The Irrawaddy Magazine |
- Businessman Reports Death Threats After Alleging Bribery Scandal in Tourism Ministry
- Thousands of Rats Swarm Irrawaddy Division Villages
- Open Letter to the State Counselor
- KNU Vice Chairman’s ‘Tight Schedule’ Upsets Karen Community in Canada
- Police Open Case Against Army Battalion in Kachin IDP Deaths
- Human Rights Watch Defends Muslims Praying in Public
- Human Rights Activist Charged Under Article 66(d) for Live-streaming a Satirical Play
- Trio Arrested in Burma Admit to Bar Girl Murder
- Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought in Myanmar
- SE Asian Nations Step Up Cooperation as Islamic State Threat Mounts
- China and Burma: Not Only Pauk-Phaw
| Businessman Reports Death Threats After Alleging Bribery Scandal in Tourism Ministry Posted: 05 Jun 2017 08:15 AM PDT RANGOON – The owner of Rangoon's Orchid Hotel, U Htay Aung, on Saturday accused the Ministry of Hotel and Tourism's permanent secretary U Yee Mon of demanding 16.7 million kyats (US$12,320) from him in exchange for a recommendation letter to banks regarding the provision of loans. U Htay Aung had a 15-year lease to operate the Nan Myaing Hotel in Pyin Oo Lwin, which is owned by Ministry of Hotels and Tourism, and had applied to build an extension to the structure in 2016. In June of last year, he asked for a recommendation letter from the tourism ministry—a document that U Htay Aung hoped would serve as a guarantee for the bank in order to fund the extension. The hotelier said he was asked to provide 16.7 million kyats to U Yee Mon, the ministry's permanent secretary. U Htay Aung agreed to the deal. However, cracks in the relationship began to show once the permanent secretary took on a supervisory role regarding the Nan Myaing project, U Htay Aung said. "[U Yee Mon] pointed out small things [that were wrong] and we faced the challenge of continuing the project with many restrictions," he explained. Although U Htay Aung said he had already successfully negotiated loans with two of Burma's biggest commercial banks, Kanbawza and Ayarwady, the ministry canceled the extension project for the Nan Myaing hotel within weeks of the permanent secretary's approval. U Htay Aung said he then complained to the State Counselor's Office, the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism, as well as the Anti-Corruption Commission's office in March of this year, explaining how he felt that the permanent secretary had misused his power. "I know I was guilty as well, for giving him a bribe," U Htay Aung said, adding that because he had engaged in the transaction, he felt he "deserved" the unfortunate turn of events. Weeks later, he said he received death threats over the phone at the Orchid Hotel and that he—a Muslim—was called racist names by the caller. "The caller said they could kill me anywhere. It would not cost more than 10 million kyats. And then, I told him, 'don't shoot me like U Ko Ni—give me a shot in the middle of the forehead,'" U Htay Aung said, a reference to the assassination of the National League for Democracy's legal adviser, who was murdered in January after he was shot from behind, in the back of the head, outside Rangoon International Airport. U Htay Aung added that he had been planning to hold a press conference in Naypyidaw in recent months, but that the efforts had not been successful. He then spoke publicly about what he described as the ministry's "blackmailing" in his own Orchid Hotel in Rangoon on June 3. After speaking to the media on Saturday, he reportedly heard that the tourism ministry had hired legal consultants in order to file charges against him. "I won't regret my conduct and I am expecting the worst," said U Htay Aung. The Ministry of Hotels and Tourism published a statement on Monday evening, but did not address U Htay Aung's allegations of bribery. Instead, it said that the Nan Myaing Hotel was a state-owned building, and that the company that leased it in 2013—National Trading Co. Ltd., owned by U Htay Aung—had fallen behind on payments and was required to repay its debt. "The company hid its violations, blamed the ministry and complained about the officials and departments which could determine the case," the statement said, adding that the ministry would obtain its remaining rental fees from the company. The Irrawaddy phoned the director-general of the tourism ministry, U Tint Thwin, on Monday but there was no answer, and reporters also were unable to reach permanent secretary U Yee Mon for comment at the time of reporting. The post Businessman Reports Death Threats After Alleging Bribery Scandal in Tourism Ministry appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Thousands of Rats Swarm Irrawaddy Division Villages Posted: 05 Jun 2017 07:51 AM PDT PATHEIN, Irrawaddy Division — Thousands of rats entered villages in Irrawaddy Division's Ngapudaw Township on Sunday morning, eating locals' crops. "There were so many rats that it was impossible to count them. They ate bamboo plants, and were staying in bushes and trees outside the villages," said police lieutenant Soe Soe Min of Haigyikyun Central Police Station, located in the sub-township nearest to the infestation. "Now we are getting rid of the rats in cooperation with the locals, and burying the dead ones," he added. Locals, working with police, health, municipal and administrative officials killed more than 1,000 rats that had roamed into the villages of Zee Chaing and Kyauk Chaung—873 in Zee Chaing and more than 300 in Kyauk Chaung. The rest fled into the forest on Monday, according to the police. Locals estimated that there were as many as 10,000 rats present, and interpret the influx as a bad omen. They are believed to have emerged from rocks and sea caves between the two villages, after their nests were flooded by high tides and heavy rains. "We believe that when so many rats come into human places, it is a sign that there will be an earthquake or storm within 20 days," said Haigyikyun local U Aye Kyaw. One male and two female rats were sent for lab testing at the township health department on Monday. Translated from Burmese by Thet Ko Ko. The post Thousands of Rats Swarm Irrawaddy Division Villages appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Open Letter to the State Counselor Posted: 05 Jun 2017 07:41 AM PDT Dear State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, I hope your trip to Canada and Sweden is going well. I have no intention at all to bother you, as I know you will have important meetings with the leaders of those countries to discuss their own transitions to a federal democracy, and how they might inform our own. Like many people, I understand that this is the most important issue for your government and our entire nation. However, I'd like to raise an immediate issue that is damaging the reputation of your government, due to an unfortunate legacy. It might not be as important as restoring the peace process or building a federal nation—priorities of yours since you assumed the role as a de-facto leader of our country. But it is also an issue that your government and Parliament should take into serious consideration without delay. There is something ugly occurring which I, like many people, believe should not be happening. It concerns Article 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law. You must be aware that for the past 14 months under your administration, 61 defamation cases have been filed under Article 66(d). Out of these 61 cases, around one dozen journalists were charged and many of them are still awaiting trial. The latest targets of the statute are U Kyaw Min Swe, chief editor of The Voice, and the publication's regular columnist Ko Kyaw Zwa Naing, known by his pen name British Ko Ko Maung. They were taken into custody on Friday. The Burma Army filed a lawsuit against the pair under Article 66(d) over a satirical article that questioned the country's armed struggle and peace process. I know that 66(d) is not a creation of your government. It was enacted by ex-President Thein Sein's quasi-civilian administration in 2013. The article bans the use of a telecommunications network to "extort, threaten, obstruct, defame, disturb, inappropriately influence or intimidate." Many people believe that the previous government, run by ex-generals, created such a legal mechanism to be able to sue those who stood against their administration. Of the seven cases filed under the Article 66(d) during their tenure, five led to sentencing. Three cases were filed due to "defamation" against the commander-in-chief of the military while one was against then-President Thein Sein. Only one case was filed due to "defamation" against you. I am sure you, your government and Parliament are quite aware of the previous government's intentions. After all, 61 cases have been put forward using this article under your National League for Democracy (NLD) government to date. This has been shocking, indeed, and indicates that something has gone wrong under the NLD-government. However, I don’t interpret it to mean that your government is solely responsible for all of the cases. According to the Research Team on the Telecommunications Law led by activist Maung Saung Kha—a poet who was himself sentenced and jailed in 2016 under Article 66(d)—the military has used the law to file seven lawsuits while members of the NLD used the article to file six lawsuits. Meanwhile, other known NLD supporters have used the article to file eight lawsuits because they believed others defamed you as the State Counselor. Thus, out of 61 cases, it is believed that around 20 of the cases were politically motivated. What surprises me is why the NLD government or its Parliaments have let its members and supporters apply this controversial law created by the previous government against individuals today. Even high-ranking officials of the NLD administration and the party have turned to 66(d), rather than more standard defamation charges described in penal codes. In terms of defamation, there exists Article 500 of the Penal Code. Perhaps the previous government and former parliamentary members of the then ruling military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party thought that "defamation" over the internet, through the use of social media, might have been more damaging than traditional methods of communication or media. I can only conclude that some of the NLD government's officials and key members of the current parliaments share the view with those who enacted Article 66(d) in 2013. That might be one reason why it has taken far too long to review this controversial law. Many activists have demanded that Parliament repeal or amend the law, so that it is not abused by influential people or institutions. Those activists are disappointed, as it seems that the current democratic administration will this controversial law to be misused by anyone. State Counselor, I personally believe that it's high time to review Article 66(d) through concerned parliamentary committees. As long as this controversial statute is yet to be addressed, we will see more individuals, including journalists, be jailed under charges of "defamation." It's ugly, isn't it—both for our country and for your administration. Kyaw Zwa Moe is the editor of The Irrawaddy's English edition. The post Open Letter to the State Counselor appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| KNU Vice Chairman’s ‘Tight Schedule’ Upsets Karen Community in Canada Posted: 05 Jun 2017 07:33 AM PDT CHIANG MAI, Thailand — Members of the ethnic Karen community in Canada—most of whom are refugees from the civil war in Burma—are disappointed the Karen National Union (KNU) vice chairman Padoh Kwe Htoo Win will not visit them on his tour of the country, according to an activist. Padoh Kwe Htoo Win and other leaders of ethnic armed organizations, such as Lian Sakong of the Chin National Front, Khun Myint Tun of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization, and Sai Leng of the Restoration Council of Shan State are touring Canada from June 3 to June 10 to study its federal system. Hsa Moo, a Karen activist who works with the Karen community in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, told The Irrawaddy the community wants to hear the KNU vice chairman clarify the group's stance on Burma's on-going peace process. "The Karen community in Canada feel [Padoh Kwe Htoo Win] does not have time for them. They want to hear from him and know about the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) in particular—about what the benefits of the NCA are for the Karen people," she said. She added that the community would like an assurance of the safety of refugees on the Thai-Burma border who she claimed are under pressure to return their homes in Burma despite the militarization of the KNU-controlled territories in Karen State. The community wants to know how the KNU and Burma government plan to safely repatriate the refugees, she added. Burma's State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will be in the country from June 5 to June 9 to meet Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and other officials before traveling to Sweden. Burma's ethnic communities in Canada, including the Karen, plan to hold a peaceful demonstration in Toronto on June 9 while the State Counselor visits the city. "They will ask for rights for ethnic minorities," said Hsa Moo, adding that the ethnic groups will also question Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's plans for refugee repatriation. The protesters will raise concerns about militarization in Karen State and growing pressure on Burmese refugees in Thailand to return home because of cuts in humanitarian aid, according to the activist. The EAO leaders plan to visit the cities of Toronto, Ottawa, and Quebec. In a letter written by the KNU vice chairman's assistant and seen by The Irrawaddy, Padoh Kwe Htoo Win said he could not meet the Karen refugees in Canada because of a "tight schedule," but that the EAO leaders were "open to a visit and small discussion." "You might also hear that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is coming to Canada and her government members will be joining this study trip," read the letter. "However, she has her own schedule and I don't want to speculate if she will be traveling with the team or not."
The post KNU Vice Chairman's 'Tight Schedule' Upsets Karen Community in Canada appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Police Open Case Against Army Battalion in Kachin IDP Deaths Posted: 05 Jun 2017 04:26 AM PDT RANGOON — The Mansi Township police have opened a case against Battalion 319 of the Burma Army, after its soldiers were accused of killing three internally displaced ethnic Kachin men in Mai Hkawng village, Kachin State. "We opened charges against them for murder—Article 302 [of the penal code]," police officer Aung Kyaw Soe Win told The Irrawaddy on Monday. He said it could not yet be confirmed how many members of the battalion might have been involved in the deaths. The Burma Army is holding its own military investigation, according to the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing. After the investigation is completed, they will allegedly hand over the soldiers in question to the police. "The police will do a press conference when we know more about it," Aung Kyaw Soe Win said. Nhkum Gam Awng, 31, Maran Brang Seng, 22, and Labya Naw Hkum, 27, from Mai Hkawng internally displaced persons (IDP) camp, were reportedly arrested by Battalion 319 on May 25 near Hka Pra Yang village, about three miles away, while they were collecting firewood, according to camp officials and community elders. Their maimed bodies were found on May 28, with the victims having sustained skull fractures and knife wounds, according to a post-mortem report. Camp officials and the victims' family members hope to prosecute those responsible for the murders in a civilian court, a member of the Kachin Baptist Convention told The Irrawaddy when the story broke in late May. The post Police Open Case Against Army Battalion in Kachin IDP Deaths appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Human Rights Watch Defends Muslims Praying in Public Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:50 AM PDT RANGOON — Human Rights Watch on Monday called for the Burma government to overrule local officials in Rangoon who are threatening to charge Muslims for holding Ramadan prayers in a public space. On May 31, about 50 Muslims worshipped near a shuttered Islamic school in Thaketa Township, one of two madrassas in the area that were shut down by a ultranationalist mob on April 28. It is unclear when they will reopen. In a statement on June 1, township authorities warned Muslims from the group they would take action under Article 133 of Burma's Penal Code for praying in public without official permission, as it said the prayers blocked the road and threatened "stability and the rule of law." Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch (HRW)'s Asia Division, said: "ward-level officials' threats to charge and prosecute Muslims" who took part in the prayer session on May 31 was "further evidence of the Myanmar government's failure to protect religious freedoms." "Since that day, local police and ward officials in Yangon have been consistently harassing and threatening members of the Muslim community with criminal charges and fines because they dared assemble in the street to hold prayers during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan," he said. "These actions by local officials are an outrage that should be urgently overruled by senior leaders in the General Administration Department, or failing that, the minister of home affairs. If the ministry refuses to act within days to cease these threats of charges, then as de facto head of government, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should step in to protect freedom of conscience and religion," he added. Robertson said mosques and madrassas that have been forcibly shuttered should be "immediately re-opened." "Religious believers should not be threatened or criminally charged simply for exercising their fundamental right to observe and practice their religion," he said. Local Muslims told The Irrawaddy that they do not have enough places to pray. Township authorities were unavailable for comment on Monday. The post Human Rights Watch Defends Muslims Praying in Public appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Human Rights Activist Charged Under Article 66(d) for Live-streaming a Satirical Play Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:42 AM PDT PATHEIN, Irrawaddy Division — A local human rights leader in Irrawaddy Division's capital Pathein was arrested on Sunday after he was charged with Article 66(d) of Burma's Telecommunications Law for live-streaming a play that was critical of military clashes with ethnic armed groups on Facebook. Police arrested U Tun Tun Oo, leader of the Human Rights Activists Association, for streaming the drama entitled "We Want No War" staged by high school students and undergraduates of Pathein University during a peace discussion in Pathein on Jan. 9. Personnel of the Burma Army South Western Command filed a lawsuit against him at Pathein Central Police Station under Section 34(d) of the Electronic Transactions Law. But police sought legal advice from township law officials who suggested charging U Tun Tun Oo with Article 66(d) instead. U Tun Tun Oo was brought to trial at Pathein Township Court on Monday. Nine students performed the satirical play in which a news agency called "Oxygen" interviewed supporters of Burma's conflict. "I streamed it live so that my friends could watch it because my son participated in the drama. I did not intend to defame the military," he told the media. The Burma Army also sued nine students involved in the drama for defamation. The Pathein Township Court judge acquitted seven of the nine students but charged two—Ko Aung Khant Zaw and Ko Myat Thu Htet, who organized the play. The two are still facing trial. Since the enactment of the Telecommunications Law in 2013, there has been a total of 67 cases filed under Article 66(d), according to a local research group led by a former prisoner Maung Saung Kha, a poet who was jailed under the same charge in 2016. On Friday, police detained chief editor of The Voice Daily newspaper Ko Kyaw Min Swe and regular columnist Ko Kyaw Zwa Naing—also known by his pen name British Ko Ko Maung—under Article 66(d) over a satirical article about Burma's peace process. Translated from Burmese by Thet Ko Ko. The post Human Rights Activist Charged Under Article 66(d) for Live-streaming a Satirical Play appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| Trio Arrested in Burma Admit to Bar Girl Murder Posted: 05 Jun 2017 01:08 AM PDT BANGKOK, Thailand — The three female suspects wanted for the murder of a karaoke bar girl have confessed to the charges laid against them, with one of the suspects, Preeyanuch "Preaw" Nonwangchai, insisting she had no intention to kill the victim. Speaking at a press conference Sunday following their arrests, national police chief Chakthip Chaijinda said the death of 22-year-old Warisara Klinjui is not linked to any organized drug ring. A personal feud and an unpaid debt were the motives, he said. The police called in the media Sunday afternoon in Bangkok, several hours after the arrests of Ms Preeyanuch, 24, Kawita "Earn" Ratchada, 25, and Apiwan "Jae" Sattayabundit, 28, were confirmed on Saturday night. The three have been charged with cooperating in premeditated murder, concealing a body and theft. A crime re-enactment is expected to take place Monday at 7-8 locations in Khon Kaen. The suspects were not present at the press briefing led by the national police chief. They were flown from Chiang Rai to Bangkok and then to Khon Kaen province where they were to be further interrogated by investigators in charge of the case. The trio are among a group of five who allegedly killed Warisara, dismembered her body and buried the body parts in Khon Kaen's Khao Suan Kwang district late last month. The female trio fled across the border to Tachileik in Burma's Shan State on May 25, the day Warisara's body was discovered. Two other detained suspects are Wasin Namprom, 25, who was arrested in Laos and his girlfriend Jidarat Promkhun, 21, who was nabbed in Ubon Ratchathani. Thai authorities sought help from their Burma counterparts to hunt down the suspects, who hid in a vacant house in Tachileik. The trio were detained by Burma authorities on Saturday night and delivered to the Thai police Sunday morning. According to Pol Gen Chakthip, who questioned the three suspects by himself for an hour, the suspects have confessed to all the charges and Preeyanuch has implicated Wasin as being involved in the dismembering. Pol Gen Chakthip said Warisara's murder stemmed from a personal conflict as the victim had given police information leading to the arrest of Preeyanuch's husband in a drug-related case. Her husband is now in prison. In addition, Preeyanuch claimed Warisara owed her up to 40,000 baht for more than a year. Quoting Preeyanuch, the police chief said she had no intention to kill Warisara but wanted to teach the victim a lesson. "She insisted she met the victim by chance about 1 a.m. of May 25 after not having seen her for a year. So she asked her to get into the car to teach her a lesson but they had a row in the car and she strangled the victim in a fit of rage. The victim died in the car. "The suspects thought about concealing the body by dumping it into the water but knew it would turn up. So they dismembered and buried the body," he said. According to Pol Gen Chakthip, the suspects contacted authorities to surrender under pressure. "They gave themselves up to authorities because we put a lot on pressure on this case. We asked Myanmar to help hunt them down. The suspects said they didn't want other people to get in trouble," he said. "At least they had the conscience to turn themselves in," he said. The hand-over of the three suspects was made on Saturday night shortly after 9 p.m. when Lt Col Aung Mien U, the Burma co-chairman of the Thailand-Myanmar Border Township Committee (TBC), and Pol Lt Col Ten Win, chief of the Tachilek police station, sent an urgent message to Col Kidakorn Chantra, commander of the 3rd Cavalry Task Force of the Pha Muang Force and the Thai co-chairman of the TBC. On receiving the message, Col Kidakorn ordered Thai authorities led by Pol Col Ekkorn Bussababodin, chief of the Chiang Rai immigration office, Pol Col Songkrit Ontakhrai, the Mae Sai police chief, and Thai TBC members to receive the suspects from Burma authorities. The hand-over was made at a bridge across the Sai River and witnessed by a large number of people including tourists on the Thai side. A photo of Thai and Burma authorities with the three suspects went viral. Commenting on social media calls that the trio faces the death sentence, he said sentencing is a judicial matter and said the harshest penalty in a murder case is death. Pol Gen Chakthip also defended police treatment of the suspects, who were seen in several photos released on social media as "relaxed" and not handcuffed, saying authorities were confident the suspects would not flee. He also claimed it was "normal" for police to let female suspects apply make-up while in detention. Pol Maj Gen Charoenwit Sriwanich, deputy chief of Police Region 4, said no drug charge was pressed against the suspects. Pol Lt Gen Nathathorn Prousoontorn, commissioner of the Immigration Bureau, said immigration authorities had pressured business operators not to provide shelter to the suspects. He said the three went out with customers on May 27-28 before turning up in Tachilek. After hearing about the arrests, the victim's family said they want to see justice run its course and the punishment must fit the crime. Thonglom Klinjui, 67, grandmother of the victim, said the crime was "cruel and inhumane" and hoped the suspects would get what they deserve. Sakhon Phasi, mother of Preeyanuch, said she was relieved to hear that her daughter is alive. Sakhon said she hoped her daughter would be forgiven now she decided to pay her dues for the crime. "She has surrendered and will pay for what she did, I hope she will be forgiven," she said.
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| Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought in Myanmar Posted: 04 Jun 2017 11:41 PM PDT With Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought in Myanmar, Matthew J. Walton offers a thorough account of how Buddhist ideas have influenced political thinking and, as a result, political action, in Myanmar. Central to such an account is the argument that politics in Myanmar cannot be thought of without Buddhism, given that Buddhism, as a "moral universe," delineates what "the political" consists of, and what forms political authority and participation might take. The phrase "moral universe" is a significant term for Walton— one intentionally used to underscore the fact that, for Buddhists in Myanmar, "political action and political change are quintessentially moral practices" insofar as the world is understood to be governed by moral rules, and a moral logic of cause and effect (8). Yet, as Walton makes clear in his successive chapters, this moral universe, and the moral-causal logic upon which it is built, is not unproblematic for Burmese Buddhists, but rather produces certain political impulses and tensions. Such tensions must be acknowledged if scholars and citizens alike are to develop a deeper understanding of Myanmar's political inheritance and still-fragile transition. This pragmatic orientation towards core concepts of contemporary Burmese politics makes Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought much more than an exercise in political theory or religious inquiry. Instead, the questions Walton seeks to answer, while lying at the intersection of Burmese political thought and Buddhist moral practice, are profoundly concrete in nature. Take, for example, the question of human nature, as addressed within a Burmese Buddhist worldview— a topic Walton tackles in the third chapter of his book. While providing a detailed reading of two key texts addressing human nature and its relation to socio-political circumstances and modes of authority— the Aggañña Sutta and the Cakkavatti Sutta— the chapter ultimately constructs an argument with tangible consequences for contemporary politics. Given that the suttas Walton analyzes provide two notions of human nature that exist in tension with one another— the notion of humans as inherently flawed and weak, and that of humans as simultaneously powerful in their capability of achieving ultimate enlightenment—it is unsurprising that visions of the value of political authority might also exist on a spectrum that lies between two poles. When humans are envisioned as inherently flawed, then the promise of political authority is one linked to the preservation of moral and material hierarchies— a logic that resonates in the commonly-heard invocations as to the necessity of a "disciplined democracy" or for government based on the establishment of "order" (a concept discussed in detail in chapter 4). Conversely, a viewpoint that foregrounds individuals' ability to transcend their flaws posits a more complete solution linked to moral action— one that exists above and beyond the temporary and transitory order achieved by forms of political authority. These two responses to the question of human nature, and the role of authority vis-à-vis a population, have direct implications for the types of political arrangements deemed acceptable or effective in Myanmar. Walton makes this clear in discussing the way in which contemporary visions of governance oscillate between an expressed goal of maintaining order and that of liberation, with governance seen as that which could free citizens to strive for moral action and, relatedly, a just and stable state. Sometimes existing in opposition, but often woven together in complex articulations as to what sort of "democracy" Myanmar might pursue, these two logics of government, and the paradoxical "moral universe" upon which they are built, must be understood if we are to assess progress toward the expressed goals of Myanmar's political actors and institutions. Questions of human nature and the resultant goal of governance relates in important ways to how exactly "politics," as a concept, might be conceived— a point that underscores Walton's central proposal that it is only with an eye toward Buddhist thought that we might understand what "the political" consists of in Myanmar. Even at the most fundamental level, when considering the common Burmese word for "politics," nain ngan ye, "politics" articulates in significant ways with the paradoxical Buddhist conceptions of humanity and authority referenced above. Nain ngan ye, itself, implies an emphasis on kingly authority and the demarcating of the realm of "high" politics, one accessible only to elites. Such a conception echoes, in significant ways, a vision of government as that which achieves order through the actions of a highly selective group of actors, and where the moral failings of the masses render them unable to exercise political rule. It is interesting to contrast this selective, elite inflection of nain ngan ye with more recent notions of political participation as associated with individual moral practice (a phenomenon to which Walton turns in the fifth chapter). Foregrounding moral practice and meditation, and such actions' implications for the collective, this latter conception of politics counters the more dominant notion of politics as relevant only to the elites. Instead, in this second conception, one's moral practice can affect the circumstances of their community, and the collective pursuit of liberation, both in the religious and political senses of the word. While such points represent only a sampling of the diverse, yet equally essential, religious and political concepts outlined in Walton's text, what is evident even in such a brief summary is the ways in which terms foreign scholars might commonly associate only with a liberal, rights-based theory of governance— terms such as "freedom," "democracy," and "participation"— take on new meaning (sometimes dramatically so) when considered in terms of the "moral universe" in which they function. Particularly valuable in this regard are the pages Walton devotes to the translation and explication of common Burmese language words such as the example of nain ngan ye referenced above and, relatedly, local understandings of commonly-cited Western terms. A section on the three most commonly-used notions of "democracy" as circulated in Burmese political discourse— those of a "disciplined democracy," a "rights-based democracy," and a "moral democracy"— for instance (see chapter 6), should give pause to scholars and advocates alike, reminding them to ask what exactly is meant by the unqualified use of the term "democracy" in the Myanmar context. Such insights can only come from close readings of the texts that represent both historical and contemporary political thought in Myanmar, in their original Burmese— a task Walton advances here in his engagement with Burmese language sources from the last 150 years. In addition to complicating scholarly notions of "the political" in Myanmar, Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought in Myanmar delivers a second challenge to the field of Burma/Myanmar studies by demonstrating just how crucial Burmese language materials and competencies can be in the crafting of an academic text. Even in arguing for the conceptual and methodological advances he proposes, Walton is nonetheless keenly aware of the limitations of his study— limitations that he draws on to effectively map out the state of the research into Buddhism and political thought in Myanmar, as well as to identify productive directions for future research. Recognizing, for example, that a focus on "Burmese Buddhism," precludes him from addressing either the diversity external to such a category— such as Buddhist practices of non-Burman groups such as the Karen, Mon, or Shan—or that which lies within in— the variations in Buddhist thought and practice extant among Burman Buddhists— Walton notes the necessity for comparative scholarship that extends beyond assumptions of a single, coherent perspective on politics in Myanmar. Furthermore, while Walton furthers discussions of Burmese Buddhism's relationship to politics, arguing strongly for recognition of Myanmar's own intellectual history and the Buddhist political ideas that undergird such a history, the question of how Myanmar's dominant political and religious philosophies might have been developed in dialogue with other traditions could use more attention— a point Walton himself underscores in his discussion of twentieth century debates around the proper relationship between Marxism and Buddhism. Certainly, the fluidity with which ideas traveled throughout the colonial and independence eras, not to mention the contemporary moment— when an influx of political consultants and governance specialists brings a new language through which "politics" is discussed— speaks to a need for more fine-grained research into how Buddhist ideas exist not as a "pure" body of thought, but rather one developed in dialogue with other contradictory worldviews throughout history. Possible expansions of this research aside, overall, Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought in Myanmar provides a much-needed accounting of contemporary Burmese Buddhist approaches to politics, and the worldview and logics upon which such approaches are based. Clearly written, yet carefully researched through both English and Burmese language texts, the book provides a foundational introduction to Buddhist thought— useful for religious scholars and those less familiar with Buddhism, alike— while also spelling out the concrete and practical implications of such a worldview when it comes to the domain of politics. Whether related to Buddhist nationalism and associated exclusionary politics, the carefully-managed transition to a "discipline-flourishing democracy," or the fraught relationship between freedom and authoritarianism in Myanmar's history, Walton's emphasis on the Burmese Buddhist "moral universe" is indispensable to any number of questions central to Myanmar's ongoing political transition. This article originally appeared in Tea Circle, a forum hosted at Oxford University for emerging research and perspectives on Burma/Myanmar. The post Buddhism, Politics, and Political Thought in Myanmar appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| SE Asian Nations Step Up Cooperation as Islamic State Threat Mounts Posted: 04 Jun 2017 10:25 PM PDT SINGAPORE — Southeast Asian nations plan to use spy planes and drones to stem the movement of militants across their porous borders, defense officials said at the weekend, as concerns rise over the growing clout of Islamic State in the region. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines said they would launch joint air patrols this month at their shared boundaries in the Sulu Sea, in addition to existing maritime patrols. Authorities in the region have urged greater cooperation to counter the fallout from a raging battle with Islamic State-linked militants in the southern Philippines, the biggest warning yet that the ultra-radical group is building a base in Southeast Asia. "Our open borders are being exploited by terrorist groups to facilitate personnel and material," Le Luong Minh, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) told the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual regional security forum in Singapore. The region is home to 600 million people and includes Indonesia, which has the world's highest number of Muslims. Authorities in both Indonesia and Malaysia, also Muslim-majority, have said thousands of their citizens are sympathizers of Islamic State and hundreds are believed to have travelled to Syria to join the extremist group. Indonesian authorities blamed Islamic State for bombings last month that killed three police officers, the latest in a series of low-level attacks by the militants in the last 17 months. In recent months, dozens of fighters from Indonesia and Malaysia have crossed from their countries to Mindanao in the southern Philippines, intelligence officials have said, easily passing through waters that have often been lawless and plagued by pirates. Mindanao is the one region in the largely Catholic Philippines to have a significant Muslim minority. ASEAN made a joint pledge with the United States on the sidelines of the Shangri-La forum to help the Philippines overcome the militant assault in the city of Marawi. "What featured quite strongly in the US-ASEAN meeting was the pledge by both US and ASEAN members that we stand ready to help the Philippines…whether it's information, intelligence or otherwise," said Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen. Joint Patrols, Intelligent-Sharing Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, with the assistance of neighboring Singapore, have carried out joint maritime patrols in the Sulu Sea since last year after a series of kidnappings by the pro-Islamic State Abu Sayyaf group. "We decided at least these three countries, to avoid being accused of doing nothing…We're doing joint maritime and air patrols," said Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein, adding that the air patrols will be launched on June 19. "If we do nothing, they get a foothold in this region." Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu told Reuters his country would consider deploying drones and surveillance planes at its borders with the Philippines. The measures come amid concerns that fighters may try to escape the military offensive in the Philippines, and flee to neighboring countries. "We believe the elements involved in the Marawi clashes may try to escape through the southern Philippines and head either for Malaysian or Indonesian waters," said Malaysia's counter-terrorism police chief, Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay. "This is one of their only ways out." Among other measures, Singaporean and Malaysian officials said monitoring and intelligence-sharing on specific individuals had been stepped up in the wake of the fighting in Marawi. Singapore's Home Affairs Minister K. Shanmugam on Sunday urged residents of the wealthy city-state to report friends or family suspected of being radicalized, according to local media. Security experts have warned that Southeast Asian countries are vulnerable to the spread of Islamic State as it suffers setbacks in Syria and Iraq. "We're seeing that, as Islamic State is losing ground on the battlegrounds of the Middle East, they're pushing their franchise overseas as energetically as they can," said Nigel Inkster of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies. "We're seeing this in the southern Philippines but there are other countries in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, that are at risk." The post SE Asian Nations Step Up Cooperation as Islamic State Threat Mounts appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
| China and Burma: Not Only Pauk-Phaw Posted: 04 Jun 2017 07:30 PM PDT Pauk-Phaw and its Evolution "Pauk-phaw" was a term coined in the 1950s to describe the supposedly friendly and close relationship between China and Burma. It may be translated as "fraternal" but, according to Burma expert David Steinberg, it "has a closer Chinese connotation of siblings from the same womb [and] was used uniquely for Burma." A memorial to honor the pauk-phaw relationship was erected in Mangshi in China's Yunnan province in 1956 and the term was invoked as recently as September 2010, when Burmese junta leader Snr Gen Than Shwe paid an official visit to China. But despite such diplomatic niceties, relations between China and Burma have not always been especially cordial. China, a vast, mainly inland, empire, has always looked for outlets to the sea for its land-locked western and southwestern provinces. That policy began as far back as the 18th century and manifests itself today in the "One Belt, One Road" development strategy proposed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping to open new trade routes between China and Eurasia. The Burma corridor gives China access to South- and Southeast Asia as well as the entire Indian Ocean region, and has, therefore, always been of utmost strategic importance to whoever is in power in China. In the 1760s, the Chinese Qing Dynasty launched four military expeditions against Burma in order to occupy the country. The Chinese were driven back after suffering extremely heavy casualties and the successful defense of the Burmese kingdom laid the foundations for today's boundary between the two countries. Burma survived as an independent nation until the arrival of the British in the 19th century. British colonization kept the Chinese even more firmly at bay, however, a new era in bilateral relations was ushered in after Burma became an independent republic on January 4, 1948 and Mao Zedong's communists proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949.  After that, relations between China and Burma may be divided into five periods. In the first from 1949 to 1962, Beijing maintained a cautiously cordial but basically friendly relationship with the non-aligned, democratic government of Prime Minister U Nu, which ruled Burma from independence until Gen. Ne Win and the army seized power in a coup d'état on March 2, 1962. In the second period, during the first sixteen years of Ne Win's rule, Beijing actively supported the armed struggle of the insurgent Communist Party of Burma (CPB). China poured more arms and ammunition into the CPB than to any other communist movement in Asia outside Indochina. Following policy changes in China after the death of Mao in 1976, and the return to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the third period began as Beijing sought rapprochement with the government in Rangoon. At the same time, however, support for the CPB continued albeit on a much reduced scale. The fourth period of relations came after the Burmese military's suppression of a nationwide pro-democracy uprising in Burma in September 1988 and the formation of a junta initially called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and then the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). When Western nations imposed sanctions on Burma, the relationship with China began to be characterized by genuine cooperation as China ramped up economic ties and politically shielded the rights-abusing military regime from international criticism. This arrangement allowed Beijing to make deeper economic and political inroads into Burma than at any previous time. The fifth period began in 2011, when a new, quasi-civilian government led by former general Thein Sein took over and began to steer the country away from its heavy dependence on China, which had begun to alarm many fiercely nationalistic Burmese army officers. Relations with the West improved—and China's response to this new and unexpected situation came in two different forms: 1) continued support for the Burmese government, and 2) support to certain insurgent groups fighting the regime. This strategy may appear superficially contradictory, but it is a system that, under examination, has its own logic. China may have transformed its economic system from rigid socialism to free-wheeling capitalism, but politically, it remains an authoritarian one-party state where the Communist Party of China (CPC) is above the government and military. The old policy of maintaining "government-to-government" as well as "party-to-party" relations has not changed. Even while trade with China continues to boom and the Chinese are selling fighters-jets and other military hardware to Burma, "party-to-party" relations continue to be maintained with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the successor to the CPB. The UWSA today is better equipped, with Chinese-supplied weaponry, than the old CPB army ever was. The UWSA serves as a "stick" in China's relationship with Burma while diplomacy and promises of aid, trade, and investment are the "carrot." As China sees it, it cannot simply "hand over" Burma to the West. The country is far too important strategically and economically to the PRC for that to happen. 1949-1962: The "Pauk-Phaw" Years The relations between China and Burma in the late forties were troubled by a disputed and largely un-demarcated border, illegal immigration into Burma by vast numbers of Chinese laborers, businessmen and even farmers in search of greener pastures, and smuggling. Relations became even more uncertain when large numbers of Nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) troops of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated into Burma's north-eastern hill areas following their defeat in the Chinese civil war. From clandestine bases in remote border mountains that were not under the control of the central Burmese government, these Kuomintang forces launched a secret war against China's new Communist government, supported by the ROC government on Taiwan, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Thailand. There was a definite possibility of a war between the PRC and the unwilling host to these forces. However, the Sino-Burmese relations that developed from this initial possibility of conflict provides a good example of how a small, comparatively weak country worked to preserve its independence and neutrality in dealing with the largest and then most powerful nation in Asia. Burma's independent foreign policy vis-à-vis China was all the more remarkable considering that successive Chinese governments, regardless of their political nature, always considered Burma to be a vassal state and the pre-colonial Burmese kings often had to send tribute missions to the Chinese Emperor. A breakthrough came in early 1953 when Burma decided to take the matter of the Kuomintang presence on its soil to the United Nations. Prior to that, the fledgling Burma Army had fought several decisive battles against the Kuomintang, which clearly demonstrated that these guests were not camping on Burmese territory with the consent of the government in Rangoon. On April 22, 1953 the UN adopted a resolution demanding that the Kuomintang lay down their arms and leave Burma. Although thousands of Nationalist Chinese soldiers were evacuated to Taiwan, the UN resolution was thwarted as Rangoon was unable to stop the provision of reinforcements to remaining forces via secret airstrips in north-eastern Burma in aircraft provided by the CIA. Regardless, the U Nu government had made its point, and on April 22, 1954, the PRC and Burma for the first time signed a bilateral trade agreement. On June 28-29, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Burma at the invitation of the Burmese government and held talks with U Nu. A joint Sino-Burmese declaration was signed by the two leaders on June 29, endorsing the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence": Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equal and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence. Even though this policy was labeled pauk-phaw, in reality, Burma adopted a neutral stand on foreign policy, with the ultimate aim of preventing China from interfering in its internal affairs. The concept pauk-phaw relied on a deeply asymmetrical "friendship" between China—a huge and often threatening regional superpower—and Burma, a much smaller country on its periphery. The first years of Burmese independence were marked by widespread insurgencies, and the CPB was one of the major rebel forces. Although the CPB had strong Maoist tendencies as early as the fifties, Beijing refrained from supporting it. The next issue to settle was the disputed Sino-Burmese border, which U Nu discussed in detail during a September 1956 visit to China. He returned with a tentative plan for a settlement that called for Chinese recognition of Burmese sovereignty over the so-called Namwan Assigned Tract in exchange for ceding to China three villages in Kachin State: Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang. China also pledged to recognize Burmese claims on the remainder of the 1,357-mile frontier. U Nu's concessions provoked protests from both Burmese politicians and ethnic groups such as the Kachin, who rose up in rebellion in 1961 as a direct result of the border talks with China. However, negotiations continued for nearly four years until an agreement was eventually signed on January 28, 1960. In 1958, U Nu was forced to hand over power to a military caretaker government, headed by army chief General Ne Win, who concluded the border agreement and signed a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression with China. In addition to the three Kachin villages (59 square miles), Ne Win also ceded the Panhung-Panglao area of the northern Wa Hills (173 square miles). In return, the Namwan area (85 square miles), which for all practical purposes was part of Burma anyway, formally became Burmese territory. More importantly, though, China did renounce all its claims to areas in northern Kachin State. Until that time, Chinese maps had shown the border to be just north of the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina and Taiwanese (ROC) maps still show the border at that point, since Taipei has never recognized any agreements signed between the communist government in Beijing and other nations. Following a general election in February-March 1960, U Nu returned to power. With the border now demarcated, Burma launched a new offensive against the Kuomintang forces in north-eastern Burma the following year. This time, thousands of Chinese troops of the Chinese Communist Party's People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also crossed the border into Burma near the town of Mong Yang north of Kengtung in eastern Shan state, where the Kuomintang maintained a major base. Mong Pa Liao, another Kuomintang base near Burma's border with Laos, was also attacked in a campaign that was clearly coordinated with the Burmese military. It is reasonable to assume that this was part of the new "friendship agreement" between the PRC and Burma as well, although it has never been admitted officially. Tomorrow: Part 2. 'Brothers no More' Bertil Lintner is an award-winning journalist and author who specializes in Burma. This article was originally published here by The Project 2049 Institute, a policy group based in the US. The post China and Burma: Not Only Pauk-Phaw appeared first on The Irrawaddy. |
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