Friday, November 24, 2017

The Irrawaddy Magazine

The Irrawaddy Magazine


Local Media Furious After Being Barred From Repatriation Signing Ceremony

Posted: 24 Nov 2017 06:35 AM PST

YANGON — Local reporters expressed their anger about the government's limitations on access to information after they were banned from covering the signing of a bilateral agreement on the repatriation of refugees from Bangladesh on Thursday.

Amid mounting international pressure and concern over the Rakhine crisis, Myanmar reached an agreement with Bangladesh in Naypyitaw on Thursday for the return of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya who had fled to Bangladesh.

Minister for the State Counselor's Office U Kyaw Tint Swe and Bangladesh's Foreign Minister AH Mahmood Ali signed an "Arrangement on the Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State," according to an announcement from the State Counselor's Office released later in the day.

Only Bangladeshi reporters who accompanied the Bangladesh delegation and official Myanmar state media were allowed to cover the signing event.

Local reporters complained that they were bounced between the State Counselor Office, Ministry of Information and Ministry of Foreign Affairs while trying to get access to the event. They said officials diverted them from one ministry to another until the reporters finally learned they were banned from the event.

Ko Nyan Hlaing Lynn, Naypyitaw Bureau chief of Frontier Myanmar, said that the officials at first said they planned to have a joint press conference but later decided not to hold one. The local reporters were then left stranded outside the Office of State Counselor's Ministry, where the signing ceremony was held.

As local reporters were denied access to the event, most Myanmar media, including The Irrawaddy Burmese Edition, had to translate the news from Bangladesh media organizations and wire agencies. Frontier Myanmar published translations of reports from the Dhaka Tribune and AFP, Ko Nyan Hlaing Lynn said.

The State Counselor's Office issued a statement about the event but it included few details apart from old information that the arrangement was based on a 1992 agreement between the two countries and that it contained general guiding principles and policy arrangements to systematically verify and receive the displaced persons from Rakhine State.

Local reporters said they learned the repatriation would start within the next two months, and that a joint working group would be formed only after Bangladeshi papers reported the news.

Ko Nyan Hlaing Lynn noted the reporters also lost the opportunity to question Bangladeshi officials on their country's stand on the issue.

"I can't understand why they didn't allow us. They are under both local and international pressure over the repatriation issue. But the government lost a chance to explain about that (what and how they are going to carry out the repatriation)," he said.

Ko Aung Htet, from The Voice Daily, said that because his organization was denied access to the event, it chose not report the signing of the agreement.

He said the limitations on news coverage have increased under the current government, citing several recent events at which local media were denied access and some events, where only selected media representatives were allowed to attend.

"Even if the room is too small to allow all the press, they should have a pool system. Letting some media while blocking others is not a good idea."

U Myint Kyaw from the Myanmar Press Council said there was nothing that his organization could do in regard to the matter. But, the reporters could ask for greater access, he said.

Reporters based in Naypyitaw said that they considered boycotting a government press conference about the signing event.

"It is old news now. Bangladesh media have already covered it. I decided I won't go even if they hold a press conference this late," Ko Aung Htet from The Voice Daily said.

The Frontier Myanmar's Ko Nyan Hlaing Lynn said he would also join the protest.

"I want to send a message to the government that their arrangements have a problem," he said.

The post Local Media Furious After Being Barred From Repatriation Signing Ceremony appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

US ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ Charge Won’t Help Govt Solve Rakhine Issue, President’s Office Says

Posted: 24 Nov 2017 05:10 AM PST

NAYPYITAW—The US decision to label the Myanmar Army's counter-insurgency operation in northern Rakhine as "ethnic cleansing" is "unhelpful" for Myanmar's efforts to bring about durable peace in the state, President's Office spokesperson U Zaw Htay said.

After avoiding the term during his visit to Myanmar last week, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on Wednesday described the Myanmar Army's actions against Rohingya Muslims as "ethnic cleansing".

The crisis developed after an Aug. 25 attack by Muslim militants against government security forces sparked a military clearance operation, which prompted over 600,000 Rohingya Muslims to flee into Bangladesh amid allegations of human rights abuses.

"The situation in northern Rakhine State constitutes ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya," Tillerson said in a statement.

"That statement is unhelpful for Myanmar [which is] trying to find long-term solutions. We found that the statement failed to mention the killings of Hindus and innocent civilians by ARSA, and its conclusions were reached without any proven facts," U Zaw Htay told The Irrawaddy.

Washington will also pursue accountability through U.S. law, including possible targeted sanctions against those responsible for the alleged abuses, which have driven hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into Bangladesh, according to the statement.

Journalist U Thiha Thway suggested that Tillerson released the statement after deciding during his visit that the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government and the Myanmar Army had different positions on the Rakhine issue.

"The United States may have confidence that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's government will take action against wrongdoing in Rakhine and take responsibility. But perhaps it has decided to [release the statement] in order to find out what's really happening on the ground," he said.

The Myanmar government has repeatedly asked the international community to provide facts to back up allegations of human rights violations in Rakhine, but has received no meaningful facts to help with verification, he said.

"So only the United States knows what the intention of that statement was," he said.

"The Myanmar government will try to find a durable solution in northern Rakhine State based on Dr. Kofi Annan's recommendations," he added.

In another international development related to the Rakhine issue, UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said Tuesday that he had received "very troubling" evidence that will be used to assess whether genocide has been committed against Rohingya Muslims.

Amid pressure from the international community, the Myanmar government entered into a repatriation agreement with Bangladesh on Thursday, Labor, Immigration and Population Minister U Thein Swe told The Irrawaddy.

The two countries will form joint committees within two weeks, and start the repatriation process in two months, he added.

However, Myanmar will only accept those who return voluntarily, and will take action against those who have violated laws in Myanmar, the minister said. The Myanmar government also plans to issue national verification cards (MVCs) on the spot to Rohingya Muslims at repatriation centers, he said.

The post US 'Ethnic Cleansing' Charge Won't Help Govt Solve Rakhine Issue, President's Office Says appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Tussle over bank reform puts spotlight on debt pile

Posted: 24 Nov 2017 04:14 AM PST

NAYPYITAW — Myanmar's central bank has backed off from a demand that the country's private banks clear most of their loan books by January, averting a cliff-edge scenario that some bankers warned could have destabilized the financial system.

Myanmar's central bank deputy governor, Soe Thein, told Reuters that three years — instead of the original deadline of six months — would be given to lenders to recover the mostly open-ended "overdraft loans" that make up the bulk of their lending.

The compromise ends a lengthy tussle over regulations introduced in July to bring the country's banks closer to international standards. Reforming the banking sector is a key goal in leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's plan to complete Myanmar's democratic transition after decades of isolation under military rule.

"They need reasonable time for the transitional period … Sometimes international practice can't work domestically. We are very aware of and careful about the situation," said Soe Thein in an interview.

"The economy is not in a strong position, so we want the financial sector to be in a stable position. We have to establish an understanding between the banks and the central bank."

The new regulations also include stricter guidelines for bad loans — also known as "non-performing loans" (NPLs) — and an increase in the amount of capital banks are required to set aside to cover losses.

The central bank says it fears that the amount of bad debt on private lenders' books is greater than has so far been declared to the authorities. But officials are also concerned that pushing too quickly on reform could trigger volatility in the financial system.

"It's not easy, we agree, but we have to try," said Soe Thein, declining to provide an estimate of the scale of the problem because he said it was "dangerous" to try to estimate how much money the banks had lent in loans that are unlikely to be repaid.

Overdraft Loans

Officials and bankers say around 70 percent of Myanmar's more than $9 billion lending pool is in the form of so-called overdraft or evergreen loans — typically made on preferential terms to lure customers and rolled over indefinitely.

The central bank moved in July to end such practices with the new regulations drafted with the help of the International Monetary Fund. The curbs would force the banks to end indefinite roll-overs of the loans, asking them to get the loans repaid for a period of two full weeks on an annual basis.

Banks complained they were being given only six months to fix years of junta-era mismanagement and to recover most of their loans amid a sluggish economy.

"They (central bank) know what's going on in our books, but what they are asking for is almost impossible … All the local banks are in a difficult position," said Pyi Soe Htin, executive director of international banking for Yangon-based Asia Green Development Bank.

After at least three rounds of talks since July, Soe Thein told Reuters the central bank would "in the next few days" issue "follow-up instructions", allowing the overdraft loans to be converted into regular, three-year loans — a compromise that offers breathing space to Myanmar's 24 private banks.

"The payment terms and conditions will be a bit relaxed, so the customers can be a little relaxed on the payment as well as the banks can get more collection from their customers," said Soe Thein.

He did not give details of the terms of those new loans.

Some in the fledgling financial sector said that attempting to get so much debt repaid by January could trigger a run on the banks, which are deeply entwined both with one another and with the conglomerates run by businessmen close to the former ruling elite that dominate key sectors from real estate to aviation.

"This would create panic and we would have bank runs because our general public is very cautious," said Kim Chawsu, managing partner at Katalysts Investment Group and former chief financial officer of the parent company of Myanmar's largest lender, Kanbawza Group.

"If one of the banks fails, there will be a domino effect … you need to be careful on how strict you are."

The compromise by the central bank underlines the daunting challenge facing Aung San Suu Kyi, whose promise of a modern, reformist government that would end Western sanctions and attract investment is under threat.

The Rohingya crisis means some aid to Myanmar is being withheld, investors have turned wary and the country faces reinstatement of some of sanctions, making reforms more difficult.

Non-Performing Loans

Despite having one of the least developed financial sectors in the region, Myanmar's banking assets have jumped to 55 percent of its GDP in 2016 from 15 percent in 2011, when the junta handed power to a semi-civilian government, according to German state development agency GIZ.

But even after widespread political and economic reforms began in 2011, bankers say the banks have continued to lend largely on preferential terms to a small group of well-connected customers.

"These cronies, who have a lot of money, set up banks without experience or any knowledge of banking," said Sein Maung, chairman of Yangon-based First Private Bank, adding banks often lend money to "people in their networks".

The new rules introduced in July, which also included stricter curbs on banks' exposure to individual borrowers, were an attempt to change lending practices and force lenders to deal with riskier loans in a banking system that has remained poorly regulated.

Deputy governor Soe Thein said the central bank still needed to evaluate the real state of the banks and "know the magnitude of the non-performing loans".

He said that, while major banks regularly report a healthy NPL ratio at 5-6 percent of total loans, "that is lower than the real situation". He did not elaborate.

Than Lwin, former deputy central bank governor and senior adviser at Kanbawza Bank, said lenders and the central bank hold a "different definition" of what constitutes an NPL. He said banks evaluate loans based on the borrower's background and potential ability to repay, whereas the central bank — in line with international practice — judges them on number of days in arrears.

As part of Myanmar's lending reforms, Soe Thein said the central bank was set to raise the maximum lending rate to 16 percent from 13 percent so that banks could generate capital by offering higher risk loans.

The central bank was also considering allowing non-collateral loans, Soe Thein said, ending a long-standing restriction that limits loan guarantees mainly to land and buildings. He did not elaborate on the timeframe.

With home prices in the commercial hub of Yangon dropping some 20 percent over the past three years, according to property consultancy Colliers, the move could help ease concerns about lenders' over-exposure to higher-risk property.

Soe Thein said the central bank's forthcoming follow-up directive would allow banks to convert overdraft facilities to loans with terms of three years from July this year, with the exception of those loans already declared by the banks as NPLs.

After that, he said, the central bank would request full disclosures on all loans from banks and enter into further, if necessary one-on-one, negotiations on how to clean up their balance sheets, starting with loans above 5 billion kyat ($3.67 million).

Some in the industry, however, have warned that if the central bank rows back on its hard line when negotiating with the banks it may jeopardize much-needed reforms.

"They can't afford to delay the implementation because if they do that, they lose full leverage," said a financial professional involved in lending to local businesses, who declined to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter.

The post Tussle over bank reform puts spotlight on debt pile appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

NLD Legislators Call for Punitive Action in MICA Graft Scandal

Posted: 24 Nov 2017 04:05 AM PST

NAYPYITAW—National League for Democracy (NLD) lawmakers have called for legal action against officials and businessmen who participated in corrupt transactions involving the Myanmar International Cooperation Agency (MICA)—a quasi-governmental agency established by the U Thein Sein administration.

The agency was formed in 2012 as a unit of the former Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development and led by its minister, U Ohn Myint, alongside U Soe Thane, a former President's Office minister who is now a lawmaker in the Upper House.

At the time, the stated aim of the agency was to promote the meat and fish industry and to improve domestic food sufficiency. MICA was supposed to coordinate with local and foreign companies to develop underutilized assets—mainly farms, fisheries and factories.

In December last year, Dr. Arkar Moe, a lawmaker from Karen State, accused MICA's board of directors of lining their own pockets. After a parliamentary debate on the issue, the Upper House voted to abolish the agency in February this year.

The President's Office agreed with the abolition of MICA, U Hla Kyaw, the deputy minister for Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation, told Parliament at the time.

On Wednesday, the Parliament's Government Guarantees, Pledges and Undertakings Vetting Committee discussed an interim report on field surveys in the Yangon and Irrawaddy regions regarding the operations of MICA.

"I would like to urge concerned ministries to think about what punitive actions to take against [corrupt] officials and businessmen," said lawmaker U Than Soe of Yangon Region (4), who is also a member of the committee.

While it operated, MICA took control of about 70 factories and enterprises and over 150 acres of land. It has not returned them to the government, according to the committee.

According to the committee's report, while the President's Office has agreed to MICA's abolition, it has yet to set a timeframe. Furthermore, it has tasked the directors of MICA with implementing the decision. As MICA's work is intertwined with that of many other agencies, the task is a complicated one.

Citing the report, lawmaker Daw Shwe Shwe Sein Latt of Bago Region (3) said MICA had "violated the law, misappropriated State property, and lacked transparency."

The agency barely bothered to inform the new chiefs of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation about its operations, and its contracts are vaguely worded, added lawmaker Dr Pyae Phyo of Irrawaddy Region (7).

U Thein Swe, chairman of the Government Guarantees, Pledges and Undertakings Vetting Committee, told reporters that the interim report had been submitted to the cabinet.

"It is up to the concerned ministries to determine what actions to take," he said.

After the 2015 election results were released, and with a power transfer pending, the agency hastily signed at least 10 land lease deals with the private sector, with terms of 30 to 50 years. The land covered by these deals was leased out for shopping centers, markets and so on, rather than for activities supporting the country's fish and meat sector.

The post NLD Legislators Call for Punitive Action in MICA Graft Scandal appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Local tour guides want ministry to take action against foreign operators

Posted: 24 Nov 2017 03:57 AM PST

Mandalay – The Myanmar Tourist Guides Association is planning to call on the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism to crack down on the employment of foreign guides by tour operators.

The chairman of the association told The Irrawaddy on Friday that the foreign tour guides, especially those serving the Korean market, were denying local licensed Korean-speaking guides the opportunity to work.

"Most of the Korean tour agencies use native speakers as tour guides, so the local Korean-speaking guides do not have a chance to get work," said association chairman U Aung Tun Lin.

In 2012, the association raised the issue of Korean tour guides working in the country with the ministry, however, the tour operators have continued to use foreigners as tour guides.

"Back then, the ministry issued a notice and the agencies hired English-speaking guides, instead of Korean speaking local guides," he explained.

"As the Tourist Guide Association, we will submit another complaint to the ministry to protect the job security of local licensed guides and to ensure there are proper rules and regulations on the employment of unlicensed foreign tour guides," he said.

The Korean tourist market has blossomed since 2010, as the country opened its doors to the world. In the early years, there were only a couple of Korean-speaking local licensed guides. However, according to local guides, the number of professional local guides who can speak Korean has now increased to 30.

"I decided to be a Korean guide and have invested many years to learn the language and tried hard to get the license too," said Ko Kyaw Kyaw Naing, who has worked in the industry since 2010. "But now, all of our efforts have been in vain and we are unemployed as no tour agencies will hire us, for they are using Koreans instead."

According to industry regulations, tourist guides need to be citizens of Myanmar and to have a professional license issued by the Ministry of Hotel and Tourism.

Travel agencies and tour operators tended to employ native tour leaders for package tours and group tours, but hire the local licensed tourist guides for tours across the country.

The local tourist guides said their Korean counterparts seemed to have no official license, but they were somehow hired as foreign employees of the travel agencies.

"Since 2012, they have hired English-speaking guides, so they can say they have a local tour guide. If they are doing that, what kind of job can we get?" said Ko Kyaw Kyaw Naing.

"Every year, we have to pay a tax to be a tourist guide, but the funny thing is, we have no job. We would like to urge the responsible government officials to reconsider the rules and regulations on this issue to create job security and job opportunities for the local professionals," he said.

The post Local tour guides want ministry to take action against foreign operators appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Kachin Faithful Make Long Trip to Yangon to Welcome Pope Francis

Posted: 24 Nov 2017 03:10 AM PST

Thousands of ethnic Kachin from northern Myanmar are traveling to Yangon to welcome Pope Francis, who is scheduled to arrive in the country on Nov. 27.

U Naw, a Kachin religious leader, said there were about 7,000 Kachin Catholics in Myitkyina who would make the trip to Yangon to see Pope Francis.

The Irrawaddy's Mandalay-based photographer interviewed the travellers from Kachin at the city's train station today as they made their way to Yangon.

"We are Group 2 on our list. About 800 people are in our group," U Naw said, adding more followers would come over the next few days.

The elder expressed hope the pope's visit would support the peace process in the country.

The Kachin region has been wracked by fighting between the Myanmar Army and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) since 2011, when a 17-year-old ceasefire broke down. The fighting has forced more than 130,000 Kachin villagers to flee their homes.

A poster was erected at a Catholic church in Yangon to welcome Pope Francis with the words, "A Heartiest Welcome to the Holy Father Pope Francis, Missionary of Love and Peace."

Pope Francis will visit Myanmar for four days during which time he will meet State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Army chief Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing.

This is the first time a pope has visited Myanmar and his trip comes when hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims have fled to Bangladesh following an anti-militant sweep by the Myanmar Army through Rakhine state. The Pope has faulted the Myanmar Aarmy for rights abuses allegedly carried out during the clearance operation.

Myanmar's leaders have asked the pope not to use the word "Rohingya" during his visit so as to avoid inflaming local sensitivities.

Myanmar has about 700,000 people who profess to be Catholic and for many of them it is the first time they have had had a chance to see a pope in person. Members of other ethnic groups such as the Karen, Kayar and Chin are also expected to come to Yangon to witness Pope Francis's visit.

U Tangun, an ethnic Kachin man said, "I came from Myitkyina. Many people have come for this. The train has 11 carriages and it was full with all of us."

The group left from Myitkyina at 10: 30 am yesterday, and reached Mandalay train station in this morning.

"We have never heard of a pope visiting our country in our age. But, we heard that he has come to visit us this time. We are very pleased, and want to welcome him," said U Tangun.

"The intention of our trip is to support peace and people living in harmony together in our country. Our Kachin region does not have peace. The pope is a respected person in the world, and we recognize him as a special person," he said.

The journey is a long one for the Kachin pilgrims, taking two days and two nights from Myitkyina to Yangon. But Tar Zwa Taung, an ethnic Kachin woman, said any discomfort was minor compared to the opportunity to meet the pope.  "I do not feel it was difficult to make the trip as I really wanted to come to see Pope Francis."

The pope will land at the airport in Yangon at 1 pm local time with a large crowed expected to be waiting to greet him. On Nov. 29, he will lead a public mass at Kyaik Ka San Stadium at 8:30 am.

On the completion of his trip to Myanmar, Francis will visit neighboring Bangladesh.

The post Kachin Faithful Make Long Trip to Yangon to Welcome Pope Francis appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

China’s Tug of War

Posted: 24 Nov 2017 03:01 AM PST

In this special report published in the May 2013 issue of The Irrawaddy magazine, Yun Sun wrote that China — at that time seemingly in danger of being frozen out of Myanmar’s economic opening — could take comfort in the knowledge that it can never be fully counted out of its neighbor’s affairs. In light of the fallout from the situation in Rakhine, the report seems especially prescient.

Burma's democratic reform has produced both winners and losers. The country's transition to democracy has revitalized the government, opposition groups and civil society, and it has brought the people unprecedented development opportunities. On the other hand, some former military leaders and cronies have lost their previous political status and economic privileges.

Externally, the West has applauded democracy's victory in Burma and eagerly embraced the country's rich business potential. However, one of Burma's old patrons, China, has perhaps suffered most from the former pariah state's unexpected waves of change.

Indeed, Burma's reform has unveiled tremendous challenges and unpleasant uncertainties for China's national interests. Suspension of the controversial Myitsone dam project in north Burma was seen as "a slap in the face" for China; the victory of "the will of the people" against the unpopular Chinese project encouraged broad scrutiny and criticism of other business ventures signed off by Beijing during the military government.

This anti-China criticism was particularly signified in the protests against China's joint venture in the Letpadaung copper mine near Monywa in northwestern Burma. Other protests have raised concerns about the future of a strategic Chinese project to build oil and gas pipelines across Burma. Both countries seem to recognize that the pipelines, expected to be completed in May, are too important to jeopardize, but as Burma's political, economic and social spheres continue evolving at dazzling speeds, uncertainty about the project has grown.

Politically, the preliminary success of Burma's democratic transition has raised questions about China's own political system and long-postponed reforms. Although official Chinese media have characterized Burma's reforms as "too early to tell" and "untested by reality," academics and media commentators cite similarities between the former military government and China's authoritarian system, and they use Burma's smooth democratic transition to argue for the necessity and feasibility of China's own political reform. For the fifth generation of Chinese leaders stepping into their new positions, this is certainly not the most pleasant message.

The Irrawaddy Magazine's May 2013 Issue

In north Burma, the Kachin conflict has touched upon China's sensitive nerves on border stability. There may not have been a causal relationship between Burma's political reforms and the hostilities, which flared in June 2011, not long after President Thein Sein took office. However, there are rampant complaints from China about Thein Sein's inability to control the military and stabilize the border.

This dissatisfaction directly resulted in China's open intervention in peace talks between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the Burmese government in China's Yunnan Province in February. In an unprecedented move, China assumed a mediation role in the internal conflict between the central government and a local rebel group in another sovereign nation. In this sense, China deviated from its traditional principle of non-intervention in other countries' internal affairs, which has been the cornerstone of its foreign policy since the founding of the nation in 1949.

Yun Sun is a visiting fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution in Washington.Yun Sun is a visiting fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

The changing Burma has not been the best news for China's strategic landscape on the global stage either. The dissolution of Burma's international isolation and the country's rapidly improving relations with the West have undermined Beijing's original blueprint regarding the strategic utilities of Burma at regional forums to defend China's unpopular positions and in the Indian Ocean to advance China's strategic presence and national interests.

As Burma develops close ties with the West, China has seen rising competition with other powers inside the country for economic opportunities and strategic influence. This competition did not exist before the democratic reform. Among competing powers, the United States has been singled out as a main source of China's mishaps in Burma.

Eyes on America

The US government has taken exhaustive efforts to reassure Beijing that US engagement in Burma is not targeted at China in any sense. Instead, US policy makers say engagement has been motivated by Burma's democratic reform. According to an anonymous US diplomat, "To think that all we have done in Myanmar [Burma] is because of China is delusional and only reflects Beijing's paranoia about the US."

However, Beijing could not agree less. Chinese leaders firmly believe the US rebalancing to Asia is aimed at encircling China and curtailing China's regional influence. In this vein, they reason that US President Barack Obama's engagement with Burma, as a part of this rebalancing, must likewise be hostile to China. Leaked diplomatic cables about US government funding for anti-dam organizations before the suspension of Myitsone project have been cited as evidence of a US attempt to "sabotage" Chinese interests in Burma.

This antagonism has been reinforced by US actions that may remotely relate to China. American interest in the Kachin conflict and US Ambassador Derek Mitchell's visit to Kachin State raised fears in China that the US would intervene and assert its presence right on the Chinese border. The United States has also invited Burma to observe the Cobra Gold joint military exercises in Thailand, leading to concern in Beijing that close US-Burma military ties might somehow threaten China's national security either in the near term or the long run.

Even if Washington did not originally intend to contain China through its engagement with Burma, some analysts argue that Chinese interests have nonetheless been damaged as a result. For Washington to deny responsibility in China's losses only reflects its lack of consideration and respect of China's national interests.

Therefore, at a US-China-Burma trilateral dialogue in Beijing in December, when discussing how the United States and China could cooperate in Burma, Song Qingrun from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, a government think tank, openly urged the United States "not to damage China's interests inside the country and to take concrete measure to strengthen the Sino-US strategic mutual trust on Myanmar."

Reacting to reform

In light of the perceived China-unfriendly changes in Burma, Beijing has not been slow to convey displeasure. Of the war in Kachin State, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly issued harsh statements about the escalating conflict and expressed its concern over border security.

Economically, China also dramatically reduced foreign direct investment (FDI) to Burma last year. According to Chinese official media, FDI to Burma dropped from US $8.5 billion in 2011 to $1.02 billion in the first 11 months of 2012.

Given that China provided the majority of FDI to Burma in 2011, the reduction of investment inflow represents a major policy shift. The cutback might be justified in that the anti-China sentiment in Burma has created major problems for Chinese investments, but in the long run, its impact on Burma's prospects for economic growth could be profound.

Official bilateral ties seem cordial to the public. Senior Burma leaders including Thein Sein and Shwe Mann, the speaker of Burma's lower house of Parliament, have both visited Beijing since the nominally civilian government came to power in 2011.

However, during the peak of reforms between April 2011 and September 2012, none of China's top leaders visited Burma. This constitutes a sharp comparison to three such visits before Burma's democratization from March 2009 to June 2010.

Meanwhile, China is seeking to diversify its relationships with different political forces in Burma, including opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy party. Beijing has also launched a major public relations campaign to improve its image and relations with local communities in the country.

Despite prior losses, China remains hopefully about the future of Sino-Burmese relations. This confidence stems from a belief that regardless of Burma's political system or international status, China will always be its largest neighbor and China's political, economic and social influence will always persist.

As Western companies hesitate on the best timing to invest in the country, China believes its abundant foreign investment could encourage closer Sino-Burmese cooperation once Naypyidaw realizes its ties with the West are not bringing the desired economic growth.

China recognizes this relationship may not be as good as during the junta years. However, as it observes and adjusts, the Asian superpower hopes for new opportunities.

The post China's Tug of War appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

BGF Plans Large City Expansion Project in Karen State

Posted: 24 Nov 2017 01:37 AM PST

Karen State, Hpa An – Karen State Chief Minister Daw Nan Khin Htwe Myint confirmed that the Border Guard Force, led by Col Saw Chit Thu, had proposed a large city expansion project for the Kaukoo Myaing region of Myawaddy Township.

She said the state government had recently approved an initial project phase on 60 acres of land. The investment is backed by a Chinese state-owned company, Jilin Yati Co.

The Jilin Yatai group, founded in 1993, is a supplier of construction materials and has interests in coal mining, real estate, trade and tourism as well as financial investments. The company was ranked No.329 in "China's Top 500 Enterprises" in 2016, according to Yatai's own website.

During an interview with The Irrawaddy at her office, the chief minister was unable to verify estimates of the size of the project or the related company names as it has received limited information about the project from the BGF.

"Actually, establishing a city expansion project can only be authorized by the state government. To become a city it needs to develop systematically but Bo Chit Thu (the BGF leader) was very keen to start quickly, so we gave them the green light to begin on 60 acres of land."

A few days ago, in response to Chinese news reports, some online commentators claimed the project would cover 1300 acres of land and involve a total investment of USD1.5 billion. Moreover, they claimed the real goal of the project was to develop a large casino business in the remote area.

The chief minister said she was aware of the reports. "To be honest, they are very close to a neighboring country (Thailand) and have acknowledged an interest in such businesses. Sometimes we try to make them (BGF) aware that this kind of business would not have a positive impact on the public. We will try our best to control that (development of an illegal casino)," Daw Nan Khin Htwe Myint said.

Although permission for the project has been granted by the state government, it would violate the Myanmar Investment Law (MIC) if the investment really was $1,5 billion, as state and regional governments are permitted to issue approvals for investments worth up to only $5 million, while larger projects require the approval of the union government.

It's unclear whether Jilin Yatai has applied to the union government for investment approval in compliance with the MIC law.

Saw Min Min Oo, a BGF official, explained that the project was still in its initial stage, with only some storage and staff buildings having been erected. However, the armed organization is still preparing to submit a proposal to the Ministry Investment Commission in order to implement the full development plan.

According to Saw Min Min Oo, Myanmar Yatai Company will invest 100 percent of the capital and the BGF will provide 1,000-2,000 acres of land for the construction of luxury housing, condominiums, a hotel and a golf resort. But details of the plan have not been released yet. The Irrawaddy could not independently verify whether Myanmar Yatai is a local branch of Jilin Yatai.

"They (the company) encouraged us to put a casino business in the project during a meeting. We haven't yet reached an agreement on that. As you know, such a business is illegal in Myanmar," Saw Min Min Oo said.

The BGF official admitted about four to five casinos were already operating in the suburbs of Myawaddy under the protection of his organization.

Nan Khin Htwe Myint said there was little her office could do to enforce the law. "We have only a small police force. Without the help of the army we can't control it at all," she said, adding that her office was negotiating with army officials to get help.

The post BGF Plans Large City Expansion Project in Karen State appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Myanmar Govt Lost $50 million in Tax to Beer Smugglers in 2016

Posted: 24 Nov 2017 01:12 AM PST

Yangon—Illegal beer imports cost the Myanmar government around $50 million in tax revenue in 2016, according to a report by global research firm Euromonitor International.

Nearly 1 million hectoliters — up to 30 percent of all the beer sold in Myanmar — was illegally imported, according to the report released on Monday. Euromonitor estimated the loss in tax revenue at $48-52 million.

To support local producers, the government has prohibited imports of alcoholic beverages since 1995. Only certain hotels and duty-free shops are permitted to import foreign brands, a policy that has given rise to a thriving black market for beer.

An estimated 80 percent of smuggled beer enters via the Thai border, with the rest coming through the Chinese border. Most of it is sold in areas near the borders, according to the study.

"Not only beer, but also various brands of food and beverages are being smuggled into the country across the Thai and Chinese borders. They are sold cheaply, as no tax is paid. The government is losing tax revenues and local brewers are losing sales," said an official of the Myanmar Brewers Association who requested anonymity.

Affordability is the key driver of smuggled-beer consumption, according to the report, with a 330 ml can of smuggled beer costing about 35 percent less than locally produced beers on average.

"Local brewers have to pay tax to the government and bear other operating costs. So they cannot compete on price with smuggled beer. And consumers choose the cheaper ones," the brewers association official said.

Nearly 30 illegally imported beer brands are available in Myanmar, 95 percent of them well-known Thai brands, the official said.

The local beer industry paid 150 billion kyats in tax to the government under the Special Goods Tax Law in 2016, according to the report.

According to Euromonitor International, one of the biggest independent providers of strategic market research in the world, the study was done between August and November 2017 in four townships: Mawlamyine in Mon State, Myawaddy in Karen State, and Tachilek and Taunggyi in Shan State.

The research included extensive desk research, store audits in the four townships and interviews with retailers, distributors and government officials, Euromonitor said.

The post Myanmar Govt Lost $50 million in Tax to Beer Smugglers in 2016 appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

The Road Past Mangshi

Posted: 24 Nov 2017 12:42 AM PST

To remind readers of the shifting sands upon which regional and international relations are built, we revisit David I Steinberg’s special report for The Irrawaddy magazine’s May 2013 issue on the state of Myanmar-China relations in 2013, a time when the government of then-President Thein Sein appeared to be seeking closer ties with the US at China’s expense.

An impressive memorial to Sino-Burmese friendship in the Chinese town of Mangshi, Yunnan Province, commemorates the paukphaw (sibling) friendship that idealizes relations between these two countries.

This relationship was also captured in an emblematic Chinese poem from 1956 about the two peoples drinking the same river water, living by the rivers and climbing the mountains; they "share everlasting happiness." A symbolic statue of two ethereal figures carrying water frames one of the border crossings, representing both countries. Zhou Enlai, the first prime minister of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and U Nu, Burma's first prime minister under the 1947 Constitution, developed a close, warm relationship.

And yet, when the cultural revolution came to Rangoon a decade later with riots, the public's economic and political frustrations against Burma's government were redirected at the local Chinese population, leading to dozens of Chinese deaths and extensive looting. The Chinese privately deplored Gen Ne Win's Socialist ideology, known as the "Burmese Way to Socialism," which they described as state capitalism and anti-Marxist despite official endorsement.

Following these riots, China actively supported Burma's Communist Party that sought to overthrow Ne Win's administration, reasoning that party-to-party relations were quite different from state-to-state relations. China did not criticize Burma's government for the repression of nationwide pro-democracy protests in 1988; the next year, Burma did not condemn China over the Tiananmen Square protests.

In the era of Burma's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which later became the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), collaboration between both countries intensified to an unprecedented magnitude. China opened borders, increased trade and provided massive investment in military equipment and training, infrastructure and extractive industries. The illegal migration of about two million Chinese into Burma with their business acumen increased China's negative visibility. This relationship culminated in May 2011 when both countries signed a comprehensive strategic economic partnership.

Relations were, however, circumspect. To China, Burma was "a beggar with a golden bowl," asking for aid despite extensive natural resources. The Burmese, always careful about their northern neighbor, developed a saying: "When China spits, Burma swims."

To the West, especially in journalistic circles and even some governments, Burma was known as a "client state" of China. This was, however, a simplistic analysis, equating money and presence with dependence.

True, China was a "protector" of Burma in 2007 when it joined Russia in vetoing a US-introduced resolution that claimed the Southeast Asian pariah state was a threat to regional peace and security. Meanwhile, as a condition of Chinese diplomatic recognition, Burma stated from its inception that there was only one China, which included Taiwan.

David I. Steinberg is Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

There were other mutual bonds. Burma's government wanted Chinese protection against what it anticipated might be a US invasion, with worries stemming from US policies of "regime change," or recognition of the National League for Democracy's sweep on the 1990 elections, under former presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Although ludicrous to Americans, this was a palpable fear in Burma, perhaps providing a partial rationale for moving the capital from Rangoon to Naypyidaw, an air command from Mingaladon to Meikthila in central Burma, and a naval regional headquarters from Sittwe inland to An.

China wanted access to the Bay of Bengal and Burma's natural gas and hydroelectric power, along with the ability to bypass the vulnerable Malacca Strait, which is subject to bottleneck by any power attempting to contain China. A strong Chinese position in Burma might also strengthen China's claims to the disputed 96,000 square kilometer area of Arunachal Pradesh, occupied by India.

Although Burma's contemporary relations with China seem to mirror the traditional Confucian Sino-centric tribute system under which the court at Mandalay sent delegations to Beijing, there are significant differences. Other factors now play critical roles. Burma won the border dispute with China, whose Nationalist and Communist governments both claimed large areas of northern Burma as Chinese territory. In the settlement of 1960, negotiated by Ne Win but signed by U Nu, China wanted to show the international community that it was not a predatory state, and Burma was the easiest country with which to demonstrate this attitude.

Today, Chinese critical investment in Burma is not like that of a developed state seeking low-cost, labor-intensive sites for its industries; companies cannot quickly pull out their sewing machines or equipment and move to other, even lower-cost labor markets. Rather, major Chinese investments are permanent structures coordinated with China's national developmental plans and investment. The productivity and usefulness of these investments to China depend on good relations with Burma. Burma thus has a distinctly advantageous position; China needs it more than it needs China.

Because of the attempted isolation of Burma by the United States and the European Union through incremental sanctions policies, China assumed a far larger role than might otherwise have been the case, but the East Asian superpower never had a free hand in Burma.

Burma's government quietly vetoed a Chinese plan to turn the Irrawaddy River port of Bhamo, near the Chinese border, into a container site for shipments into the Bay of Bengal. More obvious was the example of President Thein Sein's decision to stop construction of the Myitsone dam in 2011 on the basis that he was listening to negative public opinion. This $3.6 billion dam was intended to supply power to Yunnan Province, but public outcry on environmental and emotional grounds was too great.

China was disconcerted by that event, not believing public opinion in Burma could play an important role after some half-century of military control and repression. Beijing unofficially but authoritatively blamed the United States for fomenting anti-Chinese sentiment through Burma's NGOs. The level of trust between China and Burma seemed to have precipitously dropped after that time.

This distrust was exacerbated by Burma-US relations, which improved as Burma's government continued to liberalize, with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visiting the Southeast Asian country in December 2011 and President Barack Obama stopping by in November last year.

The Chinese formal response to these changed international relations have been judicious and moderate, but in the country's controlled press, one paper said the Clinton trip was "undermining the [Chinese] wall in Myanmar [Burma]."

Considerable speculation exists as to why Thein Sein's government has so assiduously endorsed improved relations with the United States. Many factors seem likely, but one relates to the Burma-China relationship, which some in Burma have regarded as too close. An improved US relationship not only brings US assistance, but more importantly opens lending by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. It also encourages large-scale assistance from Japan, which views too close a Burma-China relationship as inimical to its long-term interests by strengthening China in East Asia.

To the Chinese, US direct assistance cannot replace or even compete with Chinese support. One Chinese wrote that US aid was likely to be as "beautiful moonlight on the river," nice to view but ephemeral and unsubstantial.

Burma had a tradition of neutralism that was important to its survival during the Cold War. Although the policy was anathema to both China's Chairman Mao and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, it was a sound approach to, as they say, "living in a dangerous neighborhood." Burma was always neutral, but "in China's shadow."

The current movement toward the United States, which has resulted in the best US-Burma relations since independence in 1948, will likely evolve into a more balanced, more modern neutralist stance, although China continues to perceive US relations with Burma as part of a US "containment" policy.

Still, China's interests are partly served by the reforms on which improved US-Burma relations are based. China likely fears two potential events in Burma. The first is a general uprising along the lines of the failed people's revolution in 1988. This chaos, whatever the result, would jeopardize Chinese infrastructure security, especially at two vital pipelines for offshore Burma gas and Middle Eastern and African crude oil. It would also limit the development of Yunnan Province, which is now effectively dependent on trade with Burma to improve low standards of living.

Although Burma's political and economic reforms have strongly reduced the possibility of a popular uprising, they are a double-edged sword: The reforms improve the business climate with positive impacts on the Chinese, but they will also increase international competition. More liberal censorship policies may placate the public, but they also allow freer expression of anti-Chinese sentiment.

The second issue is minority unrest and insurrections in Burma that directly affect important Chinese infrastructure. For example, fighting in Burma's Kachin State between armed rebel groups and the government army have caused instability along the Chinese border, with an influx of refugees and shells falling into Yunnan Province. The unrest has become a major hindrance to Chinese businesses.

A large percentage of the Yunnan population are also ethnic and linguistic cousins of the Kachin people; Beijing does not want the conflict to result in ethnic problems in China or the potential support of Jinghpaw (Kachin) people in Yunnan Province to their brethren in Burma.

So, despite China's continued insistence that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring states, it has moved somewhat uncomfortably to participate in the negotiating process ("intervening but not interfering") between Kachin rebels and Burma's government. In addition to resolving a potential danger, perhaps China has gotten involved in negotiations in a bid to prevent the United States from doing so.

Burma's army, the Tatmadaw, is said to be highly nationalistic in Kachin State toward both the Kachin people and the Chinese. China may have a vested and economic interest in tranquility there, but they cannot be seen as weak or subservient to internal or external pressure.

Burma must obviously act gingerly with Beijing, as it has always done, but the strong nationalism of its diverse peoples will prevent it from becoming a pawn of any state, even one as powerful as China, the colossus looming over their northern frontier.

The post The Road Past Mangshi appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Big Brother to the Rescue

Posted: 23 Nov 2017 10:18 PM PST

Whenever Burma faces a crisis, the international spotlight focuses on China. But to Myanmar's leadership, timing is everything.

On Wednesday, the United States for the first time referred to the Myanmar military's operation against the Rohingya as "ethnic cleansing" and threatened targeted sanctions against those responsible for "horrendous atrocities."

The US made its position known to the world two days after Myanmar's powerful military commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing hopped on a plane to China.

Li Zuocheng, a member of China's Central Military Commission, said during a meeting with Min Aung Hlaing that China's increasing development and prosperity represented an important development opportunity for Myanmar.

"In the face of a complex and changeable regional security situation, China is willing to maintain strategic communication between the two countries' militaries," Li was quoted as saying in a statement issued late Wednesday.

Min Aung Hlaing and other top military leaders may well be on Washington's list of sanctions targets, but the general has been made to feel welcome in China.

Once again, Beijing has made a calculated strategic move toward its southern neighbor.

Wang Yi in Naypyitaw

Soon after the Chinese Communist Party's 19th National Congress, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi flew to two countries in Asia – Bangladesh and Myanmar – to mediate the situation in northern Rakhine State. The trip was significant; China has shown foresight by investing in both countries as a long-time friend and strategic partner.

While in Myanmar, Wang met with President U Htin Kyaw, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and military Commander-in-Chief Snr Gen Min Aung Hlaing.

Adopting the role of mediator, the Chinese foreign minister voiced support for bilateral negotiations between Bangladesh and Myanmar to resolve the crisis in Rakhine, instead of an international initiative. In a meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, he stressed that the international community should create the necessary conditions and a sound environment to facilitate this.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Snr Gen Min Aung Hlaing thanked China for its understanding of the Rakhine State issue and agreed with a three-phase plan proposed by Beijing. The situation serves as a reminder of Myanmar's recent past; when the country was under the military regime, China unconditionally backed Myanmar at the United Nations and defended it from criticism over a number of issues, as it has done in Rakhine State.

When the West, including the US and the EU, condemned Myanmar's former military regime and imposed sanctions on it, China was the pariah government's main backer and largest investor.

While Min Aung Hlaing's visit was not entirely unexpected (he was invited to China several months ago but the visit was put on hold for unknown reasons), the timing of the trip, coming so soon after his meeting with Wang, surprised some observers.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has welcomed China's proposal to build an economic corridor as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The economic corridor will run from China's Yunnan Province to the central Myanmar city of Mandalay. From there it will go east to Yangon and west to the Kyaukpyu special economic zone in Rakhine State; therefore, the stability of Rakhine State is vital to China, which will use the corridor to gain access to the Indian Ocean. In fact, Myanmar is central to China's geopolitical strategic game plan in terms of trade links, energy security and its gigantic Silk Road plan. China will not allow this plan to be checked by Western influence or – more importantly – foreign military bases in Myanmar.

Beijing wants to see stability restored in the Rakhine region, as both Bangladesh and Myanmar are important to its ambitious BRI.

China has also promised to be a key player in Myanmar's ongoing peace process. All ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar are under China's influence and enjoy China's support. Myanmar needs China's help in persuading ethnic insurgents to come to the negotiating table.

As it has in the past, China has asked ethnic leaders to attend the next round of peace talks in Myanmar. The date of the next conference has not been announced yet.

Playing 'Big Brother'

China has played a 'Big Brother' role in Myanmar for decades. It will be interesting to see how, amid pressure from the West on the Rohingya issue, China and Myanmar develop and deepen their relationship from here.

The late Prime Minister U Nu once famously said, "Our tiny nation cannot have the effrontery to quarrel with any power…. And least among these, could Burma afford to quarrel with the new China?"

But China is not alone in lending a helping hand to Myanmar. Whenever Beijing makes a move in Myanmar, New Delhi raises an eyebrow.

Myanmar received backing from India when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the country weeks after the violence erupted in northern Rakhine State and fully supported the government and military.

Myanmar and India also initiated joint military exercises and agreed to cooperate on training, exchanges and intelligence sharing. New Delhi is keen to expand its support on counterterrorism and increase cooperation with the government and military. New Delhi objects to the multi-billion-dollar BRI project, boycotting a high-profile Belt and Road Forum organized by China in May.

To counter China, Japan has also increased its investment in and assistance to Myanmar. Tokyo recently announced US$1.1 billion in loans and other assistance for a railway linking Yangon and Mandalay, efforts to boost farmers' incomes, and support for small and medium enterprises, residential financing and ethnic minorities.

Moscow, too has weighed in on the crisis in Rakhine. Yangon-based Russian Ambassador Nikolay Listopadov said recently, "We are against excessive external intervention, because it won't lead to any constructive results."

"Just pressure and blaming and accusing — it simply won't work."

In candid remarks on US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's independent investigation, the ambassador said, "It's absolutely not acceptable for the Myanmar side; it will never accept it … it won't work. It's counterproductive."

In 2009-10, Russia invested in the oil and gas sector in Myanmar, but more importantly Myanmar procured weapons and jet fighters such as the MiG 29 from Russia. The Myanmar military sends hundreds of officers to Russia for training on an annual basis.

But Beijing is several steps ahead of all of them.

Myanmar's powerful neighbor to the north supports the country through aid and investment, and assistance in building strategic infrastructure projects such as oil and gas pipelines, ports, and dams. But as mentioned above, closer military cooperation is also now on the agenda. The details of any substantive agreements reached between China and Myanmar during Min Aung Hlaing's recent trip will be worth keeping an eye on.

Dragon Lady?

Since taking office in April in 2016, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has surprised her Western friends by developing a warm relationship with the Chinese. In return, Beijing has quickly increased the frequency of high-level visits, while ratcheting up aid, assistance and diplomatic coverage for Myanmar.

In fact, it seems that while China and India have assisted her government since she came to power, the West, which invested in the country's democracy movement for decades, is losing its influence under her administration. Despite this, we have seen mounting criticism and condemnation from the West of her administration and Myanmar. As a result, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will find more comfort working with regional governments and traditional allies. But she is not ignoring the West; rather, she is trying to effect a rebalancing. Can she pull it off? If so, for how long?

Myanmar is undoubtedly becoming a battleground for the superpowers as the country moves to open up and rapidly forges alliances in the region and beyond. China no doubt is feeling the heat.

Like it or not, the reality is that China has regained its old position and will remain a dominant and influential player in Myanmar, a country in which Western powers and powerful neighbors once vied for influence.

Anti-China Sentiment

It is too early to say whether people in Myanmar are ready to rethink their anti-China sentiment. Beijing is widely seen as having been the main backer of the repressive previous regimes and as a major exploiter of the country's natural resources. People in Myanmar have reservations about China and its motives.

To win over the people of the country, Beijing will have to repair its tarnished image.

However, the West's attempt to seize the moral high ground by taking an unyielding approach to the complex issue in Rakhine State has also elicited a strong emotional reaction among the general population. This could lead to doubts about the West's engagement, if not to outright anti-Western feeling.

Looking at the fallout from the crisis in Rakhine, Beijing seems to have emerged the winner. Is the US no longer in the game, as some seasoned observers have suggested? While it is hard to predict exactly how Beijing will gain from this crisis, there can be no doubt that the West is losing its influence in Myanmar.

With the decline of Western power elsewhere, the rise of China will have implications and consequences for the region and Myanmar. China today is a major player in the global economy and it will continue to gain in importance. Myanmar must prepare to counter China's dominance before it is too late.

The post Big Brother to the Rescue appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Ko Pye Lives and Breathes Poetry

Posted: 23 Nov 2017 10:08 PM PST

Ko Pye (b. 1965) lives and breathes poetry. In fact, he does nothing else – alongside Aung Cheimt the only full-time professional poet in this collection. Typical of many Burmese poets who disavow that their writing is political, above all because of a desire to not let art deteriorate into propaganda, his writing is scathingly critical of political reality, despite his protests to the contrary.

When did you start writing poetry?

I started when I quit mechanical engineering school in 1987. It was a dark period of political tumult. My family suffered much hardship. I did not have enough to eat and carried bags and cargo in the port for a living. During the 1988 uprising, a friend of mine got shot and died. I think these were the factors that drove me to become a poet. I was only 22 then.

When did you realize you wanted to become a professional poet?

I am like a billiard ball that doesn't know where it will be hit next. There have been years of darkness when I couldn't see. I was a man who was gradually losing everything bit by bit. In the end I had nothing except my heart. I even lost my guitar. I stopped singing, became silent

I didn't know it was a poem. It took me some time to realize that.

How do you write?

There is not a day I don't write poetry since about the year 2000. In my town where people are storing up gold like pirates, I am storing up poetry. Some of those who accidentally stumble upon my booty throw it away, others treasure it.

Sometimes I write four to five poems at a time, I never think they are worthless or no good. It's just like grapes that grow in a cluster from a single branch.

The poets who come into the field named "poetry" are like the visitors to a club. They may want to dance, drink, and have a good time. Although their intentions are the same, the reasons they have come to the club may differ.

In my case, society is constantly urging me on to write. A word, a situation, anything can become a poem. Especially, when it hurts me or makes me happy. I only need excitement from a word, a circumstance, a body gesture, or a sound. And then, I just have to ll the blank page before me.

Myanmar is changing, how does this affect your writing?

In our country a word like "President" is still very politicized. It is not yet easy to transform that word into a poem or a film. We are not that free yet. There are some people who wrote using that word. Some got into trouble. Some did not.

Poetry always strives to understand politics. But politics always tries to influence and use poetry. Some of us have become strong political poets. But freedom is more necessary in order to publish and exhibit work, not for the process of creating the work. I've always written what I want to write. The changing nature of politics gives my mind a little bit more freedom.

Now under our democratic government, I have freedom of expression. But in reality, this is something that does not exist. During the censorship era, once they give your writings a pass, that was it. There were no repercussions after that. Now, you can write freely but they can arrest you for what you write.

Authors’ Note: These interviews are excerpted from Burma Storybook, a poetry and photography book inspired by the documentary film of the same name, produced by Corinne van Egeraat and directed by Petr Lom. 

The English language hardcover edition of the book is for sale at Hla Day, Innwa Bookstore, Myanmar Book Center and the Strand Hotel.

A Burmese language-only paperback edition of the book is for sale through Yangon Book Plaza.

There will be a Free Open Air Screening of the Burma Storybook documentary film (82 min.) in Mahabandoola Park in Yangon on November 25 at 6 p.m.From Nov. 25 to Dec. 4, you can visit the interactive Burma Storybook Photo Exhibit at the Tourism Burma Building.

For more information: www.burmastorybook.com

The post Ko Pye Lives and Breathes Poetry appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Sue Yint, Buddhist Monk and Poet

Posted: 23 Nov 2017 09:37 PM PST

Sue Yint (b. 1974) is a Buddhist monk and a poet.  A combination that has an ancient pedigree in Myanmar, where some of the most famous poets in the countries were Buddhist monks.

How did you become a monk?

I was born in Sagaing Division, Thazin Town. My mother passed away when I was six. I went to a monastic school. I became a novice monk when I was thirteen. It's not usual for kids that age to enter a monastery as a novice. It was a fun experience. We were forty novices in the monastery in my hometown.

I then continued straight on into monkhood – without returning to lay life after being a novice as many do – at the age of fifteen. I am over forty now.

And poetry?

At the age of fifteen, I started writing some religious poems, then sonnets in the classical style. Around 1997, modernism arrived here. At first, I could not transition to the modern style easily. Rhymes were still stubbornly stuck in my head and I even thought modernism is not even poetry. I slowly learned to accept modern forms of poetry and started writing them myself at age seventeen. But I was not published back then yet.

How did you decide you wanted to be a monk forever?

I didn't – I just transitioned into monkhood and the years passed by as I continued to study. There were times I was tempted to quit. But I thought: what am I going to do as an occupation since I have no skill other than literature? How am I going to support a family if I get married? So, I decided to just enjoy this simple life with my literature and studies. I am used to a simple monastic life, free of trouble. I don't want to deal with a new environment and new experiences.

What is the biggest difficulty of being a monk?

I don't find it difficult. I have ready access to the four basic necessities: a robe to wear, meals to eat, a place to stay, and medicine. There are plenty of donors for our monastery. So I am contented, teaching and writing.

A monk's life is stoic, full of strict codes to follow. A poet's life is full of feeling and inspiration. How do you balance these two seemingly opposite disciplines?

A poet works his mind. A monk controls his mind. But even a poet or a layman needs to control his mind to a certain extent. He must, for example, avoid as many bad things as possible. But it is impossible to avoid every single small bad thing.

Inspiration can lead to fantasy and that is against the monk's code. How do you deal with that?

Sometimes, I'd get lost in romantic fantasies while composing poems about love. But I write them in a third person point of view, not in a first person point of view. Although I am a monk, I am also still human. So I do have human fantasy. But I think of the poetic inspiration as very minor transgression.

Layman poets can unleash their fantasies as much as they want. But you must always rein them in to not become excessive. Of course, I am not as free as a layman poet. But I take that limitation of freedom as a healthy challenge.

A monk cuts himself off from worldly things. Yet you still busy yourself with these very things as a poet. It is not easy dealing with these two values. Yet even Buddha himself composed his sermons as poetry, with strict adherence to composition and diction.

So you are not a monk who only reads religious scripture?

No. If I did that, I would be a scholar. To become a poet, I have to read outside literature that gets me to think, and gives me inspiration.

One of your poems is called "Attachment". Can you explain the title?

Attachment – Than Yaw Zin – is a string attached to yourself and a particular subject. It's a form of bondage. If you can cut that bondage, you will become free. But if you become entangled in that web of attachment, you will never be free. You must cut yourself free from these things. They are basically strings you've attached to yourself.

That is the Buddhist concept – freeing oneself from attachment. But it is universally applicable to all human beings regardless of religion.

Last words?

I wish all my readers and viewers of this film to be healthy in mind and body. May you all reach the state of ever-lasting truth.

Authors’ Note: These interviews are excerpted from Burma Storybook, a poetry and photography book inspired by the documentary film of the same name, produced by Corinne van Egeraat and directed by Petr Lom. 

The English language hardcover edition of the book is for sale at Hla Day, Innwa Bookstore, Myanmar Book Center and the Strand Hotel.

A Burmese language-only paperback edition of the book is for sale through Yangon Book Plaza.

There will be a Free Open Air Screening of the Burma Storybook documentary film (82 min.) in Mahabandoola Park in Yangon on November 25 at 6 p.m.From Nov. 25 to Dec. 4, you can visit the interactive Burma Storybook Photo Exhibit at the Tourism Burma Building.

For more information: www.burmastorybook.com

The post Sue Yint, Buddhist Monk and Poet appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Pope Faces Diplomatic Dilemma in Myanmar Visit

Posted: 23 Nov 2017 08:40 PM PST

VATICAN CITY — Pope Francis visits Myanmar next week, a delicate trip for the world’s most senior Christian to a majority Buddhist country accused by Washington of the “ethnic cleansing” of Muslim Rohingya people.

He will also visit Bangladesh to where more than 600,000 people have fled from what Amnesty International called “crimes against humanity” including murder, rape torture and forcible displacement, allegations the Myanmar military denies.

The trip is so delicate that some of the pope’s advisors have warned him against even saying the word “Rohingya,” lest he set off a diplomatic incident that could turn the country’s military and government against minority Christians.

The most tense moments of the Nov. 26-Dec. 2 trip are likely to be private meetings with army head Sen.-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and, separately, civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Myanmar does not recognize the Rohingya as citizens nor as a group with its own identity, posing a dilemma for Francis as he visits a country of 51 million people where only around 700,000 are Roman Catholics.

“He risks either compromising his moral authority or putting in danger the Christians of that country,” said Father Thomas Reese, a prominent American author and analyst at Religion News Service.

“I have great admiration for the pope and his abilities, but someone should have talked him out of making this trip,” he wrote.
Vatican sources say some in the Holy See believe the trip was decided too hastily after full diplomatic ties were established in May during a visit by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whose global esteem as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate has been tarnished by expressing doubts about the rights abuse allegations and failing to condemn the military.

“Pope Francis needs to be firm on all fronts. While the violence cannot stop without the cooperation of security forces, (Aung San) Suu Kyi should not be given a free pass either,” said Lynn Kuok, a fellow of the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies.

In a late addition to his itinerary, Francis will meet Rohingya refugees on the second leg of his trip in the Bangladesi capital Dhaka. His meeting with Sen.-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing was also a late addition following negotiations with the military by

Myanmar’s senior churchman, Cardinal Charles Bo.

In a video message sent to Myanmar last week, Francis said he wanted the trip to lead to “reconciliation, forgiveness and peace”, to further the Gospel values of “dignity for every man and woman” and encourage harmony and cooperation.

The pope has already used the word Rohingya in two appeals from the Vatican this year. Asked if he would say it in Myanmar, Vatican spokesman Greg Burke said Francis was taking the advice he had been given seriously, but added: “We will find out together during the trip … it is not a forbidden word”.

Senior Vatican sources said the pope will be mindful of not doing anything that could imperil Myanmar’s transition to democracy.
“The pope is one of the most respected moral voices in the world today, and for that reason his visit will be significant,” said

Richard Horsey, a Yangon-based analyst and former senior United Nations official in Myanmar.

“But he will be conscious of the fact that popular opinion in Myanmar is firmly behind the government and against the Rohingya, and that the intervention of a Christian leader on this religiously charged issue could inflame sentiments rather than encourage positive movement,” Horsey said.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on Wednesday called the operation against the Rohingya “ethnic cleansing” and threatened targeted sanctions for “horrendous atrocities.”

Amnesty International said the Rohingya and Muslims generally in Rakhine State had been subjected to “systemic social and political exclusion” for decades and accused the military of “crimes against humanity” in the last two years including murder, rape torture and forcible displacement.

Myanmar’s government has denied most of the claims, and the army has said its own probe found no evidence of wrongdoing by troops who say their actions were in response to militant attacks on 30 police posts and an army base.

“The Vatican has little by way of carrots and sticks that can help,” said Kuok, the Brookings fellow.

“That said, the pope’s visit can help to raise awareness about the Rohingya community, which may then lead to indirect pressure on governments to do more about the situation there.”

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