The Irrawaddy Magazine |
- Activists Protest Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s London ‘Freedom’ Award
- Rangoon’s Water Taxis set for June Launch
- Tourism Ministry to Expand Arakan State’s Thandwe Airport
- Burma Army to Remove Landmines in Karen State
- Wa National Organization Draft Resignation from UNFC is Leaked
- Govt to Submit Bagan UNESCO World Heritage Site Application in Sept
- A Fight to Control Chainsaws in Burma Could Turn the Tide on Illegal Logging
- Acting Police Chief to Assume Official Role in Sept
- The Mae Sot Clinic, a Lifeline on the Border, Relocates
- U Win Htein: Comments on Military Spreading Rumors A Slip of the Tongue
- Book Review: The Politics of Aid to Burma
- Film Academy Awards, Myanmar Idol, and the Peace Process in Myanmar
| Activists Protest Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s London ‘Freedom’ Award Posted: 08 May 2017 09:54 AM PDT Activists and refugees demonstrated as State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was presented with the Freedom of the City of London award on Monday, calling the recognition "disappointing" in light of ongoing abuses against ethnic and religious minorities, journalists and rights activists in Burma. "I'm so disappointed. She needs to stand on her moral ground—people have been dying, people have been raped," said Ko Aung, an 88-Generation student activist and former security assistant of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who, before moving to the UK nearly 20 years ago, spent seven years as a political prisoner in Burma. Along with the Kachin National Organization (KNO), Burma Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK), and the charity Restless Beings, Ko Aung helped organize Monday's demonstration in central London. It was attended by around 40 people who opposed the award, citing reports of abuses in Burma which they say have continued since the elected National League for Democracy-led (NLD) government took office more than one year ago.  Chanting "Aung San Suu Kyi, shame on you," they stood on the chilly London street corner for nearly three hours, holding signs calling for a release of political prisoners, a halt to religious hate speech, and an end to military violence against different ethnic nationalities, including the Kachin, Ta'ang (Palaung), Rohingya and Shan. "We have a chance to cooperate here. In Burma, we had no chance," said Ring Du Lachyung, chairperson of the KNO, regarding the attendance of demonstrators from various religious and ethnic backgrounds. "We are the same victims of military perpetrators," he added.  The Freedom of the City honor, which dates back nearly 800 years, was awarded to Daw Aung Suu Kyi in a private ceremony in London's Guildhall, to which a spokesperson for the city of London confirmed to The Irrawaddy that no media was invited. Fellow Nobel Peace laureates Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela have also received the same award. Ring Du Lachyung told The Irrawaddy at the protest that he objected to the State Counselor receiving a "freedom" award from the city of London, when, "in reality, they don't recognize the freedom of the Kachin." "The UK government should stand with us, but they stand with her," said Daw Khin Hla, a former schoolteacher from conflict-torn Buthidaung Township in Arakan State and current member of BROUK, on why she had decided to protest the event, adding, "they aren't accepting our suffering." The State Counselor has come under increasing international criticism for a stalled peace process with ethnic armed groups, continued military clashes and displacement of civilians in the country's north, and increased arrests of journalists under the country's defamation law. At an EU press conference on May 2, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi also said that she would "disassociate" from a United Nations fact-finding mission mandated to investigate recent reports of rape, extrajudicial killings, arson and torture by security forces against the Rohingya community in Arakan State in late 2016 and early 2017. In an April interview with the BBC, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi rejected assertions that crimes against the Muslim minority in northern Arakan State amounted to ethnic cleansing, and her government has repeatedly described the issues as an "internal affair." Two counter-protesters at the London demonstration echoed these sentiments and said they had come to "support Daw Aung San Suu Kyi" and to "condemn" the protest.  "Aung San Suu Kyi is our legitimate leader," said Htein Lin, who came to London as a refugee in 2007, but denounced the Rohingya who have also sought asylum in the UK, saying, "they are not a real nationality." 'Screened From Criticism' Daw Aung San Suu Kyi arrived in London on Friday night—after previously visiting Belgium, the Vatican and Italy—and, according to Burmese state media, was met by a delegation at Heathrow airport, including U Kyaw Zwa Min, Burma's ambassador to the UK. When The Irrawaddy contacted the Burmese embassy in London to inquire about the State Counselor's visit, this reporter was told that the embassy knew "nothing" of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's schedule or public engagements during her trip. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is reportedly staying at The Dorchester hotel for the duration of her time in the British capital. It is the same establishment in which her father, the late independence leader Gen Aung San, and his delegation stayed in January 1947 during the trip in which he negotiated an agreement with then Prime Minister Clement Attlee guaranteeing independence for Burma by within one year. Weeks later, he signed the Panglong Agreement in Shan State, promising ethnic nationalities equality and autonomy within a federal Union. It is said that during his weeks at the establishment 70 years ago, Aung San invited members of the Burmese community in London to The Dorchester to share meals, music and memories of their homeland. Activists have noted that his daughter's trip—her third to the UK in the last five years—has been considerably more guarded.  Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is scheduled to meet "select" members of the Burmese community on Tuesday, but at the time of reporting it remained unclear who would be attending the event. Not invited, said those at the protest, are members of the Burmese Muslim and the Kachin communities in London. Ko Aung, who remembers "working tirelessly" for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's release when she was under 15 years of military-imposed house arrest, met her during her trip to the UK in 2012, but will not be attending Tuesday's gathering. Mark Farmaner, director of advocacy organization Burma Campaign UK (BCUK), which was not involved with Monday's protest, confirmed to The Irrawaddy that his organization had also not been invited to any events relating to the State Counselor's London visit. "[The Burmese embassy] is not making official approaches to community organizations," he said in an email. "She won't be meeting a representative group and is being screened from criticism." Reuters reported that the State Counselor met the UK's Queen Elizabeth at Buckingham Palace for lunch on Friday, and that they were joined by other members of the British royal family. The post Activists Protest Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's London 'Freedom' Award appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Rangoon’s Water Taxis set for June Launch Posted: 08 May 2017 06:43 AM PDT RANGOON — The chairwoman of a company set to provide water taxi services on Rangoon's rivers next month has reassured people that the service will be safe and efficient amid criticisms that the project lacks transparency. Daw Tint Tint Lwin, the chairwoman of Tint Tint Myanmar Company, told a press conference on Friday that she was confident the initiative to ferry passengers along the city's waterways would succeed. However, lawmakers fear the implementation of the water taxis may replicate the launch of the city's revamped bus service, introduced in January, which was criticized for having aggressive staff, a shortage of buses, and being generally unreliable. Regional parliamentarians have also complained that their questions about the details of Tint Tint Myanmar Company's plan have been left unanswered, as the company, which won the tender in February, prepares to launch its fleet in the second week of June. "At first, people will be concerned, but after taking a ride and seeing the advantages of the water buses, such as less pollution, and more convenience, like reading newspapers and drinking coffee while taking a ride, plus no traffic congestion on the rivers, I am sure the demand will be high," Daw Tint Tint Lwin told reporters. She said the project was "100 percent our investment" and not a joint venture with the government or another company. Tint Tint Myanmar Company loaned USD$34 million from KBZ Bank for the project, she added. Known for running river cruises on the Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers, the firm has bought four used boats—three from Australia and one from Pattaya in Thailand—for the taxi service. The boats can carry 180-200 passengers each and are expected to arrive in Burma within the next 20 days. The Myanmar Port Authority has approved the construction of 10 boats in Pattaya under an Australian boat builder's guidance. Twenty boats are also being constructed at a dock in Rangoon's Seikgyikanaungto Township for the project. At least 16 boats will connect Hlaing Tharyar and Botahtaung townships with eight stops under the first phase of the project. Two routes along Nga Moe Yeik Creek and Thanlyin Township will follow within three to six months after the jetties have been constructed, she said. Fifty-six to 67 boats are expected to service the full operation. Daw Tint Tint Lwin said her firm has readied GPS and monitoring systems, and life jackets for every passenger. Each ticket will include travel insurance and emergency rescue teams will be on standby, she added. The water taxis will run every 20 minutes from 6 a.m. to about 6.30 p.m., with tickets from 300-500 kyats, according to the chairwoman. Phase one of the project will target about 20,000 commuters. In 2018, it aims for an annual 12 million commuters and about 24 million in 2020. But Daw Tint Tint Lwin declined to disclose the contractual term during which her company would provide the services. The Yangon Region Transport Authority (YRTA) could not be reached for comment on the contract's tenure at the time of reporting. Regional lawmaker Daw Sandar Min criticized Rangoon government in a Facebook post, as no representatives from the YRTA or transport ministry have attended the parliament to address her question from March probing for an update of the water taxis' implementation. The water taxi initiative falls under the divisional government's plans to upgrade public transport services to alleviate worsening traffic jams in the former capital and commercial hub. The post Rangoon's Water Taxis set for June Launch appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Tourism Ministry to Expand Arakan State’s Thandwe Airport Posted: 08 May 2017 05:44 AM PDT RANGOON — The Ministry of Hotels and Tourism is looking to further expand Thandwe Airport in southern Arakan State to accept large passenger planes from international destinations and serve foreign tourists wishing to visit nearby Ngapali Beach. Hotels and Tourism Minister U Ohn Maung revealed the plan at a meeting with a local hotel business association and the Ngapali Beach supervisory committee in Ngapali on Sunday, according to Arakan State Minister of Finance and Revenue U Kyaw Aye Thein. He said the tourism ministry established there has sufficient land available to extend the runway and build an international terminal to encourage tourists to fly directly to southern Arakan State's award-winning beaches without transferring in Rangoon. The runway at Thandwe Airport was previously extended and civil aviation buildings were constructed in a 440 million kyats project completed in 2016. "We are still thinking about the project, it has not been decided yet," said U Kyaw Aye Thein. "We will invite international developers to collaborate if we decide to go ahead with it." Arakan State lawmaker U Naing Kyway Aye, who presented at the meeting on Sunday, told The Irrawaddy on Monday that the Union minister's trip to the area focused on the airport expansion. Attendees of Sunday's meeting told The Irrawaddy that the minister and a Ngapali hotel business association discussed environmental conservation, waste management, local policing in tourist areas, sand mining, and a local debate over the three-to-five story limit on guesthouses. U Naing Kyway Aye said the Union minister also claimed he knew that some hotels had been illegally operating without business licenses for years and urged them to apply for permits in line with government procedures, but did not threaten action against them. U Ohn Maung designated an area of the Tha Htay River to mine sand for construction projects and promised to provide more garbage bins to create a trash-free zone, according to regional minister U Kyaw Aye Thein. In addition, the ministers inspected coastal areas where the state government proposed to open seven new beach resorts, one in Gwa Township and two in Thandwe Township, in February. U Ohn Maung is also attending a two-day sustainable tourism workshop organized by The Myanmar Responsible Tourism Institute, according to U Kyaw Aye Thein.
The post Tourism Ministry to Expand Arakan State's Thandwe Airport appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Burma Army to Remove Landmines in Karen State Posted: 08 May 2017 05:04 AM PDT The Burma Army will remove landmines in Karen State following an agreement with the Karen National Union (KNU), according to Col Wunna Aung, spokesperson for the Burma Army and member of the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC). After the KNU and the JMC discussed the military codes of conduct for the project at a three-day meeting in Rangoon last week, Col Wunna Aung said on Friday "both sides want mines to be cleared, but we will need to build trust." A timescale for the operations had not yet been decided, he said, though demining in ethnic Karen conflict areas was part of the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) signed by the Burma Army and the KNU's armed wing the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in 2015. "Demining is for the people; we will demine near public roads and schools," he said, adding that the Burma Army had agreed not to demine near KNLA bases but that exact locations had not yet been agreed. "If the international community will provide technical assistance, the Tatmadaw [Burma Army] will undertake the operations," he said. According to Col Wunna Aung there are three areas in the country with landmines—in Karen and Shan states and Bago Division. The Burma Army will eventually demine all of these areas, he said. Contrary to Col Wunna Aung's Friday suggestion that many of the landmines to be removed were placed by ethnic armed groups, KNU vice chairperson Kwe Htoo Win told The Irrawaddy that his group only placed landmines in conflict areas, not in areas used by the public. Negotiating Burma Army movement in KNU-controlled areas would need to be handled delicately, he said. Kwe Htoo Win said the process will take time and that the public needed to be educated about the demining project before it was launched. Saw Alex Htoo, a CSO leader in Karen State, said demining at the current time would “too early and premature.” While demining might appeal “on the surface,” he said, deeper political issues need to be explored so that such activities can be successful. "Firstly, [the Tatmadaw] needs to solve the military code of conduct. Secondly, they need to establish borders for their controlled territory," he said. "It seems to me that the Tatmadaw jumped steps. While they could not solve these first two points, they jumped to another step." "I do not see that the Tatmadaw has genuine concern for this project. Their actions may cause problems," he added. The post Burma Army to Remove Landmines in Karen State appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Wa National Organization Draft Resignation from UNFC is Leaked Posted: 08 May 2017 03:17 AM PDT RANGOON — A draft resignation was leaked from the Wa National Organization (WNO), showing its plans to withdraw from the seven-member ethnic alliance the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) The WNO planned to tender its resignation in the coming days, according to a WNO spokesperson, and the date of submission was left blank on the leaked document. "This is just a draft. We will have a meeting before making the final resignation. We don't know how it was leaked. We'll submit the resignation to the UNFC after our congress," Major Ta Nyi Lu, joint secretary-1 of the WNO, told The Irrawaddy. The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), which led the UNFC, also tendered its resignation from the ethnic alliance on April 29. The WNO was a member of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), a pro-democracy alliance founded after the 1988 uprising and led by the Karen National Union (KNU), which later joined the UNFC after it was founded in 2011. According to the draft resignation, it has become difficult for the WNO and its armed wing the Wa National Army (WNA) to continue cooperating with the bloc due to political and military changes in Burma. The draft resignation also said the WNO was taking steps to merge with other Wa ethnic armed organizations into a single entity in response to the demands of Wa people and organizations. Although the WNO did not reveal the details of the merger, sources close to the WNO said it would join with the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Sources speculate that the UWSA pressured the WNO to join forces as opposed to signing the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) with the government. Ethnic armed group sources have speculated that the UWSA is also putting pressure on the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) to join. The WNO/WNA and LDU are based on the Burma-Thai border and are adjacent to the southern military area controlled by the UWSA. Experts suggest these groups are backed into a corner and will find it difficult to reject the UWSA's demands. "They [the WNO and UWSA] attempted to merge a long time ago. So, under the existing circumstances, they are trying again," ethnic affairs analyst U Maung Maung Soe told The Irrawaddy. Rumors have circulated that five members of the UNFC—the New Mon State Party (NMSP), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Arakan National Council (ANC), WNO, and LDU would sign the NCA. The WNO/WNA was founded in 1976 and based on the Thai-Burma border in Shan and Karenni states. Translated from Burmese by Thet Ko Ko. The post Wa National Organization Draft Resignation from UNFC is Leaked appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Govt to Submit Bagan UNESCO World Heritage Site Application in Sept Posted: 08 May 2017 03:07 AM PDT MANDALAY — The initial application to have the Bagan Archaeological Zone listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site will be submitted by Sept. this year, according to the religion and culture ministry. "The draft report and draft management plan are now 60 percent complete and we will submit the dossier in September," said U Thein Lwin, the deputy director of the Department of Archeology, National Museum and Library under the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture. If the draft is submitted to UNESCO on time, World Heritage Site Committee representatives could visit Bagan in 2018 and the site would be brought up for deliberation at UNESCO's 2019 World Heritage Site convention, according to the director. "We are doing our best and, thanks to local help, we can assure citizens the draft will be ready in no time," U Thein Lwin said. The department said buffer zones around the Bagan site were already expanded since July last year, to Tant Kyi Taung Pagoda, west of Bagan across the Irrawaddy River, and to Yone Lut Kyung area, located east of Bagan. Bagan archaeological site was enlarged from 42 square miles to 62 square miles with these new buffer zones, according to the department. Burma's first UNESCO World Heritage Site application was submitted in 1996 but rejected because of poor management plans and legal framework. In June 2014, the religion and culture ministry committed to restarting the process. UNESCO guidelines for selection include deciding whether the site exhibits outstanding universal value, international significance and the ability to "transcend national boundaries and be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity." Economic development and a growing tourism infrastructure in Bagan's vicinity have been the biggest challenges facing the site in its bid to become a World Heritage Site, threatening preservation of the cultural areas. A 6.8-magnitude earthquake hit central Burma in August last year, damaging some 200 of Bagan's historic pagodas and temples. However, the department said the earthquake did not hamper the UNESCO submission process and works to restore earthquake-hit pagodas and temples with UNESCO consultants and archaeology experts are in progress. U Thein Lwin said of the damaged structures, 124 small pagodas and temples with limited damage had already been restored and those with serious damage would be repaired by the end of 2017. The post Govt to Submit Bagan UNESCO World Heritage Site Application in Sept appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| A Fight to Control Chainsaws in Burma Could Turn the Tide on Illegal Logging Posted: 08 May 2017 02:53 AM PDT SAGAING, Burma — Pyar Aung still remembers the first time he saw a chainsaw. It was a German-made number being used by one of the logging companies operating in the forest around his remote village in Burma's northwest Sagaing Division in 2013. "It was so powerful and fast!" recalls 50-year-old Aung, who lives in the tiny village of Mahu. It wasn't until August 2016 that he got one himself, and today he owns three. Each cost him around US$124, though cheaper versions can be purchased in urban centers for about 7 times less. In spite of the law, he said he was never asked to show paperwork to buy the chainsaws, nor were any of his fellow villagers. The claim is surprising given the fact that logging is practically a cottage industry in his community. Among 37 households they own 70 chainsaws. On a recent visit there, they also said they weren't aware of the fairly new regulation implemented in 2016 that requires them to register their chainsaws with Burma's Forestry Department. Remote locales like this are at the heart of a struggling government campaign to turn the tide on illegal chainsaw use and logging. Mahu is a stark case in point of difficulties the Burmese government faces in educating disconnected rural populations about chainsaw ownership and use. The village is an isolated island of homes deep in the Patolon Forest Reserve, part of Alaungdaw Kathapa National Park in Burma's Sagaing region. An ASEAN Heritage Park, it is Burma's largest national park, at 1,605 square kilometers (619 square miles). Despite almost non-existent knowledge of safety equipment, training, and protocols, chainsaws are gaining in popularity as the logging tool of choice in Burma's rich forests. The country is the largest supplier of natural teak (Tectona grandis) in the world. Forestry officials say they began to see an uptick in imported chainsaws between 2013 and 2014. That increase, with numbers that are very difficult to track and verify, is likely in the hundreds to thousands per year. That's bad news for Burma's forests. A chainsaw can cut down a tree four times faster than the more traditional methods of an axe or a handsaw. The UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which tracks forest cover globally, notes that between 1990 and 2015, the country already lost nearly 15 million hectares of forest and other wooded land. There's no official data yet on whether a national logging ban in place from mid-2016 to April 2017 had an impact on forest loss. The geography of locales like Mahu—incredibly remote with limited options for income—contributes to illegal logging. It is completely cut off from the outside world for the 4-month rainy season due to bad roads. The national education system only arrived in the village five years ago, and there is still no electricity nor cell signal. Villagers are motivated by basic economics to own chainsaws for logging to expedite their work. There's also a demand. Brokers from nearby villages started to show up in Mahu in 2016 in search of wood for sale, around the time that the Burmese government instituted regulations for buying and owning a chainsaw. Aung says that he can make about $95 per ton of logs. He typically collects 1.5 to 2 tons of wood per week to sell. If the rest of the village logs at a similar pace, they can cut down about 46 tons of wood every week, or over 180 tons per month. If they sell what they log at the rate Aung notes, the village can make at least $17,500 a month. A conservative estimate of annual village income from illegal logging—minus the rainy season—is about $140,000 annually. For generations, villagers here have eked out an existence on meager profit from rice farming and other activities like selling handmade bamboo mats. Logging represents a chance to diversify and amplify income streams. "If we only grow rice, it's not enough to make a living and that's why we started cutting trees, but we mostly only log teak," Aung said. Teak is one of the most valuable tropical hardwood species in the world. "The demand (for wood) is so high." Regulations and Enforcement Villagers in Mahu might claim ignorance about their illegal chainsaws and logging activity, but their actions suggest otherwise. On a recent day in February, everyone stopped logging, disassembled their chainsaws, and hid the parts deep in the forest upon word of an impending Forestry Department inspection.  Kyaw Minn Htut, founder of Thuriya Sandra Environmental Watch Group, has kept track of Mahu's chainsaws, which he confirms aren't registered and were not purchased legally. He has a complex relationship with the villagers. "It was me who reported this village to the forestry department," Htut said while sitting with residents at their monastery, which also functions as a community hall. "But I asked the forestry department officers to forgive them, because they have no money to be fined and if you take away their chainsaw, they will have no way of surviving." Htut is a native of Sagaing Division in his early 40s, and has been doing conservation work in Sagaing region since 2003. He is incredibly persistent when it comes to finding and reporting illegal logging. He once spent 10 days in the forest counting unmarked stumps in an area that had been logged and found that the company (whose name he didn't disclose) had logged 572 extra trees. "Four MTE [Myanma Timber Enterprise] officers and three FD [Forestry Department] officers were fired because of my report," he claims. Htut's philosophy is that deforestation is not caused by individual loggers, but by logging companies approved by the MTE, which regulates the industry domestically. "Chainsaws are not the problem, the root of the problem is the policy and the law," Htut said. "The current one is set up for organizations that are involved in mass production, but not for the people." When it comes to the activity in Mahu, he wants to help them to legitimately earn income from logging. With his assistance, the villagers have applied to manage the forest surrounding their village, but have not heard back from the forestry department. It's unlikely they ever will. It's also just as unlikely that they will stop cutting down trees. "The villagers here at Mahu only cut what they need to survive, they don't do it to get rich," Htut said. "Besides what will the villagers feel, if the people not related to this area come and harvest all the valuable wood, but they themselves can't even do that?" In Mandalay, the nearest urban center for the timber market and commercial goods, people are a bit more savvy about the rules for selling and owning a chainsaw. Along Mandalay's so-called "iron street" of machinery and tool shops, out of a randomly selected seven shops along a 40-block stretch, only one displayed chainsaws. Others wouldn't even discuss a sale without proper paperwork. Fears of plainclothes police officers pretending to be customers are top of mind.  Many other shops take a more subdued approach. Some put the chainsaw blades in the corner, but the rest of the equipment stays hidden in back storage rooms and are only presented on request. "There is a crackdown on chainsaws," said Ko Ko Win, who manages one such machinery shop. "If you want to sell chainsaws, you need a license, if you want to buy a chainsaw, you also need a license from the forestry department." Win adds that a obtaining a license to buy a chainsaw involves answering a list of questions such as reasons for the purchase, which trees will be cut down, and the locations where the tool will be used. "It's a very complicated procedure, I don't understand the reason behind all this madness," he said. "But I guess it's the new government, and it comes with new rules." The country held its first democratic election in decades in 2015 and brought human rights icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy, to power. In June 2016 Burma's Forestry Department amended its forestry laws to include a policy on chainsaw registration: Whoever uses a chainsaw without permission can be sued, face up to two years in prison, and/or a fine of up to $15. They also created a committee with police officers, local and regional forestry department officers, and township administrators to enforce chainsaw rules and regulations. That includes monthly reports from forestry departments in each township, district, division and state to headquarters in Naypyidaw. Combating the myriad aspects of illegal logging in Burma is already a huge job for authorities. Just as the national ban lifted in mid-April, officials announced that in the past year they seized 55,000 tons of illegal timber and 2,600 vehicles and pieces of machinery. Arrests of timber smugglers included 11 foreigners and 8,310 Burmese nationals. Import Headaches Burma is still in the early stages of regulating chainsaws, especially when it comes to import rules. Officer Phyo Zin Mon Naing is assistant director of Burma's Forestry Department at Naypyidaw and oversees chainsaw registration. He said in an interview that he's been working on issues regarding chainsaw registration since 2013, but prior to that there were simply no laws or regulations for chainsaws. In 2014, the government started to ask chainsaw users to register equipment, but the system was inefficient and difficult to enforce. The current procedure, which includes import laws, was put into place after discussion with various departments and the central government.  The complex procedure requires importers to submit an inquiry for a permit to import chainsaws and present their import license and company registration to the Ministry of Commerce. The Ministry of Commerce then submits it to the forestry department for a recommendation letter. In order to issue a recommendation letter, the forestry department has to first check the chainsaw type, country of origin, import method, the number of chainsaws in the current stock, a list of chainsaw distributors by the company and other detailed information. The importer isn't technically allowed to sell their chainsaws if they don't agree to monthly reports on their distribution and stock. Naing believes that this system, which targets importers, distributors, and users of chainsaws, is feasible. For example, they once received an application from a machinery shop that wanted to import 20,000 chainsaws. The request was rejected. "Currently, there are a total of 1,281 legal chainsaws in the country," Naing said from the most recently available chart in January 2017. "Sagaing has the most registered chainsaw at 423 units, the second is Mon State with 178 units." The numbers clearly aren't exact, though. For example, the number of known chainsaws in the Sagaing region alone would be 16 percent higher if the units in Mahu village were registered. Yet despite known pockets of lawlessness like Mahu, Naing is confident. "Now we have control over chainsaws in this country," he said, adding that between 2014 to the end of 2016, they seized a total of 746 illegal chainsaws. Most of those come from individual owners and are handed over to the MTE. Problems with Enforcement A major problem with monitoring illegal chainsaws is lack of control in insurgency areas, especially Kachin state in northern Burma. Kachin shares a long border with China and is largely controlled by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and its armed group the Kachin Independent Army (KIA). They have an estimated 8,000 troops and are believed to be involved in illegal logging. "We believe they have a large logging problem, but we don't have details," Naing said, adding that they have no communication regarding chainsaw registry with members of KIO. "But we work with the Myanmar military to seize illegal timber in those areas." They face myriad challenges, some of which could be life and death. "This work is difficult and very dangerous, officers at the forestry department don't have guns, we have no security, how do we protect ourselves?" said Naing. "We just have our pen." In fact, Naing doesn't think there is a clear connection between seized timber and registered chainsaws, especially since the registry is so new. The forestry department is also still in the process of getting its staff and other government agencies up to speed on the registry's use. If it proves effective, it could have an impact. "If we control chainsaws, it will reduce illegal logging in the future," Naing said. He added that one way they are doing this is through outreach programs, which include group information sessions on how to register chainsaws and the impact to the environment from illegal logging. In January 2017, he said they held 286 chainsaw registry outreach sessions across the country. Despite complaints over the complicated procedure to obtain a chainsaw, Naing sees the approach as standard. "If you import a car from a foreign country you have to submit paperwork, so importing chainsaws should be treated the same way," he said. He added that he thinks the forest coverage rate is directly related to number of chainsaws. "There are so few officers at the forestry department but so many loggers in Myanmar, how do we control the situation?" he asked. "We must do it, we must register the chainsaws." A Hopeful Future, at a Cost In Mahu, logging is slowly transforming the lives of the villagers, although not everyone can yet afford to purchase a chainsaw. Khin Mg Htwe is 32 years old, tan and lean from years of rice farming before he turned to working as a timber porter. "I don't know how to operate a chainsaw, and I can't afford one yet, but I'm happy they are cutting wood so I can make some income by transporting the timber out of our village," Htwe said.  The 4-hour round trip by foot to the nearest village involves tying the timber to his two cows and a two-day rest after each trip. He makes a mere $4 each time. Thar Kyi is a 32-year-old father of four, and is recognized as a chainsaw expert by other villagers, who joke that he cuts the straightest line with chainsaws. Like Htwe, Kyi doesn't own a chainsaw and is hired by chainsaw owners for $4 per day to operate their machinery. He said that part of his motivation is based on family obligations. "I have to pay $5 for my kids [per child] to go to school per month," Kyi said. Though primary education is free in Burma, teachers often ask for extra money in rural areas to offset the cost of uniforms and books.  Even though activist Htut is devoted to conservation and to preventing illegal logging, he is sympathetic to the villagers. "I will never ask them to stop logging, because I have no other money-making options to offer them yet," Htut said. "Before they used to focus more on cultivating rice, now they spend more time on logging and they have to buy rice to eat during the rainy season." He doesn't believe that stricter enforcement of chainsaw regulations will stop the loggers. "They will just go back to using axes and handsaws, the illegal logging will continue and so will the bribery to related governmental officials," he said. This article was original published on Mongabay: https://news.mongabay.com/2017/05/a-fight-to-control-chainsaws-in-myanmar-could-turn-the-tide-on-illegal-logging/ The post A Fight to Control Chainsaws in Burma Could Turn the Tide on Illegal Logging appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Acting Police Chief to Assume Official Role in Sept Posted: 08 May 2017 02:32 AM PDT NAYPYIDAW — Acting Police Chief Brig-Gen Aung Win Oo will officially assume the role in September, as his predecessor Maj-Gen Zaw Win is on a four-month paid leave before his retirement. "I've taken over his responsibilities," he told The Irrawaddy at the celebration of World Red Cross Day at the Myanmar International Convention Center-2 in Naypyidaw on Monday. "I'll be appointed to the post when his leave is over." The home affairs ministry announced the appointment of deputy chief Brig-Gen Aung Win Oo as the Burma Police Force's acting chief on April 27. Brig-Gen Aung Win Oo is a graduate of the Defense Services Academy's No. 26 intake. He was transferred to the criminal investigations department of the Burma Police Force as a colonel before being promoted to brigadier general to lead the department, and then to deputy chief. He is simultaneously serving as acting chief and deputy chief on the force. The post Acting Police Chief to Assume Official Role in Sept appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| The Mae Sot Clinic, a Lifeline on the Border, Relocates Posted: 08 May 2017 01:52 AM PDT MAE SOT, Thailand — Dozens of patients and visitors line up at respective wards to receive medicine, treatment and check-ups at the new buildings that host the Mae Tao Clinic in Mae Sot, Thailand. People of all ages have gathered en masse since 8 a.m. The clinic was founded by Dr. Cynthia Maung, a Burmese physician and activist, in Mae Sot in 1989 after she fled Burma following a brutal crackdown on opposition activists in 1988. The clinic provides free treatment to Burmese migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons and others who are unable to access healthcare in Burma. The Mae Tao Clinic moved to a new site in May of last year, following a land dispute at its former location. The clinic treats about 140,000 patients every year, according to its statistics. As funding wanes on the Thai-Burma border, the Mae Tao clinic has also experienced a decline in funding. However, due to committed donors, including some wealthy individuals, the clinic remains open. Despite political reform in Burma, the healthcare system has not advanced, especially in remote areas. At the opening ceremony for her clinic's new location, Dr. Cynthia Maung said despite the changes, Burma's health services would take years to improve. "The Mae Tao Clinic is the most accessible healthcare center for most of these patients," she said. The Irrawaddy's journalist Saw Yan Naing visited and photographed the new Mae Tao Clinic site. The post The Mae Sot Clinic, a Lifeline on the Border, Relocates appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| U Win Htein: Comments on Military Spreading Rumors A Slip of the Tongue Posted: 08 May 2017 12:14 AM PDT NAYPYIDAW —The National League for Democracy (NLD) spokesperson U Win Htein said his comments that the country's military may be involved in spreading rumors to destabilize the NLD government were a slip of the tongue. "I blurted it out, I did not accuse anybody. If I made an accusation, it is my fault. But it was not intended as an accusation," he said at a press briefing after the NLD's central executive committee met in Naypyidaw on Saturday. His comments came after the Burma Army's Information Team issued a press release on Friday to condemn U Win Htein's comments that the military may be behind rumors regarding the resignation of President U Htin Kyaw. "I don't mind if they [the Burma Army] can't stand it, it is just like being hit by a flower," he said regarding the press release, adding that the military had not yet contacted him. At a media briefing last Thursday, U Win Htein said: "It's difficult to say [who is behind the U Htin Kyaw rumor] as we are flooded with information. It's hard to guess if it was spread by the USDP [Union Solidarity and Development Party] or some military organizations, or some IT experts who hate us." The USDP also released a statement on Saturday, condemning U Win Htein's comments implicating the USDP. "In briefing the media as the NLD's representative, U Win Htein accused the USDP based on pessimism and suspicion, and this harms the USDP's dignity, and may also impact the national reconciliation process being carried out by the government," the statement read. The NLD was blaming other parties and organizations for its failures in security, the economy, and national reconciliation, according to the statement. The post U Win Htein: Comments on Military Spreading Rumors A Slip of the Tongue appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Book Review: The Politics of Aid to Burma Posted: 07 May 2017 06:52 PM PDT With the looming repatriation of 100,000 refugees from camps along the Thailand-Burma border after decades of civil war, to the escalating armed conflict in Kachin and Shan states, there is no better time to pursue debates on the politics of humanitarian aid to civilians displaced by war inside Burma. Anne Décobert's finely detailed study of the Back Pack Health Worker Teams (BPHWT) which operate in conflict areas of Eastern Burma serves as a salient historical study that informs current debates and donor decisions on aiding civilians caught in the maelstrom of modern war. The author begins the book with her arrival in the hub of Burmese émigré intrigue and resistance, the Thailand-Burma border town of Mae Sot, where she soon became embedded with BPHWT pursuing a participatory observer role in the group as a doctoral student. Back Pack is an innovative collective of community health workers who venture into active conflict areas in Eastern Burma to provide services to displaced civilians, at times several hundred thousand people, and gather data on health conditions for advocacy on donor support and human rights promotion. It did so often in conjunction with insurgents of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the world's oldest rebel movement and with its own sophisticated civilian support administration. Back Pack was at the eye of the storm that became known as 'cross-border assistance,' the basing of humanitarian actors on the Thailand side of the border that ventured deep into Burmese sovereign territory to assist civilians denied services by the government and routinely the target of systematic human rights abuses by the Burmese military. The tensions over humanitarian principles were ever present in Back Pack's modus operandi, "politicized and polarized" as Décobert succinctly describes the debate. She notes "it is frequently at the margins of sovereignty and of state definitions of legality that some of the political and ethical dilemmas of humanitarianism become most pertinent" (p.4). Back Pack made international donors and humanitarian actors extremely nervous, and incensed many who derided them as a rebel support service. The book's first chapter is an important contribution to debates on humanitarian action with special reference to Back Pack that should be required reading for any new aid worker arriving in Burma. The second chapter is an admirably balanced historical overview of the broader conflict context in Burma from which Back Pack emerged. This too should be requisite reading for any recent arrival in Burma who casually derides the contributions of the "border" to keeping people alive and the documentation of atrocities and humanitarian needs high on the international agenda. Chapter three overviews Back Pack's origins from 1998 as a backroom operation in the celebrated Mae Tao clinic of Dr. Cynthia Maung in Mae Sot to an innovator in cross-border aid, soon with its own expansive compound nearby and unique deployment of numerous mobile teams and trainers inside Karen State who saved tens of thousands of civilians. (Full disclosure: I visited this compound with great regularity and received unstintingly valuable, if often understandably irascible, assistance from its staff during my time working on the border). Décobert does justice to the people she encountered during her research in the following two chapters, with finely drawn portraits of medics and victims, of people caught up in war, repression, and poverty doing the best they can. Any cynic of cross-border aid should be compelled to read these stories, or even better, speak to people in these situations, before making easy judgments on the dilemmas they face. Many of the medics deployed were from the communities experiencing war, and many were directly targeted by Burmese army troops who deemed them participants in the conflict, which marked the operational strength but also the international suspicion of Back Pack. The author summarizes that "as victims of the military regime, they could not be neutral" (p.223). "For them," she writes "neutrality translated into indifference to injustice, oppression and suffering." Fusing practical assistance with evidence of abuses and advocacy was Back Pack's strengths. The approach of BPHWT eventually collided with more conventional international aid providers such as the United Nations and INGO's around the response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 in which 140,000 died and several hundred thousand were displaced and destitute in the Irrawaddy Delta, and the violence in Karen State following the 2010 elections when fighting broke out between the Burma military and factions of the Karen armed resistance, displacing thousands. Décobert carefully describes the disputes over who actually provided the 'real' aid to communities, and the polarizing international debates which privileged either statist or subaltern claims to genuinely "humanitarian" action for disaster and conflict relief in the context of ongoing military rule in Burma. These were bitterly contested narratives, and advocacy over the legitimacy of approaches became almost attrition warfare in itself over several years, played out in Rangoon, Mae Sot, Bangkok and key donor capitols, effecting millions of people in Burma. In the end, cross-border assistance lost to an exponentially expanded international aid and development complex based in Rangoon and supportive of the post-2011 reforms led by former President U Thein Sein. Décobert's book deserves a broad readership inside Burma not just because it provides detailed background to the humanitarian struggles along the eastern border, applicable now to providing aid to displaced civilians in the north, but as international donor priorities shift from humanitarian support to development and peace-building initiatives. The politics of humanitarianism in Burma are still in conflict. David Scott Mathieson is a Rangoon-based independent analyst, who was based along the Thailand-Burma border from 2002 to 2012. The post Book Review: The Politics of Aid to Burma appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Film Academy Awards, Myanmar Idol, and the Peace Process in Myanmar Posted: 06 May 2017 06:37 PM PDT This article makes two interrelated arguments. First, most politicians, activists and opinion makers in Myanmar see the political divide between the ruler and the ruled — or between authoritarian ruler and democratic forces — as the main problem sustaining violence, conflict, and oppression. However, a second set of divides— inter-ethnic and intra-Buddhist divides— have significantly widened recently, and racism, sexism, and intolerance have become widespread. Second, the planned "political" dialogue pursued as part of the peace process has yet to attend to these "societal" divides, and rising racism and sexism. This lack of attention is ironic in that the very purpose of the peace process is to address a 70-year-old conflict that is rooted in identity-based oppression. These arguments will be demonstrated by looking at four specific cases: The Myanmar Film Academy Awards, Myanmar Idol Season 2, the "Aung San Bridge" in Mon State, and the case of Myanmar Now's chief correspondent Swe Win vis-Ã -vis U Wirathu. These four cases were selected because they are the most recent, but we could easily apply this lens to others. Myanmar Film Academy Awards The Myanmar Motion Picture Organization held its annual Academy Awards ceremony in Yangon on March 18, 2017. The film titled "Oak Kyar Myat Pauk" won three awards for the Best Film, Best Actor, and Best Film Director categories. Oak Kyar Myat Pauk literally means the grass grown among bricks, therefore "rootless." The film is about four youth, three men and one woman. Their childhood troubles caused by financial issues, abandonment, and family separation turned them into troubled kids. The three men met each other in jail, and they met the woman, Pauk Pauk (played by Thet Mon Myint), at Paradise Hotel, which serves adult entertainment to foreign clients. Pauk Pauk works at the hotel, where she is also an undercover agent against a human trafficking gang. The film, which at first seems to highlight how family troubles negatively affect children, suddenly turns to explicit xenophobia. It portrays foreigners (Chinese and Thai) as exploiting Burmese women with the collaboration of Myanmar nationals. The main story is articulated around protecting Burmese women from foreign sexual exploitation. There are two scenes that indirectly support the main storyline. Both scenes stoke racism by using elements that Burmese spectators can more easily internalize, as they correspond with a racist nationalist attitude. One scene is when one of the troubled young men Tha Gyar (played by Tun Tun) comes home from jail and cannot find his mom. A Muslim family has bought his home and is now living there. The explicit message is that foreigners have taken advantage of his misery and made him homeless. The scene reinforces the "house owner and guest" narrative that portrays Rohingya (and Muslims in general) as not behaving themselves as guests, but instead insulting the owners. Tun Tun won the best male actor award for his role in the film. Another scene shows the leading protagonist, Shwe Oak (played by Nay Toe), speaking angrily to the Paradise's manager (played by Soe Myat Thuzar) about foreigners exploiting Burmese: …if the birds live in their own nests and eat their food, there is no reason to have any problems. But if they invade another's [nest], even small birds must protect themselves as much as they can. If you don't want any racial issues, like you say, why don't they stay in their own nests? If they invade other's [nests], [we] will break their wings and throw them in the sea. Then, politics. I don't know about that either, but I know "maggots in the meat" [quislings] who betray [her/his] home and family and collaborate with thieves…. We are not maggots that open the fence for thieves. Now, I hit the thieves that you brought in. I do not care even if it causes a national problem [implying political problems involving other countries]. That's the politics I know. Regardless of whom Shwe Oak's nationalist anger is directly or indirectly targeting, the film exacerbates intolerance, group-ism, nationalism and racism but does not buoy multiculturalism, diversity, tolerance and a progressive understanding of social justice. The film, therefore, is counterproductive in bridging societal divides and addressing identity-based conflict. The fact that the film won three Academy Awards highlights that the issue of intolerance and racism is not just a personal issue for some individuals in the industry, but for the industry itself, which officially endorses such theatrical messages of hate. Apart from long-term ideological intoxication, the film caused two social media battles: once in early 2016 when the film was shown in theaters and another in March 2017 when it won the Academy Awards. Many supporters uploaded the entire film on Facebook and YouTube, sharing the specific scene of Shwe Oak's anger discussed above— both the video file and the text— urging people to watch and read. There were comments using words like "thief," "home stealer," "woman stealer," "maggots," and so on. On the other hand, progressive social media users expressed their disappointment, and responded with disapproving comments about both the awards and the nationalist attitudes they represented. There was almost no decent or constructive debate but rather just comments thrown back and forth. Myanmar Idol The next social media war of intolerance is in regards to the Myanmar Idol singing contest. The finale of its second season took place in March 2017, a few days after the Academy Awards. The two top contestants were Thar Nge and Billy La Min Aye, one male and female, respectively. Billy was known to many as a Pa-O-Karen-Christian girl from Taunggyi, the capital of Shan State. She received an enormous amount of hate and criticism from angry viewers who swore at her on Facebook using harsh and sexist language. They said she was uptight and selfish, not friendly and considerate enough to her colleagues who were voted out, and also that she was using her beauty to garner votes. On the other hand, Thar Nge, known to be ethnic Rakhine, received some ethnic identity-related comments, but not as many. One of Billy's fans wrote that Billy, as a girl from the hills, has not sold natural gas nor seaports to the Chinese – making reference to the Kyauk Phyu seaport project and natural gas pipeline from Rakhine State to China. Thar Nge, regardless of his ethnicity, has nothing to do with the seaport or the natural gas; he lives in Pyin Oo Lwin near Mandalay and sells Burmese pea fritters as a low-income worker! Thar Nge won Myanmar Idol. Apart from the social media war of insults and indecency that went on for months, observing the show, particularly the last two minutes before announcing the winner, makes one wonder about the entire hall chanting Thar Nge's name in opposition to Billy – the nervous young lady standing on the stage – tells us about the public psyche regarding who they 'like' and 'don't like', and the strong and the vulnerable. Should the audience not show decency and maturity by making themselves appear to be comforting both candidates? Or does the same psyche operate here as in politics – the commitment to the ruthless crushing of opponents? What happens if the majority is inattentive to the vulnerable? There are lessons to learn from Myanmar Idol. The imported singing contest not only turned out to be a "nationwide affair", but also indicated how society was vulnerable to division and intolerance. It also showed how easily people resorted to intolerance, prejudice, and hate. The "Aung San Bridge" While people were waging word wars over two forms of entertainment, another war was underway in regards to the naming of a new Union government-funded bridge in Mon State. The NLD government decided to name the bridge after the late General Aung San, as opposed to the originally designated name of "Thanlwin Chaung Sone Bridge." The Mon people were outraged by the decision. They wanted the bridge to signify Mon-ness, and represent Mon State. But the government unilaterally went ahead, while failing to consider ethnic grievances, causing locals to see the bridge name as emblematic of the ongoing Burmanization of ethnic people. The issue has divided those who support the name "Aung San Bridge" and those, mostly ethnic Mon and non-Bamar ethnic minorities across the country, who are against the government decision. There have been various public protests as well as anger on social media. According to some civil society leaders in Mon State, the divide between Mon people and ethnic Bamars has widened, and those who used to collaborate on various issues do not work together anymore. The language used to oppose the "Aung San Bridge," articulated through identity politics and minority rights, has made the ethnic Bamar see the Mon as increasingly nationalistic and anti-Bamar, while ethnic people see the pro-Aung San Bridge crowd as chauvinists opposed to minority rights. At the same time as the bridge campaign, came the 2017 by-elections. The local identity-based bridge campaign entangled with rising nationalism across the country. It is the same narrative of "the house owner and the guest," originally articulated in the context of the anti-Rohingya campaign, traveling to Mon State. A Facebook campaign ad said, "Only the house owner can fix the house. Let's vote for ethnic parties to protect ethnic rights." The "house owner and guest" discourse travels not only to Mon State, but also to different parts of the country. For instance, some activists in Shan State speak of "house owners who became tenants" to refer to the way the Shan State government convened the Shan State region-based dialogue in Taunggyi between April 23 and 25. The State government convened the region-based dialogue with the approval of Dr. Tin Myo Win, chairperson of the Union-level Peace Commission. The government did not consult with political parties, ethnic armed groups, or civil society groups based in Shan State. Instead, it planned the region-based dialogue unilaterally, just four days prior to its start on April 23. Many members of the Shan State dialogue supervisory committee were unaware of the planned dialogue until April 21st. The government also organized prior township-level dialogues and district-level dialogues in one to two days. In some places, participants were invited by phone or Viber. Some were invited just two hours ahead of the dialogues — which were not really 'dialogues' or 'debates' anyway. For the Shan State region-based dialogue in Taunggyi, political parties were required to submit the names of representatives in less than a day, and position papers on politics, economics and land/environmental issues in less than two days. Stakeholders in Shan State felt that they were not given time for preparation, but instead were forced to follow the rules of the game set by the government. It is even worse for ethnic Shan people as they have not been able to convene Shan ethnic-based dialogue due to the government not allowing the dialogue to take place in Taunggyi (or Panglong). Shan communities feel the government's convening of region-based dialogue in Taunggyi was inattentive to their grievances. Equally disappointing for the Shan State Civil Society Forum Committee— a collection of representatives from various civil society organizations— is that they were not invited to the dialogue. The invited civil society representatives were not allowed to submit papers nor participate in discussion. In short, questions over representation, decision-making, implementation, and the potential consequence of the dialogue are not only puzzling for many in Shan State but create a sense of loss regarding the process. Activists speak of the fact that the Shan State region-based dialogue was supposed to be their own affair, but local stakeholders were invited as 'guests' and forced to accept the rules of the game set by the Union government, which is seen as the Bamar government — an outsider. In short, people felt that outsiders were dictating house affairs, and that homeowners instead became powerless tenants. Intra-Buddhist Divides The major religious divide in Myanmar has traditionally been between the majority Buddhist and minority Muslim communities. Religious cracks within Buddhist communities were rare until the 2015 general election campaign, when the political cracks between supporters of the NLD and the junta/USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party) were partly articulated around religion. Buddhist nationalists, banding together as Ma Ba Tha, supported the USDP in the name of protecting race/religion, while the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi supporters, still nationalists, rejected Ma Ba Tha's religiously-loaded political campaign. By that time, many people came to realize that Ma Ba Tha was using Buddhism to mobilize supporters for the USDP against the NLD. The crack was amplified in February this year when Myanmar Now's chief correspondent Swe Win raised a question regarding Ma Ba Tha's possible link to NLD lawyer U Ko Ni's assassination. Also, when the leading Ma Ba Tha monk U Wirathu publicly thanked the assassins of U Ko Ni, Swe Win criticized him, which led U Wirathu followers in Mandalay and Yangon to sue him on charges of defaming Buddhism and U Wirathu. U Wirathu's supporters warned him to apologize, but Swe Win criticized U Wirathu in a press conference instead. Swe Win requested that the Ministry of Religion and Culture comment on whether what he said about U Wirathu amounted to defamation. The ministry issued a statement on April 5, stating that it did not. The USDP and eight other political parties accused the ministry of interfering in the judiciary, and said such interference could result in unnecessary consequences. Ma Ba Tha also issued a similar statement, indicating that the ministry was responsible for any unnecessary consequences. Earlier, on Feb. 9, U Wirathu delivered a sermon in former President Thein Sein's home village of Kyon Ku, in Irrawaddy Division, stating that Buddhist women should marry dogs (or alcoholics or drug addicts) instead of 'Kalar' (a derogatory word used to describe those of South Asian descent). He said dogs were as capable as 'Kalar,' and that he would send monks to fulfil the women's desires. The sermon took place in defiance of the regional government's ban on him preaching in the region. This outraged Buddhist communities, including women, some of who have spoken out against his preaching. U Min Hlaing filed a case against U Wirathu at Dawpong court in Yangon Region (which the court rejected on the basis that the sermon took place elsewhere). On March 10, the Sangha Maha Nayaka (Ma Ha Na), the official supreme clerical body that oversees Buddhist religious life, banned U Wirathu from preaching for a year. Though the Ma Ha Na warned that legal action would be taken if he failed to comply, he has continued to disobey the ruling. His latest preaching has triggered public responses, including signature campaigns to urge the government to prosecute Wirathu, as well as social media campaigns. It should be noted that it is not only U Wirathu who is under scrutiny, but also other monks who preach hate speech. Meanwhile, nationalist monks are collecting signatures urging the prosecution of Swe Win. In short, intra-Buddhist divides have been seen recently, which was rarely the case before. For the time being, and generally speaking, the intra-Buddhist divides have the Ministry of Religion and Culture, Ma Ha Na, relatively more progressive portions of the NLD, the media and activist communities, and anti-Ma Ba Tha civilians on the one hand, and Ma Ba Tha, the USDP and its nationalist political party alliance on the other. Is the Peace Process Lagging Behind Societal Divides? The four cases discussed above raise an important question: to what extent does the peace process, particularly the planned 21st century Panglong Conference and national dialogues, respond to emerging societal situations? It is uncertain how accessible the peace process is to the public, let alone whether people have a deep understanding of, interest in, or confidence in the process, itself. But the film Oak Kyar Myat Pauk is as popular among the people, as is Myanmar Idol. Racism, hate and intolerance in theatrical dialogue have been officially endorsed by the Myanmar Film industry. Many more films insensitive to conflict and diversity can be expected. Myanmar Idol shows that society is vulnerable to division. It also shows a public psyche obsessed with crushing the opposition, and that respect, decency and comforting the weak do not seem to be part of the public culture. The "Aung San Bridge" and the Ma Ha Na/Ma Ba Tha cases show that inter-ethnic and intra-communal divides, involving the government and politicized communities, accelerate quickly. All these cases collectively demonstrate that racism, sexism, intolerance and societal division are fundamental and common to all issues in Myanmar today. Addressing these issues requires serious inter-communal and intra-communal dialogues with deep political, ideological and intellectual commitments to anti-racism, multiculturalism and social justice. It is questionable whether the planned political dialogues can address these issues at all. The process has been complicated. It is doubtful whether every key person involved in the process even understands the framework for political dialogues and emerging Terms of Reference (ToR). Progress has been slow. The first political dialogue was expected in 2013. Four years have passed, but substantive negotiations on the thematic issues agreed upon by the government and ethnic armed groups have not taken place. The relevance of the substance of political dialogues is questionable as well. While the agreed topics such as politics (federalism), security reform, economics, social, and land/environment may be important, the issues of racism, sexism, and intolerance are key to all of them. Yet, it appears that the political dialogues, designed to talk about traditional 'political' topics are detached from everyday human relations and experiences in the social world. Areas such as entertainment, racism, and religion shape society yet often do not make it to the venue of traditional or high-level political talks. In other words, political dialogue for national reconciliation, designed on the track of 'doing politics,' does not seem to reflect the societal divides. It is neither sufficient nor substantive enough to address such divides. Moreover, it is not fast enough to catch up with the societal cracks, which ironically could further slow down political talks. Perhaps, the slow pace of the political dialogue can be an opportunity for the leaders of the peace process to be 'sociologically' savvy and reflect on the 'social world.' As racism, intolerance, inter- and intra-ethnic/religious divides can be at the bottom of the list in political dialogue for peace and reconciliation, it is important for peace leaders to commit to anti-racism, multiculturalism, inter- and intra-communal harmony, and social justice. Conflict sensitivity measures must be sensitive to racism, sexism, intolerance and social justice. Otherwise, political justice will continue to be eclipsed by the forces of social injustice. This article originally appeared in Tea Circle, a forum hosted at Oxford University for emerging research and perspectives on Burma/Myanmar. The post Film Academy Awards, Myanmar Idol, and the Peace Process in Myanmar appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| You are subscribed to email updates from The Irrawaddy. To stop receiving these emails, you may unsubscribe now. | Email delivery powered by Google |
| Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, United States | |
