The Irrawaddy Magazine

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• Oct. 10 Deadline for Internal Migrants to Arrange Vote
• Casualties on Both Sides as Conflict Between DKBA, Govt Drags On
• Phuketwan Journalists Set to Stand Trial in Thailand Over Coverage of Rohingya Trafficking
• NLD Says It Intends to Field a Presidential Candidate
• Same Game, Different Tactics: China’s ‘Myanmar Corridor’
• Trafficking Boss, Accomplices Arrested in Raid on Thai Shrimp Factory
• Wary of Climate Change, Vanuatu Villagers Seek Higher Ground
• Seoul: North Korea Media Confirms Purging of Defense Chief
• China: Uighurs Deported From Thailand Wanted to Join Jihad
• Burma’s Peace Process: Matching Words with Deeds

Oct. 10 Deadline for Internal Migrants to Arrange Vote Posted: 13 Jul 2015 08:36 AM PDT A man examines eligible voter lists in Rangoon on March 30. (Photo: JPaing / The Irrawaddy) RANGOON — Migrant voters who have lived in a given constituency for at least six months but are not enumerated there as eligible voters must register with local election officials by Oct. 10 if they will not return to their native constituency to cast a ballot in Burma's upcoming general election. The Union Election Commission (UEC) announced the deadline on Friday, in recognition of what is believed to be a large population of internal migrant workers in Burma, many of whom are not likely to have updated the household registration certificates that were used to compile voter lists. Rangoon's election subcommission chairman Ko Ko estimated last month that up to 100,000 people in the city were not enumerated in the preliminary voter lists for this reason. The lists have been publically posted in four batches beginning in March, with election officials facing criticism over reports that errors on the lists are widespread. Than Htay, director of The Serenity Initiative (TSI), a civil society group that is assisting with voter education, said there were many internal migrants in areas where small-scale mining and artisan oil drilling take place, such as Hpakant in Kachin State and Mandalay Division, as well as in Rangoon, where job opportunities in the commercial capital draw migrant laborers. "The UEC has previously said that they will have separate lists for temporary residents who have been living at least 180 days when they announce the nationwide voter lists. But we need to wait and see on that," he said. The UEC said temporary residents need to submit the application form 3(a) to their ward or village subcommissions after receiving the endorsement of their local ward administrator. Subcommissions will register migrants' names on the list of the township in which they are temporarily resident if they are eligible to vote, and will instruct the native township's subcommission to remove their name, the UEC said. With the announcement of voter lists nationwide next month, voters will have 14 days to file any additional corrections and ward subcommissions are required to respond within seven days, indicating whether the complaint has been validated or not. Than Htay said another task for local subcommissions was to strip out the names of voters born between Nov. 9-30, 1997, since voter lists were compiled before the election date was announced and include anyone who turns 18 before Dec. 1. "Numerous inaccuracies have been found in the preliminary voter lists so they have to correct those lists and another problem is that they have to remove those who won't reach 18 years old from November 9 to November 30 from the lists. So, I think it is impossible to get the complete and accurate voter lists with the remaining period," he added. The UEC announced on Wednesday that the country's landmark general election would be held on Nov. 8. The post Oct. 10 Deadline for Internal Migrants to Arrange Vote appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Casualties on Both Sides as Conflict Between DKBA, Govt Drags On Posted: 13 Jul 2015 08:24 AM PDT A group of Border Guard Force soldiers patrols the Asia Highway last week. (Photo: Kyaw Kha / The Irrawaddy) RANGOON — Fighting last week between the Burma Army and ethnic Karen rebels has brought casualties for both sides as a dispute over illegal taxation along the Asia Highway in Karen State remains unresolved. State media reported on Monday that four soldiers from the Democratic Karen Benevolence Army (DKBA) were killed and three others detained, and that "some army officers from the Tatmadaw [Burma Armed Forces] sacrificed their lives for the country" in the course of nearly 40 clashes between the two sides. Fighting has taken place on the recently opened Asia Highway and an older road that also links Myawaddy and Kawkareik in Karen State. "Through cooperation between the Tatmadaw and BGF [Border Guard Force], both highways were able to open for public transportation from July 8 and 9. The situation has stabilized," said a report run in state daily The Mirror, citing the Burma Army-run Myawaddy news agency. The newspaper said Saw San Aung and Saw Kyaw Thet, two DKBA colonels, were leading the ethnic armed group's recent operations. Naing Maung Zaw, a spokesperson for the government-allied BGF, said two Burma Army soldiers were killed by a landmine on July 7 and five BGF troops were shot dead the following day. According to DKBA Capt. Saw Three Htoo, state media's description of the situation in Karen State as "stabilized" was not reflective of the reality on the ground. Burma Army troops continue to engage the DKBA, Saw Three Htoo said, with fighting between the two sides an almost daily occurrence and government reinforcements bolstering government troop positions in areas that the DKBA has traditionally controlled. "We have had to abandon two bases already, one is in Kaw Moo village, and on a hilltop in Kaw Moo," he told The Irrawaddy on Monday. The Karen captain said the head of the DKBA, Gen. Saw Lah Pwe, would lead negotiations with the government to bring an end to hostilities. "If they continue to chase us and attack us, we need to fight back in order to protect our lives. We are not people who want to be fighting," Saw Three Htoo said. Clashes reportedly first broke out on June 29, when government troops tried to secure the area ahead of Burma Army Southeastern Division Commander Gen. Tin Maung Win's visit to Myawaddy. Rebel sources said government troops entered Kawkareik without prior notice and demanded that the DKBA remove security checkpoints and toll stations administered by the ethnic armed group. Authorities in Karen State have apparently moved to clear the road of the illegal tax stations set up by the DKBA and other Karen rebel groups. Additional reporting by Min Kha Pan in Myawaddy, Karen State. The post Casualties on Both Sides as Conflict Between DKBA, Govt Drags On appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Phuketwan Journalists Set to Stand Trial in Thailand Over Coverage of Rohingya Trafficking Posted: 13 Jul 2015 08:06 AM PDT Thai national Chutima Sidasathian and Australian Alan Morison speak to the media outside a criminal court in Phuket, Thailand in April, 2014. (Photo: Reuters) CHIANG MAI — Two journalists with a Thailand-based news website are set to face trial on Tuesday on charges related to the republication of material from a Reuters news agency story in July 2013 alleging members of the Thai military were involved in human trafficking. The Thai navy filed a lawsuit against Phuketwan's editor Alan Morison and reporter Chutima Sidasathian in December 2013 for defamation and for violating the Computer Crime Act over a single paragraph the news site republished from a Reuters article alleging links between Thai officialdom and the trafficking of Muslim Rohingya fleeing persecution in Burma. The Thai navy did not pursue Reuters over the original story which formed part of an investigation that won its authors' a prestigious Pulitzer Prize for international reporting. Alan Morison, an Australian journalist who founded Phuketwan in 2008, said the website would not be updated for the duration of the trial and its immediate future remained unclear. "We are not really sure what will happen [after the court hearing]," Morison told The Irrawaddy on the eve of the trial which is due to run from July 14-16 at Phuket Provincial Court. He said the pending charges had curtailed the output of the Phuket-based news outlet which is known for its reporting on the plight of Rohingya fleeing Burma's Arakan State by boat in search of refuge abroad. "The past 18 months since the Royal Thai Navy laid the charges against us have made it very difficult because we've just devoted more and more of our time to defending ourselves and we haven't been able to cover the issues we'd like to cover, especially the Rohingya exodus that we have been covering for seven years," Morison said. "It was probably part of the plan for the Royal Thai Navy in laying the charges to shut down Phuketwan and they may well achieve that because they've made life very difficult for us." Since the lawsuit was filed, conditions for journalists working in Thailand have further deteriorated following a military coup in May 2014. Coup leader and prime minister Prayuth Chan-ocha has repeatedly hit out at journalists for critical news coverage and threatened to close down outlets that failed to toe the line. "I think it's sad for Thailand that this case is being pursued, because the relationship between the media and military is very important in any democracy," Morison told The Irrawaddy. "At the moment, because the government has allowed this case to go ahead, it's a sign that they have a view about the relationship that really doesn't suit any democracy." On July 9, a group of eight international and regional organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists, issued a joint letter to the Thai prime minister urging him to drop all charges against the two Phuketwan journalists, labeling them in violation of Thailand's commitments under international law. The organizations said the Computer Crime Act under which the journalists are charged was "clearly being used by the government in this case to suppress media freedom and silence the voice of Phuketwan." The post Phuketwan Journalists Set to Stand Trial in Thailand Over Coverage of Rohingya Trafficking appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

NLD Says It Intends to Field a Presidential Candidate Posted: 13 Jul 2015 07:31 AM PDT Senior members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) including chairwoman Aung San Suu Kyi, center, hold a press conference in Naypyidaw on Saturday. (Photo: Tun Tun / The Irrawaddy) NAYPYIDAW — Burma's main opposition party says it plans to field a presidential candidate despite an all but certain constitutional ban on its popular chairwoman running for the post. "The presidential candidate will be chosen from within the party," Aung San Suu Kyi, head of the National League for Democracy (NLD), told media at her residence in Naypyidaw on Saturday, when the party officially announced that it would contest the general election due on Nov. 8. "[The presidential candidate] must be an NLD member. If [the presidential candidate] is not now, [he or she] must be [an NLD member] later," she added. The opposition leader, who herself is barred from the presidency under Article 59(f) of Burma's controversial Constitution, said her party had a plan to ensure that its candidate is acceptable to the people. With the prospect of the NLD putting forward an alternative presidential candidate to Suu Kyi, one NLD lawmaker hinted that party patron Tin Oo or central committee member Win Htein could get the nod. "Uncle U Tin Oo is 88 now, but still in very good health. U Win Htein is just 74, but he is not very healthy. You would understand what I mean," the lawmaker told The Irrawaddy on condition of anonymity. Burma's president is elected by Parliament from among three vice presidential candidates in a vote that will likely take place in February or March of next year. The NLD is expected to perform well in the upcoming general election and would likely have significant influence on the presidential pick if its ambitions are realized. Zaw Thet Htwe, a former political prisoner, said Tin Oo was the second-to-none choice for the position, given his long military career and political experience. Tin Oo is the former commander in chief of the military and was conferred the military title "Thura," an honor given to members of the Burma Armed Forces for displaying valor in the face of the enemy. "If the presidential candidate is [to be chosen] from within the party, Thura U Tin Oo, who has a legacy and reputation [as a good soldier and pro-democracy activist], is the only one [to be chosen]," said Zaw Thet Htwe. Meanwhile Zarganar, a well-known former political prisoner, wrote on his Facebook page on June 30: "U Win Htein should be a presidential candidate. He was the DSA [Defense Services Academy's] best candidate [for his intake]. There is hardly a politician who reads like him. Wouldn't it be more interesting to think that way?" Suu Kyi said on Saturday that although she had reservations about the credibility of the forthcoming election, she had nonetheless decided to seek re-election in her Kawhmu Township constituency. Suu Kyi won the Rangoon Division seat in a 2012 by-election that her party dominated. The NLD plans to contest nationwide in the election, but the opposition party said it would not field candidates in some ethnic constituencies under an agreement it has forged with allied ethnic political parties. Burma's ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) is also likely to contest nationwide. The general election will put 1,171 seats in play between the Union Parliament and regional legislatures. Suu Kyi over the weekend reiterated concerns expressed by her party in recent weeks that there might not be enough time before polling day to correct errors in the eligible voter lists, which are thought to be riddled with inaccuracies. The NLD has launched a campaign to raise voter awareness on the issue and help people to correct their data if incorrectly enumerated. Suu Kyi also said the NLD would work toward national reconciliation as its highest priority, and in an subsequent statement on Sunday, the party said it would continue to pursue its yet-to-be-fulfilled objectives—establishing the rule of law and internal peace, and amending the Constitution—that it has been committed to achieving since it won 43 seats in Parliament in the 2012 by-election. The NLD also offered the broad outlines of its economic platform over the weekend, vowing to push for policies that reduce inequality within a free market system and modernize Burma's agricultural sector, which accounts for about 70 percent of the country's labor force. The NLD's economic platform also pledges to "devolve fiscal responsibilities and powers to the states and divisions," a key demand of Burma's ethnic minority groups. The post NLD Says It Intends to Field a Presidential Candidate appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Same Game, Different Tactics: China’s ‘Myanmar Corridor’ Posted: 13 Jul 2015 03:15 AM PDT Click to view slideshow. Much has been said and written about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's recent visit to China, and some commentators have even suggested that it may signal a shift in Beijing's policy toward Myanmar—away from the government and toward a more favorable view of the pro-democracy opposition. It would be more accurate, however, to say that China's long-term strategic and geopolitical interests in Myanmar remain the same while its tactics vary, depending on the political climate in its troubled neighbor. This became clear to me when, in June 2002, I had lunch with a senior adviser to Hu Jintao, the leader who later that year became Chinese president. It was a private meeting, so it would be unethical to mention his name, but I can relate the gist of our conversation without violating any trust or confidence. I wanted to hear his opinion on my theory about Beijing's interests in Myanmar: that China's landlocked provinces needed an outlet for exports through Myanmar territory in order for these regions to catch up with the then-rapidly developing coastal areas. Rail and road links to China's own ports were too long, and those ports would in any case be clogged with export items produced in the coastal provinces. Disparity in the development between the coast and the vast hinterland could threaten China's national security and internal stability. This was not a wild guess on my part. In fact, China made its intentions clear as early as 1985. In an article published in the official newsmagazine "Beijing Review" on September 2 of that year, Pan Qi, a former vice minister of communications, outlined the possibilities of finding such an outlet from Yunnan and Sichuan through Myanmar down to the Indian Ocean. The article mentioned the Myanmar railheads of Myitkyina and Lashio in the north and northeast, and the Ayeyarwaddy River, which flows through almost the entire length of the country, as possible conduits for Chinese exports. Therefore, I surmised, China was keen to maintain the status quo in Myanmar—friendly relations with the military junta. To my surprise, the Chinese official answered without hesitation: "Absolutely. Those are our interests in Myanmar, we do not want to see any regime change. And Myanmar is not only a potential outlet for us but also an inlet." A strange choice of words and I asked, "an inlet for what?" His reply startled me: "We are no longer self-sufficient in oil… Most of our imported oil comes from the Middle East, and in case of a future conflict with the United States, they can block the Straits of Malacca. Therefore, we are going to build another pipeline, through Myanmar to Yunnan." He didn't specify what kind of potential conflict he was envisioning with the Americans, but it could have been an invasion of Taiwan. The United States is treaty-bound to defend Taiwan—also known as the Republic of China—but not even the most hardline hawks in the Pentagon would, in such an eventuality, consider lobbing missiles into Shanghai or Beijing. But blocking the Straits of Malacca to cut vital oil supplies to China would be an option. And he was right about the pipeline. In November 2008, China and Myanmar agreed to build a US$1.5 billion oil pipeline and a $1.04 billion natural gas pipeline along exactly the route this official had mentioned to me several years before. Our conversation took place shortly after East Timor had become independent, a prospect that few could have predicted 10 years before. In the spirit of this unexpected outcome, I asked: "What would you do if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi became the president of Myanmar?" (This, of course, was before the implementation of the 2008 constitution, which bars her from assuming the presidency). He gave me another amazing reply: "But we admire Daw Aung San Suu Kyi! We think she is a fantastic woman!" The conclusion was obvious: Beijing would not want to see any drastic changes in Myanmar, but if they occurred, the Chinese would adjust accordingly to protect their long-term interests. And that is exactly what is happening today. The Chinese do not want to put all their eggs in one basket. The government in Myanmar may or may not survive in its present shape and form, but the Chinese are prepared for all eventualities. This is not by any stretch of the imagination a policy shift. Exporting Revolution With its strategic location between South and Southeast Asia, and between the Chinese hinterland and the Bay of Bengal, Myanmar has long been important to China. Forget about empty Chinese talk about "non-interference" and "respect for Myanmar's sovereignty." That is pure nonsense. China has always interfered in Myanmar's internal affairs and most probably always will. In the past it was to export world revolution; today it is trade and commerce. With a different emphasis, "the Myanmar corridor" remains of utmost importance to China's policy makers. During the decade of 1968 to 78, the Chinese poured more aid into the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) than into any other communist movement outside Indochina. A new 20,000 square kilometer base area was established along the Chinese border in Myanmar's northeast. Unlike the old CPB units, then mainly in the BagoYoma mountains north of Yangon, these new troops were equipped with modern Chinese assault rifles, machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns and mortars. Radio equipment, jeeps, trucks, petrol and even rice and other foodstuffs, cooking oil and kitchen utensils were sent across the frontier. The Chinese also built two small hydroelectric power stations inside the CPB's new northeast base. A clandestine radio station, "The People's Voice of Burma," began transmitting from the Yunnan side of the border in April 1971. It was later moved to the CPB's headquarters at Panghsang inside Myanmar—now also the headquarters of its successor, the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Among the items China sent to the CPB was a truckload of newly printed, detailed contour maps of Myanmar. The plan was to push down from the northeast to the BagoYoma mountain range, and eventually capture Yangon. That failed, however, as government forces launched a major offensive against the CPB in the BagoYoma in 1975. After the loss of other central base areas in the mid-1970s, the CPB became isolated in the northeast, far away from the Myanmar heartland, and nominated a new chairman, Thakin Ba Thein Tin, who had spent years in exile in China in the 1950s and 1960s. The area under its control was almost exclusively populated by various ethnic minorities such as the Wa, Kokang Chinese, Kachin, Akha and Lahu. Only the top leadership and most of the political commissars came from central Myanmar. Most Western scholars have suggested that China's post-1968 support for the CPB was prompted by anti-Chinese riots in Yangon in June 1967. But it was not a knee-jerk reaction to those events. Preparations for the push into Myanmar began shortly after the military takeover in 1962. China had enjoyed cordial relations with the government that was overthrown, led by U Nu, and had little confidence in the new regime led by Gen. Ne Win. China also had grander plans for the entire region. It was going to export revolution to Southeast Asia, and the CPB was a vital link in that strategy. The CPB was, in turn, expected to link up with communist parties in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and as far away as Australia. The 1967 anti-Chinese riots were merely an excuse for implementing a plan that had been drawn up years before by China's intelligence chief, Kang Sheng, a master strategist who worked closely with Thakin Ba Thein Tin and other Southeast Asian communist leaders as well as Ted Hill, the chairman of a tiny pro-Chinese communist party in Australia. In March and April 1989, the hilltribe rank-and-file of the CPB's army, tired of fighting for an ideology of which they understood very little, rose in mutiny against the party's ageing Bamar leadership. Thakin Ba Thein Tin and the other party veterans fled across the border to China, where they were allowed to settle and retire—and eventually died. After the 1989 mutiny, the CPB broke up into four different armies, all based along ethnic lines. Of these, the UWSA was by far the most numerous and powerful. The 1989 mutiny actually suited China's interests, and there are strong suggestions that China's clandestine services actually encouraged the Wa and others to rise up against their Bamar bosses. Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping's return to the political fold, China changed its policy towards the region. Now, the emphasis was on trade and economic expansion, not Maoist-style world revolution. Securing the 'Corridor' The CPB's leaders were aware of China's new policies and in internal party documents dated before the mutiny and seen by this contributor, Thakin Ba Thein Tin accused the Chinese of having become "revisionists." In a desperate last attempt to save the party, Thakin Ba Thein Tin had in early 1989 decided to send a leading cadre to Laos, a Soviet ally, to contact Moscow. That was pure lunacy since the Soviet Union was then ruled by Mikhail Gorbachev, a reformer who would have no interest whatsoever in lending support to the CPB. In any event, the mutiny broke out before the CPB emissary could reach Laos, so even he had to escape to China. But Beijing was not going to give up the secure position it had cultivated inside Myanmar since the late 1960s. In May 1989, the UWSA entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar government, which, on the one hand, suited China's new commercial interests. But it was also imperative to strengthen the UWSA. After all, the Chinese had had a long-standing relationship with most of the leaders of the UWSA, dating back to their CPB days. Thus, the UWSA was able to purchase vast quantities of weapons from China and, according to the April 26, 2013 issue of the prestigious military affairs journal "Jane's Defence Weekly," even armed transport helicopters: "The acquisition of helicopters marks the latest step in a significant upgrade for the UWSA, which has emerged as the largest and best-equipped non-state military force in Asia and, arguably, the world," the journal wrote. In the second half of 2012, the UWSA had acquired armored vehicles for the first time. These included both Chinese PTL-02 6×6 wheeled "tank destroyers" and an armored combat vehicle that IHS Jane's identified as the Chinese 4×4 ZFB-05. Furthermore, the UWSA has obtained from China huge quantities of small-arms and ammunition—and around 100 HN-5 series man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), a Chinese version of the first-generation Russian Strela-2 (SA-7 "Grail") system. The UWSA today is better armed than the CPB ever was. It can field at least 20,000 well-equipped troops apart from thousands of village militiamen and other supportive forces. Moreover, the top leaders of the UWSA are usually accompanied by Chinese intelligence officers who provide advice and guidance. So what is China up to? Why this arming of a non-state military force at the same time as Beijing has had cordial relations with the Myanmar government since it abandoned its policy of supporting communist insurrections in the region? It is no doubt a way of putting pressure on Myanmar at a time when its relations with the United States are improving. As China sees it, it cannot afford to "lose" Myanmar to the West. A strong UWSA provides China with a strategic advantage and is also a bargaining chip in negotiations with Naypyidaw. When President's Office Minister U Aung Min visited Monywa in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project, he openly admitted: "We are afraid of China… we don't dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume their support to the communists, the economy in border areas would backslide." By "the communists" he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, among them the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in Kokang, another former CPB force, which resorted to armed struggle in February this year. China, predictably, has denied any involvement in that conflict, but the fact remains that most of the MNDAA's weaponry and vast quantities of ammunition have been supplied by the UWSA. According to one well-placed source, China is indirectly "teaching the Myanmar government a lesson in Kokang: move too much to the West, and this can happen." At the same time, China is playing another "softer" card by being actively involved in so-called "peace talks" between the Myanmar government and the country's multitude of ethnic rebel armies. Whether China wants to export revolution or expand and protect commercial interests, it apparently feels that it needs to have a solid foothold inside Myanmar. There is no better and more loyal ally in this regard than the UWSA and its affiliates. Inviting Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to China essentially serves the same purpose: Put pressure on the government in Naypyidaw and keep its options open for the future—all with the aim of securing the vital "Myanmar corridor." This article originally appeared in the July 2015 issue of The Irrawaddy magazine. The post Same Game, Different Tactics: China's 'Myanmar Corridor' appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Trafficking Boss, Accomplices Arrested in Raid on Thai Shrimp Factory Posted: 13 Jul 2015 02:41 AM PDT Migrant workers from Burma are being moved from a shrimp peeling facility near Bangkok after an anti-human trafficking operation last week. (Photo: Shwe Lote Thar / Facebook) CHIANG MAI, Thailand — A joint task force of Thai police and anti-human trafficking personnel last week arrested five accomplices and the leader of a human trafficking ring near Bangkok, following the rescue of scores of migrants from Burma who had been confined in a shrimp peeling facility. Maung Htone, a Burmese national from Mon State, was apprehended along with four employment brokers and the owner of the facility, according to a migrant rights advocate who assisted with the operation that freed 64 captive laborers. "[We] had to go there about three or four times, and we closely observed and took photos before we could raid the factory," Khun Naung Oo of the Myanmar Association of Thailand (MAT), which works collaboratively with Thai authorities to identify and rescue trafficking victims, told The Irrawaddy. "Most people dare not go there, as it is a very notorious place." The migrants, mostly women from Mon State and Tenasserim Division, were among some 400 employees at the facility, he said. Those removed from the site by a rescue team last Wednesday had been confined in the facility with no work documents. A worker named Hsan Moe Aung had recently escaped and sought help at the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok, which alerted the MAT and Thailand's anti-human trafficking task force. "According to those who were rescued, the employer and middlemen [employment brokers] sometimes tortured them and threatened to shoot them if they resisted. They also said they were sometimes confined in [small] rooms," Khun Naung Oo said. MAT said Maung Htone, who is now in custody as police search for several other accomplices, was in charge of a major human trafficking operation transporting migrants from southeastern Burma to Mahachai, a port town near the Thai capital that is one of the seats of Thailand's lucrative seafood industry. Thai authorities are providing temporary shelter for the rescued workers, Khun Naung Oo said, and they will be deported to Burma shortly. Thailand is host to an estimated three million migrant laborers from Burma, though only about half of them have legitimate work documents. Many migrants fall prey to human traffickers, who charge exorbitant fees for the promise of steady work and immigration paperwork. In many cases, the documents never materialize, leaving migrants unable to move freely or seek legal recourse for poor conditions, extortion, low pay and physical abuse. The country has come under increasing pressure in recent years over its labor and immigration practices, as it has repeatedly failed to meet international standards or adequately address the issue of human trafficking. Last year, the US State Department labeled Thailand as a Tier 3 country—the lowest ranking on its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report—but waived sanctions that can accompany the designation. This year's TIP report is due out in the coming weeks, with Thailand's ranking unlikely to improve. Thai authorities and migrant brokers have also been implicated in a massive trafficking syndicate moving stateless Rohingya refugees from Burma and migrants from Bangladesh across Thai territory en route to Malaysia. The infamous human cargo scheme led to a regional migrant crisis earlier this year, as the early May discovery of mass graves in southern Thailand led to a sudden crackdown of the trade that caused traffickers to abandon boatloads of migrants at sea. The post Trafficking Boss, Accomplices Arrested in Raid on Thai Shrimp Factory appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Wary of Climate Change, Vanuatu Villagers Seek Higher Ground Posted: 12 Jul 2015 11:47 PM PDT Samuel, left, stands with his father Phillip in the ruins of their home in Port Vila, Vanuatu, following the landfall of Cyclone Pam in March 2015. (Photo: Reuters) TAKARA, Vanuatu — Many people living in this coastal village in Vanuatu believe the March cyclone that sent waves surging through their homes was the latest and most dramatic sign of climate change. They are now considering rebuilding their entire community on higher ground. Cyclone Pam struck the Pacific archipelago three months ago, blasting the islands with winds of 270 kilometers (168 miles) per hour, killing at least 11 people and affecting 180,000 more by destroying their homes and crops. Many residents saw it as part of broader environmental changes they've witnessed in recent years, from higher sea levels to trees bearing fruit out of season. "We have seen a lot of changes in our weather patterns. The level of the sea rise. And it is affecting the nation at the moment," said Vanuatu President Baldwin Lonsdale in an interview with The Associated Press. "The impact of climate change is quite real in Vanuatu." Parts of Vanuatu are low-lying and are starting to see visible signs of rising sea levels as the Earth warms and ice caps melt. The world's oceans have risen nearly 7 centimeters (nearly 3 inches) since 1992, scientists at the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration say, and are projected to rise at a faster rate in the decades to come. More damaging than the overall rise, however, are the unpredictable surges brought on by more severe storms. While scientists caution that singular events like the cyclone can't be attributed solely to climate change, many say there is a link to a general increase in violent weather. "The short answer would be that certainly there is a connection between climate change and extreme weather," said Debarati Guha-Sapir, a professor at the University of Louvain School of Public Health in Brussels. "The numbers of storms and high wind events have been increasing. So have droughts, in fact, and all of these are very connected to climate change." She said there's likely to be an increase in catastrophic flooding in coming years and people need to better prepare for that. Vanuatu isn't the only Pacific island nation figuring out how to face climate change. Low-lying Kiribati has purchased land in Fiji, which Kiribati President Anote Tong says is an investment and also a guarantee in case the entire nation needs to move. In Takara, which is on Vanuatu's main island of Efate, village chief Benjamin Tamata said he wants to move the village of about 200 people inland by about 300 meters (1,000 feet) to move away from the rising seas and to avoid future storm surges. "When the cyclone came to my village, it's not only the cyclone," he said. "With the sea level rising, it came through and damaged our houses. And some of the people run away." He said many escaped to a nearby school, but now it's time to plan for the long term. "We try to relocate," he said. "To take all the people from this village and we try to relocate where we can be safe, or where we can survive from the sea." If Takara does move inland, it won't be the first village to do so in Vanuatu. A decade ago, dozens of villagers on Tegua Island moved inland in what the United Nations described as one of the first cases of mass displacement triggered by global warming. "Staff from the meteorological office and hazard department, they went and assessed the level of sea rise," said Lonsdale. "And they advised people to move inland. And so they assisted. They assisted the communities and we have moved them farther up from the coastal area." NOAA, NASA, the Japanese weather agency, and the World Meteorological Organization all declared 2014 the hottest year on record, with NOAA putting 2014 at an average of 58.26 degrees Fahrenheit (14.6 Celsius). As the world gets warmer, water expands, so the seas rise. But on top of that, ice sheets in Greenland and west Antarctica are melting, as are world glaciers, and scientists worry that meltwater will dramatically increase sea level by about 1 meter by the end of the century. Islanders are also noticing other effects of climate change, said Shadrack Welegtabit, the director of Vanuatu's National Disaster Management Office. He said trees are bearing fruit and nuts all year round, instead of in distinct seasons like in the past. "Not only in Vanuatu, but probably in the Pacific as a whole, climate change does have an impact," Welegtabit said. "We are beginning to see changes in the weather patterns. We are beginning to have more intense weather, more severe cyclones." Vanuatu has made strides in its rebuilding efforts since the cyclone, and many tourism operators are hoping that the tourists who help power the economy will soon return. But for others, like Vila North School Principal Elina Jaywelson Gilu, the rebuild has been painfully slow. She's still operating three classes from a tent provided by aid agency Unicef while she waits for her classroom buildings to get new roofs. "You can just imagine our classes are very noisy, and it's really, really hard to get the students to concentrate," she said. "Because they are all under one roof and it's not been partitioned to separate the classes. And they are all sitting on the floor." Shirley Laban, the climate change adaptation manager in Vanuatu for aid agency Oxfam, said its time for the world to get serious about tackling climate change. "What more can we show you? Category-5 Cyclone Pam is the real evidence already," she said. "We need to cut down on this carbon emission. Because as long as we do not cut down, vulnerable individuals, countries, women and children will continue to be impacted." The post Wary of Climate Change, Vanuatu Villagers Seek Higher Ground appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Seoul: North Korea Media Confirms Purging of Defense Chief Posted: 12 Jul 2015 10:47 PM PDT North Korean leader Kim Jong Un receives applause as he guides the multiple-rocket launching drill of women's sub-units under KPA Unit 851, in this undated photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) April 24, 2014. (Photo: Reuters) SEOUL — North Korea has officially confirmed the purging of its defense chief two months after Seoul's spy service said he had been executed for disloyalty to leader Kim Jong Un, a South Korean official said Monday. South Korea's National Intelligence Service told lawmakers in May that People's Armed Forces Minister Hyon Yong Chol was killed by anti-aircraft gunfire for talking back to Kim, complaining about his policies and sleeping during a meeting. The North's state media has since not mentioned Hyon or his disappearance. But over the weekend, the country's official Korean Central News Agency named army general Pak Yong Sik as the armed forces minister in a dispatch about a meeting with a Lao military delegation. South Korean Unification Ministry spokesman Jeong Joon-Hee told reporters on Monday that this confirmed Hyon's replacement and purging. Since taking power upon the death of his dictator father Kim Jong Il in December 2011, Kim has orchestrated a series of executions, purgings and personnel reshuffles in what outside analysts say is an attempt to bolster his grip on power. Some experts say repeated bloody power shifts indicate the young leader is still struggling to establish himself. South Korean officials say 70 North Korean officials have been executed since Kim's inauguration. The most notable execution before Hyon's happened in 2013 when Kim had his uncle and No. 2, Jang Song Thaek, executed for alleged treason. Pak, known as a top official at the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army, is considered one of Kim's closest associates and is among the officials who have accompanied Kim on various public activities mentioned in state media. The post Seoul: North Korea Media Confirms Purging of Defense Chief appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

China: Uighurs Deported From Thailand Wanted to Join Jihad Posted: 12 Jul 2015 10:38 PM PDT A suspected Uighur from China's region of Xinjiang holds his son at a temporary shelter after they were detained in 2014 near the Thailand-Malaysia border in Hat Yai. (Photo: Reuters) BEIJING — China's government has alleged that more than 100 minority Muslim Uighurs who were sent back by Thailand after fleeing China were on their way to fight in the Middle East and that some were implicated in terrorist activities at home. Thailand has been harshly criticized by the United Nations, the European Union and human rights groups for repatriating the 109 Uighurs back to China, where activists say they face persecution, instead of sending them to Turkey, which has accepted other Uighurs. The Uighurs (pronounced WEE-gurs), a Turkic-speaking Muslim minority in China's far western region of Xinjiang, have complained of harsh cultural and religious suppression as well as economic marginalization under Chinese rule. Beijing has accused Uighur separatists of terrorism in Xinjiang, where ethnic violence has left hundreds of people dead. China's official Xinhua News Agency, citing the Ministry of Public Security, said late Saturday that the 109 "illegal immigrants" had been on their way "to join jihad" in Turkey, Syria or Iraq, and that 13 of them had fled China after being implicated in terrorist activities. Another two had escaped detention, according to Xinhua. The report also claimed that a Chinese police investigation had uncovered several gangs recruiting people for jihad, and that Turkish diplomats in some Southeast Asian countries had facilitated the illegal movement of people. The Uighurs were detained in Thailand more than a year ago, but claimed to be Turkish. A group of 173 were sent to Turkey after Thai authorities said they determined they were indeed Turkish, but the 109 were found to be Chinese, according to Thai deputy government spokesman Maj-Gen Verachon Sukhonthapatipak. Another eight arrived from Thailand to Turkey on Saturday and 52 remaining Uighurs would be sent back to their country once their nationalities were verified, Verachon said Saturday. Xinhua said that many of the 109 Uighurs had been radicalized by materials sent by the exiled World Uyghur Congress, a Munich, Germany-based rights group for the ethnic minority, and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, designated by China as a terrorist organization. In response to the report, Dilxat Raxit, World Uyghur Congress spokesman, said Sunday that China was "shirking responsibility for Uighurs fleeing because of its policy of suppression. The so-called radicals are those who hope to flee China and live a stable and dignified life in a safe and free country." The post China: Uighurs Deported From Thailand Wanted to Join Jihad appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

Burma’s Peace Process: Matching Words with Deeds Posted: 12 Jul 2015 05:00 PM PDT Government representatives shake hands with ethnic delegates during peace talks at the Myanmar Peace Center in Rangoon in March 2015. (Photo: JPaing / The Irrawaddy) Negotiations on a nationwide ceasefire agreement between the government and ethnic armed groups that had appeared to be progressing well, recently hit a stumbling block. On March 30, 2015, the government's Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) and the ethnics' negotiating bloc, the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), announced the completion of a draft Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) following more than 17 months of deliberations. Whether or not key decision makers on both sides will sign it into a "national treaty" remains an open question. On June 2-9, leaders of 17 Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) gathered at Law Khee Lar, home to the headquarters of one of the most powerful ethnic armed groups the Karen National Union, for a summit attended by more than 190 leaders, representatives, special guests and observers. The international guest list included the UN Secretary General's Special Advisor on Burma Vijay Nambiar, China's Asian Affairs Envoy Sun Guoxiang and Yuji Muri of the Nippon Foundation. At the summit, EAO leaders pored over the NCA draft word by word. They discussed, debated and finally reached a consensus affirming their collective commitment to a peace deal that all could abide by. Pragmatism and idealism were two guiding principles not easy to reconcile, but ethnic leaders managed to find a path forward and settle their differences. Political principles, ceasefire codes of conduct and military integration were extensively discussed during the dialogue which was extended from the originally proposed five days to eight. Some 14 amendments to the NCA were proposed and ethnic representatives also formed a new and higher level delegation to negotiate with the government on the proposed amendments. However, the government's immediate reaction to the new negotiating bloc was lukewarm and they indicated their opposition to any amendments to the draft. Deal or No Deal? The signing of the NCA is now up in the air, with the impasse sending mixed messages to peace supporters around the country. Many have begun to assume that the deal has reached a dead end. A closer look at the negotiation process reveals issues in the approaches and practices on both sides. From the beginning, both the government and ethnic armed groups have evinced uneasiness over making certain compromises. Some EAOs have faced ideological rifts not only between groups but within their own organizations. There are groups among EAOs that see the peace process as an opportunity to address their political grievances through political dialogue. This view is generally supported by EAOs, but some appear to disagree on timing and strategy. The more idealistic groups demand some form of assurance from the government before committing themselves to a ceasefire deal. Despite differences, there is a prevailing notion that a national-level political dialogue, which is embedded in the NCA, would be the only way to address the root causes of ethnic issues. On the government's part, it has failed to seize the opportunity to win over the hearts and minds of EAOs. The government has not made clear whether laws that could be used to arrest and punish people associated with non-state armed groups, such as the Unlawful Association Act, will be scrapped after a peace deal. In paying lip service to nationwide peace and national dialogue, the government has failed to match words with actions. Ongoing armed conflicts in some ethnic minority areas and the displacement of civilians has simply fomented skepticism among EAOs about the government's true intentions. Ethnic leaders also view the military-drafted 2008 Constitution as depriving ethnic minorities of their rights and see little gain in a peace deal unless the charter is amended. EAOs are wary of any deal that resembles pacts of the past, when the military government was only interested in disarming ethnic armed groups and transforming them into pliable entities such as Border Guard Forces under army control—not in addressing underlying political problems. During the negotiations, Burma Army officials maintained that military integration meant disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), while EAOs saw the process of integration as security sector reform (SSR) which has wider implications than DDR and includes a whole range of reforms including of the judiciary and the police. Nai Hong Sar, chief negotiator with the NCCT, said the proposed amendments to the NCA primarily concerned wording in the document that was unclear or controversial. However, as outlined above, there are factors other than language that could derail the NCA. Pursuing Political Dialogue Key stakeholders, including political parties and civil society organizations that have been working on a framework for National Dialogue, have questioned the continuous deferral of the NCA. A number of political parties have been impatient for a ceasefire deal which, if not concluded, raises uncertainty as to the emergence of a National Dialogue. In 2014, the two main political party alliances, the Nationalities Brotherhood Federation and the Federal Democratic Alliance, alongside other parties, formed a 10 member committee called the Peace and Political Dialogue Initiative Committee. The committee produced a draft framework for political dialogue. Burma's leading opposition party, the National League for Democracy, also drafted a framework in 2014. The United Nationalities Alliance, which is made up of mainly ethnic political parties and won seats in the 1990 election, released its own framework for political dialogue in March 2015. The Myanmar Peace Centre published a booklet describing the basic principles, aims and working procedures of a proposed political dialogue and cited examples of the frameworks drawn up by the above political groups. Most of the frameworks share very similar objectives, including instituting a federal union and addressing root causes of political grievances. Many of the political groups argue that political dialogue should not be held back until after the NCA is signed. In other words, the NCA should not necessarily be the mechanism for ushering in political dialogue. Many stakeholders are keen to see the emergence of a common framework for political dialogue before the election season sweeps in—and the clock is ticking. Recent efforts to amend the Constitution in Parliament have proven fruitless. The military continues to hold onto, and wield, its veto power, making it almost impossible to advance a more democratic charter and nation. Several political leaders and MPs have expressed their disappointment over the military's ongoing legislative power. The peace process, on the other hand, is a different beast to the parliamentary push for constitutional amendments. Both the government and the military have committed themselves to the peace process. On Burma's Union Day in February this year, the government led by President Thein Sein, Union Parliament Speaker Shwe Man and the ministers of ethnic affairs, together with leaders of four EAOs, recommitted to the peace process by signing a non-binding agreement pledging to build a union based on "democratic and federal principles." At present, the peace process is at a crossroads. It presents the opportunity, for the first time, for all ethnic and non-state armed groups, the government, the military and other stakeholders to work together and peacefully resolve the country's long lasting civil conflict. We hope that our leaders are wise enough to embrace the quickest, surest way to end the suffering of 51 million people. Dr Sai Oo works with the Pyidaungsu Institute and attended the recent EAO Summit in Law Khee Lar. The opinions expressed here are his own and do not necessarily represent the Institute. The post Burma's Peace Process: Matching Words with Deeds appeared first on The Irrawaddy.

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