Friday, October 24, 2014

Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News

Parliament peace chief visits Mongla

Posted: 24 Oct 2014 02:47 AM PDT

U Thein Zaw, the parliament's pointman for the ongoing peace process met and talked with Wa and Mongla leaders on Wednesday, 23 October, according to sources from the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) that is based in Mongla, where China, Burma and Laos meet.



"He had 3 propositions:
• One, for the Wa and Mongla to lead the way by example by signing the NCA
• To accept the Commander-in-Chief's 6 point principle for peace (genuine desire for peace, keeping the promises made in the agreements, not to exploit on the agreements made, not to be a burden to the local populace, to strictly abide by existing laws and to accept the Three National Causes and abide by the 2008 constitution)
• To open up Mongla for tourism and trade

Mongla's leader Sai Leun and Wa deputy leader Xiao Minliang were seen at the meeting.

U Thein Zaw left Mongla yesterday at 8:30.

He is one of the three vice chairmen of the Union Peacemaking Work Committal (UPWC) established by Naypyitaw in 2012. Two others are U Aung Min, President's Office Minister, and Deputy Senior General Soe Win.

This was the second visit U Thein Zaw made to Shan State in a week. The first was on 18 October with Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) leaders in Lashio.

GAB: The power behind the throne

Posted: 24 Oct 2014 02:45 AM PDT

How much is the military going up to allow the country to become a "democracy" (and a federal union)?
Not much, according to the latest research study published by the Asia Foundation this month, Administering the State in Myanmar: An overview of the General Administration Department, a sequel to  its last year's State and Region Governments in Myanmar.





Going through the 59 page report, it appears the military is now "a game without the name" instead of its former status of "a game with the name." Instead of overtly running the country, the military has only gone behind the scenes.

The GAD is an integral part of the home ministry, itself one of the 3 "military ministries" where the President has little or no say. It "supports the coordination and communication in the Government's 36 ministries and also connects the capital, Naypyitaw, to approximately 16,700 wards and village tracts" (under which are 63, 968 villages) within the union. It "plays wide range of roles-ranging from tax collection, to land management, and assorted registration and certification processes."

At the state and region level, "the GAD provides basic administrative and coordination functions for the region/state government, the region/state hluttaw (legiclature), as well as Union ministries and state/region departments. The senior GAD administrator for each state and region is the executive secretary of the state/region government (Deputy Director General level), and currently supervises 283 GAD employees staffing a General Administrator Office, a state/region Government Office, and a state/region Hluttaw Office."

One consequence is that "there are no independent state/region ministries to carry out the functions assigned to the states and regions under Schedule II of the 2008 Constitution. Instead, there is a combination of departments with mixed accountability relationships with both Union and state/region governments on the one hand, and state/region units of centralized Union ministries on the other. The executive and legislative structures of a state/region government continue to rely on the key building block of the country's pre-existing governance structure: the GAD."

Clearly, the states and regions are not happy about this and have been pushing for amendment of the 2008 constitution. According to the reports coming from Naypyitaw, the debates on the amendments will begin next month.

So let's hope that the post 2010-military is a new breed and thinks the way we do: that the best government is the least government and let the states and regions decide for themselves how they should administer themselves. The outcome of the amendment will then be a welcome boost to a lasting peace in our land.

War on Drugs: Should Burma be decertified?

Posted: 23 Oct 2014 03:11 AM PDT

Less than a month from now, Air Force One will be landing in Naypyitaw, carrying the leader of the world's still most powerful country. One of the prepared reports from his host country is expected to be the government's present drive against drug production and trafficking.



This is important, because continued decertification in March 2015 mean continued American opposition to loans from multilateral development banks.  Of course, the penalty can still be waived on "national security" grounds, although it is hard to say if Washington will consider Burma's  strictly neutral foreign policy stance from a positive or negative viewpoint.

During the last two months, Punako and Nampong, two of the most notorious People's Militia Force (PMF) strongholds have been raided. A consignment of more than 600 blocks of heroin was also seized in Monghsat. In all the three cases, some little known suspects have been detained but all prominent chiefs of the said PMFs (set up by the Burma Army) have been left untouched.

As reported in Bouncing Back: Relapse in the Golden Triangle by Transnational Institute (TNI) last June, quoting Jean-Luc Lemahieu, former representative of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) "there are no angels in this part of the world, but there are no full devils either".

The report nevertheless points out several design flaws in the government's 15 (now 20) year master plan to eradicate drugs which was adopted in 1999. "Government officials say that this target (2014) was fixed without much consultation, and are at a loss how to implement it," it says. "It will never work," a senior military officer commented, "but carry it out anyway." As predicted by him, the plan fell far short of achieving its goal and was retargeted to 2019. To date, it is not quite clear either how the government is planning to go about the next 5 years.

One of the problems is the strategy of the military that has created the PMFs to counter the rebels. The Ta Moe Nye PMF in northern Shan State is a case in point:

The Ta Moe Nye Militia in Kutkai Township was formed in the 1960s and supported the government in fighting the CPB (Communist Party of Burma). Its leaders established a close working relationship with the subsequent SPDC chairman Senior General Than Shwe when he was serving as a Tatmadaw officer in northern Shan State, supplying guides and large numbers of mules and horses of army operations. "We never paid them for it, but there was an understanding that they would get something in return", says a retired army officer who was on active duty in the region at the time. "These militias were involved in opium and heroin production and they sent convoys to Lashio. We let them through, and we knew they were transporting drugs."

The PMFs, it explains, "are intended to act as buffer between the Tatmadaw and armed ethnic opposition groups, and to deny the latter access to territory, resources and population. Militias are directly under Tatmadaw control and are allowed to do business and to tax the local population and trade passing through their checkpoints. Many of them have become heavily involved in the drug trade, especially in recent years."

Successive military government's focus, it concludes, is on managing the problem as opposed to attempting to resolve it.

The results are not surprising:
·       Kokang (in 2002) and Wa (in 2005) successfully banned opium production "mainly because of pressure from the Chinese," according to a representative of Mongla group. Following the bans, opium cultivation‐and outside investment‐relocated mainly to southern Shan State
·       Crop substitution programs, which involved land grabbing for agricultural investment especially by Chinese companies, further marginalized the poppy growing communities who were forced to depend all the more on poppy cultivation in order to survive
·       Continuing conflict has also created 'vacuums' where foreign financiers have taken advantage of. "It is difficult to get rid of the drug trade, because of the strong financial support from (outside sources)," according to a former member of a ceasefire group
·       The involvement of Tatmadaw units and commanders in the drug trade has also been documented

One problem that needs immediate resolution, the report says, is the participation of civil society in discussions on drug policy. This has prompted a CSO member to point out that Burma's drug issue "is all about us without us." Indeed, since the drug problem affects everybody, it was time all stakeholders came together to find a solution, instead of wasting time looking for a culprit.

Until then, the United States should continue encouraging all of the stakeholders to work together instead of engaging in a debate whether or not to continue decertifying the country.

Burma Army continues troop deployment to SSPP/SSA areas, despite promising to withdraw

Posted: 22 Oct 2014 09:09 AM PDT

Despite a promise to the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) by the Burma Army's Central Eastern Commander that government troops would be withdrawn from contested SSPP/SSA areas, troop reinforcements are still being sent into the area.



After the SSPP/SSA had been forced to withdraw from their Ta Phar Hsawng base in Ke See township in early October, they met with the government's Union Peace-making Work Committee in Lashio on 18th October, where the Central Eastern Commander General Ko Ko Naing promised that government troops would be withdrawn from the disputed territories.

However, according to local residents, on 20th October 2014, the Eastern Region Command (Ya Pa Kha), based in Taunggyi, sent in at least ten trucks and over 200 troops to the SSPP/SSA controlled area.

"Strangely, the Burma Army has been sending in reinforcements in construction trucks, not military trucks. The soldiers were in civilian clothes, not army uniforms, and they were also hiding their guns and weapons. All troops from Lashio and Kholam were sent to the area in that way," said a local residents who lives near the LIB 286 base in Murng Nong.

The government troops are also setting up a base at Ta Phar Hsawng, which they seized from the SSPP/SSA. They are ordering villagers to voluntarily provide them with bamboo, wood, and thatch to build their base, according to local villagers.
"General Ko Ko Naing said that the government troops that had been attacking the Ta Phar Hsawng base would retreat. He said that only two Burma Army units would stay in the area, and five units would be withdrawn. But so far we haven't seen any sign that they will withdraw. Instead, they are digging trenches. In Murng Hsu we have seen around 10 military trucks moving toward Murng Ort. Since 17th October, there have also been 6 military trucks coming down from Tangyan," said one of the SSPP/SSA commanders at the frontlines.

According to an officer from the SSPP/SSA headquarters, the Central Eastern Command has demanded that the SSPP/SSA withdraw all their troops from the areas of Tah Phar Hsawng, Pan Ze, and Loi Yoi, in Ke See township, within five days, or they would have to use force to drive out the SSPP/SSA.
Apart from promising to withdraw their troops at the Lashio meeting, the Burma Army also agreed to provide compensation of around 2.2 million kyats (USD 2,200) to the war refugees and to villagers whose homes were destroyed and who lost their property due to the fighting in Ta Phar Hsawng. However, according to local residents, no compensation has yet been given to any villagers.

The SSPP/SSA and the Burmese government signed a union level cease fire agreement nearly three years ago, but there has continued to be fighting between the two sides. Accusing the SSPP/SSA of intruding into Union territories, the Burma Army has progressively occupied SSPP/SSA areas and bases.

Does the Shan Word ‘Death’ Tell Us?!

Posted: 22 Oct 2014 03:32 AM PDT

I. Introduction!
'…the Shan is a Buddhist when he is well and animist when he is ill', this is a statement made by (James Haxton) Telford, a scholar who had studied animism in Burma. He further comments that despite the fact that Shan have been converted to Buddhism for centuries, the breakaway from animism was never completed (Telford: 1937). To some degree, his statement is still relevant to most Shan Buddhists today. They celebrate religious ceremonies lavishly all year round in their happy days. But in times of ailing, they are busy with animistic ways, such as, consulting the shaman, searching for khwan (ၶႂၼ်/ၽၼ်) (soul), incantation candle etc until it becomes difficult for outsiders to differentiate between Buddhism and animism. This is partly due to the fact that the Shan have embraced Buddhism and some animism beliefs have been redefined to fit into new religious context.



Read details here>>
http://www.english.panglong.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5949:does-the-shan-word-death-tell-us&catid=115:opinions&Itemid=308

BURMA PEACE PROCESS: Failing to secure negotiated surrender government falls back on “Plan B”

Posted: 21 Oct 2014 01:29 AM PDT

Within a week, four recent interviews, three with Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) top negotiators and one with union parliamentarian, U Hla Swe, who has attended the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) meeting in Rangoon, would likely be a barometer, indicating which way the political wind is blowing and whether the ongoing peace process will be stalled altogether.



The first interview is with the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) leader, General Gun Maw, who is also a top NCCT peace negotiator. He said that during the peace talks, from September 22 to 26, although it was agreed to tackle the issue of troops deployment on both sides, the government said that it would take on the issue at a later date. And now the military has demanded that the KIA Battalion 6 stationed near Hpakant's jade mines to move out, on the grounds that its troopers were demanding taxes from the mining companies. However, the KIA was told to hold its ground by the headquarters. This stance was again confirmed by RFA report on 20 October.

When asked, by the DVB on 18 October, what General Gun Maw would like to comment on the government demand of KIA troops to move out, during this ongoing period of peace talks with the NCCT, he said: "The situation makes us think about it. The KIO central committee assess the issue this morning (October 17). During the NCCT and UPWC meeting, the military refused to discuss about troops deployment. Actually, after rejecting to talk about the agreement on troops withdrawal and code of conduct, it is giving ultimatum that the KIA Battalion 6 moves out, which make us think if the government has changed its mind."

He further said: "In our view, in order to move forward in peace process, problems need to be resolved. Now the example of solving problem with the DKBA is not correct. Again, the example of solving problem with the Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) is not right. The example of solving problem with our KIA is also not adequate. We see that solving the problems through military means is not quite appropriate."


SHAN reported on 19 October that while a group of government delegates led by U Thein Zaw and representatives of SSPP/SSA were meeting at the North-eastern Regional Command based in Lashio (Northern Shan State) on 18th October 2014, the Burma Army was sending in troop reinforcements to SSPP/SSA areas.

On 2 October said that Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Army ordered to attack SSPP/SSA base of Ta Pha Sawng and other outposts in Kehsi Township.  It is said the offensive, with some 1,000 Burma Army troops, was due to the SSA refusal to withdraw from the said base, which the Burma Army has been demanding to evacuate.

The second interview is with Nai Han Thar or Nai Hong Sar, New Mon State Party (NMSP) Chief and NCCT top negotiator. In a video interview with the DVB, on 18 October, he pointed out the backsliding situation of the peace process, due to the government offensives, on the heels of the failed or unsuccessful September peace negotiation, with heavy armed clashes in Kachin, Shan, Karen and Mon States. The government troops have been on aggressive moves against the KIA, Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), SSPP/SSA and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA).

He particularly stressed that the military, which is part of the Union Peacemaking Work committee (UPWC), rejected the terms of "federal union, federal army formation and rights of self-determination". During the previous round of peace talks in August, the said terms were already agreed to be discussed, during the phase of political dialogue. But the military made an about-turn with the agreement, demanding to add "according to the current existing law" in front of the "rights of self-determination". Nai Hong Sar said that this would mean the acceptance of the military-drawn 2008 Constitution, which is out of question. Apart from rejecting the word "federal", the military also like to change the word "federal army formation" to "union army issue", buttressing it with the argument that the Burma Army or Tatmadaw is already a union army, employing many ethnic groups residing within the country. On top of that, the military also asked that the words "revolution" should be taken out of the context, which earlier has been agreed to be used in the ceasefire agreement text, except on the front cover. The NCCT argues that, in order to uphold its dignity, it has to differentiate with the other armed groups that are either Border Guard Force (BGF), government militias or drug trafficking gangs.

The third interview is conducted by Mizzima, on 18 October, with Hkun Okker, Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) patron and NCCT top negotiator. He said: " We cannot make any concession more in our discussion with the government. It depends on how much the government could make concession and adjustment."

The fourth interview is the union parliamentarian U Hla Swe with DVB, on 18 October. He has attended a meeting dubbed "Internal Peace Process and the Role of Parliament", held at Max hotel, in Rangoon by the MPC. According to the explanation of the MPC officials, he said. "They discussed that it has not reached the political discussion phase and are of the opinion that the peace process will go beyond 2015 and proceed well into 2016. At the end, political process will be debated and discussed within the parliament. Finally, political dialogue will be decided by the parliament. One cannot disregard the parliament and it will take the leading role in the peace process."

Accordingly, RFA report on 20 October said that the MPC officials and the parliamentarians attending the meeting have agreed to table the MPC's six steps peace process procedure, at the parliament, for approval.

This piece of news has to be read together with the SHAN report of 14 October. SHAN writes: "The situation is such the President was said to have given a deadline: Finalization of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) draft by 30 October or he'll have to consider "Plan B."

And by mentioning "Plan B", the President is indicating to implement the "Open Book" strategy or way of doing things, where parties could sign NCA individually at their convenience and not necessarily doing it together. Of course, this is a far cry from nationwide ceasefire and a total loss of face, besides losing the promised international development aids, which would follow only after the signing of the NCA.

Another political facet is that the President and his top negotiator, U Aung Min, have spelled out their real demand that the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) must give in to the military-drawn 2008 Constitution, which is exactly a non-starter. All the non-Burman ethnic nationalities have been demanding the amendment or rewriting the constitution to be in line with their aspirations of equality, democracy and rights of self-determination, anchored in a real federal union. This "constitutional crisis" has been plaguing the country for decades and coercively pushing to make the EAO accept it is like declaring an all out war on them.

Summing up the whole situation, the military offensives and tension created by the Burma Army is designed to derail the peace process, so that the supremacy position of the military could be maintained. It is now clear that military is acting on the directive of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), which is headed by the President and military top brass. In other words, the image of President being a reformist and the military seen as hard-liner has been totally shattered. In other words, the government, parliament and the military are all under one blanket.

Hopefully, this senseless heightening of the armed conflict and poverty of wisdom and lack of accommodation won't last too long, so that normalcy could return to this deeply divided society.

The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor

"Land Grabbing: Perspectives from East and Southeast Asia"

Posted: 20 Oct 2014 03:46 AM PDT

CALL FOR PAPERS

International Academic Conference on

"Land Grabbing:
Perspectives from East and Southeast Asia"

5-6 June 2015
Chiang Mai University, Thailand
  
The Land Deal Politics Initiative (LDPI) is collaborating with several initiatives and institutions to hold an international conference on, "Land Grabbing: Perspectives from East and Southeast Asia", with a regional focus on East  and Southeast Asia, with emphasis on land grabbing, responses to climate change consequences and policy responses as well as resource conflict. It will be held on 5-6 June 2015 in Chiang Mai, Thailand and to be hosted by The Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD) of Chiang Mai University.



The purpose of the 2015 Chiang Mai conference is to continue deepening and broadening our understanding of global land deals – but in the specific regional context, with special attention to climate change and the role of China and other middle income countries within the region. As before, we remain open to broader topics around land grab intersections with political economy, political ecology and political sociology, and will convene a series of parallel sessions on a range of themes responding to the issues below (and others):

·       Agrarian Change
·       Finance
·       Green Grabbing
·       The role of BRICS/China, other East Asian countries and middle income countries (MICs)
·       Resistance and Alternatives
·       International Policy ActorsAnd many more…

The organizers invite papers that offer rigorous and innovative analysis of this list of issues. Papers based on recent, original field research are especially welcomed. We also encourage comparative studies. Doctoral students and younger researchers, particularly from within the region, are especially encouraged to participate.​

The deadline for Paper Submission: 31 October 2014
More information about the conference, please visit http://rcsd.soc.cmu.ac.th and www.iss.nl/ldpi.


For further inquiries, please contact landpolitics@gmail.com.

Peace process in limbo, when ceasefire is a joke

Posted: 19 Oct 2014 11:29 PM PDT

Col Sao Swy Mangrai, Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), was asked during a meeting, "How's the ceasefire going?" In response, he stretched out his arms like he was holding a gun and said, "Like this. Cease! (releases the trigger and lowers the gun) Fire! (raises the gun and squeezes the trigger). Cease! Fire! Cease! Fire!"



He repeated his demonstration until his audience got the message and laughed.

But, lamentably, it wasn't – and isn't – a laughing matter.

Since it had signed both "state level" and "union level" ceasefire agreements with Naypyitaw on 28 January 2012, the SSPP/SSA had already been engaged in more than 150 clashes with the Burma Army, that had launched at least 6 major operations against it, after it refused to move out from its long-established strongholds along the west bank of the Salween:
·       June 2012                              Loi phapheung
Mong Awd Tract
Monghsu township

·       July 2012                                7thmile camp
Mong-Kao tract
Tangyan township

·       February 2013                    Loilarn
Mong-Long tract
Tangyan township

·       March 2013                          Kawnghsai-Hwe Pu
Loizay tract
Tangyan township

·       June 2014                              Loi Hseng
Namtawng tract
Monghsu township

·       June-October 2014          Ta Pha Hsawng
Wan Warp tract
Kehsi township

Most recently on 9 October, flushed with victory over the removal of the SSA from Ta Pha Hsawng 6 days earlier, the Burma Army, through its Shan State minister Col Aung Thu, "notified" it to withdraw its troops from Nam Hsi Zeng-Loilarn, near the Salween crossing of Ta Man Hsom.



(Note On the opposite bank in the east is Pangyang, the gateway to the United Wa State Army's headquarters in Panghsang aka Pang-Kham). 

There is no question what will happen if the SSA refuses to budge, ceasefire or no ceasefire, agreement or no agreement.

According to the 5-point ceasefire agreement signed in Taunggyi, "It is agreed that SSPP/SSA units, headquartered in Wanhai (Kehsi township), will be deployed pro tempore at present positions."

The Burma Army appears to be long past caring about the text of the agreement, insisting that SSPP/SSA units are not allowed to move outside Wanhai. That doing so violates the agreement, thereby permitting the Burma Army to do whatever it wants with it.

Incidentally, the same position has been taken with regards to the SSPP's cousin in the south, Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA). While the text of the 16 January 2012 agreement says: Homong  and Monghta (on the Thai-Burma border) are designated as towns for RCSS/SSA headquarters, the Burma Army's interpretation is that RCSS/SSA units are not allowed to move outside Homong-Monghta areas. As a result, more than 100 clashes have taken place between the two sides, which included one major operation.

Clearly, the Burma Army's present target is the SSPP/SSA. But the RCSS/SSA knows well who's next on the Burma Army's hit list.

Which doesn't augers well for the ongoing peace process.


It is therefore high time President Thein Sein reins in the Army before the peace process he initiated on 17 August 2011 is being derailed by it. 

Government troops reinforced while SSPP representatives meet U Thein Zaw

Posted: 19 Oct 2014 08:21 AM PDT

While a group of government delegates led by U Thein Zaw and representatives of SSPP/SSA were meeting at the North-eastern Regional Command based in Lashio (Northern Shan State) on 18th October 2014, the Burma Army was sending in troop reinforcements to SSPP/SSA areas.



Local sources say the Burma Army was reinforcing their troops in SSPP/SSA areas while the Vice-Chairman of the Union Peace-making Work Committee U Thein Zaw, Northeastern Regional Military Commander General Aung Soe, Eastern-central commander General Ko Ko Naing and a group led by SSPP/SSA General Secretary Sao Khun Sai were meeting in Lashio on 18th October, 2014.

"They have told us to withdraw our troops from Pan Ze tract, Ke See township. They will tell us the same thing at their meeting in Lashio. They have been reinforcing their troops to give us pressure. If we don't withdraw our troops, they said they would use force to attack. There were six fully loaded military trucks from Lashio and several military trucks from the Military Operations Commands (MOC, or Sa Ka Kha) 2," said one of the SSPP/SSA communication officers.

A resident of Tangyan said that, at least five loaded Burma Army military trucks were heading to Loi-lang, Tangyan township.

The Burma Army have told SSPP/SSA to withdraw their troops and bases from the areas of Pan Ze tract in Ke See township, and Nam Si Zeng and Loi-lang areas in Tangyan township, northern Shan State.

Since a union level ceasefire agreement between the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army and the Naypyitaw government was signed in January, 2012, it has happened repeatedly that the Burma Army sent in reinforcements and occupied SSPP/SSA areas while the government and SSPP/SSA delegates were meeting. Since the signing of the ceasefire agreement, there have been hundreds of clashes between the Government and the SSPP/SSA.

Villagers flee due to firing of over 20 mortar shells in Ke See township

Posted: 16 Oct 2014 05:29 AM PDT

One of the Burma army units stationed in Wan Warp tract, Ke See township fired over 20 mortar shells into a village on October 13th 2014, causing the entire village to flee and seek shelter in a temple nearby. 



Burma Army aircrafts and helicopters have been flying over the Wanhai area from 13 to 14 October. On October 13, at around 11 am one of the Burmese military units patrolling around Wan Warp tract began firing over 20 (60mm) mortar shells from their base in Wan Ta Pharn village into Pan Ze village and the surrounding area. Due to the shelling all the villagers fled to Wan Warp temple to seek refuge.  

"The mortar shells fell into our village, nearby our village, and inside our farms. The Burma Army also threatened us that they would burn down our village if we provided the Shan Army with any kind of help and support. So, all our villagers were so afraid and had to leave our houses. We have no other place to go except Wan Warp temple," said one of the villagers who is seeking refuge.  

 "They fired randomly, but fortunately nobody was hurt. They fired the mortar shells in order to threaten us and to divert attention because one of their military helicopters was landing at their Nam Put base. While the helicopter was landing three of their fighter aircrafts also flew above the area. So one of the main reasons they fired the mortar shells was to threaten us and another was to divert our attention. It is their military strategy," said one of the SSPP/SSA commanders in the area. 

The Kholam-based Burma Army's Central Eastern Command told the SSPP/SSA to withdraw and move their troops 3 miles inside from the Ke See-Pan Ze-Loi Ywe-Kholong main road, by telephone via their liaison office in Kholam.

 "They said if we do not withdraw our troops they will take action, which means they might use force to attack us. We have no other choice, but to defend ourselves. Today, 15th October 2014, there was fighting in Pan Ze as well," said the commander.


The Ke See-Pan Ze-Loi Ywe-Kholong main road is a gravel road built by SSPP/SSA since 1995. 

Peace process: Breaking the deadlock

Posted: 13 Oct 2014 09:15 PM PDT

One evening more than 30 years ago, when I got back home, I asked my wife what we had for dinner. She said fish and I was happy because one of the meals I have always enjoyed is rice with fish. But then I found out that there was only one fish and not a very big one at that. If I was to have my way, my wife would end up eating her rice with a sprinkle of fish and if we agreed to go half, I would not be eating much either, as a fish head is something that I have never liked.

Fortunately, I had no chance to express my feelings because my wife said, "Would you mind giving me your share of the head and I give you my share of the rest?" And I was surprised, because we had been married for only a few months and I wasn't sure whether she was joking or just doing me a favor. She explained when I looked at her questioningly, "You see, I have always loved eating fish head. I never care for the rest of them."

Since then, there has been an unsigned agreement between her and myself. When it comes to fish: She eats the head and I the rest. Had we insisted on the position that we went half, we wouldn't be having such a happy arrangement.

That was what I thought when one of the researchers  who had attended the 22-26 September negotiations between the rebels' Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) and the government's Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC).  Both were focusing too much on positions than interests.

The situation is such the President was said to have given a deadline: Finalization of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) draft by 30 October or he'll have to consider "Plan B."

Positions taken include:
  • ·       Demarcation of ceasefire territory (which is a UPWC proposal. "Does it mean we keep on fighting outside it?" asked an NCCT official)
  • ·       Replacing of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) before political settlement instead of after, as agreed earlier by the UPWC. (I have yet to hear the NCCT asking why the UPWC had a sudden change of mind)
  • ·       The UPWC also had another change of mind. Previously it had agreed that the NCA would be ratified by the union legislature. But now it is suggesting "submission of the NCA to the union legislature for ratification" instead, as earlier wording could have been considered too presumptuous by the legislature. Again I have yet to hear how then we can be sure that it will be ratified despite using an unassuming wording.

All in all, I would venture that instead of each side holding to its positions (or rather its chosen wordings) they try to explain what their interests or concerns are. Then they are more likely to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.

After all, since both sides have agreed to uphold the government's long trumpeted Three Causes: Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of national solidarity and Perpetuation of national sovereignty, the rest should be considered, particularly by the government, as a walk in the park and not one on a tightrope.


Col Aung Thu orderes the SSPP/SSA to withdraw from Salween river

Posted: 13 Oct 2014 01:03 AM PDT

The Shan State Minister of Border Affairs and Security, Col Aung Tu has written a letter to the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (a.k.a Shan State Army-North or SSA-N) to withdraw its troops and camps from west of the Salween river, near areas under the control of the United Wa State Army. 


On October 9th , 2014 a letter signed by the Minister of Border Affairs and Security Col Aung Tu was sent, telling the SSPP/SSA to withdraw its troops and bases from the areas of Kun Parng Kun Kone, Nam Si Zeng and Loi-lang in Murng Kao tract, Tangyan township, northern Shan State, to the west of the Nam Pang river.
"They, the Myanmar army, have accused our troops of trespassing into the area of Loi-lang and Nam Si Zeng. This is a shameless accusation. It was the Burma Army which broke the 1947 Panglong Agreement and claimed that they had come to Shan State to help the Shans drive out the Kuomintang and since then the Burma Army has refused to leave Shan State. Therefore, if they invade we will use every means to defend our territories. This is our mother-land," said one of the SSPP/SSA commanders at the frontline.
The Burma Army insisted that they had to use force and conduct their recent offensive because the SSPP/SSA had refused to withdraw their troops from the Ta Pha Saung base, into which they had "trespassed." However, even after the SSPP/SSA had already withdrawn their troops from Ta Pha Saung, the Burma army also attacked other of SSPP/SSA bases, including Nam Put, Kong Mark Hin Tarn, Kong Mike Nyaung, Kong Mak Mong Lao, Kong Sao Merng, from which they had not been asked to withdraw.
"This has the potential to ruin the peace process. We have heard that there could be more fighting in the areas along the west of the Salween River. Whether the nationwide ceasefire agreement is signed or not, it will make no difference. Though we have been trying to deal via the negotiation table, they will continue giving us military pressure like this,"said an unnamed SSPP/SSA central committee officer.  

The Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army signed a ceasefire with Naypyitaw on January 28, 2012 at the union level. 

Harder to win than war -Day 4

Posted: 12 Oct 2014 10:46 PM PDT

Day Four. Saturday, 4 October 2014

Ask me who's the Shan misunderstood most by other Shans and I'll lose no time in pointing out at Harn Yawnghwe, born Sao Hso Harn Fa, the youngest son of Sao Shwe Thaike and Sao Hearn Hkam of the princely house of Yawnghwe. (Interestingly, his namesake, King Hso Harn Fa, pronounced Tho Han Bwa by the Burmese, who ruled Ava, 1527-1542, is also the most hated Shan sovereign for reputedly killing 300 Burmese monks. Burmese history in the meanwhile has only praise for the Burmese king Alaungpaya who was said to have put to death 3,000 Mon monks in 1757.)



I was surprised to find people who have never met him but hate him nevertheless with so much fervor, until I remembered what Joseph Goebbels, the minister for propaganda for Nazi Germany:

If you tell a lie big enough
and keep repeating it,
people will eventually come to believe it

This morning he has the opportunity to change (or at least make them rethink) their minds about him.

The topic he speaks is about the current peace process. The following are excerpts:

"I'm not speaking for anyone and I'm not criticizing anyone either. What I have been doing is in the interests of both Shans and other nationalities in the union.

In politics, we cannot afford to place complete reliance on anyone. In 1947 we had made a grave mistake by relying upon some Burmese leaders.

Today, as yesterday, there are a lot of good Burmese leaders, but still we have to depend on ourselves.

We have always called for equality. At the same time, we are waiting for the Burmese leaders to begin first. That is not equality but elevating them to the status of our superiors. If we want to be equal we need to show the way and ask them to walk with us. We have to do it ourselves.

Some of us think the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) process was initiated by the Burmese government in order to buy time. That is not true. It came into being because we demanded it, and because we do not want the Burmese Army to attack those that have yet to sign the state/union level ceasefire agreements.

Some of us are also saying we need to wait for the 2015 elections and that we will have a better deal under the new president. But we have to remember that if U Thein Sein, a former general, is having trouble handling the military, what can we expect from a purely civilian president? We may choose to sign the NCA now or then. But the military now will still be the military then.

The Open Book plan is okay in principle. But in practice, any big armed organization that hesitates to sign will become the military's target.

As for the DDR, putting it before political settlement is like putting the cart before the horse. Even foreign governments know it is unreasonable.

What the present government is doing, the next government must continue. But if the present government is unable to accomplish anything, the next must begin anew and time invested since 2011 will be wasted. What we need is a guarantee that whoever becomes government will go through with the peace process to its fruition.

We later have a coffee break followed by a meeting with the Karen and UPWC delegations, where we have the opportunity to thank the government for the successful transaction and conclusion of the three-day meeting.

"Well, it appears peace is harder to win than war," remarks the RCSS boss at the end of the day.

You're telling me, General? 

Harder to win than war -Day 2 (continued from 7 October 2014)

Posted: 09 Oct 2014 01:20 AM PDT

Day Two. Wednesday, 2 October 2014 (continued from 7 October 2014)

The meeting, dubbed "Towards a Common Understanding", begins with short opening speeches from 5 top leaders:
·       Hkun Htun Oo, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), better known as "Tiger Head" party
·       Sai Ai Pao, Shan Nationalities Democratice Party (SNDP), better known as "White Tiger" party
·       Lt-Gen Hso Ten, Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), better known as SSA North
·       Maj Gen Gaifa, Hseng Keow People's Militia Force (PMF)
·       Lt-Gen Yawd Serk, Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), better known as SSA South


Sai Ai Pao, 68, who is also mining minister of Shan State Government, urges signing of NCA as soon as possible. "If there is no peace, there is no stability," he says. "And if there is no stability, there is no development."

Lang Kher and Loilem are the least developed districts in Shan State South, according to him. Because development grants from donors such as EU and JICA only go to relatively peaceful districts such as Taunggyi.

Hso Ten meanwhile reminds younger participants of his younger days: "When I first arrived in Thailand in 1959, the people here said they envied our country. But now it's the other way round and that's because if war, which wouldn't have started if the Panglong Agreement was honored."

Harn Yawnghwe explains how U Aung Min is involved in the organization of the meeting: "In 1962, many Shan leaders were imprisoned because of their call for federalism. Then in 2005 the next generation leaders (including Hkun Htun Oo and Hso Ten) were thrown in jail, because of their meeting in Taunggyi. U Aung Min has therefore accompanied our leaders here to Bangkok to demonstrate that our meeting is taking place with the government blessing.

The following are excerpts from the thoughts expressed by the participants (whose names are withheld here) on the ongoing peace process:
·       Why is the government launching a large scale operation against the SSPP/SSA (at 05:40 this morning), when it has already signed state and union level ceasefire agreements? We have to make sure such incidents don't happen after the NCA has been signed.
Note
The battle known as Ta Pha Sawng lasted 3 days with the Burma Army using some 500 120mm and 2,500 60mm mortar shells against the SSA North, according to sources.

·       This is our second chance after Panglong (1497). We need to go about it carefully before signing.
·       Widespread use of drugs
·       Forced recruitment by the armed movements
·       With Aung San Suu Kyi, she has to worry only about politics. With us Shans we have to consider not only political issues, but also the survival of the Shan nation and its homeland
·       We need to consider the rights of non-Shans in our State as well
·       The Wa has the right to demand what it wants. But we need to take into consideration what the Shans in Sagaing Region and Kachin State want too.
·       Personal pride must always take a distant second place to national pride. We need to be humble to each other.
·       2015 elections
The SNLD and the SNDP discuss problems that exist between them after which Hkun Htun Oo offers his hand to Sai Ai Pao, who shakes it, amid applause by the rest of the participants.
(To be continued)


Day Two. Wednesday, 2 October 2014 (Continued from above)


At 17:30, the RCSS delegation holds meeting with U Aung Min.

SYS
·       The C-in-C's 6 point conduition is unacceptable
·       The reason the 31 point agreements concluded between the two sides have yet to be implemented is also because of the military. I think the military is too over-suspicious. (Earlier he had suggested that informal meetings be held between the two sides to break the ice). If it continues the same way, there'll be no NCA.
·       There is much talking about Plan B. Why should we believe Plan B will work if Plan A doesn't?
·       The fighting in central Shan State
·       Proposes opening of Lak Taeng-Pang Gamgaw border pass to facilitate the industrial zone project agreed by both sides in May 2012

UAM
News coming from the UNFC (United Nationalities Federal Council, the 12-party armed alliance) have toughened the stance taken by the military:
·       The CEC of the UNFC being taken over by 3 KIO  (Kachin Independent Organization) members
·       The formation of the Federal Union Army (FUA)
·       The placement of the NCCT (Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team) under the UNFC wing (The NCCT was formed by the Ethnic Armed Organizations Conference in November 2013)
·       The tripartite agreement between the NLD (National League for Democracy), UNA (United Nationalities Alliance, which the SNLD is the leading member) and The UNFC to hold up the NCA until after 2016 (when a new administration has been installed)
Note
The SNLD has flatly denied there is such an agreement between the three.

The military had retaliated by restating the C-in-C's 6 points (although they are not incorporated into the 4thNCA single text draft) and the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) of the ethnic armed forces before political settlement is reached ("The president has already assured you should disarm only when you are satisfied with the terms")

We are going to do our best to make sure there is no Plan B. An informal meeting with the NCCT will be held before the formal one later. (He repeats what was said earlier at the Shan leaders meeting)
·       The military is responsible for security. Therefore the signing of the NCA is necessary before the 31 point agreements can be implemented
·       What happens at Ta Pha Sawng is because the Army needs it for its movements during the rainy season. The two sides met twice and the President, during the second meeting, had suggested that both sides withdraw. However the SSA had refused to despite having given consent to the President.
Note
1.)   The SSA North leaders said withdrawal should be made by the Burma Army first, because, in its past experience, every time the SSA withdrew first, the Burma Army took over its abandoned positions
2.)   The SSA North also pointed out that the Burma Army had already had the main crossing at Nam Lawng, that it needed the Ta Pha Sawng crossing therefore did not make sense
·       As for the opening of the Thai-Burmese border crossing, the two countries must negotiate first

Note
Thais in Chiangmai's Wiang Haeng say opening it will bring prosperity as well as problems (notably drugs) to the area. But that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.

SYS
If the Burma Army does not want to fight, the solution is simple: Just keep the soldiers in their camps. No one will come to fight them.

Before parting each to his room, one SSA officer confides that the minister's explanations are fine, except they don't convince him.

BURMA PEACE PROCESS: Hardened military stance puts peace talks in jeopardy

Posted: 07 Oct 2014 03:20 AM PDT

Quite a lot has happened just within a few days, after the end of peace talks that had ended on 26 September.

The Burma Army launched a massive offensive against the Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) in central Shan State, numerous armed clashes erupted with the various Karen resistance groups in Karen and Mon States, heightened armed confrontation were reported with the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in northern Shan State, the Shan unity meeting involving, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), SSPP/SSA and Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) was held in Bangkok for 3 days, and last but not least, the President Thein Sein radio speech emphasizing that failing to seal the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) could derail the 2015 nationwide election. Let us have a close look on these recent happenings and do some speculation, on which way the peace process is heading or what political future, we have in store.

Burma Army offensive
Although the armed clashes between the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) have never stopped, despite ceasefire agreements, some state and the other union levels, have been signed, the recent heavy clashes stand out as a real stumbling block and barrier to the ongoing peace process.
According to Altsean September report, in September, tensions escalated between the Burma Army and Karen ethnic armed groups, with each side ordering the other to disarm in Myawaddy Township, Karen State, when several fire-fights occurred between the government troops and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA).
The Irrawaddy report on 2 October said heavy clashes between the Burma Army and a combined force of Palaung, Kachin and Kokang ethnic rebels in northern Shan State's Kutkhai Township killed 17 government soldiers last few days, according to  a Palaung rebel source. The report said that the Burma Army's Infantry Division 11 made an incursion into TNLA area, prompting a response by fighters of the TNLA, the KIA and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a small Kokang militia.

The SHAN report on 3 October said that Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Army ordered to attack SSPP/SSA base of Ta Pha Sawng and another outpost in Kehsi Township, on 2 October. It is said the offensive, with some 1,000 Burma Army troops, was due to the SSA refusal to withdraw from the said base, which the Burma Army has been demanding to evacuate.

According to DVB report of 3 October, the government forces involved in the attack belong to the North-eastern Region Command, and included troops from the 247th and 248th Light Infantry Battalions, as well as the 248th and 523rd Infantry Battalions. Altogether, a combined force of eight battalions were involved in the offensive against the SSA.

According to SSA sources, the Burma Army suffered 5 deaths and about 20 wounded, while SSA causality was 3 deaths. The fighting was said to have spread to other several locations. But the SSA has withdrawn from the contested area to ease the tension, according to the RFA report, on 3 October.
RFA recent report on 3 October writes, that according to Khun Hseng, the SSPP/SSA had held an emergency meeting to discuss the retreat because it wants a political—not military—solution to tensions between ethnic rebels and the government.
"We haven't had any good results from solving the problems through military means for about 60 years," he said. "That's why we decided our troops should retreat, so that the clashes didn't continue to spread."

The Shan State Army had not yet received a response from Thein Zaw, deputy chairman of the government's Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC), after informing him that its troops had retreated, he said.
Shan unity meeting

The Shan unity meeting, held in Bangkok from 2 to 4 October, was attended by SNLD, SNDP, SSPP/SSA, RCSS/SSA and People's Militia, Hseng Kaew (SSA) has produced three points agreement. The unofficial translation from Burmese language, dated 4 October, is as follows:
1.              Issues concerning the future of Shan State and Union of Burma will be tackled together hand-in-hand.
2.              In order to progress and solidify, for a longer term, issues of peace process in Shan State and Union of Burma will be tackled together hand-in-hand.
3.              Will solve political problems through political means, through negotiations.
At the same time, RCSS/SSA released a statement, on 3 October, which condemned the Burma Army for waging an offensive against the SSPP/SSA. In its three points statement it strongly protests the Burma Army offensive against SSPP/SSA, using thousands of troops; criticizes activities of the Burma Army as being against the President led peace process and its own six guiding principles; and reminds all ethnic resistance armies that have made peace with the government should reassess the activities of the Burma Army.

The RCSS/SSA spokesman, Sai Hseng Merng said: " The government should help solve the problem of Burma Army offensive against the SSPP/SSA. Not only the Shan armed groups but other ethnic armed groups also should be aware of the situation that Burma Army is not sincere, saying one thing and doing another thing. Instead of scaling down the deployment, it is reinforcing militarily and conducting offensives. We should reassess it and if peace breaks down, it is because of the Burma Army."

The parties attending the meeting has also sent a letter to President Thein Sein through U Aung Min, requesting him to help halt the Burma Army offensive on the SSA.

President linking NCA to forth-coming nationwide election
Meanwhile, President Thein Sein, in his monthly radio message to the public on 1 October, said that the signing of a nationwide ceasefire accord is necessary for the success of the 2015 general elections and a smooth political transition in Burma, according to The Irrawaddy report of 2 October.

The DVB report, on 2 October, on the same issue writes: "Only if we can sign a nationwide ceasefire agreement can we begin the political dialogue which will lead the political future of our country," Thein Sein said in his address to the nation, which was broadcast across Burma by radio. "I want you to note that we can only ensure political stability, the holding of the 2015 elections, and a subsequent smooth political transition only if this [political dialogue] process commences."

Speculation on the stalled peace process
Quite a few opinions have been making the rounds on why the peace process has stalled, after three years of ongoing deliberation.

One speculation is that the Kachin Independence Organization/ Army (KIO/KIA) headed faction within the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordinating Team (NCCT) is unwilling to sign the NCA for it doesn't like to give due credit to the Thein Sein regime, for it could capitalize on the success of the accord to boost its standing in the forth-coming 2015 nationwide election.

Another supposition, which is quite widespread, is that the government and the military are pushing for a watered-down NCA, without really addressing the aspirations of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities, to be signed as soon as possible. In other words, the government and the military are pushing for a "negotiated surrender" or face total warfare. Understandably, the NCCT is reluctant to sign the agreement without solid political guarantee.

According to the Mizzima report of 5 October, Nai Hong Sar, NCCT top negotiator and Chairman of the NMSP, who is reviewing the outcome of the recent meeting with the UPWC in Rangoon, together with the other ethnic leaders in Chiangmai said: " The recent battles occurring in the north and south have changed the nature of the peace talks. We are analysing, whether this is leading against achieving peace." 

NCCT has been reassessing the armed clashes recurring between the government forces and the SSPP/SSA, KNU, Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC), DKBA, and KIA, during these few days.

Nai Hong Sar said that during the latest round of peace talks, the government side didn't appear to be committed to the peace process. He said: "The recent armed clashes happened again and they didn't happen on their own. They are all linked together."

The NCCT proposal on the formation of a federal army was previously agreed to be discussed during the political dialogue phase. But during the latest round of talks, the military made an about-turn and rejected it and changed it to the "issue of Union Army", which derailed the peace process.
He said:" The situation is not good if one looks at the heightened military clashes occurring. The peace process could be destroyed. Otherwise, they are pushing us to accept their pattern. If not successful, they will place themselves in the advantaged position. It is like if you can't make it, destroy it."

Summing up
If we look at the development within the last few weeks into, we would come to the conclusion that "sincere political will and trust" have been seriously depleted between the NCCT and UPWC.
Sincerity on the part of the government and military or UPWC is lacking, if back-tracking on agreed federal union and federal formation discussion is to be taken at the future political dialogue phase is an indication. The government side knows pretty well that these are core aspirations, based on Panglong promises and agreement, which is non-negotiable for the EAO and as well, for all the non-Burman ethnic nationalities.

Again, the ironed out political accord, which could eventually be reached at the political dialogue phase after signing of the NCA, in the near future, is said to pass through the parliament screening and agreement first, before ratifying it, according to the UPWC. But the NCCT just wants the agreed political accord to be endorsed by the parliament.

This would mean that the ethnic nationalities and EAO must bow to the authority of USDP-military dominated regime and as well, the full acceptance of the 2008, military-drawn constitution.   The ethnic nationalities have been striving to correct the "constitutional crisis" or "political imbalance" for more than 60 years, so that justice would be done to them in terms of equality, rights of self-determination and democracy.

From the point of the USDP-military regime, it is a "catch-22" like situation. Without yielding to the ethnic aspiration of federalism, there will be no solution or peaceful settlement; and if the genuine form of federal union is agreed, it will lose its racial supremacy or colonial master position, which it considers to be its rightful legacy.

Other than that, the benefit of doubt given, that Thein Sein government might be an agent of change, belonging to the reform faction and military faction belonging to the hard-line faction, reluctant to accept change, is eroding fast. For the repeated Burma Army large scale offensives could not be stopped, despite already signed union-level, ceasefire agreements signed by the Shan and Karen resistance forces with the government. And this development has led many to ponder, if the government and military factions are just playing good-cop, bad-cop scenario, when in fact, they belong to the same interest group.

Recently, Mizzima, on 5 October, reported the bombing of three places in Taunggyi, capital of the Shan State, on 4 October, at 10:45 in the evening. It was said to have exploded at Burma Army Eastern Command, 212nd Burma Army Signal Battalion and traffic control Police station, where two policemen were badly wounded. One could only pray that this would only be an isolated case. But if this is an indication of the escalation of internal armed conflict on a wider scale, prompting to jump-start an urban guerilla warfare type of movement to counter the Burma Army offensives, we all will be in for a long nightmare. Some might say, this is pure fear-mongering. But the possibility is there and this has to be nibbed in the bud. No one knows for sure that the religious terrorist groups threatening to escalate their fight to include Burma on its global agenda is not going to take advantage of the heightened ethnic conflict.

And the only way to avoid this is only through sincere accommodation of ethnic aspirations, change of racial supremacy mind-set, rebuilding of trust and discarding the "might is right" posture. It is evident that hardened military stance is not doing any good to the country and could even derail the peace process altogether.
The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor

Harder to win than war - Day 2

Posted: 07 Oct 2014 03:17 AM PDT

Day Two. Thursday, 2 October 2014

"Negotiating for the NCA (Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement) is like eating roasted beans," says U Aung Min this morning to the 40 Shans gathering at the meeting room of the hotel. "First you choose only crisp ones. At last only tough ones remain. But we have to go though them, because there is no Hsay Myidoe (fast remedy) for the ills that have accumulated for more than 60 years."
He is speaking about the deadlock reached between the NCCT and The UPWC last month.

The impasse took place due to the apprehension of the military, according to him, over several pieces of information that they have received:
·       One of them being the formation of the Federal Union Army (FUA) under the UNFC though the military had agreed to place the issue to be discussed during the Framework and Political Dialogue Negotiations
·       The result is the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) which has been placed ahead of the political settlement despite earlier agreement to place it after it ("The President has promised to return the DDR back to after political settlement", he says)
·       The parliament also proposed the "ratification of the NCA by the parliament" be changed to "submission of the NCA to the parliament", which gives rise to concern by the NCCT ("But that is as it should be, "he explains later," because the parliament won't like being seen as a rubber stamp. But the president has promised to take care of the matter")

 Naypyitaw, according to him, has also promised three more things:
·       To work toward peace by all means
·       To work toward peace as soon as possible
·       To achieve peace without with the least mistakes

"What is going to happen if the NCA draft is rejected by the NCCT?" one Shan leader asks. U Aung Min is prompt with his reply: We can invite the 14 groups that have already signed state level and union level ceasefire agreements, after they are ratified by the parliament, for political dialogue. Those that have yet to sign them will also be invited as observers."

He then takes leave, leaving the Shans to ponder over his speech. (To be continued)

Commander-in-Chief's failed-decision or maintaining pre-concieved idea of top-dog position

Posted: 07 Oct 2014 03:15 AM PDT

It is unfortunate that due to some rumors and unconfirmed news, the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing has decided to launch a large scale operation against the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).

According to the interview given to VOA, Sai Nyunt Lwin, General Secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), on 5 October, said: "The government publicized that it has to respond to the SSA ambush. As far as we know, according to the news, the two military commands with five military columns made a concerted, two pronged, operation. We analyze it and are concerned for the peace process. That's why five organizations attending the meeting have sent a petition to the President to help stop the offensive."

A DVB report, on 6 October, that Hkun Htun Oo, within the capacity of Shan State Joint Action Committee (SSJAC) and Chairman of the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), in response to the government's suspicion on UNFC dragging the peace process, said: " The main point is that Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) explaining on what points still could not be agreed with the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC); for example, the suspicion of Commander-in-Chief and wrong information he got, before he left for Japan. According to it the UNFC, UNA and NLD were determined and agreed to drag the signing of ceasefire agreement beyond 2015 and until 2016. They were asking whether this information is false or correct. Since the UNA, NLD and UNFC have never met, it is clear this is false information."

The tragedy is that people have to die or get wounded, combatants as well as civilians, because of such poorly informed decision. Making hasty decision according to one's spontaneous mood has no place in the important process of political settlement. Again, if this is just an unwise action based on unconfirmed rumors, the USDP-military regime needs to rethink and reassess its decision-making pattern. But if the recent offensive in Shan State is just a continuation of maintaining its top-dog position politically and militarily, there is no need to go on with this sham peace talks. For its ultimate aim is just to reach a "negotiated surrender" and not projecting at achieving a "level playing field", leading to the atmosphere of equality, democracy and rights of self-determination for all ethnic groups, big or small.

The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor
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