Wednesday, November 5, 2014

Shan Herald Agency for News

Shan Herald Agency for News

BURMA PEACE PROCESS: Can the regime accept adversaries as equal negotiation partners?

Posted: 05 Nov 2014 02:47 AM PST

As SHAN report on National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) hits the headline, The Irrawaddy interview with John Sifton, who is the Asia Division Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch (HRW), based in Washington DC, is also publicized, on the same date of 5th November.

The question posed by The Irrawaddy to John Siffon, if he could expand on what he said that President Thein Sein didn't hold all the power over reforms, but that the Burmese military did, he said:
"I worry that many outside actors have fundamentally misjudged the transition process. They believe that a quasi-democratic government has taken power from the vestiges of a military authoritarian government and are now navigating a reform process that will end with a democratic government with control over the military, and not the other way around."

"That's entirely inaccurate. The fact is, the Burmese military continues to retain overarching political control in this country, in terms of the Constitution, economic power, and their ability to repress most of the population through force, especially people living in ethnic areas. This will continue to be the case until the military is compelled, by one method or another, to relinquish its powers. Of course it isn't easy for an autocratic junta to give away its powers, but that is why it is so important that they continue to feel outside pressure when the process stalls."

In the SHAN report of points that need to be discussed, regarding NCA, part has confirmed the Burmese military position of clinging to absolute power monopoly, at least in four instances, supporting John Siffon's statement.
The first point writes:
•    The Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) says the present Tatmadaw (armed forces), being made up of multi-ethnic nationalities, is already a Union Armed Forces (or even a Federal Union Armed Forces though the military is against using the word "Federal"). Somehow this doesn't sound right to the Nationwide Ceasefire Negotiation Team (NCCT).

This is clearly the denial that the present Tatmadaw or Burma Army is dominated by the ethnic Burman majority from top to the bottom of the military hierarchy. But everyone knows that it is the suppression tool used by the successive military governments to subdue non-Burman ethnics' self-determination movements and as well, to quell any democratic opposition all along. A few cannon fodders from the rank of non-Burman ethnic nationalities don't make it a federal army.

The second point writes:
•    Violations of NCA will be resolved peacefully by parties concerned instead of by Union Peacemaking Central Committee (UPCC) as proposed by UPWC.

The third point writes:
•    The formation of Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee at different levels and Joint Union Peace Dialogue Committee (The UPWC only agrees to have a Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee but still undecided about setting it up at different levels. It is also for the UPCC to oversee the whole peace process)
Both the second and third points tabled by the UPWC demands that the UPCC oversees the whole peace process is like telling your adversary to accept your verdict on a dispute, which you are personally involved. It is like saying, when gambling that "Head I win, tail you lose". As SHAN rightly pointed out, the UPCC, to all intents and purposes, is another name for the National Defense and Security Council, the most powerful organ in the whole Union.

The fourth point writes:
•  That the NCA should be submitted to the Union Assembly instead of should be ratified by the Union Assembly (The MPC says "submitting the NCA" is a proper technical wording because the executive cannot give orders to the legislature. However since the government party has 53% of seats and the military 25% of seats in the Union Assembly, that should be no problem.)

The argument here is not whether the NCA could sail through with the help of USDP-Military dominated Union Assembly, but how the Union Assembly is seen by the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO). The EAO, including most ethnic political parties, see it as a military dominated Assembly and as such, is part and parcel of the ruling clique. Asking for the endorsement of the agreed NCA is only to buttress the accord made between the non-Burman ethnic nationalities and USDP-Military dominated government. In other words, the USDP-Military government suppose to be only acting on behalf of the Burman majority or for Burman State – which the Burmese military has divided into seven regions now - and not necessarily having the ruling mandate, which covers also the non-Burman ethnic nationalities and their territories.

And so, it seems, it is again difficult to imagine that the Burmese military will reform on its own free will to make way for meaningful, peaceful reconciliation and democratization, if this deeply rooted, pre-conceived, military mindset is not altered to accommodate the aspirations of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities.

To sum up, the progress to sign NCA will solely depend on how much the USDP-Military regime could change its mindset of domination and manipulation in all negotiations to accepting the adversaries as equal negotiation partners for a fair deal.

The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor

The 4th NCA draft: Deadlock or last hurdle?

Posted: 04 Nov 2014 05:41 PM PST

For more than a month since the end or the 6th Union Peacemaking Work Committee-Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (UPWC-NCCT) negotiations, no new formal meeting has been called. According to the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) that is currently visiting Chiangmai for an informal meeting with the NCCT, it will be coming only after 13 November, when the Asean Summit chaired by Naypyitaw drew to a close.



Looking through the 4thdraft that was produced by the UPWC-NCCT meeting, 22-26 September, one may be able to make an informed guess whether we may or may not see a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signed soon.

First, let us see what both sides have agreed so far:
§  The Three National Causes (Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of the national sovereignty and Perpetuation of national sovereignty)  as proposed by the UPWC
§  The Spirit of Panglong (but not the Promises of Panglong) as proposed by the NCCT
§  Military preparations either for defense of the country or defense against external dangers should be discussed and implemented by both sides in ceasefire zones (Questions may arise as to the difference between "defense of the country" and "defense against external dangers" and whether there should be "non-ceasefire zones")
§  Establishment of liasion offices in locations deemed necessary
§  Non-participation of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the planned political dialogue, as proposed by the NCCT (They have other roles to play, according to the NCCT)
§  Violations of NCA will be resolved peacefully by parties concerned instead of by Union Peacemaking Central Committee (UPCC) as proposed by UPWC (UPCC, to all intents and purposes, is another name for the National Defense and Security Council, the most powerful organ in the whole Union)
N.BThe NCCT had proposed a Joint Union Peace Dialogue Committee (JUPDC)

The following are points that need to be further discussed:
§  The UPWC says the present Tatmadaw (armed forces), being made up of multi-ethnic nationalities, is already a Union Armed Forces (or even a Federal Union Armed Forces though the military is against using the word "Federal"). Somehow this doesn't sound right to the NCCT
§  The NCA must be signed by all acceptable Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) as proposed by the NCCT which the UPWC doesn't agree
§  The formation of Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee at different levels and Joint Union Peace Dialogue Committee (The UPWC only agrees to have a Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee but still undecided about setting it up at different levels. It is also for the UPCC to oversee the whole peace process)
§  As mentioned earlier, the term "Ceasefire Zones" as proposed by the UPWC. The NCCT argues after the NCA is signed, all territories in the Union become ceasefire zones. "Does designation of specific ceasefire zones mean we will still fight outside them?" one NCCT member has remarked.  
§  The removal of the chapter dealing with Interim Arrangements and Code of Conduct by the UPWC which counter proposes that a new team be formed to negotiate them
§  The UPWC proposal that the EAOs don't expand their forces and recruit new members (The NCCT has counter proposed that the EAOs will discuss and implement reduction of recruits instead)
§  On the NCCT side, it is considering UPWC proposal that there should be a joint management of local development, environmental conservation,  promotion of literary and cultural activities and peacekeeping  (Some NCCT members, notably the Shan State Progress Party, has proposed that local civilian representatives be included)
§  The NCCT proposal that apart from the UN Secretary General, representatives from other countries such as India, China, Japan, Asean, US and UK be witness signatories and that they are allowed to play significant roles such  as being observers to the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee)
§  Further details on repositioning of troops

The two sides also need to discuss further on points that were agreed earlier but backed out from at the latest meeting:
§  That the NCA should be submitted to the Union Assembly instead of should be ratified by the Union Assembly (The MPC says "submitting the NCA" is a proper technical wording because the executive cannot give orders to the legislature. However since the government party has 53% of seats and the military 25% of seats in the Union Assembly, that should be no problem.)
§  Implementation of the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration) before political dialogue begins instead of after political settlement has been reachedas agreed earlier (The MPC says the UPWC has once again agreed to keep it as it was in the third NCA draft)
§  The President and the Commander-in-Chief will be witnesses at the NCA signing ceremony instead of being signatories as agreed earlier (The MPC says the change was prompted by the growing military distrust of the NCCT following the Congress of the United Nationalities Federal Council which announced its takeover of the negotiation team on 2 September)


The question now is: Do the people have any chance for peace in our time?
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