Wednesday, August 17, 2016

The Irrawaddy Magazine

The Irrawaddy Magazine


Should State-Owned Enterprises Be Privatized?

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 08:34 AM PDT

Staff work behind the glass barrier of a ticket office for Myanmar Airways in central Rangoon on September 19, 2012. State-owned Myanmar Airways re-formed as Myanmar National Airlines in 2014 and is undergoing a shift to become a corporation, while retaining its own budget. (Photo: Damir Sagoli / Reuters)

Staff work behind the glass barrier of a ticket office for Myanmar Airways in central Rangoon on September 19, 2012. State-owned Myanmar Airways re-formed as Myanmar National Airlines in 2014 and is undergoing a shift to become a corporation, while retaining its own budget. (Photo: Damir Sagoli / Reuters)

RANGOON — Burma's government has sought verification as to why state-owned enterprises have been unprofitable, in order to better consider a move toward privatization to reduce the budget deficit.

On August 11 in the Upper House, Myat Nyana Soe, the secretary of the Joint Bill Committee, urged the Union Parliament to form a commission to investigate state-run enterprises which are running at a loss.

The Bill Committee suggested suspending state-run business projects during the current fiscal year, stressing that they need to be re-evaluated.

Myat Nyana Soe said it is time that a commission consisting of foreign consultants be formed to evaluate unprofitable state-run businesses, with an exception made for enterprises that the government operates in the public interest from within the Union budget.

"If large sums of investment have been put into those businesses and it is sure they will continue to function at a loss, then we should suspend or ultimately shut them down based on the assessment of the proposed commission," said Myat Nyana Soe.

Burma's economic analysts expressed varying views in response to the bill committee's proposal to suspend and privatize failing state-run businesses.

Economist Aung Ko Ko said privatization is not the only the way to fix a budget deficit, and recommended that the government first explore why these businesses have been encountering loss.

"The government can still manage those businesses, because if all business is privatized, only the private sector will benefit. Customers will see the impact of this," he said.

Aung Ko Ko pointed out that in the past many state-owned enterprises were handed over to people who were close with government officials and their outputs have not changed.

"For example, fuel enterprises have been privatized. [But] even though international oil prices are down, the local prices have yet to fall. It is because the government does not place controls on the private sector, and finally, customers face the consequences," he said.

"In my opinion…state-owned businesses in the transport sector [in particular] should not be privatized, because it affects people's daily lives," Aung Ko Ko added.

Nyo Nyo Thin, a former Rangoon Division lawmaker, echoed Aung Ko Ko's sentiments on privatization and urged government officials to carry out an internal investigation into such businesses to root out corruption.

"It's possible that those businesses have had losses because of corruption. If [the government] can address cases of bribery, it can manage rather than privatize, in order to reduce the state deficit," she said.

"Some state-owned enterprises should not be handed over to the private sector, like those in transport. This new government should not follow by doing what the previous government has done," Nyo Nyo Thin continued.

In 2011, the former Thein Sein-led administration formed a privatization commission and proceeded to privatize thousands of state-owned enterprises including factories, land and customer services.

Laws exist that allow state-run businesses such as Inland Water Transport, Myanma Port Authority, Myanma Dockyards and Myanmar Airways to operate on their own, apart from the state budget. However, the bill committee criticized how after those businesses suffered losses, they rejoined the state budget and received special reserve funds.

"To recover loss with the use of special reserve funds is just a short-term solution. It will not solve the root cause," Myat Nyana Soe added.

However, Tun Lwin Oo, a director-general with the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications who is supervising those businesses, said in a press conference on Tuesday that such enterprises had tried to stand on their own but failed, and therefore need to operate under the state budget.

"Inland Water Transport is operating at a loss across the country except on the Arakan coast. It is also because people choose other modes of transportation as time goes on. Though it is taking on losses, we need to continue operation to meet public needs, and therefore I have proposed that it should be funded by the state budget," said Tun Lwin Oo.

Under the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, the former Myanmar Airways—re-branded now as Myanmar National Airlines—is currently re-forming as a corporation with its own budget.

Maung Maung Lay, from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI), explained that state-run businesses were not privatized properly during the Thein Sein administration's era due to poor transparency and nepotism, causing the enterprises to then fail.

"The government should have privatized burdensome businesses a long time ago. But it is important that they do not secretly hand them over to their close associates like the previous government did. The resulting problems of such favoritism have not yet been resolved. The current government knows that," Maung Maung Lay said.

Tin Cho, an advisor to the Parami Group of Companies, also shared his view on the issue.

"Since there was no transparency during the time of the previous government, those businesses got into the wrong hands. They bought them, not to operate them, but to sell the land. So, how is this going to help economic development?" said Tin Cho.

After General Ne Win and his military regime nationalized Burma's businesses in 1963—one year after taking power in a coup—most failed due to mismanagement. Ne Win's government suffered a budget deficit; to resolve this, it printed a surplus of banknotes, leading to massive inflation and ultimately collapsing the economy, explained Tin Cho.

"It all failed because there were no experts," he said.

The post Should State-Owned Enterprises Be Privatized? appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Commission on Arakan State to be Formed With Buddhist and Muslim Members

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 07:14 AM PDT

The Central Committee for Peace and Development in Arakan State convene in Napyidaw on August 9. (Photo: Myanmar State Counsellor Office / Facebook)

The Central Committee for Peace and Development in Arakan State convene in Napyidaw on August 9. (Photo: Myanmar State Counsellor Office / Facebook)

RANGOON — Plans are underway to form a new commission to resolve the communal and humanitarian crisis in Arakan State, which will include Muslim and Buddhist Arakanese representatives—but from Rangoon rather than Arakan State.

The new nine-member commission is to play a consultative role in Arakan State—soliciting views from local Buddhist and Muslim communities, to be forwarded to the central government, which is keeping a tight rein on the region and delegating few decisions to state-level leaders.

The news was imparted during meetings in the state capital Sittwe on Monday, conducted separately with Buddhist Arakanese and Muslim Rohingya "community leaders" by the Central Committee for Peace and Development in Arakan State—a body chaired by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, involving Union-level ministers and the Arakan State Chief Minister.

Suu Kyi was absent from the meetings. Lt-Gen Ye Lwin, the Union Minister for Border Affairs, was the highest-ranking member of the committee present.

The new nine-member commission will include three members from "the international community"—The Irrawaddy could not ascertain who this referred to—two Buddhist Arakanese members, two Muslim members, and two government representatives, according to Tha Pwint, a retired Arakanese lawyer from Sittwe who was present at one of the Monday meetings.

He said that Arakanese representatives in their meeting with the high-level committee had expressed dissatisfaction that the Muslim and Buddhist Arakanese members of the new commission would not be local to Arakan State, but be from Rangoon. No objections were reported from Rohingya representatives during their own meeting.

One of the proposed Buddhist Arakanese representatives is Win Mya, the current chairman of Burma's National Human Rights Commission, which has been widely criticized as ineffective since its formation in 2011.

One of the proposed Muslim representatives—who is seemingly not required to be Rohingya or "Bengali," as most Burmese term them, or have actual links to Arakan State—is Aye Lwin, a Rangoon-based religious authority and member of Burma's Interfaith Friendship Organization. The other Arakanese and Muslim representatives have yet to be revealed.

Rohingya and Buddhist Arakanese self-described community leaders, speaking to The Irrawaddy, expressed skepticism over the ability of the new commission to resolve the communal conflict, which has been largely frozen since anti-Muslim violence in 2012 and 2013.

Aung Win, a Rohingya rights activist from Sittwe who also joined one of the Monday meetings, said he would only be satisfied when "direct action" is taken by the central government in Arakan State, suggesting that the new commission is a distraction.

"The day the government gets involved directly, will be the day when our problems can be solved," he said.

Tha Pwint, the local Arakanese retired lawyer, said the crisis could be resolved only with the imposition of the rule of law.

He accused the government of "not taking action" against "illegal migrants who come to stay in our region"—a reference to the largely stateless Rohingya, whose claim to belonging to Arakan State is strongly denied by most Buddhist Arakanese, and much of the wider Burmese public.

Suu Kyi may visit Arakan State at the end of this month, along with the new commission, and consult with community leaders from both sides, according to Aung Win.

The post Commission on Arakan State to be Formed With Buddhist and Muslim Members appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Seven Charged With Illegal Assembly After US Embassy Protest

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 05:10 AM PDT

Demonstrators, including Ashin Parmoukkha and Win Ko Ko Latt, are pictured at the protest outside the US Embassy on April 28, 2016. (Photo: Myo Min Soe / The Irrawaddy)

Demonstrators, including Ashin Parmoukkha and Win Ko Ko Latt, are pictured at the protest outside the US Embassy on April 28, 2016. (Photo: Myo Min Soe / The Irrawaddy)

RANGOON— The Kamayut Township police have brought charges against seven Burmese nationalists on Tuesday who, in April, protested outside the US Embassy in Rangoon against the American mission's use of the word "Rohingya." A trial is scheduled for August 30.

Hundreds of protesters, including Buddhist monks, held a demonstration outside the US embassy on April 28 in Rangoon. They condemned the embassy for using the term "Rohingya" in a statement issued on April 20 after more than 18 people belonging to the Rohingya minority were killed when their boat sank off the coast of Sittwe, Arakan State.

A police officer from the Kamayut police station told The Irrawaddy that they opened the case against the seven protesters under Article 19 of the Peaceful Assembly Law, accusing those involved of "illegal assembly." Among the charged are three monks, including Ashin Parmoukkha, formerly a prominent member of the ultranationalist organization best known by its Burmese acronym—Ma Ba Tha. Win Ko Ko Latt of the Myanmar Nationalist Network also faces charges.

Ashin Parmoukkha said that Win Ko Ko Latt originally sought permission to protest in front of the US Embassy, but the police put forward the Bo Sein Hman grounds in Rangoon's Bahan Township as an alternative protest site. The group instead gathered first in front of Rangoon University, before marching to the nearby US Embassy.

"We are not guilty," the monk said. "We just protested since the US ambassador used the term 'Rohingya.' The ones who use that term are cunning. And I didn't participate in the march. I just gave a speech there."

The protesters reject the term Rohingya—with which the Muslim minority self-identifies—and instead refer to the group as "Bengali," implying that they are migrants from neighboring Bangladesh. Burma's 1982 Citizenship Law does not recognize the Rohingya among the country's 135 official ethnic groups, contributing to widespread statelessness for the community.

The post Seven Charged With Illegal Assembly After US Embassy Protest appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Local Jade Traders Request Mining Ban

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 05:04 AM PDT

 Dump trucks loaded with soil at a jade mine in Hpakant, Kachin State. (Photo: Soe Zeya Tun / Reuters)

Dump trucks loaded with soil at a jade mine in Hpakant, Kachin State. (Photo: Soe Zeya Tun / Reuters)

MANDALAY — Jade traders in upper Burma urged the government to stop jade mining in Kachin State's Hpakant and Lone Khin regions to prevent the decline of the local jade market.

More than 20,000 jade traders from Mandalay, Sagaing, Hpakant and Lone Khin signed a petition to this effect and sent it to government officials in Naypyidaw on Tuesday.

"We want the government to halt jade mining and exports, in order to prevent a market downturn inside the country," said Thein Win, chairperson of the Mandalay Jade Market maintenance committee.

About 90 percent of the country's local jade market is in the Mandalay, Sagaing, Hpakant and Lone Khin regions. The biggest jade market is in Mandalay, where Chinese buyers do most of their trading.

The petition stated that the mass production of jade and direct export of uncut stones, mainly to China, had affected the local trading market.

"Starting in 2014, mining companies used heavy machinery to mass produce. They sold uncut boulders directly to Chinese traders and locals had few opportunities to buy them," he added.

Locals say small scale traders and gems cutters have been affected as well, due to the declining price of jade.

"Because the uncut rocks are exported—both legally and illegally—to China, there's no stock left in the local market. The price of the jade has fallen about 50 percent in the local market and there is no high quality jade left in the market," Thein Win added.

Burma's biannual jade emporiums rely on trade with China, and have taken a hit now that buyers are mainly focused on the direct export of uncut jade across the Sino-Burma border. Local traders say that illegal exports have shifted interest away from the emporiums and hurt the local market.

"We urge government authorities to halt all jade mining for the time being, deter the export of uncut jade and take action against illegal exports. If they don't, the local jade market will not exist for much longer," said Thein Win.

"In 2012, the government halted mining and the local jade market reacted favorably. This is why we are urging them to do the same once again," he added.

In July, the government decided not to renew existing jade mining licenses pending an environmental impact assessment. Hundreds of licenses expired at the end of July, but hundreds more will not expire until 2018.

The petition stated that the government should not take action against local prospectors who search for jade in Kachin State's mines in order to make a living. The traders said they disagree with the natural resources and environmental conservation minister's decision in early August to take legal action against the prospectors, in an effort to control deadly accidents due to the collapse of mining waste and the resulting landslides.

"This is not a good solution. The Mandalay Jade Market depends heavily on local prospectors. If the government wants to prevent accidents, they should take action against the mining companies and the illegal traders," said Kyaw Zaw Aung, secretary of the Mandalay Jade Market's maintenance committee.

The petition was sent to the office of State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, the minister of natural resources and environmental conservation, the parliamentary committees for natural resources and environment conservation and the Mandalay Division chief minister.

"If the government ignores us, we will take to the streets and protest," he added.

The post Local Jade Traders Request Mining Ban appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

The Beijing High Jump

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 03:32 AM PDT

ATH_Cartoon

The post The Beijing High Jump appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

How to Grow Burma’s Economy

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 12:18 AM PDT

Author Joe Studwell spoke about the importance of smallholder farmers in economic policy at a conference in Naypyidaw on Tuesday. (Photo: Kyaw Phyo Tha / The Irrawaddy)

Author Joe Studwell spoke about the importance of smallholder farmers in economic policy at a conference in Naypyidaw on Tuesday. (Photo: Kyaw Phyo Tha / The Irrawaddy)

UK-based author Joe Studwell made a list of recommended reads by Bill Gates with his influential book "How Asia Works," an analysis of success and failure in Asian economies.

In his book, Studwell argues that high-performing countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China set the foundations for economic success by strengthening smallholder agriculture, subjecting industry to export discipline and pursuing a tightly controlled financial policy. 

Studwell spoke to The Irrawaddy ahead of his keynote speech at a conference in Naypyidaw on Tuesday on the role of government in supporting smallholder agriculture, to accelerate economic development.

You argue that the route to national economic success is for government to get behind agriculture, especially smallholder farming. Why is agriculture so key?

Agriculture is the most fundamental question that confronts any poor country. By definition, in any poor country, 70 to 75 percent of the population lives by agriculture. It's a simple numbers consideration. If you can begin to extract some value from 70-75 percent of the population then you are on the way to increasing capital accumulation.

What happens in agriculture sets the agenda for everything else. If you get agriculture right, then you can do what four countries—Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China—have achieved. You can transform from real poverty to developed country status in two generations. But you have to get it right.

By 'getting it right' you have described the need for government to provide major support to smallholders, through the supply of credit, ambitious farmer extension schemes to improve yields, and improved rural infrastructure to get produce to markets, among other measures. Please elaborate.

What you want is maximized output. You want agriculture that is more like gardening. When you have large amounts of very low cost labor, which you do in Myanmar, then small-scale agriculture is very responsive to labor input. If you've ever had a vegetable garden, and if you individually water plants, individually fertilize plants, and you use trellises and grow things vertically […] you can produce massively more per square meter than you could produce with scale farming.

The fundamental point is that when you have a lot of people who are underemployed or unemployed, then this kind of gardening approach to agriculture will maximize your output. But if you don't put all the pieces together right, it won't work.

When heavily-supported small agriculture starts to produce higher yields, what are the wider economic effects?

What happens is that everybody gets a little surplus. Then you get demand for consumer goods, industrial goods. If you go to rural China, you see that when farmers start to get money, the first thing they invest in is their assets, like their houses. They want cement, bits of construction materials like steel, glass. Then you have a demand for basic goods consumer goods, things around the house like a television, radio, bicycle: simple goods that you can be competitive producing domestically.

So, you get this very nice demand profile for the beginning of industrialization. If you have successful household agriculture you get more industrialization, and more entrepreneurship.

You have said that Southeast Asian economies, with the exception of Vietnam, have been less successful because they undervalued agriculture. What does that mean for this country, where small-scale agriculture has also traditionally received low priority?

I'd say two things. One, if people undervalue agriculture in Myanmar it's because you exist here in a region of the world where agriculture has been undervalued by governments. It's one of the big reasons why Southeast Asia is a relative developmental failure, compared to Northeast Asia. Myanmar needs to look around the world and take lessons from the most successful countries, not its neighbors.

The new government has to choose between different policy options.  Boosting smallholder farming is one option. Some might say that promoting large-scale commercial agriculture is another?

Contract farming is not a good idea [for now] […] Development is about stages. It's about taking small steps and going through a learning process. At this stage of Myanmar's development, all of the evidence that I can see [suggests] that a strategy of high-yield household farming is the best thing for economic development, the best thing to accelerate growth, the best thing for poverty alleviation, and best thing to create a national consensus.

On a plantation, you've got the people who work and provide the labor. All they can buy is food. The guy who controls the plantation, he wants an imported car and a wide screen TV set, and he sends his children to schools abroad. None of this is feeding the domestic economy. So there are considerations beyond agriculture. This is why I say that what you do on agriculture sets the agenda for everything that follows.

Yet large-scale farming has advocates, and to some extent it has already begun.

In Myanmar, my understanding is that at the back end of the previous government, and at the front end of this government, people thought it was a good policy. One problem for a government like Myanmar is that it needs foreign exchange. The country is desperate for currency to pay for imports. When these agribusinesses come along, and promise to invest hard currency, it's very tempting for the government to think, 'great, a hundred million US dollars.' But actually, you're going to create a type of agriculture that is not high-yield. It's high profit for the company. But it's a sub-optimal model. What you want is maximized output.

At the outset, in any of the successful countries in Asia, there was no scale farming, no plantation farming. Later on, you get to the stage where you may consolidate farms, but you do it yourself.

Where else might there be skepticism or pushback against a policy to prioritize smallholders?

Well, obviously, people who wield power live in cities. You get what is sometimes referred to as urban bias. Urban bias makes for bad policy in poor countries, because most people live by farming, and you need to mobilize people to progress.

Then there's a pushback from anyone trying to control large tracts of land—anyone […] engaged in a more feudal type of agriculture, where thousands toil so one or two can live in big houses with lots of servants. There are a lot of those in any underdeveloped country. It's a normal state of affairs.

So, inevitably, there are some tough decisions that have to be made, and some vested interests that have to be confronted. But, at the same time, if you can develop a strategy that is clearly in the national interest, then some people who stand to lose will go along with that strategy, because they are able to recognize the national interest.

At the end of the day, it depends on how this government is going to set its priorities. All I would say is that anything is possible for Myanmar. I mean, economic progress is about human organization, and the organization of people is led by governments, particularly at an early stage of development. So, Myanmar will succeed or fail based on how this government engages with the challenges of rural development.

This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity. The conference, titled "Smallholder Agriculture: The Foundation of Economic Development," brought Burmese and international experts together, and was hosted by the Renaissance Institute, Landesa and USAID.

The full title of Joe Studwell's book is, "How Asia Works, Success and Failure in the World's Most Dynamic Region."

The post How to Grow Burma's Economy appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

New SEZ Management Committees Formed

Posted: 16 Aug 2016 11:23 PM PDT

A man looks at his watermelon field near the Thilawa SEZ outside Rangoon on Oct. 2, 2012. (Photo: Soe Zeya Tun / Reuters)

A man looks at his watermelon field near the Thilawa SEZ outside Rangoon on Oct. 2, 2012. (Photo: Soe Zeya Tun / Reuters)

RANGOON — President Htin Kyaw has formed the new Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Central Management Committee and Central Working Committee with officials from within Burma's new government, led by Vice President-2 Henry Van Thio and Minister of Commerce Than Myint, respectively.

The President's Office announced the formation of the new committees on Monday. The central SEZ management committee consists of 15 members including multiple Union ministers, who will be required to submit a detailed report to the Union government regarding proposals for new SEZs, their locations, boundaries, logistical requirements, and negotiating points to be considered with state and divisional authorities.

The committee will also organize sub-committees to plan and manage projects, as well as address different business categories and separate enterprises by appropriate size for investors. They will also fix rates for fees, tax, capital and exemptions.

Aung Naing Oo, a member of the SEZ Central Working Committee and director general of the Directorate of Investment and Companies Administration (DICA), explained the reason for the new committees.

"By the SEZ law, the former committees have expired. That's why the President has formed them with new members. They will review all zones, both old and new," he said.

The working committee, which reports to the management committee, also has 15 members, including permanent secretaries from multiple ministries.

"The management committee will work to make policy and we, the working group, will work on ground. We will work together," Aung Naing Oo said.

Although ex-president Thein Sein once held the post of chairman under the previous Central Management Committee, and his vice president, Nyan Tun, held the post in the working committee, current President Htin Kyaw opted out of the post.

Recently, Burma's SEZs in Kyaukphyu, Dawei and Thilawa have faced issues regarding land confiscation and compensation, as well as weak infrastructure.

The Dawei SEZ and deep-sea port, located in Tenasserim Division and financed by the Burmese, Thai and Japanese governments, has faced local opposition for years due to social and environmental concerns, and only recently secured funding.

Arakan State's Kyaukphyu SEZ, whose tender was given to China's CITIC Group of Companies, has been in the works for years but has yet to resolve local complaints regarding unfair acquisition practices and land compensation.

The Kyaukphyu SEZ is expected to include an industrial zone, a housing estate and two deep-sea ports. A key feature is a Sino-Burmese pipeline project that will enable the transport of oil and gas into China's isolated southwestern provinces.

Myat Thin Aung, chairman of Rangoon's Hlaing Tharyar Industrial Zone, said SEZ committees should prioritize developing infrastructure and remain cognizant of environmental impacts.

"Environmental impact and air pollution are big concerns, as is developing weak infrastructure—both for our country and for investors," he said.

The post New SEZ Management Committees Formed appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Bertil Lintner: ‘China is the Most Important Foreign Player in the Peace Process’

Posted: 16 Aug 2016 06:23 PM PDT

Bertil Lintner pictured in Rangoon in 2016. (Photo: The Irrawaddy)

Bertil Lintner pictured in Rangoon in 2016. (Photo: The Irrawaddy)

It's complicated: In an interview with The Irrawaddy, longtime Burma expert Bertil Lintner assesses the many interests at play during State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi's visit to China on Wednesday.

 

As a Burmese government delegation led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi leaves for a state visit to China, what can the Burmese expect from this trip? 

It is quite possible that China would want to restart the Myitsone project, but that would be political suicide for any Burmese government. If China wants to improve its tarnished image in Burma, it should drop Myitsone altogether, and also make a public announcement to that effect.

 

The Burmese have always been concerned about China interfering in Burma's internal affairs. In the North, China continues to support ethnic rebels including the Wa and Kokang. At the last ethnic summit in Mai Ja Yang, the Chinese envoy said that it supports and backs all forces working to achieve internal peace in Burma. It seems Beijing wants to see more stability along the border. 

It is important to remember that China, not some Western, self-appointed peacemakers and interlocutors, is the most important foreign player in the peace process. China wants peace and stability along the border, but it will not give up the leverage it has inside Burma by severing ties with the UWSA [United Wa State Army], the MNDAA [Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army], the NDAA [National Democratic Alliance Army, also known as the Mongla Group] and other ethnic armed organizations. China's relations with those groups gives it bargaining chips, and a much stronger position in the peace process than any Norwegian, Swiss or Australian entity could ever hope for.

 

Do you think China is more pragmatic in dealing with Suu Kyi? In the past, Beijing officials reportedly complained about Burmese generals' intransigence and corruption. Can you tell whether Suu Kyi and President Xi Jinping are prepared to turn a new page? What are the key challenges in improving ties? 

It is obvious that China, at least for the time being, seems more comfortable dealing with Suu Kyi than the Tatmadaw, which is eager to re-establish military-to-military relations with the West in order to lessen the dependence on China. But at the same time, China knows that the military, not the elected government, is the country's most powerful institution. The military controls the Defense, Home and Border Affairs ministries, and the Tatmadaw is an autonomous institution that takes orders from the commander-in-chief, not the president or the state counselor. China would have to play a delicate balancing act here, and, perhaps, even play the government against the military.

 

How do you see China evaluating and viewing the substantial rise of Western influence in Burma? Beijing seemed to be caught off guard when the country began opening up in 2011 and 2012. But since last year, it has been more aggressively engaging Burma and has launched more public relations offensives, inviting opposition members—including Suu Kyi—to Beijing. Last week we saw Song Tao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China meet almost every key leader in Burma.

China is no doubt worried about Western inroads into Burma, especially the possibility of military-to-military relations with the US, which was suggested by William C. Dickey, ex defense attaché to Burma, in a recent article.  Dickey stated that "moves by other Western as well as Asian countries to develop bilateral military ties with Myanmar suggest it is time for the US to change its approach and actively assist in transforming the country’s armed forces—just as Washington has successfully done with other Southeast Asian military forces." Many would argue that the US has a very poor record of transforming its allied military forces into more democratic institutions, just look at Thailand, Egypt and Turkey. Although Dickey doesn’t mention it, it is clear to any observer that he is talking about getting Burma away from its hitherto heavy dependence on China. Regional security issues, not human rights and democracy, are at the top of Pentagon's priorities in the region.

 

Western governments, including the US, usually take the moral high ground by maintaining sanctions and making statements on human rights issues. But it seems Beijing is more pragmatic and more focused on not losing its important geopolitical strategic partner and business interests at all costs. Who is going to be winner in this so-called "great game" over Burma in the end?  

Although human rights are not the most important issue for the US, it can't ignore such concerns and it has to raise objections if human rights are being violated. China has no such problem, and would not risk losing the influence it still has in Burma because of any human rights issue. That's a severe dilemma for the US and the West.

 

How do you see Suu Kyi rebalancing Burma's foreign policy with rest of Asia and beyond, as she has been seen as pro-West in the past? She once said that she wants to make friends with the rest of the world. 

It remains to be seen how she, as Burma's foreign minister, is going to balance relations with China and Japan and the West. But one has to remember that China is an immediate neighbor with vital strategic interests in Burma. The US, and even Japan, are far away. It would be impossible for any government in Burma to ignore the importance of China.

 

Aside from controversial Myitsone project, the oil and gas pipeline and proposed rail link between Sittwe and Yunnan is much more important. With it, China will gain access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. To China, Burma will serve as a geo-political strategic buffer zone. Do you see India and Japan as major players in the future to counter China's comprehensive strategic ambition? 

Absolutely, and we can see how the prime ministers of the two countries, Shinzo Abe in Japan and Narendra Modi in India, are becoming close friends and allies. What they have in common is concern over the rise of China. India has long considered the Indian Ocean their "lake," and do not want China to establish footholds there. Japan is worried about China’s increasingly assertive policies in the entire region.

The post Bertil Lintner: 'China is the Most Important Foreign Player in the Peace Process' appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

National News

National News


Activists fear Myitsone restart

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 01:00 AM PDT

Activists are prepared to resume protests against the Myitsone mega-dam development in Kachin State, amid concerns that Foreign Minister Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's visit to China could result in the revival of the suspended project.

Locals reject proposed Shan parliament site to save trees

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 12:57 AM PDT

A Proposed Shan parliament building will have to find a new location after locals and political parties objected to the removal of 150-year-old trees.

FREDA to plant 50,000 trees in Yangon Region

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 12:56 AM PDT

Supermarket shoppers may get to play a part in the greening of Yangon. City Mart has entered an agreement with the Forest Resource Environment Development and Conservation Association (FREDA) to plant 50,000 trees in Yangon over the next year.

Funding shortfall delays Panglong park plan

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 12:55 AM PDT

Further funding will be required if a new Bogyoke Aung San statue is to be erected in the Danu self-administered zone, say local residents, as budget constraints have delayed construction of a monument in honour of the original and the upcoming Pang­long conferences on ethnic unity. 

‘Bullet’ jumps gun on IS Shan State expansion story

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 12:53 AM PDT

Reports that members of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group had entered Myanmar appear to be incorrect, said the Ministry of Home Affairs yesterday, after a journal self-published by controversial former MP U Hla Swe last week declared the arrival of the caliphate in Shan State.

MP accuses militia of aiding Chinese timber smugglers in Puta-o

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 12:51 AM PDT

Smuggling of valuable timber in northern Kachin State has reduced forest cover in some areas by up to 80 percent, say local officials. They blame a local militia and its civilian officials, as well as foreign accomplices, amid hints that the national armed forces might be involved.

Taung Pyone festival winds down

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 12:49 AM PDT

After a wild week of spirit worship, boisterous music and heavy drinking, the Taung Pyone Nat Festival comes to an end tomorrow as the full moon day of the lunar month of Wagaung crosses the sky over Myanmar.

Activists call for more aid in measles-infected Naga

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 12:39 AM PDT

Naga activists are calling for more government support for the people of Sagaing Region's Naga Self-Administered Zone, who are suffering from infectious diseases, health problems and other issues.

Pyidaungsu Hluttaw agrees to US$100m loan from World Bank

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 12:34 AM PDT

With the goal of developing Myanmar's financial sector, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw voted to borrow US$100 million from the World Bank yesterday.

Non-signatories granted eight seats on Panglong committee

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 12:32 AM PDT

Eight seats have been reserved for non-signatories to the nationwide ceasefire agreement on the joint preparatory committee for the upcoming 21st-century Panglong Conference, sources involved in the planning said yesterday after a meeting of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee.

Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News


Shallow graves uncovered in Namtu Township

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 02:00 AM PDT

The bodies of three local men have been discovered in shallow graves in Namtu Township. The cause of death is as yet unknown.

Photo by citizen journalist- Dead bodies of three villagers were found on August 4 between the villages of Wan Mai and Sarm Kar, Namtu Township.
According to one of the victims' family members, the three have been identified as: Loong Por Kham, 56; Sai Ai Parng, 31; and Sai Ai Htwe, 24.

All three were from the village of Kong Hong and had disappeared while out foraging for forest foods on August 1 in Mongmu village tract, Namtu Township.

Their bodies were uncovered on August 4 between the villages of Wan Mai and Sarm Kar, the family member told Shan Herald.

Sai Lek, a spokesperson for the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, or SNLD, said this is not the first time that this kind of incident had happened. In fact, he said, it all too common.

Sai Lek blamed the frequency of such murders on a lack of rule of law in the region.
"I have urged the Shan State and Union governments to put some serious attention into this issue and try to solve the problem immediately," he said. "The armed groups also have to understand and respect the law. They should respect human rights and behave according to military ethics."

According to Tai Freedom News Agency, the news and information department of the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) reported on August 13 that two of the victims were soldiers of its rivals, the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).

Reached for comment, an SSPP/SSA official, who wished to remain anonymous, told Shan Herald that the militia will form a committee to investigate the case. He said that they will proceed with the investigation according to the law, and bring the culprit or culprits to justice.

Loong Maung, who found the graves, said that he has no idea which armed group, if any, committed the crime. He said that he and other residents reported the case to local authorities and local political parties. 

"The bodies were found near one of the ethnic armed groups' camps," Loong Maung told Shan Herald without elaborating or providing any further details.  

Armed groups active in the area include Burmese government forces, the Kachin Independence Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, the RCSS/SSA, and the SSPP/SSA.

According to a resident in Namtu who did not wish to be identified, another villager had been found murdered recently in Nyaungmong village.

In the most high-profile recent case, on June 25, seven civilians were killed by government troops in Mong Yaw, Lashio Township. A trial for the suspected soldiers and officers involved is currently under way at a military court in Lashio.

By Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN)

Learning to share: About low hanging fruits

Posted: 17 Aug 2016 01:55 AM PDT

Afterword

A lot of problems in this world would disappear, if we talk to each other instead of about each other.
Workshop quotes

I wasn't planning to write this. I thought I had already written enough.

But something happened following my Day Four journal. Which, if the truth were not made known in time, could be disastrous —in the long term, if not immediately.

On Day Three and Day Four, we went through the usual motions of a workshop: Conducting scenarios and options exercises.

The subject was how to deal with the Union Peace Conference (21st Century Panglong) The Lady had just announce would take place on 31 August. How the EAOs, both signatories and non signatories, should respond to it.

The resultant options:

·         To boycott the conference. Write to her "we" would not be coming.
·         To write to her that it should only be a "grand opening", no more
·         To write to her that "we" will attend, but for future cooperation, the muddled up process should be renegotiated

The reader doesn't need me to say what the outcome was:

Option #1. The workshop did not spend much time on it. Here are some of the responses:

"I'll go, even if not one else goes."
"The signatory EAOs will become divided"
"Criticisms both at home and abroad"
"This is not the time for confrontation"
"Refusal to participate will be too risky."

Option #2. Demanding that it be just a "grand opening" is not enough. "We" still need to be prepared for any eventuality

Option #3. This is the workshop's choice. To write to her that "we" will attend, but we will also need to discuss how we could move further ahead when we play by the NCA rules

A letter was accordingly written, as reported by SHAN yesterday (16 August 2016) and delivered on 12 August. The State Counselor's reply, appreciated by all concerned, is that she will be meeting the PPST (Peace Process Steering Team) on 24 August morning. The JICM (Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting) will be held in the afternoon on the same day.

That seemed to have cleared up all the hiccups in the peace process that arose, after the new government took over on 30 March.

Except for on unanticipated development: That leading members of the government's UPC-21CPC Preparatory Committee are unhappy with "suggestions" by a certain workshop participant to "boycott" the Conference.

Is this misunderstanding? Or mis(dis) information? The situation calls for a clarification. However, the fact is that the Preparatory Committee, though in direct contact channel with the said participant, has yet to demand an explanation. And the unresolved situation, though seemingly insignificant at present, can explode into an uncontrollable one, as unexplained misreadings accumulate.

I end this journal with a counsel from my Chinese teacher, Lao Zi (some regard him as Tai-Shan):

Everything easy means great difficulty
So, to the sage, everything is difficult

Thus, in the end, nothing is difficult

Aung San Suu Kyi’s Visit to Beijing: Recalibrating Myanmar’s China Policy

Posted: 16 Aug 2016 07:52 PM PDT

Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government faced a tough situation with China at the time of their inauguration in March. But, as she visits Beijing this week, hopes are high again in China that a redirection of Myanmar's foreign policy could be underway and the pendulum of Myanmar's balancing diplomacy is swinging back to the east. But many challenges lie ahead. These include resolution of the Myitsone dam impasse, repositioning political relations between the two countries, and peaceful settlement of ethnic conflicts in the Myanmar borderlands. The stakes are very high. The outcome of Aung San Suu Kyi's meetings could well come to define Myanmar-China relations for many years to come.

Protesters in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, march against the Myitsone dam project in Kachin State in 2011 - The dam is a sensitive issue between China and Myanmar and China has been eagerly pushing for a resolution of the suspended project. / Photo credit AK Rockefeller @Flickr
On 17 August, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will begin her first trip to China as Myanmar's state counselor after her party won the 2015 general election and subsequently assumed office in March. Her first trip to Beijing was in June 2015, and was widely perceived as successfully normalizing her relationship with China, an ardent supporter of earlier military governments that had detained her for more than a decade. Aung San Suu Kyi is also expected to visit the United States in the coming September. The sequence seems to suggest a prioritization of Beijing over Washington in Myanmar's current foreign strategy. That sequence, along with a series of events leading up to her China visit, raises great enthusiasm in China that a redirection of Myanmar's foreign policy could be underway and the pendulum of Myanmar's balancing diplomacy is finally swinging back to the east.

Different from the U Thein Sein government, which was seen as turning "pro-West" in Beijing, Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government are believed to be more "neutral" in their foreign policy. The destination of her first official foreign visit since assuming office was none of the great powers, but Laos, a neighboring country chairing the ASEAN this year. While China might have been disappointed that she did not visit China first, the fact that she did not pick a Western country, especially the United States, for her first foreign visit is nevertheless regarded as comforting. The sense of reassurance for Beijing is strengthened by the perception that Suu Kyi's relationship with the United States may not be as smooth and trouble-free as people had previously perceived. The combination of these factors reignites the hope in China that Suu Kyi's ascension to power could actually bring opportunities to rebuild the damaged bilateral relations and re-strengthen China's waning influence in the country.

Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government faced a tough situation on China at the time of their inauguration in March. The deterioration of Sino-Myanmar relations since 2011 is widely acknowledged. Former President Thein Sein suspended the Chinese-invested Myitsone mega-dam in September 2011. While the project has never been popular in Myanmar, the Chinese nevertheless saw themselves as the victim of a pseudo-democratic government's attempt to gain legitimacy, popularity and support by both the Myanmar people and the West. China's antagonism was exacerbated by Thein Sein government's lukewarm attitude toward Chinese economic ambition in the country, as manifested by the suspension of the Letpadaung copper mine, the abandonment of the Sino-Myanmar railway and the difficulties it encountered in the bidding for the Kyaukpyu special economic zone. The sense of agony peaked in 2015, when officials in Myanmar appeared to accuse China of supporting ethnic armed organizations in northern Myanmar and undermining the government's peace process by blocking the participation of several groups in the October Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), an accusation that China vehemently denies.

Such a difficult context puts Aung San Suu Kyi's China policy at a critical juncture in history. The NLD government could continue to cater to anti-China sentiment inside Myanmar and run the risk of losing China's support for the peace process and for Myanmar's domestic economic agenda. Or, it could try to improve relations with China and enlist Beijing's help for Myanmar's national priorities on ethnic reconciliation and economic development.

The record of the past four months seems to suggest that Aung San Suu Kyi identifies with the second option and has recalibrated the country's policy toward its large neighbor in the north. Ample evidence on key fronts suggests that she has strived to improve relations with China, with her upcoming China visit being the latest one. On the state-to-state level, ministerial level visits by key government officials have increased. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was the first foreign guest Suu Kyi invited and received in April after the inauguration of the NLD government. They met again in Vientiane three months later during the ASEAN Foreign Minister meetings. At that meeting, very much to China's satisfaction, Myanmar maintained its traditional detached position on the controversial South China Sea disputes. Also in July, China's Minister of State Security, Geng Huichang paid a highly unusual visit to Myanmar, where he met with Suu Kyi. Given the Ministry of State Security's unique status and special mandate, the meeting is widely interpreted as having focused on the issue of northern Myanmar, including Sino-Myanmar cooperation on the peace process. Last but not least, the Chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Song Tao, visited Myanmar one week before Suu Kyi's scheduled visit to Beijing. He held meetings with a wide range of political leaders in Myanmar besides Suu Kyi, including the Commander-in-Chief Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, ex-President Thein Sein, former head of the military government Than Shwe and former speaker of the Lower House Shwe Mann. Having learned the importance of building diverse relations with different political forces in the country, China is keen on tying any loose ends and preempting any sour feelings with the military and former ruling party that might arise from a rapprochement between Suu Kyi and China.

To China's great pleasure, Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD government finally took an apparent step toward the resolution of the Myitsone dam project. The announcement of the establishment of a new commission to examine the hydropower projects on the Irrawaddy river has come days before her trip to China. The decision will greatly mitigate the pressure on Suu Kyi to provide a definitive answer on the fate of the problem during her visit. Former President Thein Sein's decision to suspend the Myitsone dam during his term of office has effectively been dissolved by the inauguration of the NLD government, and China has been eagerly pushing for a resolution of the suspended project. Indeed, China has been so eager to move on that its bottom line has been lowered from the project's resumption to an agreement over the disbursed investment under its cancellation.

The newly-established commission may or may not resume the Myitsone dam project. On the one hand, Myanmar's power shortage has become so critical that it not only affects the nation's economic functioning, but it also raises questions about the future effectiveness of the NLD government. Earlier in August, Htein Lwin, permanent secretary at the Ministry of Electric Power, openly acknowledged the necessity of hydropower projects, citing an increase in power demand. In fact, given Myanmar's rich natural endowment in water resources, many analysts believe that well-regulated hydropower projects could indeed be the most realistic way to solve the country's energy problem. While such hydropower projects do not have to include the Myitsone dam, the general attitude toward hydropower is changing, and Myitsone's specific strengths and weaknesses are up for investigation and debate. A transparent and thorough examination of the project by the commission is indeed the best way to answer questions and dispel criticisms on both sides.

Foreseeably, given the emotional baggage and public sentiment associated with the Myitsone dam in Myanmar society, if the NLD government decides to resume the project based on perceived merits, it would encounter major political and public objections. While sufficient scientific evidence and thorough policy deliberations should form the foundation for any such decision, Aung San Suu Kyi will be the only one in the country with the authority to pull this through. Such a political maneuver, however, will be costly, as attested by the criticisms against her after she chaired a commission that decided to resume the Letpadaung copper mine in 2013. And people should bear in mind that the Myitsone dam and the Letpadaung copper mine are not on the same level in terms of their scale, complexity and public objections.

The peace process will also be a key issue for Aung San Suu Kyi during her China trip. It remains unknown to what extent, and on what issues, she and her team have specifically requested China's support for the peace process. Nevertheless, according to private sources, such solicitation has been conveyed and well responded to. In order to build good will with Suu Kyi and the NLD government early on, China has demonstrated an unprecedented level of support and cooperative attitude toward the nationwide peace process and the 21st Century Panglong Conference to be held on the last day of August.

Chinese financial contributions to, and political support for, the Myanmar peace process have increased substantially since March. Earlier this year, China donated three million USD to the peace process, a scenario that was not considered possible during the former Thein Sein government. The Chinese special envoy for Asian Affairs, Sun Guoxiang, attended the Maijayang summit among ethnic nationality groups hosted by the Kachin Independence Organization in late July and publicly committed China's continued support to the peace process administered by the NLD government. He and other Chinese officials have also lobbied non-signatory groups to the NCA, including the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army in the eastern Shan state, to join the 21st Century Panglong Conference. They have been so enthusiastic and persistent that some ethnic leaders complained that the Chinese were lobbying for them to surrender to serve China's bigger cause.

Besides politics, one other issue that will be high on Aung San Suu Kyi's agenda in China is economic cooperation. There is indeed much common ground, such as on power supply. China's Yunnan province suffers major overcapacity in power generation and could potentially turn into a supplier of electricity to Myanmar. Technical difficulties, such as Myanmar's lack of power grid, will be good issues to discuss since the Chinese are more than willing to invest in such infrastructure to boost political affinity and economic interdependence. The Chinese have conveyed their willingness to be flexible on the price of such electric power and infrastructure as long as Myanmar remains friendly and cooperative. Anything that can pull Myanmar closer to China and enmesh it in China's national/regional economic network will be seen as good political investment with profound payoffs in the future.

For her part, Aung San Suu Kyi is apparently recalibrating Myanmar's policy toward China. Does this signify a redirection of Myanmar's neutralism and non-alignment foreign policy? So far the answer is negative, although her decision to improve relations with China is increasingly clear. Many people are waiting to see how Suu Kyi navigates the great power politics and balances Myanmar's relations with all countries, China included. Yet the task might be more difficult than it appears. China has a lot to offer to boost Suu Kyi's domestic agenda, especially in its peace process and economic development. It is practical for her and her government to seek China's support and contribution. However, they should also understand that China's support always comes at a price. Issues such as the Myitsone dam project and Myanmar's embrace of China's strategic agenda will be at the back of the mind of Chinese officials when they sit at the negotiation table. Aung San Suu Kyi will have much work to do, and much caution to take, to anticipate the potential consequences of China's demands on both her domestic constituencies and her foreign partners in order to best promote and protect Myanmar's long-term national interests.

Written by Yun Sun, a Senior Associate with the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center. Her expertise is in Chinese foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, Sino-Myanmar relations and China's relations with neighboring countries and authoritarian regimes.

These commentaries are part of a TNI project funded by Sweden.

BOYCOTT THE BURMA "PEACE" CONFERENCE

Posted: 16 Aug 2016 07:43 PM PDT

Aung San Suu Kyi has announced that Burma will have a national peace conference, starting at the end of the month. Many people have commented that this leaves very little time for planning, and that it should be postponed. What is the point of having a conference if the lack of suitable preparations means that it will fail?

This in turn raises the question of what the conference is actually supposed to achieve.

A peace conference is simply a meeting between two or more sides in a war. Its goal, obviously, is to end the conflict: to achieve peace.

In theory, such a meeting could be limited to two people, one representative each for conflicts which have two clear sides. They would then bargain hard and compromise where necessary. Such negotiations could involve a whole series of meetings, as the representatives communicate with their compatriots, and everyone gets comfortable with and finally approves the appropriate compromises.

Peace conferences may also have facilitators or mediators - independent individuals who help and if necessary prod the different warring parties to compromise.

As a general principle, the lower the number of people who are involved, the more likely the negotiation will succeed. Adding more participants raises the prospect not only of additional disputes between the two sides, but also within them. Suu Kyi's planned conference, therefore, which is to have close to one thousand participants, clearly has poor prospects, at least if the meeting goal is real peace for Burma.

Successful peace negotiations also have a couple of other characteristics:

Sincerity - The negotiations cannot achieve a favorable conclusion if the sides to the conflict are insincere. For Burma, this too raises the question of whether the conference should even be held. Burma's military dictatorship, under the continuing ultimate rule of Senior General Than Shwe, although he now has his orders carried out in secret by factotums, starting with Min Aung Hlaing, and which enforces its rule through the Burma Army, is not sincere. Were it sincere, the dictatorship would immediately end its offensives in the ethnic nationality areas, and pull back its troops. Not only will the dictatorship not do this, it has in fact made no concessions whatsoever, including on the issues of inclusion, the demand for ethnic army disarmament, and their need to sign the so-called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. Therefore, any negotiations will - they necessarily must - fail.

Role of mediator - If the negotiation involves a facilitator, this party must be objective and impartial. For Burma, the facilitator is Suu Kyi. However, she is not impartial. Through both her words and actions she has taken sides - with the dictatorship. Suu Kyi has met with dictatorship officers and agents many, many times (going back to Thein Sein). Conversely, she has met the ethnic armed organization non-signatories only once (the "other side" in the war), and in a staged meeting where they felt compelled not to be forthright about what they and their peoples are experiencing (e.g., by not describing dictatorship offensives and war crimes). She has never publicly condemned the Burma Army for its decades of atrocities. Instead, she has announced her warm feelings towards it. Also, she has followed the dictatorship blueprint to the letter. She has installed former military personnel in key positions in the peace process institutions, and in the government posts which she appoints (country representative to the U.N., Attorney General, Minister of Population and Immigration). She has further insisted that the peace negotiation be based on the NCA. In effect, she is trying to corner the non-signatory EAOs and force them to accept something with which they disagree.

Why is she doing this? Is it Burman racism? She is after all Burman, as is the dictatorship. Do the ethnic nationality interests, including as formalized in the Panglong Agreement, have no significance to her? Or, as her apologists argue, is she merely stuck in a difficult situation, and has decided to capitulate to the dictatorship at every turn, to minimize the risk of having the generals re-seize overt power, even if this means the ethnic nationalities must accept never-ending oppression?

Frankly, the underlying reason for her behavior does not matter. The "peace" conference won't lead to peace. It will be a spectacle, and the ethnic nationality participants merely actors on a stage. The one thing we can be certain of is that Suu Kyi has unlimited vanity (and also arrogance - she believes that she and she alone knows what is right for the country), and while the peace conference won't end Burma's Civil War, it will indulge her. She will be on the grand international stage once again. How lovely!

The non-signatory EAOs have one responsibility - to do what is best for their people. Since the peace conference will have no result, or, even worse, a fake result - Burma is at peace!, while the war continues without end - they should boycott the conference. They should not attend without inclusiveness, and also unless there is a concrete plan to achieve something tangible about the war, starting with a ceasefire announcement by the Burma Army. They should not allow themselves to be puppets in Suu Kyi's show.

http://www.dictatorwatch.org/prpeaceconference.html