this edited volume as groundwork. Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Rubin (1987) discussed the strategies for managing conflict. These strategies include problem solving, contending, yielding, inaction, and withdrawal. In Conflict in Myanmar, some of the chapter writers have failed to acknowledge important techniques for conflict management in the very complicated peace negotiations. For this reader, the choices of decision-making strategies among political stakeholders, including the Tatmadaw and ethnic minority armed forces, can be conceptualized in a more perfect manner if there is an integration between Pruitt's and Rubin's approach and a piecemeal approach that is presented in Su Mon Thazin Aung's chapter (pp.25-46), focusing only on incremental bargaining technique, being done piece by piece or one stage at a time. Indeed, various conflict strategies have been emerging in Myanmar's current peace process, for example, a contending strategy, composed of military threats and preemptive actions. However, it is Nehginpao Kipgen’s Myanmar: A Political History (2016) that points to a problem solving strategy through a discussion of underlying interests and concession making as the most likely relevant technique for resolving conflict in Myanmar. For conflict in political dynamics, Myanmar is a hybrid transitioning state that metamorphosed from an old authoritarian regime to a new democratizing polity. In the chapter about democracy and communal violence, Tamas Wells discovers the different interpretations of democracy between international aid workers and Burmese activists/democratic leaders (pp.245-260). The first group believes that universal human rights is the main component for democracy, whereas the latter assumes that the necessary foundations for Myanmar's democracy are the unity and the protection of the majority (p.247). Although Wells' finding and other intensive details from Michael Lidauer's chapter (pp.139-161) and Than Tun's chapter (pp. 177-198), emphasizing a causal interplay between election and conflict in the country's multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious plural society, can capture the essence of conflict in democratizing Myanmar partly, I think Arend Lijphart's classification of democratic pattern might help in viewing the issue more precisely. Lijphart (1977) explained different elements between majoritarian democracy and consensus/consociational democracy as well as emphasized the latter as a solution for conflict in states where traditional majoritarian democracy might not work due to deep rooted ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages. Therefore, in Myanmar or in its subnational polities, particularly Rakhine State, the fluctuation of communal violence can be analyzed through Lijphart's classical typology or through the conceptual relationships between democracy, consociationalism, and multiculturalism. After reviewing Conflict in Myanmar, I believe that a harmonious integration between a classification system inside the book and some of the conceptual insights mentioned above would help to facilitate a deeper understanding about Myanmar and the comparative conflicts on a global scale. The art of typological building can play a crucial role in accomplishing this task. By putting the 'politics-political-non-political' classification into Lijphart's majoritarian-consensus/consociational democracy framework, a systematic comparison can be done via the emerging six types—for example, the combination of politics and majoritarian democracy and the fusion between the political and consensus/consociational democracy. These two types might produce different outcomes for conflict management in Myanmar. While the previous one presents the risk of 'tyranny of the majority' and the 'centralistic majoritarian nationalism,' the latter might support a more delicate political engineering that is suitable for Myanmar’s pluralistic heterogeneous society. Last but not least, despite the remaining difficulty in theorizing the essence of conflict thoroughly, Conflict in Myanmar opens a new chapter for inspecting this problem by using Myanmar as a major case. Overall, the book is a timely contribution following the pace of political change and conflict transformation in Myanmar. The volume will be of interest to scholars and readers of Myanmar politics, comparative politics, Asian ethnography, and peace studies. Its unique selling point lies in the fact that it significantly contributes to the complex and labyrinthine 'Gordian knot' inside one of the most fascinating Balkanized states in the contemporary world. Dulyapak Preecharush is an Assistant Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Thammasat University. The post Book Review: Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics and Religion appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| You are subscribed to email updates from The Irrawaddy. To stop receiving these emails, you may unsubscribe now. | Email delivery powered by Google |
| Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, United States | |
