Saturday, April 5, 2014

Democratic Voice of Burma

Democratic Voice of Burma


Authorities accused of undermining efforts to resume Arakan aid

Posted: 05 Apr 2014 01:37 AM PDT

Efforts by the Myanmar Health Cluster partners to discuss restored humanitarian access across Arakan State have been subject to political pressures, sources close to the negotiations tell DVB, although cooperation between the Ministry of Health and NGOs over the past few days indicates that limited progress is occurring.

More than 170 staff members from international NGOs and UN agencies were evacuated from Sittwe following attacks on their offices and residences last week. Their departure follows the expulsion from Arakan State in late February of Médecins Sans Frontières Holland (MSF-H) whose programs provided frontline healthcare for an estimated 700,000 people, including some 200,000 residents of displaced persons camps and remote areas, mostly Rohingya Muslims.

Although the government pledged to fill in the gaps left by the “temporary suspension” of MSF’s activities, there is evidence to suggest elements within it are actively undermining efforts to re-establish humanitarian access.

"It’s a bit of a contradiction: on one hand they [Burmese authorities] are saying they want the UN and the INGOs back in, but at the same time they can’t get back in,” a foreign NGO official, who did not want to be named, told DVB.

Burma's Ministry of Health (MoH) dispatched teams to Arakan to pick up where MSF and other aid agencies were forced to leave off, but their capacity to provide services is limited.

"What they’re doing is miniscule. They’re not even doing that effectively," the international aid worker said. "There is basically no health cover in Rakhine [Arakan], and in the north – especially in Maungdaw – there’s a lot of intimidation, attacks on villages, people being beaten.

"It’s a humanitarian disaster, and there’s also a risk of a massacre."

The official claims that offers of assistance by the WHO Health Cluster for Myanmar – which coordinates policy among humanitarian organisations and UN agencies – have largely been ignored or refused outright.

The official claims a proposal to establish a “rapid response team” for when crises arise – comprised of humanitarian workers from abroad or working in other parts of the country – was not immediately embraced by the MoH, even though the proposed composition of the team was intended to allay fears of bias.

Offers from MSF Holland and other NGOs to allow MoH relief teams to use their vehicles, as well as offers of financial support, were also allegedly rejected, although limited cooperation has begun over the past week. The Ministry has sent five relief teams, comprised of 18 healthcare professionals, which have joined forces with a contingent of 17 workers from the Myanmar Health Assistants’ Association already in Sittwe. However, the INGO official told DVB that the relief workers have just two ambulances at their disposal. This means their activities have been largely limited to camps around Sittwe, as they have no other means of accessing needy areas further north.

The Ministry’s relief efforts have been largely unable to service Rohingya populations, as relief staff are afraid to enter Rohingya camps for fear of reprisal. “They’re only going to Rakhine places anyways, not to the camps, because they feel unsafe there,” the official said.

Sources familiar with the negotiations between the WHO Health Cluster and the Ministry of Health claim that the health teams dispatched by Naypyidaw mean well, but have to contend with pressure from other branches of the government.

“The non-acceptance of offers does not constitute immediately the rejection of offers,” Dr. Liviu Vedrasco, the WHO Health Cluster coordinator for Myanmar, told DVB on Friday. “Offers of assistance have been accepted at the Sittwe level, and things are moving in that regard … if you want to look at all the ministries in the Myanmar government, I think the Ministry of Health has been the most responsive in this situation,” he said.

Another proposal – which would have MoH teams partner with international NGOs to operate mobile clinics – has been more successful. A joint effort by the MoH and Mercy Malaysia to deliver aid to a Rohingya camp near Sittwe was blocked by protests last week, but the blended team has been able to deliver some aid over the past few days using Mercy Malaysia’s vehicles, with more to come on the horizon.

The Arakan State Health Department will apparently allow joint MoH-INGO teams to expand their operations to Mrauk-U and Pauktaw townships next week.

“I am hoping this will only increase … and we will come back to the state of affairs that we had a few weeks ago in a short time,” Vedrasco said.

Despite these signs of progress, Vedrasco estimates that Arakan State has just 10 or 15 percent of the front-line medical relief workers that it did before the pullout.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) claims the humanitarian situation in Arakan is at a tipping point. “The immediate effects of the disruption of humanitarian services [are] already being felt in IDP camps and isolated villages in Rakhine State,” the agency said in a statement released on Wednesday.

More than 300 children with severe malnutrition in Sittwe are no longer receiving therapeutic treatment, while 1,300 metric tonnes of food needs to be distributed in Arakan to replenish dwindling stores, the statement said, a feat that will be difficult for the government to accomplish without the participation of NGOs.

A Reuters report on Wednesday quoted humanitarian workers stating that camps around Sittwe will run out of drinking water within ten days. “Water is a critical issue at this time of year. The camps we’re particularly concerned about are ones that depend on 'waterboating' – bringing water to them by boat,” said UNOCHA spokesman Pierre Peron. "That’s a particular problem in Pauktaw … there are a couple of camps there where … it’s a real concern, and they need water ASAP.”

The US State Department issued a statement on Wednesday condemning the Burmese government for its failure to provide “the travel authorisations necessary for the humanitarian aid workers to resume their life-saving services.”

NGOs and UN agencies apply for travel documents with the ministries closest to their mandate – medical NGOs would apply with the Ministry of Health, for example – but these are then processed by a higher office.

The NGO official claims that new travel authorisations will not be issued until after the Burmese New Year holidays, which end on 21 April. This was seemingly corroborated by Arakan State government spokesman Win Myaing on Thursday, who told the media that relief efforts in the state would resume “in the third week of April".

In the meantime, he said, state-level departments have aid distribution covered, and currently have enough food and medicine to supply those in need until 16 April.

"We have already distributed them [vulnerable communities and internally displaced persons] both food and medicine through state-level government departments to last until 16 April," he said. "We also have a store of rice – more than 3,000 sacks at a Sittwe warehouse and another 1,000 more at the Myanmar Port Authority warehouse.

"In fact, that is enough; we can do the math," he told DVB on Thursday. "In the past, aid from donor countries was distributed through organisations set up by state-level government departments – it did not always go through the UN and INGOs."

"What they [Burmese authorities] are doing is miniscule. They’re not even doing that effectively. There is basically no health cover in Rakhine [Arakan], and in the north – especially in Maungdaw – there’s a lot of intimidation, attacks on villages, people being beaten.”

Some INGOs hold previously approved travel authorisations that are still valid, but logistical challenges have prevented them from resuming operations.

The destruction wrought by the attacks has left humanitarian agencies without the living quarters, offices and warehouses they need to conduct their operations, posing a significant challenge to re-establishing operations in a timely manner.

“To provide this kind of assistance, you don’t just need doctors and nurses. You need the logistical backup … even if 50 doctors were to show up tomorrow, you can’t do much,” said Vedrasco.

An Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC), run cooperatively by the Union and Arakan State governments, has existed in a limited capacity for a while. It should – at least in theory – serve as a much-needed coordination mechanism for the government to prevent overlap and redundancies in aid distribution.

“They are trying to strengthen their activities and their presence, and all people within the government, INGOs, and the UN, are calling for a stronger ECC,” Vedrasco said.

On Wednesday, Win Myaing claimed the activities of humanitarian agencies that intend to return to Arakan would be subject to the approval of the ECC, raising fears that a strengthened ECC will function as a mechanism to further politicise and restrict aid delivery to Arakan’s hardest-hit populations.

Vedrasco dismissed the notion that the ECC will have veto power over the activities of humanitarian organisations, as existing memoranda of understanding between INGOs, UN agencies and various ministries determine what humanitarian organisations are allowed to do.

But a number of organisations operate in Burma with expired or lapsed memoranda of understanding, raising fears that re-negotiated terms will make them beholden to government-mandated missives to politicise their aid delivery. In February, the government cited MSF’s lapsed memorandum of understanding as partial justification for its order to suspend the organisation's medical and healthcare activities in Arakan.

The attacks against UN agencies and INGOs in Sittwe last week were prompted by the removal of a Buddhist flag from the offices of Malteser International by a foreign female staff member, which Arakanese nationalists have adopted as a symbol of protest against the controversial, UN-backed census currently underway around the country.

The effects of this protest are immediately significant; however it is the essentially the impoverished people of Arakan – Buddhist and Muslim alike – who will pay the highest price.

Thai police bust Burmese migrant smuggling ring

Posted: 04 Apr 2014 11:55 PM PDT

More than 100 illegal immigrants and three members of a human trafficking gang have been rounded up after a surveillance operation by Thailand's Tak immigration police.

The operation was launched at 8pm on Thursday and ended this morning after a tip-off that a gang would try to smuggle illegal immigrants from Burma to Bangkok via Tak province on two vans, Pol Col Pongnakhon Nakhonsantiparb, chief of Tak immigration police, said.

Police set up overnight surveillance on the road and detected the vans loaded with immigrants heading to an abandoned hut in forest area in moo 4 village in Tambon Ban Tak of Ban Tak district early on Friday morning.

The team then followed the two vans to the Phahol Yothin Road, where they were stopped.

The first van, driven by Sompong Pliaharn, had 38 Burmese nationals on board, 22 males and 16 females. The second had 18 men and 20 women.

Police said the second van driver was Somchai Wongkaand and his navigator Noppon Maradit.

The team returned to the hut and discovered 28 more illegal immigrants hiding inside.  Some of the arrested Burmese who can speak Thai told police they each paid 13,000-15,000 baht (US$400- $500) to the gang to be smuggled into Thailand to find work, Pol Col Pongnakhon said.

This article was originally published in the Bangkok Post on 4 April 2014.

Ethnocentric Buddhism: A new theme in Burmese Buddhism

Posted: 04 Apr 2014 10:36 PM PDT

A new alliance is beginning to take shape in South and Southeast Asia with the news that the Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force) has invited Wirathu, leader of the 969 movement in Burma, to visit them in Sri Lanka.

There is clearly a new phenomenon emerging and a new term is needed to describe precisely what is happening on the ground with this collection of new Buddhist alliances. There has been much talk of "Buddhist terror", "extremist Buddhism" and most famously, "the face of Buddhist terror", however these headlines are sensationalist. A more subtle and nuanced description is needed, focusing upon key features of this new phenomenon in Buddhism taking shape in Burma and other parts of the world, notably Sri Lanka.

There have been those who have commented upon the supposed use of Buddhism by the National Religious Protection Group (NRPG), a group headed by Wirathu, a vanguard leader of ultra-nationalism in Burma. It has also been suggested that the ruling party in Burma, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) are manipulating notions of Burmese identity with those of Buddhist identity. However, there is no clear consideration of these elements from the historical perspective of Buddhist ideas.

"Ethnocentric Buddhism" is a term I have begun to use to describe a particular phenomenon in the history of Buddhism, although I suspect it is not a recent one. The term points to the notion that Buddhist identity is intrinsically linked to national identity. It also denotes the idea that other factors will be apparent in creating Buddhist and national identity in different Buddhist cultures. For example, in Thailand there is the idea of "nation, religion and monarch" (chat-sasana-phramahakasat) and in Burma "nation, language and religion" (amyo-barthar-tharthanar). In both of these examples the idea of the Buddhist religion (sasana/tharthanar) is linked to other factors in the formation of national and cultural identity. Further, in both cases the defence of one's religion is linked to these other themes of national identity — to defend one is to defend the other.

There are a number of possible factors and ideas that could shape the formation of an ethnocentric type of Buddhism in a given country. Not all of these ideas are available in each cultural context. Some are available across Buddhist Asia, some confined to a particular area, or would have been used during different historical periods. There is the idea of the "true dharma" existing in one particular place and of that location preserving this true version of the Buddha's teachings. For example, in Sri Lanka after the transmission of Buddhism, some aspects of the Pali Canon would be considered to preserve the essential word of the Buddha. Later, national identity could be built around this idea together with other texts being used and composed together with Buddhist symbols, the tooth relic for example, creating the notion of a direct lineage to the Buddha.

This is clearly linked to the idea of a particular text containing the essential teaching of the Buddha. The so called "Lotus-sutra (Saddharma-Pundarika-sutra) is the best know example, but there are many others. The Abhidhamma could be said to serve a similar purpose in South and Southeast Asian Buddhism. The notion of the decline of the Dharma in its various manifestations (mappō, for example) is clear — the teachings last a set period of time and this lends itself to an urgency for a given people to preserve and defend the teachings of the Buddha. There is the idea that Buddhism is threatened and that there is a very real need to uphold Buddhism because of this threat. The teachings can be corrupted. The idea that the teachings can be corrupted is written into the Buddhist narrative DNA.

This in turn gives rise to a natural sense of  "Buddhist nationalism". What is essential to the tradition is emphasized and "Buddhist fundamentalism" comes to the fore when the "other" is polarised as a threat to the future of Buddhism. In turn Buddhism is linked to ethnicity — a particular ethnic group is under threat and have the need and the necessity to preserve the teachings of the Buddha. Other ethnic groups, unless they come under the control of the dominant Buddhist group are a threat. Movements like the so-called 969 movement in Burma and the Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force) in Sri Lanka exemplify some of these ideas.

A possible Islamophobic Buddhism and the Buddhist Defence League are other examples. Unlike in "protestant Buddhism", where the laity have enhanced importance, the monastics, with all of their symbolic importance are again at the top of the hierarchy of ethnocentric Buddhism. The traditional hierarchical nature of Buddhist culture is returned. The monastics cannot be questioned in their symbolic roles as the direct link between the layperson and the overcoming of dukkha. Once again the aspiration is to one day be reborn, when one can go from home to homelessness and renounce society. This will only be possible if the monastics of the present preserve the Dharma for that future rebirth.

Finally, linking many of these ideas is that of an emerging sense that blasphemy is being committed against Buddhism. Blasphemy is not usually an idea associated with Buddhism but it is coming to prominence in what I am terming ethnocentric Buddhism. It could increasingly be argued that it has indeed been a component, an often prominent one, in other historical periods and might be linked to textual ideas of the sanctity of the Buddha and his tradition.

All of these factors are giving rise to this new phenomenon in Buddhism. We should not term it "Buddhist terror" or "the face of Buddhist terror" but attempt to understand this phenomenon on its own terms in the history of Buddhist doctrine and Buddhist practice.

 

Dr Paul Fuller has taught Religious Studies at Universities in Southeast Asia, the University of Sydney in Australia and at Bath Spa University in the UK. His research interests include early Indian Buddhist philosophy and the Buddhist ideas of Aung San Suu Kyi. His book, The Notion of Ditthi in Theravada Buddhism: The Point of View (RoutledgeCurzon Critical Studies in Buddhism, 2004) explores the textual basis of discrimination and attachment in the Pali Canon.

 The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not reflect DVB policy.

 

Rangoon gets security-conscious for Thingyan

Posted: 04 Apr 2014 08:29 PM PDT

Rangoon Division police say they are implementing various security measures to ensure the safety of all revellers during the Thingyan water festival, the traditional Burmese New Year celebrations that will be held from 13 to 16 April.

CCTV cameras have been installed at pavilions while explosives teams will conduct inspections in case of bombs, following an incident in 2010 when festivities in Rangoon were rocked by a series of bomb blasts that killed 10 and injured 178.

And in efforts to curb offences common during the festive period, police said they intend to introduce breathalysers and open special courthouses to convict those caught drunk-driving, street-fighting, thieving and using drugs.

Police Lt-Col Myint Aye, the deputy commander of Eastern Rangoon District Police Force, said explosives teams will be deployed ahead of and during Thingyan to inspect pavilions three times a day to prevent acts of terror. He said it is now mandatory for pavilions to employ security personnel – 15 staff at large pavilions and 10 at medium or small sized venues.

"Rangoon Division Police are deploying EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] teams to inspect for bombs at pavilions ahead of Thingyan and three times a day during the water festival," he said, adding that all pavilion managers are to submit their security footage to the nearest supervisory office by 8pm during the New Year festival.

The police chief said inspectors will also search for weapons to curb street brawls, and said those found possessing a weapon will be punished.

Gen Tin Win, Rangoon Division's Minister of Security and Border Affairs, said special courthouses will be opened in townships so that authorities can take action immediately against criminals and unruly revellers.

"As Thingyan is a long public holiday, we are looking to open special courthouses during the festival to take immediate action on those who commit crimes and offences," he said.

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